SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION
                Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
               Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. __)


                  X Filed by a Party other than the Registrant

                           Check the appropriate box:

[ ]  Preliminary Proxy Statement

[ ]  Confidential,  for Use of the  Commission  only  (as  permitted  by Rule
     14a-6(e)(2))

[ ]  Definitive Proxy Statement

[X]  Definitive Additional Materials

[ ]  Soliciting Material Pursuant to 240.14a-11(c) or 240.14a-12


                        DWS RREEF Real Estate Fund II, Inc.
                (Name of Registrants as Specified in Its Charter)

                             SUSAN L. CICIORA TRUST
                          ALASKA TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE
                                SUSAN L. CICIORA
                                 RICHARD I. BARR
                                 JOEL W. LOONEY
                           c/o Stephen C. Miller, Esq.
                          and Joel L. Terwilliger, Esq.
                           2344 Spruce Street, Suite A
                                Boulder, CO 80302
                                  (303)442-2156
    (Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

               Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):

x    No fee required

     Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11

(1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(3) Per-unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to
Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is
calculated and state how it was determined):

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(4) Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(5) Total fee paid:

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.

     Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule
0-11(a)(2)  and  identify  the  filing  for  which the  offsetting  fee was paid
previously.  Identify the previous filing by registration  statement  number, or
the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.

(1) Amount Previously Paid:______________________________________

(2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:________________

(3) Filing Party:________________________________________________

(4) Date Filed:__________________________________________________



                             SUSAN L. CICIORA TRUST
                           c/o Stephen C. Miller, P.C.
                           2344 Spruce Street, Suite A
                             Boulder, Colorado 80302

                                  July 22, 2009


By Federal Express and U.S. Certified Mail

John Millette, Corporate Secretary
DWS RREEF Real Estate Fund II, Inc. (the "Fund")
c/o Deutsche Investment Management Americas
345 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10154-0004

J. Christopher Jackson, Esq.
c/o Deutsche Asset Management, Inc.
280 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10017



To the Corporate Secretary of the Fund:

The continued  erosion of stockholder value in the Fund has gone on long enough!
The  stockholders  have voted,  and many of them have  communicated to the Trust
that they  share our belief  that  Deutsche  Asset  Management,  Inc.  and RREEF
America, L.L.C. are simply no longer fit to manage our assets.  Fortunately,  it
only requires a majority of the  outstanding  voting  securities of the Fund (as
defined in the  Investment  Company Act of 1940, as amended (the "1940 Act")) to
fire these advisers and hire more competent managers.

Further,  the Trust has become  increasingly  alarmed at the motives of Deutsche
Asset  Management,  Inc. with regard to their stalling  tactics.  Last week they
amended the Fund's bylaws to make it more difficult for  stockholders  to submit
their proposals to Fund's  management.  Today,  an article  appeared in The Wall
Street  Journal that  reported  that  Deutsche  Bank AG "has  dismissed  two top
executives  following an internal  investigation into whether [Deutsche Bank AG]
conducted  surveillance  on a board  member and others  [including  an  activist
shareholder]." This has prompted prosecutors in Germany to open an investigation
into what else is going on at Deutsche  Bank AG!  According  to the Fund's proxy
materials, Deutsche Asset Management, Inc., the investment manager for the Fund,
is a wholly-owned  subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG. We are very  concerned  about
what is  happening  with our Fund and the Fund's  management,  and believe  that
stockholders'  attempts to guide our assets in a different  direction should not
be thwarted at every turn.

Accordingly,   and  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  Fund's  by-laws  and
organizational  documents and other public  documents filed by the Fund with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"), I hereby notify you on behalf of
the Susan L. Ciciora  Trust (the  "Trust")  that,  at the Fund's  upcoming  2009
annual meeting of stockholders  (the "2009  Stockholders'  Meeting"),  the Trust


intends  to  nominate  candidates  for  election  as  directors  of the Fund and
introduce  certain  proposals  (collectively,  the  "Proposals").  The Proposals
conform to the notice  requirements of the Fund's most recent proxy filed with
the SEC on May 28, 2008, and the Fund's bylaws as filed with the SEC on July 25,
2003,  and as  amended  (the  "2003  Bylaws").  It also  conforms  to the  bylaw
amendments  filed in the Fund's 8K on July 15, 2009. The Trust requests that the
Fund  provide a true and correct  copy of the current  bylaws and as they may be
amended from time to time.

     The Proposals are as follows:

     1. A proposal to terminate the Investment  Management Agreement between the
Fund and  Deutsche  Asset  Management,  Inc.  (the  "Investment  Manager")  (the
"Management Agreement").

     2. A proposal to terminate the Investment  Advisory  Agreement  between the
Investment  Manager and RREEF America,  L.L.C.  (the "Investment  Adviser") (the
"Advisory Agreement").

The  Investment  Manager and  Investment  Adviser are  referred to herein as the
"Managers".  Justification  for  Proposals  1 and 2 above is simple:  The Fund's
performance  over the past year under the Managers has been more than appalling.
It has been one of the worst of any  closed-end  or open-end  fund in the entire
mutual fund  universe.  In the latest  ratings by  Morningstar(TM)  (January 31,
2009), the Fund received 1 of 5 stars for its overall, 3- and 5-year performance
history,  as  compared  with other  similarly  situated  specialty  real  estate
closed-end funds. There is no excuse for the extraordinarily poor performance of
the Fund. For the one-year period ending  12/31/08,  the Fund had a total return
on net asset value  ("NAV") of -91.6%.  To nearly wipe out the entire value of a
fund in one year is unheard of, even in a market that saw the S&P 500 Index drop
by 37% in that same time frame. Surprisingly,  the market price for the Fund has
dropped  even more than NAV  because  the  discount  for the Fund  increased - a
decline of 93.5% for the year ending  12/31/08.  This loss far exceeds any other
market indices for similarly  situated  funds.  In fact, the Fund lost more than
twice  the  percent  lost by the S&P  Index.  As noted in an  article  published
December 16, 2008 on seekingalpha.com,  SRO was "the worst performing closed end
fund". SRQ, another fund under the Managers,  was one of the infamous five worst
performers  as named by  seekingalpha.com  (in an article  published  January 4,
2009,  SRQ was named  one of the  "five  worst  performing  closed-end  funds in
2008").  SRQ  also  received  the same  dismal  Morningstar(TM)  ratings  as its
sister-fund.  Having one investment manager for two of the five worst performing
funds in 2008 clearly  indicates that it is time for new  investment  management
for the Fund.

Further,  the Trust is concerned about the  relationship  between Deutsche Asset
Management,  Inc.,  the  investment  manager for the Fund,  which is part of the
United  States  asset  management  activities  of Deutsche  Bank AG and which is


purportedly under investigation by prosecutors in Frankfurt,  Germany. We do not
want our Fund's  assets or  management  "tainted" by this  relationship  between
Deutsche  Asset  Management,  Inc. and Deutsche  Bank AG.  Additionally,  we are
concerned  that these spying  activities  may not be limited and could  possibly
include  other  activist  stockholders,  including  the  Trust.  You are  hereby
notified that, on behalf of the Trust, I intend to seek  assurances from current
management  that such  activities  do not  include  stockholders  of funds under
management by Deutsche Asset Management, Inc., including the Fund.

Notwithstanding  the above Proposals 1 and 2, the Trust  encourages the Board of
Directors of the Fund (the  "Board") to terminate the  Management  Agreement and
Advisory  Agreement sooner rather than later. The Board members have a fiduciary
duty to the  stockholders to make a change,  as the Managers  clearly have shown
that they should no longer  manage the Fund. It is the duty of the Board to save
what little is left in the Fund and  embrace the changes  proposed by the Trust.
However,  if the Board  elects not to pursue  this  course of action,  the Trust
intends to pursue the above Proposals in a proxy contest.

     3.  Nominate for election by the  stockholders  the  following  nominees as
Class III directors for the Fund: Susan L. Ciciora, Richard I. Barr, and Joel W.
Looney  (collectively,  the  "Nominees).  Copies of the  Nominees'  resumes  are
attached to this letter and contain all  information  required under Article II,
ss. 11 of the 2003 Bylaws.

     4. A proposal  recommending that the Board amend Article XIII of the Fund's
bylaws  (the  "Bylaws")  such that  authority  to amend the Bylaws is not vested
solely in the Board. See discussion under Proposal 6 below.

     5. A proposal  recommending  that the Board amend Article III, ss. 2 of the
Bylaws to reduce the number of directors  and  declassify  the Board  consistent
with the discussion under Proposals 7 and 8 below.

     6. A proposal  recommending  that the Board amend the Fund's  charter  (the
"Charter"),  vesting in the  stockholders the power to amend or adopt the Bylaws
by the  affirmative  vote of a majority of all votes  entitled to be cast on the
matter.  The Trust  believes that all  stockholders  benefit if they have better
access to and more influence in the Fund's governance. The Fund's Bylaws contain
important  policies  affecting the day-to-day  management of the Fund, which the
Trust believes  stockholders should have a voice in establishing.  Presently the
Bylaws contain a provision  which vests the authority to adopt,  alter or repeal
Bylaws  solely with the Board.  The Trust  believes that the authority to adopt,
alter or  repeal  Bylaws  should  be a shared  authority  between  the Board and
stockholders.  This  permits the Board to be  responsive  to  house-keeping  and
substantive matters regarding Fund operations, while at the same time giving the
owners of the Fund the power to effect  changes should they choose to do so. The
Trust also believes that when  stockholders  "speak" by adopting a Bylaw,  their
action should not be subject to being overturned or altered by unilateral action


of a Board whose job it is to serve  stockholders.  The Trust believes that this
Proposal will accommodate the  practicalities  of managing the Fund while at the
same time  protecting an important  right of  stockholders.  This Proposal would
codify in the  Charter the shared  authority  to make,  alter or repeal  Bylaws,
while at the same  time  making  it  clear  that  Bylaws  that  are  adopted  by
stockholders cannot be altered,  repealed or otherwise  circumvented without the
affirmative  approval of stockholders.  If recommended by the Board and approved
by stockholders, the Charter will be amended to add the following provision:

     The Bylaws of the Corporation, whether adopted by the Board of Directors or
     the stockholders,  shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal, and
     new Bylaws may be made, by either (a) the affirmative vote of a majority of
     all the  votes  entitled  to be cast on the  matter;  or (b) the  Board  of
     Directors; provided, however, that the Board of Directors may not (i) amend
     or repeal a Bylaw that allocates  solely to stockholders the power to amend
     or repeal  such  Bylaw,  or (ii) amend or repeal  Bylaws or make new Bylaws
     that conflict with or otherwise alter in any material respect the effect of
     Bylaws previously adopted by the stockholders.

     7. A  proposal  recommending  that the Board  amend the  Charter to set the
number  of  members  of the  Board  to  five.  Company  charters  often  contain
provisions that set a high upper-limit on the number of board seats,  permitting
the  company's  board to increase or decrease the number of board seats in their
discretion,  subject to this upper  limit.  Currently  the Charter  sets a lower
limit as required by MGCL and the upper limit at twelve, permitting the Board to
increase or decrease its size  subject to the upper  limit.  Boards may use such
provisions to quickly increase or decrease their size in an effort to dilute the
voting  impact of  directors  - such as those  elected in proxy  contests - with
views contrary to those of management. The Trust views the ability to manipulate
the number of members on the Board as unnecessary and ultimately  ineffective in
thwarting  stockholder  desires.  In addition,  it  potentially  increases  Fund
expenses and insulates the Board from  stockholders.  Common sense suggests that
if the Fund has more Board seats,  the Fund (and thus  stockholders)  will spend
more on Board  compensation.  The Trust believes that, because of the relatively
narrow business focus of an investment  company such as the Fund, five Directors
can  adequately  and  efficiently   fulfill  their  obligation  to  oversee  the
operations  of  the  Fund  and  its  management  and  act  as  "watchdogs"   for
stockholders.  The Trust believes that the best approach is to seek a few highly
qualified  individuals  to fill  directorships  and pay them  fairly.  This way,
stockholders  get more  "bang  for the  buck"  in  their  Board  and  don't  pay
unnecessary  Board  expenses.  If  recommended  by the  Board  and  approved  by
stockholders,  the  Charter  will be amended to delete the  entirety  of Article
VI(1) and replaced with the following provision:

     The number of directors shall be five.

     8. A proposal  recommending that the Board amend the Charter to de-classify
the Board and provide  for the annual  election of  directors.  The  election of


directors is the primary means for  stockholders to exercise  influence over the
Fund and its policies. The Trust believes that classified boards have the effect
of reducing  the  accountability  of directors  to a company's  stockholders.  A
classified board prevents  stockholders from electing all directors on an annual
basis  and  may  discourage  proxy  contests  in  which   stockholders  have  an
opportunity to vote for a competing slate of nominees.  While classified  boards
are viewed by some as  increasing  the long-term  stability and  continuity of a
board, the Trust believes that, in the case of the Fund, long-term stability and
continuity  should result from the annual election of Directors,  which provides
stockholders  with  the  opportunity  to  evaluate  Director  performance,  both
individually and  collectively,  on an annual basis. If recommended by the Board
and  approved  by  stockholders,  the  Charter  will be amended  to deleted  the
entirety of Article VI(3) and replaced with the following provision:

     The directors  shall be elected at each annual meeting of the  stockholders
     commencing  in 2010,  except as necessary to fill any  vacancies,  and each
     director  elected  shall hold  office  until his or her  successor  is duly
     elected and qualifies,  or until his or her earlier resignation,  death, or
     removal.

     9. A proposal recommending that the Board amend the Charter to provide that
the Secretary of the Fund shall call a special  meeting of  stockholders  on the
written  request  of  stockholders  entitled  to cast at least  25% of all votes
entitled  to be  cast  at the  meeting.  Presently,  under  the  Fund's  Bylaws,
stockholders cannot call a special meeting unless a written request is submitted
by the  holders of a majority  of  outstanding  shares  entitled  to vote at the
meeting.  This ownership  threshold  restricts a  stockholder's  right to call a
meeting.  This  Proposal  would  amend  the  Charter  to reduce  the  percentage
ownership level from a "majority" to 25% of outstanding  shares, thus making the
potential for a stockholder or group of  stockholders  to call a special meeting
more  realistic  and  useful.  If  recommended  by the  Board  and  approved  by
stockholders, the Charter will be amended with the following provision:

     The  Secretary  of the  Corporation  shall  call a special  meeting  of the
     stockholders  on the written  request of  stockholders  entitled to cast at
     least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the votes entitled to be cast at the
     meeting.

     10. A proposal  recommending  that the Board  amend the  Charter to provide
that the Fund no longer be subject to Maryland General  Corporation Law ("MGCL")
ss.ss. 3-801 through 805 - the Maryland Unsolicited  Takeovers Act ("MUTA") such
that the  Fund  will no  longer  be  subject  to MUTA.  MUTA has the  effect  of
entrenching  management  and  diminishing  stockholder  influence.  Amending the
Charter  such  that the Fund is no  longer  subject  to MUTA  should  result  in
maximizing Board and management  accountability  to stockholders.  This Proposal
would  amend the  Charter  to "opt out" of the  provisions  of MUTA by  deleting
Article VI(2). If recommended by the Board and approved by stockholders, Article
VI(2) of the Charter will be deleted in its entirety.


     11. A proposal  recommending  that the Board change the name of the Fund so
that it does not  include  "DWS" or  reference  to the DWS  family of funds,  or
investments in real estate or similar securities. Further, we want to remove any
association of the Fund with Deutsche Asset  Management,  Inc. and Deutsche Bank
AG due to our concerns of corporate malfeasance.

     12.  A  proposal   recommending  that  the  Board  resolve  to  negate  the
applicability of the Maryland  Control Share  Acquisition Act (the "MCSAA") such
that the Trust will no longer be subject thereto.  The MCSAA limits  stockholder
voting rights in excess of certain thresholds.  The Trust believes, as evidenced
by the  recent  deepening  of the  Fund's  discount,  that the MCSAA is  harming
stockholders  who may want to exit the Fund.  The  Trust  and other  significant
stockholders are apt to be discouraged  from purchasing  shares they cannot vote
and thus avoid  purchasing  shares in the market which would  otherwise  provide
pricing support for exiting stockholders.  Moreover, when the Fund announced its
adoption  of the  MCSAA,  its  press  release  said  that the  MCSAA  and  other
obstructive  measures  were "to protect the  interest  of  stockholders  pending
stockholder  consideration  of proposed  plans of  liquidation  for [the] Fund."
Given the fact that the "plan of  liquidation"  was  defeated,  the Board should
have terminated the MCSAA immediately after the special meeting on May 20, 2009.
Obviously they didn't. Stockholders have spoken and have clearly expressed their
disdain  for  the  "plan  of  liquidation,"  so it is time  to  terminate  these
obstructive measures which serve only to harm stockholders.  We believe that the
MCSAA, in conjunction with the Fund's "poison pill", denies stockholders wanting
to sell shares and erodes any prospect for much needed price support.

     13. A proposal  recommending that the Board resolve to terminate the rights
agreement  dated  April 9,  2009 and as may be  amended  from  time to time (the
"poison pill"),  whereby future purchases of the Fund's shares by the Trust will
trigger a dilutive  rights  dividend  specifically  targeted  to dilute only the
Trust. On April 9, 2009, the Board  implemented a so-called  "Rights  Agreement"
which would trigger dilutive rights dividends if the Trust purchases  additional
shares of the Fund.  Like the  MCSAA  discussed  above,  this  "poison  pill" is
designed to discourage the Trust from  purchasing  additional  shares and denies
stockholders  wanting to sell their most likely prospect for a much needed price
support.  As with the MCSAA, the Fund announced that the measure was to "protect
the interest of stockholders pending stockholder consideration of proposed plans
of liquidation for [the] Fund." As discussed above, stockholders have spoken and
clearly  rejected the "plan of  liquidation",  so it is time to terminate  these
obstructive measures which serve only to harm stockholders.

More to the point, "poison pills" are simply wrong. Here's what happens with the
Fund's  poison  pills:  if the Trust buys 0.01% more of the Fund's  shares,  all
stockholders  other than the Trust receive three additional  shares at a cost of
$0.01 per share.  The Trust  receives  nothing.  This means  that,  based on the
Trust's holdings in the Fund, the Trust's economic  interest would be reduced by
almost 70%. We believe that the Board would essentially steal from the Trust and


hand over the "loot" to the  non-Trust  stockholders.  That may not sound like a
bad deal for the  non-Trust  stockholders.  But from the Trust's  point of view,
it's  robbery  and if the  Board  has the  ethical  capacity  to rob the  Trust,
stockholders  should  figure it has the ethical  capacity to rob the rest of the
stockholders of the Fund. The Trust believes this is fundamentally  wrong of the
Board  and is not  indicative  of the type of Board  that the  stockholders  can
trust.

The  Trust  represents  to the Fund  that as of the date of this  notice it is a
stockholder  of record of  1,915,835  shares of the  Fund's  common  stock  (the
"Shares") which represents  approximately 5% of the Fund's total outstanding and
issued  shares.  The Trust further  represents to the Fund that it intends to be
present at the Meeting to nominate  the  Nominees to serve as  directors  of the
Fund,  to submit  the  Proposals  as  contained  herein,  and to vote its Shares
accordingly  with the nominations  and proposals as presented by the Trust.  The
Trust hereby  represents to the Fund that it intends to continue to own, through
the date of the Meeting, these Shares.

If the Fund  determines that more than three Class III directors will be elected
at the 2009 Stockholders'  Meeting, or the Board expands the number of available
seats on the Board, the Trust intends to nominate  candidates for the additional
Board seats and will  provide  the Fund with the  required  information  for any
additional nominees.

As a representative of the Fund's largest  stockholder,  I urge the directors to
support these proposals as they are in the best interests of all stockholders of
the Fund and introduce sound corporate governance principals.

Only 4 of the 12  members  of the Board own  shares  of the  Fund;  their  total
ownership  comprises a paltry 3,950 shares among the four  members.(1)  The fact
that 8 of the 12 of  these  incumbent  directors  own no  shares,  and  that the
remaining  directors have so little invested  suggests little  incentive for the
current Board to work  diligently  toward the future success of the Fund and its
stockholders.  Certainly,  this lack of meaningful ownership highlights that the
incumbents  do not  have  enough  faith  in the  Fund's  management  to  warrant
investing  their own money with the Fund.  Accordingly,  the Trust believes that
the stockholders of the Fund deserve new advisers to provide a better chance for
a positive  return on their  investment  and a more  confident  outlook  for the
Fund's future.  In this regard,  we recommend  that the Board  consider  Boulder
Investment Advisers,  LLC and Stewart Investment  Advisers,  both SEC registered
investment advisers who advise the Boulder-based group of closed-end funds.(2)

If the Board  agrees with these  Proposals,  I invite you to discuss  with me at
your  earliest   convenience   how  we  might  mutually   affect  a  smooth  and
cost-efficient  implementation of the Proposals. Please contact me at in writing


at the address  provided above if you have  questions.  Please fax a copy of any
written  response  to my legal  counsel,  Stephen  C.  Miller,  Esq.  or Joel L.
Terwilliger, Esq. at (303) 245-0420.

                                   Sincerely,

                                   The Susan L. Ciciora Trust


                                   /s/ Stewart R. Horejsi
                                   -------------------------------

                                   By: Stewart R. Horejsi, its Financial Advisor



Cc: Board of Directors of the Fund

Footnotes:


     (1) Based on information  from the Fund's most recent Proxy Statement dated
May 28, 2008.

     (2) Boulder Total Return Fund,  Boulder Growth & Income Fund and The Denali
Fund.