[FORM OF LETTER TO CERTAIN STOCKHOLDERS]


RE: MAYTAG CORPORATION


You should have recently received the Proxy materials for the upcoming Annual
Meeting of Maytag Corporation. We have several items on this year's Proxy and
would like to take this opportunity to highlight some of the major issues.

o    MAYTAG 2000 EMPLOYEE STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN. The Plan requests an additional
     3.9 million shares, which is less than 5% of the shares outstanding on the
     record date. The Board believes that the Plan will provide incentives,
     which link and align the personal interests of employees to those of the
     Corporation's shareholders. A significant amount of total compensation of
     our higher level employees is at risk in the form of equity-based grants,
     including stock options which are inherently performance based. We believe
     our compensation structure focuses management's attention on developing and
     implementing strategies that will positively affect the value of the stock
     over the long term. THE BOARD'S COMPENSATION COMMITTEE, MADE UP ENTIRELY OF
     INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE DIRECTORS APPROVED THE PLAN. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
     RECOMMENDS A VOTE FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PLAN.

o    SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE ANNUAL ELECTION OF THE ENTIRE BOARD OF
     DIRECTORS. The purpose of a staggered or classified board of directors is
     to safeguard the Corporation against the efforts of a third-party intent on
     quickly taking control of the business and not paying fair value for the
     business and its assets. If all Directors can be elected at once, a
     third-party can orchestrate the complete removal of all sitting directors.
     With the threat of an entirely new board, the current Board of Directors
     could lose the time needed to evaluate and react to any such third-party
     offer. The Board also believes that a classified Board of Directors
     facilitates continuity and stability in the composition of the Board by
     assuring that a majority of the Directors at any time will have prior
     experience and in-depth knowledge of the Corporation. STAGGERED BOARDS CAN
     BE USEFUL AGAINST INAPPROPRIATE TAKEOVERS. AN INDEPENDENT BOARD WILL USE
     THIS TOOL; TEN OUT OF TWELVE DIRECTORS ARE INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE DIRECTORS.
     THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE AGAINST THIS PROPOSAL.

o    SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL TO REINSTATE SIMPLE-MAJORITY VOTE. The proponent's
     resolution is so vague that the Board is uncertain what is specifically
     being requested. There are various super- majority voting provisions in the
     Certificate of Incorporation. Only one, however, requires an 80% majority.
     Article Ninth of the Certificate of Incorporation requires an 80% vote of
     the shares outstanding and entitled to vote when a potential acquiror of
     the Corporation offers a premium price to some shareholders rather than the
     same price to all shareholders. The Board believes that it is unfair to
     permit a potential acquirer to pay a premium price to acquire a position in
     the Corporation and then offer the remaining shareowners a lower price. A
     super-majority voting requirement under such circumstances (a Fair Price
     provision) is necessary to protect the interest of all shareholders.




     The Proponent's resolution might also refer to all super-majority
     provisions of the Certificate and Bylaws of the Corporation. Super-majority
     provisions assure that carefully considered corporate governance rules are
     not replaced without a substantial consensus majority for change.
     Super-majority provisions along with other defensive tools empower the
     Board to act in the shareholders' best interests by carefully considering
     and responding in a reasoned manner to hostile bids. In addition, repeal of
     all super-majority provisions would repeal the highly desirable Fair Price
     provision. SUPER-MAJORITY VOTING PROVISIONS CAN BE USEFUL AGAINST
     INAPPROPRIATE TAKEOVERS. AN INDEPENDENT BOARD WILL USE THIS TOOL; TEN OUT
     OF TWELVE DIRECTORS ARE INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE DIRECTORS. THE BOARD OF
     DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE AGAINST THIS PROPOSAL.

o    SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REGARDING "GOLDEN PARACHUTES". The Corporation's
     severance pay agreements enable the Corporation to attract and retain top
     management talent and would encourage executive officers to remain with the
     Corporation in the face of a potential change of control. Management can
     remain focused and objective during a potential change of control, rather
     than being distracted by the uncertainties of their future employment and
     personal financial situation, thereby allowing them to act decisively to
     maximize shareholder value for all shareholders. Requiring shareholder
     approval of executive severance pay agreements would hamper the
     Corporation's flexibility to act promptly and decisively in attracting and
     retaining executives and would put the Corporation at a disadvantage to
     other companies with which it competes for executive management. EXECUTIVE
     COMPENSATION IS MONITORED BY THE BOARD'S COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MADE UP
     ENTIRELY OF INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE DIRECTORS. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
     RECOMMENDS A VOTE AGAINST THIS PROPOSAL.

We encourage you to support the recommendations of management for the Stock
Incentive Plan and against each of the shareholder proposals. Should you have
any questions concerning any of the Proxy items, please contact Frederick G.
Wohlschlaeger, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary
(515-787-7040) or John Tolson, Director, Investor Relations (515-787-8136).

Respectfully,



Lloyd D. Ward,
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer