BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION
KEY EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE PLAN
1996 Payout Criteria Based on Economic Value Added (EVA)
Economic Value Added (EVA(R)) is a registered trademark of Stern
Stewart & Co., and they have assisted Boise Cascade in developing
this incentive plan.
PAYOUT AS A PERCENT OF SALARY
Improvement
in EVA CEO EVP/SVP VP
______________ ______ ________ _____
Less than
($619,742,000) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
($350,000,000) 30.9% 24.1% 18.0%
($175,000,000) 50.9% 39.6% 29.7%
($103,742,000) 75.4% 58.6% 44.0%
($103,741,999) 105.4% 82.0% 61.5%
$0 140.9% 109.6% 82.2%
$175,000,000 160.9% 125.2% 93.9%
$350,000,000 173.9% 135.3% 101.5%
o For Improvement in EVA in excess of $350 Million the payout
increases proportionally to the increase from $175 Million
to $350 Million.
o The payout is interpolated on a straight line for
Improvement in EVA not shown in the table.
EVA = Net Operating Profit Before Tax -
Capital Charge
Net Operating Profit
Before Tax (NOPBT)* = Income from operating assets
+ Imputed interest of capitalized
lease obligations
+ Increase (decrease) in LIFO reserve
- Amortization of restructuring
losses
* Unusual nonrecurring and nonoperating income or expense
items do not affect NOPBT
Capital Charge = EVA Capital x 16%
EVA Capital** = Operating Capital
+ Imputed capital value of lease
obligations
+ Total LIFO reserve account
- Gain from the sale of assets
+ Unamortized restructuring losses
** Nonrecurring and nonoperating losses do not affect Operating
Capital. There may be adjustments to Operating Capital for
strategic investments while they are under construction and
up to two additional years subject to approval by the
Executive Compensation Committee of the Board.
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION
KEY EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE PLAN
I. 1997 Payout Criteria Based on Economic Value Added (EVA)
Economic Value Added (EVA(R)) is a registered trademark of Stern
Stewart & Co., and they have assisted Boise Cascade in developing
this incentive plan.
PAYOUT AS A PERCENT OF SALARY
Improvement
in EVA CEO EVP/SVP VP
______________ ______ ________ _____
($161,005,000) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
($135,000,000) 3.5% 2.2% 1.7%
$40,000,000 73.5% 47.2% 36.7%
$127,500,000 108.5% 69.7% 54.2%
$215,000,000 120.1% 77.2% 60.1%
$477,775,000 152.8% 98.3% 76.4%
$477,775,001 166.8% 107.3% 83.4%
$577,775,000 180.2% 115.8% 90.1%
o For Improvement in EVA in excess of $577.8 Million, the
payout increases proportionally to the increase from
$477.8 Million to $577.8 Million.
o The payout is interpolated on a straight line for
Improvement in EVA not shown in the table.
EVA = Net Operating Profit Before Tax -
Capital Charge
Net Operating Profit
Before Tax (NOPBT)* = Income from operating assets
+ Imputed interest of capitalized
lease obligations
+ Increase (decrease) in LIFO reserve
- Amortization of restructuring
losses
* Unusual nonrecurring and nonoperating income or expense
items do not affect NOPBT
Capital Charge = EVA Capital x 16%
EVA Capital** = Operating Capital
+ Imputed capital value of lease
obligations
+ Total LIFO reserve account
- Gain from the sale of assets
+ Unamortized restructuring losses
** Nonrecurring and nonoperating losses do not affect Operating
Capital. There may be adjustments to Operating Capital for
strategic investments while they are under construction and
up to two additional years subject to approval by the
Executive Compensation Committee of the Board.
II. Alternative Payout
An Alternative Payout shall be calculated as follows: the actual
percentage payouts earned for the 1997 plan year under the Company's
Paper Division Incentive Plan, Packaging Division Incentive Plan,
Timber and Wood Products Division Incentive Plan, BMDD Incentive Plan,
BCOP Incentive Plan, and Trucking Division Incentive Plan shall be
averaged (weighted according to the total capital of each respective
division). This average payout shall then be multiplied by the ratio
each officer's target payout bears to the target payout of key execu-
tives in such plans (e.g., VP ratio = 35/24; EVP/SVP ratio = 45/24;
CEO ratio = 70/24) to arrive at the Alternative Payout percentage.
The Alternative Payout may be reduced by the Executive Compensation
Committee, in its sole discretion, to any percentage amount
(including zero).
Payout under the Plan will be the greater of (1) payout determined
under criteria based on EVA or (2) the Alternative Payout.