SCHEDULE 14A
                                 (RULE 14a-101)

                     INFORMATION REQUIRED IN PROXY STATEMENT
                            SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION

                PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(a) OF THE
                         SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

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[  ] Confidential, for use of the Commission only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)
     (2)).

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[  ] Soliciting material under Rule 14a-12.

                          FIRST AVIATION SERVICES INC.
         --------------------------------------------------------------
                (Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)

                    WYNNEFIELD PARTNERS SMALL CAP VALUE, L.P.
                   WYNNEFIELD PARTNERS SMALL CAP VALUE, L.P. I
                 WYNNEFIELD SMALL CAP VALUE OFFSHORE FUND, LTD.
                       WYNNEFIELD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC
                            WYNNEFIELD CAPITAL, INC.
                                   NELSON OBUS
                                JOSHUA H. LANDES
                  WYNNEFIELD CAPITAL, INC. PROFIT SHARING PLAN
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     (Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement if Other Than the Registrant)



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The following  press release was issued June 1, 2004,  and posted on the website
www.rescuefavs.com:

                                                                        CONTACT:
                                                                     Eric Berman
                                                                      Joseph Kuo
                                                            of Kekst and Company
                                                                    212-521-4800
                                                                             or:
                                                                     Nelson Obus
                                                           of Wynnefield Capital
                                                                    212-760-0134

                    WYNNEFIELD GROUP REITERATES COMMITMENT TO
                           VALUE FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS

                 -- RESPONDS TO FIRST AVIATION SERVICES BOARD --

NEW  YORK,  NY,  June 1,  2004 - The  Wynnefield  Group,  the  largest  minority
shareholder in First Aviation Services Inc. (NASDAQ:  FAVS),  today released the
following  letter in response to the letter to shareholders  from the FAvS Board
of Directors dated May 26, 2004:

Dear Members of the Board of Directors:

As  long-time   shareholders  in  First  Aviation   Services  (FAvS),   we  were
disappointed  to see your  recent  letter to  shareholders.  Please know that we
undertake  this proxy contest as a matter of principle on behalf of ALL minority
shareholders.  Your  allegation that Wynnefield is seeking to pressure the board
to buy back our  shares at a premium  is  completely  untrue  and is  completely
contrary to the investment philosophy of Wynnefield. A review of our eleven-year
history of investing in public companies would confirm that Wynnefield has NEVER
accepted a premium  price for its shares alone.  Wynnefield  would only sell its
shares at a price that was available to all other shareholders.

We have launched this proxy contest as a last resort.  Management  and the board
have rejected our plea to develop and execute within a  board-agreed  time frame
something  that this  company  has never  had:  a  business  plan that  delivers
consistent  profits  and value to ALL  shareholders.  Our focus here is to bring
fresh  thinking  to the  board and  enlist  its  commitment  to  developing  and
implementing  a  business  plan  that  delivers  consistent   profitability  and
shareholder  value  within a specified  period of time.  If - and only if - this
fails,  we would ask the  board's  commitment  to  engage  in a  value-releasing
transaction for all shareholders.

We are compelled to respond to several  inaccurate  assertions in your letter to
shareholders.  This is not an issue of personal rhetoric; the fact of the matter
is that,  while using the investing  public's money, the board and management of
FAvS have  failed to create  value over their  many years of  stewardship.  Your
characterization of the company's performance under your stewardship ignores the
facts, including:

   o  FAvS stock trades near net/net  working  capital  (liquidation  value) per
      share - indicating  that the market assigns its existing  business  little
      value.

   o  FAvS has reported  average  annual  losses from  continuing  operations of
      $(0.12) per share for the past four fiscal years; and



Wynnefield Group Responds -- continued                                         2

   o  FAvS stock traded below book value for more than three years.

You asked shareholders not to be fooled by Wynnefield. In truth, it is the board
that is attempting to fool FAvS shareholders, not Wynnefield.  Management boasts
that it is  achieving  "record  sales," but has  repeatedly  refused to disclose
whether  its  sales  are  attributable  to  its  low-margin  parts  distribution
operations,  or its  potentially  more  profitable  supply-chain  management (or
logistics) operations, which management has described as the "rationale for this
Company being public." With no segment  disclosure,  understanding the "success"
of the logistics  business is problematic.  We cannot know whether the company's
refusal to separately  report logistics sales is an attempt to obscure a lack of
progress in the logistics sector from FAvS shareholders.

While FAvS management  continues to blame a post-9/11  industry downturn for the
company's weak performance,  the facts demonstrate that FAvS' closest competitor
(Aviall, Inc.) has consistently  outperformed FAvS since that time, and that the
industry has been recovering:

   o  Since 2001,  Aviall's  share price has increased by more than 225%,  while
      FAvS' has remained essentially flat (see www.rescuefavs.com for chart);

   o  In 1999, FAvS sold its aircraft/engine overhaul subsidiary,  whose primary
      customers  were  military,  and has failed to make use of the  proceeds to
      grow FAvS'  business,  while  Aviall  entered  the  military  market  with
      significant positive results;

   o  FAvS' paid a $7.251 million special one-time dividend, the majority of
      which went to First Equity, the holding company and investment banking
      firm owned 100% by FAvS' Chairman and its CEO, instead of using this cash
      to invest in the growth of FAvS to replace business lost from the
      disposition of its lucrative aircraft/engine overhaul operations;

   o  The  general  aviation  industry  improved  significantly  from the  first
      quarter of 2003 to the first  quarter of 2004 - with  parts  shipments  up
      9.7% and total  billings up 21.1% --  according  to the  General  Aviation
      Manufacturers Association.

We believe FAvS' continued  underperformance  results from the company's failure
to articulate and execute a consistently  profitable business plan and a lack of
investment  in the growth of the  business -  strategies  it had outlined in its
1997  Initial  Public  Offering  prospectus  and  subsequent  communications  to
shareholders.  Although  that growth  strategy  included,  among  other  things,
acquisition of complementary  businesses,  as noted above, FAvS SOLD its primary
subsidiary for net cash of $44 million in 1999, and with that cash has only made
one small ($4.6 million) acquisition.

Moreover, there are important issues at stake in this contest involving minority
shareholders' rights and corporate  governance.  As you know, FAvS is controlled
by First Equity,  a holding  company and investment  banking firm that is itself
owned entirely by FAvS'  Chairman and its CEO. First Equity,  owning just 51% of
the company,  has had  complete  control over  director  elections  and business
strategies.





Wynnefield Group Responds -- continued                                         3

In fact, even as the company's performance continues to suffer, these management
insiders continue to reap financial rewards:

   o  First  Equity has  received  fees of more than $1.4  million over the past
      four years for "advisory  services relating to potential  acquisitions and
      other  financial  transactions"  - even though only one small $4.6 million
      acquisition was completed during that time;

   o  First Equity has  received  annual  lease and  expense-sharing  payments -
      including $140,000 this past year - to maintain  headquarters in Westport,
      CT - even though  there is ample space at the  company's  central  Memphis
      facilities; and

   o  First   Equity's   co-owner  (who  also  serves  as  FAvS'  CEO)  receives
      significant  bonuses and salary - including a discretionary  cash bonus of
      $200,000  for the  fiscal  year ended  January  31,  2004 - even  though a
      significant  portion of his  compensation  was  supposed  to be "at risk,"
      based  upon  the  Company's  performance  and  achievement  of  objectives
      compared  to the  performance  of the  company's  successful  competitors,
      according to FAvS' proxy statement.

The board's efforts - under the control of the 51% owner (the investment banking
firm First  Equity) - have been  unsuccessful  in  improving  returns to outside
shareholders  or addressing  financial  rewards to insiders.  We have  therefore
pursued the election to the board of a representative of minority  shareholders,
who would bring fresh ideas and help to develop and execute a plan that  creates
value for ALL shareholders.  GIVEN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE COMPANY, IT IS HARD TO
UNDERSTAND  MANAGEMENT'S  OPPOSITION TO THE ELECTION OF A SINGLE DIRECTOR OF THE
MINORITY  SHAREHOLDERS'  CHOOSING.  There is no  denying  that  the true  public
shareholders  of FAvS have had no practical  opportunity  to elect a director of
their choosing.

In this contest,  we are proposing that minority  shareholders - who represent a
combined total of more than 48% of the company - have ONE  representative on its
board of  directors.  Why is FAvS  afraid of only one board  member  elected  by
minority shareholders? Why is FAvS averse to the possibility of fresh ideas?

We have proposed Nelson Obus as a candidate for the board because he is a highly
experienced, long-term value investor, who currently serves on the boards of two
other public  companies.  In fact,  he serves on the audit  committees  of these
companies and additionally  the  compensation  committee of one of them, and has
helped to guide them to improved equity value for ALL shareholders.

We first proposed Mr. Obus as a candidate for the FAvS board last year. In 2003,
Mr. Obus received more than 66% of the votes cast excluding shares controlled by
First  Equity  and  executive  management,  despite  ONLY  TWO  DAYS to  solicit
shareholders.

If  elected  this  year,  Mr.  Obus will  focus the board of  directors  through
concrete  suggestions for the development of a consistently  profitable business
plan that  benefits ALL  shareholders  of the company.  ONLY ABSENT  DISCERNIBLE
PROGRESS TOWARD  PROFITABILITY AND GROWTH WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME FRAME WILL HE
RECOMMEND  TRANSACTIONS TO RELEASE VALUE FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS.  AND EVEN THEN HE
WOULD BE ONLY ONE VOICE AMONG FIVE DIRECTORS.

We are also  proposing the  implementation  of  cumulative  voting of directors.
Cumulative  voting would allow  holders of 33.4% of FAvS stock to elect a single
director of their own choosing (when two directors are up for election).



Wynnefield Group Responds -- continued                                         4

Rather than continue to falsely impugn our motives and make personal assaults on
Mr.  Obus'  character,  the board should  focus on its  responsibilities  to its
minority shareholders.

Sincerely,
/s/
Nelson Obus
On behalf of The Wynnefield Group


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Shareholders  are  advised  to read  the  Wynnefield  Group's  definitive  proxy
statement, which contains important information.  Shareholders may obtain a free
copy of the proxy statement and other  documents  filed by the Wynnefield  Group
with the SEC at the SEC's internet website at www.sec.gov.  The proxy statement,
a proxy card,  and other  documents may also be obtained free of charge from the
Wynnefield Group's proxy solicitor or from the Wynnefield Group by request to:

           Lawrence E. Dennedy        or       Nelson Obus
           Daniel M. Sullivan                  The Wynnefield Group
           MacKenzie Partners, Inc.            450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 509
           105 Madison Avenue                  Phone:  (212) 760-0134
           New York, NY  10016
           Phone:  (800) 322-2885

If you have lost your proxy card from the Wynnefield  Group,  or did not receive
one, you may obtain  another proxy  statement  and card by contacting  MacKenzie
Partners, Inc. or The Wynnefield Group at the phone numbers listed above.

ABOUT THE WYNNEFIELD GROUP:

The Wynnefield Group is First Aviation's  largest outside  shareholder,  holding
29.7% of the  company's  outstanding  common  stock.  Wynnefield  is a long-term
investor in FAvS, having first invested in the company shortly after its initial
public offering more than six years ago.

The Wynnefield Group includes  several  affiliates of Wynnefield  Capital,  Inc.
(WCI), a value  investor,  specializing  in U.S. small cap situations  that have
company-  or  industry-specific  catalysts.  WCI was  established  in 1992.  Its
founding  partners,  Nelson Obus and Joshua  Landes,  held senior  research  and
institutional  equity positions at Lazard Freres & Co. during the 1980s, and the
initial  Wynnefield  investors  included many of their colleagues at Lazard. The
fund has grown to  approximately  $200  million  under  management.  Nelson Obus
currently  serves on the boards of directors of two publicly  traded  companies,
Layne  Christensen  Company (NASDAQ:  LAYN) and Sylvan Inc.  (NASDAQ:  SYLN) and
additionally   serves  on  the  audit  committees  of  both  companies  and  the
compensation committee of Layne.

More information  about the Wynnefield  Group's efforts to help provide value to
all FAvS shareholders can be found at www.rescuefavs.com.

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