Exhibit (a)(5)(i)



                                                [Deutsche Asset Management logo]



                      [ Letterhead of The Korea Fund, Inc.]

                                                               February 10, 2004





Harvard Management Company, Inc.
600 Atlantic Avenue
Boston, MA 02210-2203


Attention:  Mr. Steven Alperin


Dear Mr. Alperin:

      The directors of The Korea Fund, Inc. have reviewed Harvard Management's
January 27, 2004 Schedule 13D amendment and letter, in which Harvard questioned
the adequacy of the tender offer and program for subsequent tender offers
announced by the Fund on January 21, 2004.

      As you know, we have welcomed and considered carefully the views of
Harvard. On December 16, our Board met with you and your colleagues and we took
into account your views before authorizing the tender offer and the program. You
told us that Harvard had never previously met with a full board of a closed-end
fund in which Harvard has invested.

      At the December 16 meeting, when you addressed the discount issue, we
noted the duties of our Board of Directors related to all of the Fund's
shareholders. You acknowledged that, but also pointed out that Harvard's
interests do differ in some respects from the interests of other shareholders.
For example, you noted that Harvard would like the Fund's portfolio to mirror
closely the Korean stock market index in order to permit Harvard to effect
hedges more readily.

      The Fund's investment objective is, as you know, to seek long-term capital
appreciation through investments in Korean securities. The Fund's shareholders
bought their shares knowing of the Fund's investment objective. Over the years,
the Fund has achieved superior investment performance. The Fund's Manager
believes that the closed-end structure has helped the Fund achieve its strong
performance record. As a closed-end fund, the Fund has been able to be more
fully invested, and has also been able to invest in emerging companies that are
not yet in the Korean index and that have




                                                [Deutsche Asset Management logo]

Harvard Management Company, Inc.
Page 2
February 10, 2004


performed extremely well. Likewise, the ability to overweight stocks that the
Manager believes have potential and to underweight stocks that the Manager
believes are unpromising is in the interest of all shareholders. In short, our
present configuration has helped the Fund to optimize investment returns.

      Before making its decision, the Board considered Harvard's views and other
relevant factors. These factors included the Fund's investment objective, the
Fund's investment performance and the possible adverse effects certain
alternatives would have on portfolio management, on the Fund's expense ratio and
on investment results. Actions such as self-tenders for a large percentage of
the Fund's shares or repeated sizable self-tenders -- your suggestions -- pose
serious risks to shareholders who have bought Fund shares for long-term capital
appreciation. Those risks include higher expense ratios, possible adverse effect
on the market prices of the Fund's portfolio securities, the need for greater
portfolio liquidity, and jeopardy to the Fund's investment results.

      Harvard, as a substantial investor in closed-end funds, is doubtless well
aware that there are no easy solutions to the discount to net asset value issue.
But how well investors have done with their investment in the Fund is measured
not by the discount, but by total return on investment. By that measure, Harvard
and other shareholders have benefited from the Fund's strong investment
performance under its closed-end structure.

      We believe the Fund's tender offer and the program represent a carefully
considered and balanced approach, consistent with the Fund's investment
objective and the interests of shareholders. The tender offer affords
shareholders the opportunity to realize 95% of net asset value for 10% of their
holdings. Should the discount during the measuring periods in the next two years
exceed 15% -- a commonly used benchmark --shareholders in both 2005 and 2006
will have the opportunity in each of those years to sell 10% of their shares to
the Fund at 95% of net asset value. In that case, the Fund would have
repurchased 30% of its stock in three years -- a very substantial step to
address the discount.

      At our meeting on December 16, you suggested that further repurchases by
the Fund could be subject to a trigger related to the size of the discount. In
your letter of December 19 to the Board you advocated an "ongoing program". The
Fund's program announced on January 21 is responsive to those suggestions.



                                                [Deutsche Asset Management logo]

Harvard Management Company, Inc.
Page 3
February 10, 2004


         You may be sure that the Board intends to closely follow the discount
and ways to address it, consistent with the best interests of the Fund and its
shareholders. The tender offer and ongoing program announced by the Fund on
January 21 seek to address the discount without unduly affecting portfolio
management and the Fund's ability to deliver investment results to shareholders.

                                    Sincerely,

                                    /s/RICHARD HALE

                                    Richard Hale
                                    Chairman of the Board and President

cc:   Board of Directors


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