EXHIBIT 10.24
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION
KEY EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE PLAN
I. 1998 PAYOUT CRITERIA
PAYOUT AS A PERCENT OF SALARY
Financial
Improvement CEO SVP VP
______________ ______ ______ ______
($152,336,667) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
($135,000,000) 2.3% 1.5% 1.2%
$127,500,000 107.3% 69.0% 53.7%
$215,000,000 119.0% 76.5% 59.5%
$418,055,000 146.1% 93.9% 73.0%
$418,055,001 157.7% 101.4% 78.9%
$518,055,000 171.1% 110.0% 85.5%
o For Financial Improvement in excess of $518.1 million, the payout increases
proportionally to the increase from $418.1 million to $518.1 million.
o The payout is interpolated on a straight line for Financial Improvement not
shown in the table.
o Financial Improvement is measured by calculating the company's economic
value added.
Economic Value Added = Net Operating Profit Before Tax - Capital Charge
Net Operating Profit
Before Tax (NOPBT)* = Income from operating assets
+ Imputed interest of capitalized lease obligations
+ Increase (decrease) in LIFO reserve
- Amortization of restructuring losses
* Unusual nonrecurring and nonoperating income or expense items do not
affect NOPBT
Capital Charge = Capital x 16%
Capital** = Operating Capital
+ Imputed capital value of lease obligations
+ Total LIFO reserve account
- Gain from the sale of assets
+ Unamortized restructuring losses
** Nonrecurring and nonoperating losses do not affect Operating Capital.
There may be adjustments to Operating Capital for strategic investments
while they are under construction and up to two additional years
subject to approval by the Executive Compensation Committee of the
Board.
II. ALTERNATIVE PAYOUT
An Alternative Payout shall be calculated as follows: the actual
percentage payouts earned for the 1998 plan year under the company's Pape
Division Incentive Plan, Packaging Division Incentive Plan, Timber and
Wood Products Division Incentive Plan, BMDD Incentive Plan, BCOP Incentive
Plan, and Trucking Division Incentive Plan shall be averaged (weighted
according to the total capital of each respective division). This average
payout shall then be multiplied by the ratio each officer's target payout
bears to the target payout of key executives in such plans (e.g., VP
ratio = 35/24; SVP ratio = 45/24; CEO ratio = 70/24) to arrive at the
Alternative Payout percentage. The Alternative Payout may be reduced by
the Executive Compensation Committee, in its sole discretion, to any
percentage amount (including zero).
Payout under the Plan will be the greater of (1) payout determined under
criteria based on economic value added or (2) the Alternative Payout.
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION
KEY EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE PLAN
I. 1999 PAYOUT CRITERIA
PAYOUT AS A PERCENT OF SALARY
Financial
Improvement CEO SVP VP
______________ ______ ______ ______
($163,208,889) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
($150,000,000) 1.5% 1.0% 0.8%
$150,000,000 106.5% 68.5% 53.3%
$324,054,000 126.8% 81.5% 63.4%
$324,054,001 138.5% 89.0% 69.3%
$424,054,000 150.2% 96.5% 75.1%
o For Financial Improvement in excess of $424.1 million, the payout increases
proportionally to the increase from $324.1 million to $424.1 million.
o The payout is interpolated on a straight line for Financial Improvement not
shown in the table.
o Financial Improvement is measured by calculating the company's economic
value added.
Economic Value Added = Net Operating Profit Before Tax - Capital Charge
Net Operating Profit
Before Tax (NOPBT)* = Income from operating assets
+ Imputed interest of capitalized lease obligations
+ Increase (decrease) in LIFO reserve
- Amortization of restructuring losses
* Unusual nonrecurring and nonoperating income or expense items do not
affect NOPBT
Capital Charge = Capital x 16%
Capital** = Operating Capital
+ Imputed capital value of lease obligations
+ Total LIFO reserve account
- Gain from the sale of assets
+ Unamortized restructuring losses
** Nonrecurring and nonoperating losses do not affect Operating Capital.
There may be adjustments to Operating Capital for strategic investments
while they are under construction and up to two additional years
subject to approval by the Executive Compensation Committee of the
Board.
II. ALTERNATIVE PAYOUT
An Alternative Payout shall be calculated as follows: the actual
percentage payouts earned for the 1999 plan year under the company's Paper
Division Incentive Plan, Packaging Division Incentive Plan, Timber and
Wood Products Division Incentive Plan, BMDD Incentive Plan, BCOP Incentive
Plan, and Trucking Division Incentive Plan shall be averaged (weighted
according to the total capital of each respective division). This average
payout shall then be multiplied by the ratio each officer's target payout
bears to the target payout of key executives in such plans (e.g., VP
ratio = 35/24; SVP ratio = 45/24; CEO ratio = 70/24) to arrive at the
Alternative Payout percentage. The Alternative Payout may be reduced by
the Executive Compensation Committee, in its sole discretion, to any
percentage amount (including zero).
Payout under the Plan will be the greater of (1) payout determined under
criteria based on economic value added or (2) the Alternative Payout.