SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION
Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. __)

Filed by the Registrant

x Filed by a Party other than the Registrant

Check the appropriate box:

[ ] Preliminary Proxy Statement

[ ] Confidential, for Use of the Commission only (as permitted by Rule
14a-6(e)(2))

[ ] Definitive Proxy Statement

[X] Definitive Additional Materials

[ ] Soliciting Material Pursuant to 240.14a-11(c) or 240.14a-12

DWS RREEF Real Estate Fund, Inc.
(Name of Registrants as Specified in Its Charter)

SUSAN L. CICIORA TRUST
c/o Stephen C. Miller, Esq.
and Joel L. Terwilliger, Esq.
2344 Spruce Street, Suite A
Boulder, CO 80302
(303)442-2156
(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):

x No fee required

Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11

(1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(3) Per-unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to
Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is
calculated and state how it was determined):

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(4) Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(5) Total fee paid:

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.

Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule
0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid
previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or
the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.

(1) Amount Previously Paid:______________________________________

(2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:________________

(3) Filing Party:________________________________________________

(4) Date Filed:__________________________________________________

SUSAN L. CICIORA TRUST
c/o Stephen C. Miller, P.C.
2344 Spruce Street, Suite A
Boulder, CO 80302

May 6, 2009

Fellow Stockholders of DWS RREEF Real Estate Fund, Inc. ("SRQ")

Dear Fellow Stockholder:

Vote AGAINST the plan of liquidation. It's the last chance for people like
us to keep the board of directors that got us into this mess from losing even
more of our money at SRQ in an effort to bury their mistakes.

If the board gets its way and liquidates our fund, we all will lose the
huge tax loss carry-forwards in SRQ that we stockholders have so painfully
"earned." In fact, the tax loss carry-forward is the most meaningful asset that
we stockholders have left in SRQ. Why are these directors willing to waste our
tax loss carry-forward? The Board is unlike you and us, in that they have
virtually no money invested in our fund and have nothing to lose by recommending
another wrong decision. They just want to bury their past mistakes as quickly as
possible, even if it wastes more of our assets. The table below shows the
current interest each director has in our fund.

DOLLAR VALUE OF SHARE
DIRECTOR SRQ SHARES OWNED(1) OWNERSHIP AS OF 5/4/09
=============================== ========================== ==============================

John W. Ballantine 0 $0
Henry P. Becton, Jr. 900 $1,971
Dawn-Marie Driscoll 200 $438
Keith R. Fox 0 $0
Paul K. Freeman 0 $0
Kenneth C. Froewiss 500 $1,095
Richard J. Herring 900 $1,971
William McClayton 0 $0
Rebecca W. Rimel 0 $0
Alex Schwarzer 0 $0
William N. Searcy, Jr. 0 $0
Jean Gleason Stromberg 0 $0
Robert H. Wadsworth 0 $0

Given this, it's no wonder the current directors don't care about what
happens to SRQ. However, this is not the case for the rest of us. As the largest
stockholder of SRQ, owning 16.5% of the fund, we are AGAINST their plan of
liquidation. We are in the same position as you, and we want to maximize
stockholder value and get out from under SRQ's inadequate management. That's why
we OPPOSE their bad plan to liquidate SRQ.

In addition, we have a track record of expertise and success in similar
situations. In the past, other trusts that I advise have successfully acquired
control of other closed-end investment companies, including Boulder Growth &
Income Fund, Inc. (NYSE:BIF) and The Denali Fund Inc. (NYSE:DNY). BIF and DNY
just received 2008 Lipper Performance Achievement Certificates in their
respective Lipper categories as follows:

Boulder Growth & Income Fund:

Ranks #1 in the Lipper Closed-End Equity Fund Performance Analysis for Core
Funds for the 1-Year Ended December 31, 2008;

Ranks #1 in the Lipper Closed-End Equity Fund Performance Analysis for Core
Funds for the 5-Year Ended December 31, 2008.

The Denali Fund:

Ranks #1 in the Lipper Closed-End Equity Fund Performance Analysis for Real
Estate Funds for the 1-Year Ended December 31, 2008;

Ranks #1 in the Lipper Closed-End Equity Fund Performance Analysis for Real
Estate Funds for the 5-Year Ended December 31, 2008*.

I am not alone in voicing frustration and concern for our investments in
SRQ. Many other stockholders have called or sent letters to us to voice their
support for our proposals and their frustration with the current board of
directors. I have attached an article from a retired accounting professor,
Harvard Law School graduate and fellow stockholder who shares our frustration
and I invite you to read his attached article. As stated in the attached
article, it appears that they are "trying desperately to bury their mistakes."
We agree, and we think that they are trying to do it at the expense of us
stockholders.

Who can you trust? The board of directors who got us into this mess and
have almost no ownership, or the largest stockholder who is in the same boat as
you, with a proven track record of managing closed-end funds that have won
prestigious Lipper Awards?

Give us a chance to earn enough to increase the NAV of the Fund $178
million tax free by using up the current tax loss carry-forwards. Vote AGAINST
liquidation!

Only your last vote counts. Even if you have already voted "for" their plan
of liquidation, you can still change your vote to "AGAINST" by voting again
using the proxy you received earlier, or:

To vote by telephone, call toll-free: 1-800-454-8683

To vote by internet, go to www.proxyvote.com

Whether you vote by telephone or internet, use your 12 digit Control Number
as shown on the right side of your proxy card. If you cannot locate your proxy
card, call 1-800-662-5200 for assistance.

If you have questions why the Trust is AGAINST the plan of liquidation,
please contact Joel Terwilliger immediately at (303) 442-2156. Best wishes from
a fellow stockholder.

Yours truly,

Stewart R. Horejsi
Representative for the Susan L. Ciciora Trust

The Susan L. Ciciora Trust (the "Trust") has filed a proxy statement in
connection with the 2009 special meeting of DWS RREEF Real Estate Fund
stockholders. Stockholders are strongly advised to read the Trust's proxy
statement and the accompanying GREEN proxy card, as they contain important
information, including information relating to the participants in such proxy
solicitation. Stockholders can obtain this proxy statement, any amendments or
supplements to the proxy statement and other documents filed by the Trust with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for free at the internet website
maintained by the SEC at www.sec.gov.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) According to the most recent public filings available via EDGAR.

* My colleagues and I assumed management of DNY in October 2007.

The Curious Case of DWS Investments

Seekingalpha.com

April 21, 2009 - Investment managers at Deutsche Bank's DWS mutual fund complex
are trying desperately to bury their mistakes. And no wonder. Under their
guidance, the DWS RREEF Real Estate Fund II (closed-end fund ticker "SRO") lost
91.6% of its value in the fourth quarter of 2008, incinerating about $340
million of investor equity, while its smaller twin fund I ("SRQ"), down only
82%, burned through another $200 million. These losses may have set some new
record for the rapid destruction of shareholder value by professional asset
managers, and they earned both funds a solid 1-star ("worst") rating.

Now both funds have asked their shareholders to approve plans for liquidation:
the remaining assets are to be sold, the proceeds distributed, and the funds
will cease to exist. SRO and SRQ will only remain as fading, painful memories
for their unhappy investors. [Disclosure: The author is a retired accounting
professor who bought 500 shares of SRQ for an IRA account back in July 2004. The
shares are now worth about 1/10th of what they had cost.]

But an unlikely hero has come to the rescue. The liquidation plans emerged from
a Board of Directors meeting on March 11, shortly after SEC filings by one
Stewart Horejsi had announced the purchase of about 7% of SRQ and 5% of SRO.
Horejsi, a wealthy activist investor who has wrested control over several other
closed-end funds in recent years, proposed to terminate DWS/Deutsche Bank's
contract to manage SRO and SRQ, "in order to save what little is left", and
intimated his willingness to engage in a proxy fight for control.

Since that time Horejsi has continued to accumulate shares (at latest count,
16.5% of SRQ), and he has come out in vehement opposition to the liquidation
plan, calling it a dumb idea coming from "exceptionally bad management" and a
complacent board of directors.

The DWS fund managers have responded vigorously. In order to keep Horejsi from
blocking their plan to liquidate the funds, they have caused the funds to adopt
"poison pill" defenses, to alter bylaws so as to allow arbitrary adjournments of
shareholder meetings, and to rule out the selection of a new manager affiliated
with a shareholder (i.e. Horejsi) unless 80% of the Directors approve.

These moves would be understandable if this were a typical proxy fight, with
incumbents seeking to maintain the corporate entity and preserve control, but
here the managers are fighting to keep control of the funds in order to
obliterate them.

Why bother? Why is DWS so intent on having SRO and SRQ commit corporate
hara-kiri that it feeds them poison pills to use in case anyone tries to rescue
them? Why gin up the lawyers and the proxy tele-marketers, at shareholder
expense, just to provide a quick death and burial for these unlamented funds.

It can't be due to concern for the reputation of the folks involved. Like
superstar athletes on steroids, portfolio managers John Robertson, Jerry
Ehlinger, John Vojticek and Asad Kazim have set records that will not be easily
forgotten. Even in the market turmoil of late 2008, when the Vanguard REIT Index
ETF (VNQ) was down by 39%, losing more than 90% of investors' capital in less
than 3 months is the sort of accomplishment that should dissuade any
conscientious investment firm from ever allowing any of them near any position
of fiduciary responsibility, ever.

What other motive, then, can DWS have for insisting that SRO and SRQ put to
sleep? Why should DWS care whether the books and records of the funds get
recycled into pulp or fall into unfriendly hands? And just how does one manage
to lose $200 million or $340 million in a few weeks, entirely through legitimate
asset management, without any trace of Ponzi-like dishonesty and under a legal
regime that demands full disclosure?

The proxy statement blames the losses on "unprecedented and intense volatility
in the real estate market and increased investor fears and reactions related to
the worldwide credit crunch". As SRQ's annual report put it:

The fund underperformed its benchmark and peer group by a wide margin
mainly because of the fund's large leverage position, which badly hurt
performance when investors began selling real estate assets
indiscriminately during the early part of the fourth quarter as the
worldwide credit crunch intensified.

Very true, as far as it goes. Both funds leveraged common stock with auction
rate preferred. SRQ entered the 4th quarter with net assets of about $400
million: $160mm preferred (at face and redemption value) leaving $240mm net
equity for the 15.7 million common shares, with a net asset value of $15.32 per
share. SRO was a bit more leveraged: $730 million net assets backing $350mm in
preferred shares, leaving $380mm for the 38 million common shares, or about
$10.04 per share.

October was a devastating month, with VNQ (the REIT index ETF) falling over 31%,
and November compounded the cruelty with an additional 23% drop. For geared
funds like SRO and SRQ, such losses fall disproportionately on the common equity
holders. The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires at least $1 of common stock
net equity for every $1 of preferred. When net assets decline, this means that
some preferred shares must be redeemed in order to restore the ratio, but this
in turn requires funds to sell their holdings into a collapsing market in order
to raise enough cash for redemption. SRO started the 4th quarter with roughly
$668mm worth of investments and $53mm cash, but by the end of October it had
only $231mm worth of investments left after raising an additional $201mm cash in
preparation for a preferred stock buyback.

Going from $668mm to $231mm + $201mm implies a loss of $236mm, which fell
entirely on the common shares, and is the main reason why net asset value
crashed from $10.04/share to $3.61/share during the month. [Note: a loss of
$236mm out of $668mm is a 35% decline overall, which is in line with VNQ's -31%
for October. It meant a 64% decline for the common shares -- but that's
leverage.]

However, a close look at the financial statement numbers suggests there's more
to the story than just leveraged bad luck. Footnote A to each fund's Annual
Report for 2008 says,

The Fund may enter into interest rate swap transactions to reduce the
interest rate risk inherent in the Fund's underlying investments and issued
preferred shares.

In fact, SRO entered the 4th quarter with five open interest rate swaps for a
notional total of $437,500,000, under which it agreed to pay counterparty banks
- -- primarily the United Bank of Switzerland (UBS) -- fixed rate interest at at
4% per annum, while receiving in exchange variable interest at the LIBOR rate.
One swap had a 2008 end date, but the others extended as long as ten years. At
the start of the 4th quarter SRO had an unrealized gain of about $2mm on these
swaps, and by October 31st they were off by just $700K.

After October, though, the LIBOR interest rate fell dramatically, so the value
of the cash flows SRO was to receive became much less than that of the fixed
payments under the swaps. By year-end, four of the swap contracts had been wound
up, at a realized loss of $20,604,055, and the remaining contract was under
water by $12,929,062. SRO's swaps do not seem well matched to its portfolio or
to its scheduled redemption of preferred shares. They look more like an interest
rate speculation than the risk-reducing hedge described in the footnotes.

This speculation cost the common shareholders about $33 million during the 4th
quarter -- almost as much as the $34 million of asset value that still remained
for the common shares at year-end. The results at SRQ were not quite as bad:
$11.3 million in swap losses were realized during the 4th quarter and the
year-end position was only about $6 million under water, while SRQ still had $44
million in net equity remaining for the common shareholders.

The tax law says, in effect, that investment companies should invest in
investments. Companies like SRO and SRQ are exempt from corporate income tax if
at least 90% of their gross income consists of dividends, interest, securities
lending, gains from selling stock, securities or currencies, and suchlike. (Tax
Code Sec. 851(b)(2).) It seems, however, that DWS wanted to juice up the results
for SRO and SRQ by having them buy into a privately held health resort, Canyon
Ranch Holdings, LLC.

The problem is that part of the gross income from such a business shows up on
the tax return of its owners, even if the net result is a loss, and this sort of
income is potentially poisonous for the 90% test.

Indeed, SRO's liquidation proxy projects that the unlucky fund will fail to
qualify as an investment company for year 2009, and Federal corporate taxes will
have to be paid on this year's income before the balance can be distributed to
the shareholders. [For SRQ it's still a close question.] Nor did Canyon Ranch
fare well as an investment. SRO put $21,600,000 into it back in January, 2005.
On September 30, 2008 it was on the books at $18,003,815. SRO's books show it
was written down to $14 million in October, down to $4 million in November, and
down to just $1,814,400 at year-end. It disappeared from the balance sheet
entirely by the end of February 2009 -- whether by sale or write-off is not
known. The 4th quarter loss on Canyon Ranch was $16.2 million, compared to
ending equity of $34 million.

SRQ had a similar experience: Canyon Ranch went from a carrying value of $4.8
million at 9/30/08 to just $484,000 by year-end.

Canyon Ranch was not the only write-off. Both funds also owned preferred shares
in hotel companies that had recently been taken private through leveraged
buyouts. At the start of the 4th quarter, SRO valued its shares in Eagle
Hospitality Properties at $3,586,700 and its shares in W2007 Grace Acquisitions
I at $4,223,625. By year-end these interests had both been written down by more
than 99%, leaving Eagle at $34,820 and W2007 Grace at $37,980.

One wonders if these illiquid shares still have any value at all, and how any
rights that may exist can be enforced if SRO itself ceases to exist. For SRQ the
story is the same: the value of its investment in these two companies fell from
$7.1 million on September 30th to roughly $65,000 by year-end.

It's hard to know, though, whether to take these values seriously, because it's
not clear whether DWS and SRO took them seriously. The "fair value" accounting
rules say that funds like SRO should disclose how they value their holdings: are
the numbers based on market prices (Level 1), other observable inputs (Level 2),
or "significant unobservable inputs" (Level 3)? SRO's semiannual report showed
Level 3 investments on June 30, 2008 were $39,041,135, which is the total of the
values then assigned to Canyon Ranch, Eagle, W2007 Grace and a Rule144A
investment in Hatteras Financial Corp. The year-end audited financials indicate
that Hatteras had been transferred out of Level 3, leaving only $1,887,200 after
write-downs as the remaining value of Canyon Ranch, Eagle and W2007 Grace.

However, the 3rd quarter schedule of holdings (issued between the other two
reports, and certified, as usual, by the CEO and the CFO) shows Level 3 at
$27,621,355, which equals the values then assigned to Canyon Ranch, Eagle and
Hatteras. Something is missing. The investment schedule shows W2007 Grace being
carried at $4,223,625, but it's not in the Level 3 total. SRO says that nothing
was transferred into or out of Level 3 during the quarter, yet W2007 Grace was
there on June 30, not there on September 30, and back there again on December
31. What kind of accounting magic is this? Maybe DWS employs double-entry
gremlins or bookkeeping imps. And maybe those sprites also know whether the net
asset values that SRO was reporting to the public in late November and early
December did or did not include the $21 million loss that the fund had incurred
on those interest rate swaps.

So where were the independent Directors of SRO and SRQ, the twelve "watchdogs"
who are supposed to be looking out for shareholder interests? Four of them
actually owned fund shares, though in nominal amounts. At DWS, however, a single
consolidated board of directors is responsible for overseeing all of the
closed-end and open-end funds in the DWS complex, so each Director of SRO and
SRQ sits simultaneously on the Board of 131 or so other funds. A three hour
board meeting, not counting coffee breaks, would allow about 81 seconds for
discussing the affairs of any particular fund. And considering that each
"independent" director collected upwards of $189,000 a year for their services
to the DWS fund complex, it could be that the watchdogs didn't bark because they
were too busy chewing.

As the Delaware Supreme Court said long ago about compliant Directors: "Whether
they were supine merely, or for sufficient reasons entirely subservient it is
not profitable to inquire. It is sufficient to say... that theirs is an
unenviable position whether testifying for or against the appellants." Guth v.
Loft, 5 A. 2d 503, 512 (Del. 1939.)

Coming from portfolio managers, excuses aren't much consolation for investors.
Apologies would be nice, and compensation nicer still. But as the folks at DWS
know: "dead funds tell no tales."

Disclosure: I still own the 500 shares of SRQ bought in happier times.

Contributor: Contrarius

This article can be located at the following link:
http://seekingalpha.com/article/131943-the-curious-case-of-dws-investments