Exhibit 99.297



                  ISSUES AND QUESTIONS WITH CONGESTION PROPOSAL

Potential Issues:

While all details of this proposal may not have to be expressly defined to
initially sell this solution, it must be noted that issues identified by the PX
as minor while in the development of previous projects have had significant
affects on the success of their implementation. It should thus be a priority to
understand, define and resolve all potential issues as soon as possible

This model relies upon the secondary trading of FTRs to enhance liquidity.
However, it is unlikely that customers who purchased annual FTR contracts will
be willing to wait until the Day-Ahead market to lock-in commitments for them.
This is especially the case in a use-or-lose model such as is proposed for
California. If no FTRs were present in the market, orders will have to be
matched within the same location, as is the case in the current BFM model. The
forward trading of FTRs could potentially enhance their liquidity.

Transmission rights holders could use the ability to recall and modify firm
schedules to greatly exaggerate non-firm market volatility. If firm schedule
modification had too great an effect on non-firm transactions, public confidence
in this market could be undermined. This may be a desirable outcome, as it could
encourage greater participation in the PX's firm market.

The manner in which RMR pre-dispatch and over-generation are incorporated into
this solution still need to be finalized.

This model does not currently reduce customer uncertainty regarding wheeling out
charges. This has been identified as a market limiting factor and needs to be
minimized.

This solution requires the development of a complex algorithm. The PX needs to
ensure that this can, in fact be developed in a manner that retains customer
confidence in the clarity of the PX's prices auction results.


Questions:

o   What potential gaming effects are created by the ability to modify firm
    schedules repeatedly until the close of HA? What are the effects on the
    non-firm market? (see above)

o   How viable is this solution if the expected transmission liquidity does not
    develop? What if the ISO doesn't run the non-firm market?

o   Are orders into the non-firm market by resource, by portfolio or does it
    matter? (I'm presuming by resource to eliminate additional scheduling
    requirements)

o   Could the PX solution be engineered to allow for linking of hours?

o   Is this the simplest solution that could have been obtained? Are there
    unnecessary complexities that affect ease of implementation / use?




                  ISSUES AND QUESTIONS WITH CONGESTION PROPOSAL

o   This solution closely resembles the Titanium proposal. What were the
    characteristics of the proposal that led the PX to choose not to implement
    it? How are those issues resolved in this solution?