Burkle Ronald W SC 13D/A BARNES & NOBLE / BURKLE RONALD W ownership change | SEC 6 May 10

Exhibit 99.3

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE



YUCAIPA AMERICAN ALLIANCE FUND II, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership, and YUCAIPA AMERICAN ALLIANCE (PARALLEL) FUND II, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership, Plaintiffs,	) ) ) ) ) )	C.A. No.
v.	) ) )
LEONARD RIGGIO, STEPHEN RIGGIO, GEORGE	)
CAMPBELL JR., MICHAEL J. DEL GIUDICE,	)
WILLIAM DILLARD, II, PATRICIA L. HIGGINS,	)
IRENE R. MILLER, MARGARET T. MONACO,	)
LAWRENCE S. ZILAVY, and BARNES & NOBLE,	)
INC., a Delaware corporation.	)
	)
Defendants.	)

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF,

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES

Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, L.P. and Yucaipa American Alliance (Parallel) Fund

II, L.P (collectively, “Yucaipa” or “Plaintiffs”), by and through their undersigned counsel, allege,

upon knowledge as to their own actions and otherwise upon information and belief (including the

investigation of counsel and review of publicly available information), as follows:

SUMMARY OF ACTION

1. This case is about a self-dealing scheme designed to entrench the Riggio family in

their control of Barnes & Noble, Inc. (“B&N” or the “Company”) and prevent an effective proxy

contest from being mounted by Yucaipa or other public stockholders.¹ In breach of their

fiduciary duties, the Board of Directors of B&N, Leonard Riggio, Stephen Riggio, George

¹ In this Complaint, all stockholders other than the Riggio family, those business

associates beholden to the Riggio family, the Board and Company management are referred to as

the “public stockholders.”

Campbell Jr., Michael J. Del Giudice, William Dillard, II, Patricia L. Higgins, Irene R. Miller,

Margaret T. Monaco, and Lawrence S. Zilavy (the “Director Defendants” or the “Board”),

adopted a poison pill triggered when any stockholder other than the Riggio family acquires 20%

or more of the outstanding shares of B&N. This poison pill was adopted shortly after Yucaipa’s

public announcement that it intended to express its views “regarding the need for improved

corporate governance,” and contemporaneously with Yucaipa’s acquisition of 17.8% of B&N

common shares. The Board did so despite the fact that the Riggio family owns approximately

32.4%² of B&N common shares and, together with other B&N insiders and business associates

beholden to the Riggios, they collectively own approximately 38.2% of B&N common shares.

2. The B&N Board, in a further breach of its fiduciary duties, subsequently refused

(a) Yucaipa’s request to allow public stockholders to purchase, without triggering the poison pill,

an equivalent amount of B&N common shares to those owned by the Riggo family, and (b) to

directly answer Yucaipa’s question as to whether Riggio family members were allowed, under

the vague and ambiguous provisions of the poison pill, to acquire more than 50% of B&N

common shares.

3. The B&N Board has not identified any material benefit to the Company’s public

stockholders in adopting the poison pill. Yet the benefits to the Riggio family and the Board in

ensuring that they will remain in control and office are obvious. This is particularly troublesome

given the Board’s failure to use an independent special committee when adopting the poison pill

and the history of self-dealing transactions involving the Riggios, including:

² All share calculations are based on information in either the Company’s or the

individual stockholder’s most recent SEC filings. Beneficial ownership is calculated consistent

with Rule 13d-3(d)(1)(i) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,

and therefore includes options exercisable within 60 days of the date the information was

reported.

Using B&N as the Riggios’ personal piggy bank, when they sold Barnes & Noble

College Booksellers, Inc. (“College Books”) – owned by Leonard Riggio and his

wife – to B&N for cash and notes³ at an above-market price and interest rate,

respectively;

Causing B&N to enter into leases with entities in which the Riggio family has an

interest with aggregate annual rent of approximately $5.5 million in fiscal year

2008 alone;

Causing B&N to purchase textbooks, for $8.25 million in fiscal year 2008 alone,

from MBS Textbook Exchange, Inc. – an entity in which Leonard Riggio,

Stephen Riggio and various members of the Riggio family have a majority

interest; and

Causing B&N to hire a company owned by Leonard and Stephen Riggio’s brother

and friends to provide freight distribution services for all of B&N’s shipping to its

retail stores.

4. Yucaipa expects to propose a slate of three directors to oppose management’s

slate at the next annual meeting of B&N stockholders which B&N has publicly stated will be

held on or before September 30, 2010. As detailed below, the poison pill – with one set of rules

for the Riggio family and another set of rules for all the other B&N stockholders – creates a

terribly slanted playing field and makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Yucaipa and

B&N’s other public stockholders to overcome the huge voting advantage the poison pill gives to

the Riggio family and their beholden business associates. The poison pill gives the Riggios and

the Board an unfair advantage in a proxy contest by deterring or preventing public stockholders

³ The notes also contain a change of control provision – often referred to as a “poison

put.”

from exercising their franchise, thereby ensuring that the Riggio family and the incumbent Board

remain in control and in office.

5. Yucaipa challenges those features of the poison pill that inhibit B&N’s public

stockholders from exercising their stockholder franchise. Yucaipa requests that the Court

implement one or more of the following remedies for Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary

duties in adopting and refusing to amend the poison pill. These are all designed to level the

playing field so that (a) B&N’s public stockholders may, through a proxy contest, fairly express

their displeasure with the Riggios’ self-dealing transactions and the Board’s complicity in

approving them, and (b) B&N’s public stockholders may fairly assert and protect their rights as

stockholders now and in the future.

6. First, Yucaipa requests that the Court declare that the 20% trigger for the poison

pill is invalid and should instead be at least 30%. This is less than the approximately 32.4% of

B&N’s outstanding shares owned by the Riggio family, whom the B&N Board preferentially

exempted from the effects of the poison pill. Alternatively, Yucaipa requests that the Court

enjoin the Riggio family from exercising voting rights for any of their shares above the 20%

ownership limit that the poison pill imposes on other stockholders.

7. Second, Yucaipa requests that the Court declare that no member of the Riggio

family may acquire shares resulting in collective ownership by the Riggio family of more than

the approximately 32.4% of the Company’s outstanding shares that the family owned at the time

the poison pill was adopted.

8. Third, Yucaipa requests that the Court declare that Yucaipa and other

stockholders may, without triggering the poison pill, cooperate with and/or enter into

agreements, arrangements or understandings with any other stockholder of the Company with

respect to (a) a proxy contest for the election of directors, or (b) a vote of the stockholders

concerning whether to keep the poison pill in place. Alternatively, Yucaipa requests that the

Court declare that the provisions of the poison pill which would cause the pill to be triggered by

such stockholder actions are invalid.

9. Leonard Riggio personally owns approximately 30.6% of B&N’s issued and

outstanding common stock, and exercises practical dominion and control over the business and

affairs of the Company as its founder, largest individual stockholder, CEO until 2002 (when he

was replaced by his brother, Stephen) and Chairman of the Board since 1986. In addition,

Leonard Riggio dominates the Board through personal and professional relationships with the

other Director Defendants. Leonard Riggio is a “controlling stockholder” of the Company.

While serving as the Chairman of B&N’s Board and during his tenure as CEO, Leonard Riggio

repeatedly engaged in self-dealing transactions with B&N and used its resources to advance his

own family’s personal business ventures at the expense of B&N and its public stockholders.

10. For example, in August 2009, B&N agreed to purchase College Books. College

Books was a company then owned entirely by Leonard Riggio and his wife. While Leonard

Riggio and his wife received over a half a billion dollars in cash and notes from the transaction,

B&N used much needed cash and incurred significant debt to pay an excessive amount for a

company that conducts business in an increasingly challenging environment: college textbook

sales. Immediately prior to the College Books transaction, Leonard Riggio also caused College

Books to distribute 667,058 B&N shares held by College Books (representing approximately

1.2% of the outstanding B&N shares) to 17 members of College Books’ management, all of

whom were appointed by Leonard Riggio. Due to Leonard Riggio’s substantial control and

influence over the Board, it is not surprising that they approved such an unfavorable transaction

that was disadvantageous and not entirely fair to the Company or its public stockholders.

11. In response to such blatant self-dealing by Leonard Riggio, and with legitimate

concerns about the adequacy and enforcement of the Company’s corporate governance policies

and practices (as evidenced by, among other things, the College Books transaction), Yucaipa

began to raise with the Board concerns about the Riggios’ self-dealing and domination of the

Company, the deteriorating performance of the Company, and the poor corporate governance at

the Company. These communications were either ignored or rebuffed by Leonard Riggio and

the other Board members. With the stock price of B&N declining after the College Books

acquisition and believing that, despite this acquisition, B&N’s shares were still undervalued,

Yucaipa acquired shares in the Company to, among other things, increase its voting power

should it decide to nominate a slate of independent directors at B&N’s next annual stockholder

meeting. However, without a stock position large enough to neutralize the Riggios’ voting

power (which is supplemented by their control of the corporate machinery and treasury), a proxy

contest to provide the Company’s stockholders an alternative to the continued self-dealing

domination of the Company by the Riggios is practically impossible. B&N’s nine-member

Board is divided into three classes elected for three year terms. Thus, even if Yucaipa were to

succeed in electing a full slate of three independent directors, those directors would be a minority

of the Board.

12. Just four days after Yucaipa disclosed that it had increased its stake in B&N to

approximately 16.8% and announced its concern about the governance of B&N (and the same

day that Yucaipa disclosed that it had increased its stake to approximately 17.8%), the Board

adopted the poison pill. The Board’s sudden concern with Yucaipa’s accumulation of shares was

in marked contrast to the Board’s historical indifference to the Riggios’ accumulation of shares.

For example, the Company had adopted a poison pill in July 1998 which it allowed to expire in

July 2008, and the Company expressly elected, in its certificate of incorporation, not to be

governed by Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Thus, during this period

when the most obvious party could acquire absolute control of the Company without paying an

appropriate premium – the Riggio family – the Board was indifferent to protecting the public

stockholders from share purchases by the Riggios. Indeed, as detailed below, the Board

authorized transactions that actuallyincreased the Riggios’ percentage ownership while the prior

poison pill was in place. However, within days after the Riggios and the Board became aware

that Yucaipa might be willing to accumulate a stock position large enough to challenge the

Riggios and thereby provide a meaningful choice to the public stockholders in a proxy contest,

the Board adopted a poison pill. The Board’s action was not for the purpose of protecting the

public stockholders, but rather for the sole purpose and with the effect of obstructing any

stockholder from running a proxy contest challenging the Riggios’ dominance and control as

well as assuring that they would remain in office.

13. The poison pill is replete with provisions that operate to the advantage of the

Riggios and to the detriment of B&N’s public stockholders. For example:

Leonard Riggio, who beneficially owned approximately 30.6% of the Company’s

common stock at the time the Board adopted the poison pill, is exempted from the

poison pill’s 20% trigger.

Even though the “grandfather” provision of the poison pill is drafted as a general

provision of purportedly neutral application, the only stockholder who can

possibly qualify for the exception to the general 20% ownership rule is Leonard

Riggio and other Riggio family members (or trusts for their benefit);

The poison pill allows for transfers of shares among the members of the Riggio

family or trusts for their benefit without triggering the poison pill, establishing

members of the Riggio family as part of a special class of stockholders with

preferential rights.

The poison pill is triggered if stockholders owning more than 20% of the stock of

the Company enter into any “agreement, arrangement or understanding (written

or oral) for the purpose of . . . voting . . . any voting securities of the Company . . .

[or] . . .cooperate in . . . influencing the control of the Company.” (Emphasis

supplied.) This broadly worded provision is intended to stifle stockholder dissent

by preventing existing, dissatisfied stockholders of the Company from

“cooperating” in connection with a proxy contest which might dislodge the

Riggios from wielding de facto control of the Company, notwithstanding that the

Riggios and others beholden to the them already own approximately 38.2% of the

Company’s stock.

The poison pill effectively prohibits stockholders owning, individually, shares,

which if added together would be in excess of 20%, from cooperating, reaching

agreements, arrangements or understandings in connection with a proxy contest

while the Riggio family through the Company is free to engage in all of those

activities. As a result, the pill materially interferes with the stockholder franchise.

The poison pill is written with a calculated and artful ambiguity as to whether the

entire Riggio family is “grandfathered” under the poison pill but unable to acquire

any additional shares, or whether members of the family other than Leonard

Riggio could acquire additional stock of the Company, so that the family could

collectively acquire over 50% of the Company’s stock without triggering the

poison pill. Indeed, when Yucaipa twice asked in letters whether any member of

the Riggio family could acquire additional shares without triggering the poison

pill, the Board twice refused to directly answer the question.

The poison pill operates to preclude collective action by public stockholders –

none of whom owns more than 20% of the Company’s stock – but apparently

allows members of the Riggio family, which already beneficially owns

approximately 32.4% of the stock, to achieve absolute voting control.

The poison pill expressly allows the Board to approve additional share

acquisitions by the Riggio family so that the poison pill is not triggered by such

acquisitions, but the poison pill does not provide the same approval mechanism

for share acquisitions by persons other than the Riggios.

The poison pill is not triggered by additional shares being issued to Leonard or

Stephen Riggio, who already beneficially own approximately 32.4% of the

Company’s stock, pursuant to the Company’s compensation plans. Thus, the

Riggios will be able to augment their share position under the poison pill.

14. As set forth herein, the Board has used the poison pill as a weapon to intentionally

discriminate against Yucaipa and B&N’s other public stockholders. The poison pill deters or

prevents B&N’s public stockholders from conducting a proxy contest and operates to entrench

the Riggios to the detriment of the public stockholders. Such a result constitutes an

impermissible restraint upon B&N’s public stockholders’ franchise rights, serving only the

Riggios’ and the Director Defendants’ self-interests to maintain control of the Company and

remain in office.

15. The Board’s adoption and maintenance of the poison pill is wrongful for

numerous reasons, including:

The poison pill was adopted and is being maintained for the principal purpose

and/or effect of frustrating a proxy contest and improperly limiting the public

stockholder franchise.

The adoption of the poison pill with a 20% trigger, while “grandfathering” the

Riggio family’s significantly higher ownership stake and potentially allowing

them to acquire absolute voting control, is not reasonable in relation to any

legitimate corporate purpose.

The poison pill materially interferes with the stockholder franchise. The Board in

adopting the poison pill did not and cannot identify either a compelling corporate

justification or a threat to an important corporate policy which would outweigh

the harm to the stockholder franchise.

The poison pill is an unfair, self-dealing transaction between the Company and

the Riggios because it provides materially preferential treatment and custom-

made benefits to the Riggios who exercise practical control over the Company.

The Board was grossly negligent in adopting and maintaining the poison pill,

because the Board either ignored or failed to understand the most critical

component of the poison pill: how the poison pill would inappropriately and

disproportionately benefit and protect the Riggios’ exercise of control and would

materially and unfairly disenfranchise and discriminate against the other

stockholders of the Company. Indeed, even after twice being asked in writing, the

Board refused to answer the basic but critical question of whether the Riggios can

acquire more than 50% of the Company’s stock without triggering the poison pill.

(See Exhibit A, Yucaipa’s letter, dated January 28, 2010, to the B&N Board;

Exhibit B, B&N’s letter to Managing Partner of Yucaipa, dated February 17,

2010; Exhibit C, B&N’s 8K dated February 17, 2010, attaching amendment to the

poison pill; and Exhibit D, Yucaipa’s letter, dated February 25, 2010, to the B&N

Board, to which there has been no response.)

The Board acted in bad faith because (i) no committee of independent directors

considered whether the adoption of a poison pill with custom-crafted Riggio

exceptions was for the benefit of the other stockholders and (ii) the adoption and

continuation of the poison pill are not in the best interests of the Company or its

public stockholders, but instead were intended to stifle stockholder dissent and to

ensure the Riggios’ continued control of the Company.

16. The purpose for which the poison pill was adopted is best demonstrated by the

Board’s response to Yucaipa’s request that it be permitted to acquire the same percentage of

shares as were collectively owned by the Riggios and other B&N insiders. The acquisition of

such a share position by Yucaipa would not cause a change of control, but rather would

neutralize the practical control exercised by the Riggios and the insiders beholden to them,

thereby enhancing the value of the remaining public shares. Yet, the Board refused Yucaipa’s

request without any legitimate explanation of resulting benefit to the Company’s public

stockholders, nor did the Board address why it was appropriate at the same time to enshrine the

Riggios’ ownership and control by creating a different set of rules for them. It is manifest that

only the Riggios and those beholden to them benefit from the Board’s refusal to allow any other

stockholder to own an equivalent stake in the Company.

THE PARTIES

17. Plaintiff Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, L.P. (“YAAF II”) is a Delaware

limited partnership with its principal place of business located at 9130 W. Sunset Boulevard, Los

Angeles, California 90069. YAAF II is the direct beneficial owner of 6,806,868 shares of

B&N’s common stock, which represents 11.8% of the B&N shares outstanding.

18. Plaintiff Yucaipa American Alliance (Parallel) Fund II, L.P. (“YAAF II Parallel”)

is a Delaware limited partnership with its principal place of business located at 9130 W. Sunset

Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90069. YAAF II Parallel is the direct beneficial owner of

4,484,345 shares of B&N’s common stock, which represents 7.8% of the B&N shares

outstanding.

19. YAAF II and YAAF II Parallel together beneficially own 11,291,213 shares

representing approximately 19.6% of the B&N shares outstanding and at all times relevant

hereto, have been record or beneficial stockholders of B&N shares.

20. Defendant Leonard Riggio has been Chairman of the Board since 1986. He also

served as the Chief Executive Officer of B&N from 1986 through February 2002, at which time

he turned the reins over to his younger brother, Stephen Riggio. Leonard Riggio is the direct

beneficial owner of 17,900,132 shares of B&N’s common stock, which represents approximately

30.6% of the shares outstanding, and is by far the largest individual stockholder of B&N.

21. Defendant Stephen Riggio is the younger brother of Leonard Riggio, and has been a

director of the Company since September 1993. Stephen Riggio joined the Company in 1975.

From 1981 to 1987, he served as Vice President and General Manager of the Company’s direct

mail division, and in 1987 he was appointed Executive Vice President of Merchandising. From

1995 to 1997, Stephen Riggio was the Company’s Chief Operating Officer. He was appointed

Vice-Chairman in 1997, and replaced Leonard Riggio as Chief Executive Officer from February

2002 until March 18, 2010, when he was succeeded by William Lynch. Stephen Riggio is the

direct beneficial owner of 1,516,751 shares of B&N common stock, which represents

approximately 2.6% of the B&N shares outstanding. In addition, he is the beneficiary of options

to purchase another 964,202 B&N shares held in trust for him by Leonard Riggio. Each fiscal

year since at least 2006, Stephen Riggio has been paid at least approximately $3 million by the

Company in cash and equity-based compensation.

22. Defendant George Campbell Jr. (“Campbell”) has been a B&N Board member

since 2008, and serves on the Compensation Committee. Campbell beneficially owns 8,115

shares of B&N common stock. In 2008, Campbell received over $60,000 in director

compensation.

23. Defendant Michael J. Del Giudice (“Del Giudice”) has served as a B&N Board

member since 1999, and is the Chair of the Compensation Committee and a member of the

Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee and the Audit Committee. Del Giudice

beneficially owns 46,974 shares of B&N common stock. In 2008, he was paid nearly $130,000

in director compensation.

24. Defendant William T. Dillard, II (“Dillard”) has been a member of the B&N

Board of Directors since November 1993, when B&N went public. Dillard is the Chair of the

Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee, and is a member of the Compensation

Committee. Dillard beneficially owns 89,635 shares of B&N common stock. In 2008, he was

paid over $200,000 in director compensation.

25. Defendant Patricia L. Higgins (“Higgins”) served on the B&N Board from 1999

to 2004 and again since June 2006. Higgins is a member of the Audit Committee and the

Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee. Higgins beneficially owns 32,553 shares of

B&N common stock. In 2008, she was paid over $200,000 in director compensation.

26. Defendant Irene R. Miller (“Miller”) has been a member of the Board of the

Company since May 1995. Miller served as the Chief Financial Officer of the Company from

September 1993 to June 1997. From September 1995 to June 1997, Miller was Vice-Chairman

of the Company. Miller beneficially owns 51,329 shares of B&N common stock. In 2008,

Miller received nearly $200,000 in director compensation.

27. Defendant Margaret T. Monaco (“Monaco”) has been a member of the Company

Board since May 1995 and serves on the Audit Committee. Monaco beneficially owns 93,848

shares of B&N common stock. In 2008, Monaco received nearly $200,000 in director

compensation.

28. Defendant Lawrence S. Zilavy (“Zilavy”) has been a Board member since June

2006. Zilavy beneficially owns 32,553 shares of B&N common stock. In 2008, Zilavy received

more than $140,000 in director compensation.

29. Defendant Barnes & Noble, Inc. (“B&N” or the “Company”) is a corporation

organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of

business at 122 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

A Brief Overview of Barnes & Noble and Its Current Financial Status

30. B&N is the world’s largest bookseller. The Company’s main businesses include

retail stores, internet sales, publishing, and eBooks. As of October 2009, the Company operated

775 retail book stores and over 630 college bookstores, and conducted its online businesses

through barnesandnoble.com llc.

31. In fiscal year 2008, B&N had revenues of $5.12 billion, compared to $5.29 billion

in 2007. As reported by Reuters Company Research on April 29, 2010, over the past five years,

B&N lost approximately 35% of its market value – underperforming the S&P 500 Total Return

Index by approximately 39%. According to data from Standard & Poor’s Equity Research as of

April 24, 2010, over the last three years, B&N sales have been stagnant, hovering at a

compound-annual growth rate of less than 1% while net income has fallen on average by

approximately 16% per year during that period.

32. For the third-quarter that ended January 30, 2010, B&N earned $80.4 million, or

$1.38 a share, approximately a 5.6% decrease from $85.1 million, or $1.42 a share, for the book

retailer for the same period in the previous year. For the same time period, store sales fell 4.7%

to $1.3 billion and sales at stores open at least 15 months fell 5.5%, compared to the same period

in the previous year. B&N expects a fourth-quarter loss between 85 cents and $1.15 a share. For

the year, the Company foresees earnings in the range of 23 cents to 53 cents. Additionally, B&N

expects a stores sales drop between 3% and 5% for the current fiscal year.

The Riggios’ Control Over the Company

33. B&N is controlled by Leonard Riggio, its founder, Chairman of the Board, and

controlling stockholder. Leonard Riggio controls B&N through his beneficial ownership of

approximately 30.6% of B&N’s outstanding common stock and through his influence over the

Board and other persons beholden to him, including, Stephen Riggio, who owns approximately

2.6% of the outstanding B&N shares and for whom Leonard Riggio holds in trust options to

purchase 964,202 shares of stock for his benefit. Leonard Riggio and Stephen Riggio

collectively own approximately 32.4% of the Company. If the shares of B&N stock received by

the former College Books officers and employees – all of whom were appointed by Leonard

Riggio – are included, the percentage increases to approximately 33.5%. The non-Riggio

directors and officers of the Company beneficially own 3,386,508 shares, increasing the

percentage of shares owned by the Riggio family and those beholden to it to approximately

38.2%.

34. While serving as the Chairman of B&N’s Board and during his tenure as CEO of

the Company, Leonard Riggio repeatedly used B&N and its resources to advance the business

ventures of himself and his family and friends at the expense of B&N and its stockholders. For

example, Leonard Riggio caused B&N to enter into leases with entities in which the Riggio

family has an interest with aggregate annual rent of approximately $5.5 million in fiscal year

2008 alone. Leonard Riggio also caused B&N to purchase textbooks, in an amount totaling

$8.25 million in fiscal year 2008 alone, from MBS Textbook Exchange, Inc. – an entity in which

Leonard Riggio, Stephen Riggio and various members of the Riggio family have a majority

interest. Additionally, Leonard Riggio caused B&N to hire a company owned by a brother of

Leonard and Stephen Riggio and friends to provide freight distribution services for all of B&N’s

shipping to its retail stores. Leonard Riggio also caused B&N to transact business on

noncompetitive and disadvantageous terms with two other companies in which he holds minority

interests. These companies were B&N’s principal supplier of music, movies, newspapers and

magazines, and its supplier for database equipment and services. Finally, in yet another unfair

related-party transaction, Leonard Riggio caused B&N to buy one of his companies that later

became a wholly-owned subsidiary of GameStop Corp. (“GameStop”) at a significant premium

over the price he and his investor friends had paid just two years earlier. Leonard Riggio

subsequently had B&N divest its holdings in GameStop despite its success, which resulted in

Leonard Riggio receiving the largest distribution of shares due to his status as B&N’s largest

individual stockholder.

35. Not surprisingly, B&N and its public stockholders have been harmed by these

unfair transactions with companies controlled by or affiliated with Leonard Riggio. B&N has

been overcharged for goods and services, forced to sell goods at a discount or subsidize Leonard

Riggio’s related companies’ operating costs by providing office space at cost, and marketing and

other services at no cost. By approving these types of related transactions, the Board, comprised

of friends, employees, and others beholden to Leonard Riggio, have repeatedly demonstrated

their lack of independence from the Company’s Chairman by their willingness to rubber stamp

transactions that give Leonard Riggio and his friends and family substantial benefits to the

detriment of B&N and its stockholders.

The College Books Acquisition

1. Background of College Books

36. College Books was founded by Leonard Riggio in 1965 and is one of the largest

operators of college and university bookstores in the nation. College Books was entirely owned

by Leonard Riggio and his wife, Louise Riggio, until it was acquired by B&N on September 30,

2009.

37. Leonard Riggio abused his power over B&N by siphoning benefits from the

Company to advantage College Books. For example, B&N subsidized College Books’ operating

costs by leasing office space to College Books at cost, and supplying inventory to College Books

stores at attractive rates. Leonard Riggio’s manipulation of B&N allowed College Books to

become one of the largest operators of college and university bookstores in the U.S. However,

when faced with declining sales growth and a changing market landscape, Leonard Riggio

liquidated his investment in College Books by selling it to B&N for over half a billion dollars,

which drained B&N of cash and significantly increased its debt burden to finance the sale.

2. The Board’s Announcement of the College Books Acquisition

38. On August 10, 2009, B&N announced that it had entered into a stock purchase

agreement with Leonard and his wife, Louise Riggio, in which B&N would acquire all of

College Books’s issued and outstanding stock, in a transaction valued at $596 million. In return,

Leonard and Louise Riggio would receive $346 million in cash and $250 million in B&N-issued

notes.

39. The College Books transaction was completed on September 30, 2009. An SEC

filing revealed that the transaction purchase price had been reduced to $514 million, reflecting

$82 million in cash bonuses paid to College Books management team and employees. In

addition, Leonard Riggio caused College Books to distribute 667,058 shares of B&N stock

(approximately 1.2% of the outstanding B&N shares) to 17 members of the College Books’

management – all of whom were appointed by him. Thus, these individuals profited

significantly from the distribution of B&N stock, which would have otherwise been acquired by

B&N as part of the acquisition.

3. The Self-Interested Transaction Was Not Entirely Fair to B&N’s Stockholders

40. The College Books acquisition price constituted disproportionately large

consideration that was well beyond the price any independent, third-party purchaser would pay,

particularly due to the recent technological innovations and trends in the college book industry.

Barron’s reported on August 14, 2009 that “the deal strategically makes little sense over time as

the company essentially doubles its exposure to one of the segments that we believe are most at

risk to technology change over the next several years, as well as reduces that cash element of the

Barnes & Noble story that has supported it for so long.” Credit Suisse Analyst Gary Balter noted

that “the recently announced acquisition of Barnes & Noble College Booksellers significantly

raises the [B&N] risk profile and takes away the free cash that could have been used for a special

dividend.” Immediately after the deal was announced, Credit Suisse downgraded Barnes &

Noble from “Neutral” to “Underperform,” and the Company shares fell by approximately 9.2%

the same day (August 14, 2009), further confirming the acquisition’s unfairness.

41. Leonard Riggio used his influence as B&N’s controlling stockholder and

Chairman to force College Books onto B&N for grossly excessive consideration of cash and

notes, thus shifting the risk of a challenging business from him to B&N and its public

stockholders. By using the Company’s assets to enrich himself, he and the Board members

which approved the transaction breached their fiduciary duties.

42. Between August 17 and September 18, 2009, six derivative actions were filed in

this Court, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties, waste of corporate assets, and unjust enrichment

in connection with the approval of the College Books acquisition. The Court subsequently

consolidated those actions and a consolidated complaint was filed on November 3, 2009.

Thereafter, on March 18, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated stockholder

derivative complaint, C.A. No. 4813-VCS.

D. Yucaipa’s Purchase of Stock Did Not Pose a Threat to B&N Or its Stockholders

43. In late November 2008, prior to its purchase of any B&N stock, Ronald Burkle

(Yucaipa’s managing member) called Leonard Riggio, whom he knew as the result of prior joint

investments. Mr. Burkle told Leonard Riggio that he believed B&N’s stock had been battered by

the recession and was undervalued. He stated that Yucaipa was going to make an investment in

B&N as he believed B&N to be a retailer which offered a “superior customer experience” and

that its stock would do well when the economy improved. He stated that Yucaipa did not seek to

acquire or control B&N. Mr. Burkle did offer several ideas as to how B&N might leverage and

further enhance the B&N customer experience. Mr. Burkle stated that he did not know if

Yucaipa would acquire more than 5% of the B&N common stock, but that if it were going to do

so he would tell Mr. Riggio.

44. In late December 2008 or early January 2009, Mr. Burkle met with Mr. Riggio in

New York and told him that Yucaipa still believed B&N’s stock to be undervalued and Yucaipa

was purchasing more B&N shares and would be filing a 13D. Among other things, they

discussed the opportunity presented by the bankruptcy of Border’s, B&N’s biggest competitor.

Numerous parties had suggested that purchasing certain Borders assets (the “Best of Borders”)

out of bankruptcy would make sense for B&N. Mr. Riggio stated that he was against such a

transaction because: (a) he did not want to increase B&N’s exposure to retail stores (even by

acquiring more retail stores in prime locations at an attractive price); and (b) he wanted to keep

B&N liquid and not have B&N incur any additional debt. Mr. Burkle left the decision as to a

possible Best of Borders transaction up the Board and reiterated Yucaipa’s desire to be a long-

term investor who would from time-to-time offer suggestions as how to improve upon and

leverage the superior retail experience that B&N provides to its customers.

45. Between November 24, 2008 and December 31, 2008, Yucaipa acquired an

aggregate of 4,584,313 B&N shares and, on January 2, 2009, Yucaipa disclosed in its 13D filing

that it beneficially owned approximately 8.3% of B&N’s outstanding shares.

46. On August 10, 2009, B&N announced the College Books transaction with the

Riggios. This transaction was contrary to what Mr. Riggio had told Mr. Burkle when discussing

a possible Best of Borders transaction. Contrary to Mr. Riggio’s earlier opposition to increasing

B&N’s exposure to retail outlets, the College Books transaction did precisely that; and contrary

to Mr. Riggio’s earlier opposition to increased debt and desire to maintain B&N’s liquidity, the

College Books transaction increased B&N’s debt by hundreds of millions of dollars and

impaired its liquidity by paying significant amounts of cash to the Riggios. Even worse, it

lessened Mr. Riggio’s personal exposure to the very risks he had expressed a concern about

while exposing B&N and its stockholders to those same risks. Mr. Burkle, noting the reversal of

Mr. Riggio’s prior position, wrote to the Board on August 14, 2009, stating as follows:

Never would I imagine that you would try to put these two

companies together. It is contrary to everything that [Leonard

Riggio] told me.

Barnes & Noble is a great company. It doesn’t need to double-

down on the technology risk that the industry faces and it doesn’t

need to give up the financial stability that its current balance sheet

affords it.

You’ve built a great company and you are a very wealthy man.

You don’t need to do this. It’s not right for the company and it’s

horrible for your reputation.

See Exhibit E.

47. After being ignored and rebuffed by Leonard Riggio and the other Board

members, Yucaipa decided to raise its stake in B&N. With the stock price of B&N declining

after the College Books acquisition and believing that, despite this acquisition, B&N’s shares

were still undervalued, Yucaipa acquired shares in the Company to among other things, increase

its voting power should it decide to nominate a slate of independent directors at B&N’s next

annual stockholder meeting. However, without a stock position large enough to neutralize the

Riggios’ voting power (which is supplemented by their control of the corporate machinery and

treasury), a proxy contest to provide the Company’s stockholders an alternative to the continued

self-dealing domination of the Company by the Riggios is practically impossible. B&N’s nine-

member Board is divided into three classes elected for three year terms. Thus, even if Yucaipa

were to succeed in electing a full slate of three independent directors, those directors would be a

minority of the Board.

48. On November 13, 2009, Yucaipa disclosed in its Amendment No. 1 to its

Schedule 13D that it had purchased an additional 5,038,900 shares of B&N common stock, thus

increasing its stake in B&N to 16.8%, up from the 8.3% it had held since January 2009. In that

filing Yucaipa stated that it was “concerned with the adequacy and enforcement of the

Company’s corporate governance policies and practices, as evidenced in part by the recent

acquisition of Barnes & Noble College Booksellers, Inc,” and that it “intend[ed] to express [its]

views regarding the need for improved corporate governance to the board of directors and the

management of the Company,” and that it “may in the future exercise any and all of [its]

respective rights as shareholders of the Company in a manner consistent with [its] equity

interests.”

49. Three days later, on November 16, 2009, Yucaipa disclosed that it had acquired

an additional 457,000 shares of B&N common stock, raising its stake to 17.8% of the B&N

shares.

E. The Board Responds to Yucaipa’s Rising Stake in B&N By Adopting a Poison Pill

50. The Board responded to Yucaipa’s disclosure that it had upped its stake in B&N

to approximately 17.8% by adopting a Stockholder Rights Plan, referred to herein as the “poison

pill,” effective November 17, 2009. The poison pill was intended to make it extremely difficult

if not impossible for any outside stockholder to conduct a proxy contest to challenge the Riggios

and the incumbent Board. The Company concurrently issued a November 17, 2009 press release

stating, without directly addressing Yucaipa, that the poison pill was adopted “in response to the

recent rapid accumulation of a significant portion of [B&N’s] outstanding common stock,” and

purportedly “intended to protect the company and its stockholders from efforts to obtain control

of the company that are inconsistent with the best interests of the company and its stockholders.”

In adopting the poison pill, which does not expire for three years, the Board did not create a

special committee, in order to minimize the conflict of interest inherent in their adoption of

defensive measures, particularly problematic where, as here, the adoption of the defensive

measure protects the stock position of an existing controlling stockholder. While B&N has

stated that it intends to put the poison pill to a vote of its stockholders within 12 months, it has

refused to say whether the poison pill will be put up for a vote at B&N’s 2010 annual meeting.

51. The poison pill was implemented in the form of a distribution of a dividend of one

“Right” for each outstanding share of common stock, par value $0.001 per share, of B&N. Each

Right entitles the registered holder to purchase from B&N a unit consisting of one one-

thousandth (1/1,000) of a share of Series I Preferred Stock, par value $0.001 per share, of the

Company at a price of $100.00.

52. Under the poison pill, the Rights would become exercisable if a person or group –

other than the Riggio family – acquires 20% or more of B&N’s common stock or announces a

tender offer which results in the ownership of 20% or more of B&N’s common stock. The

Rights also will be exercisable if a person or group that already owns 20% or more of B&N

common stock acquires any additional shares (other than pursuant to B&N’s compensation or

benefit plans). If the Rights become exercisable, all rights holders (other than the person

triggering the poison pill) will be entitled to acquire B&N’s common stock at a 50% discount

without board approval.

53. The poison pill includes a provision that purports to “grandfather” in any

“Excluded Person” who would otherwise trigger the poison pill based on their share acquisition

as of the date the pill was adopted. In fact this provision only applies to Leonard Riggio and

some or all of this family members, as they are the only stockholders who held more than 20% of

the B&N shares at the time the poison pill was adopted. Other provisions allow Excluded

Persons (i.e., Leonard Riggio, Stephen Riggio or other members of their family) to freely transfer

shares to their family members (and trusts for their benefit) without triggering the poison pill.

Tellingly, Excluded Persons may also acquire additional shares without triggering the poison pill

with Board approval, but the poison pill does not authorize the Board to approve such exceptions

for any other stockholder.

54. In addition to the custom-made Riggio provisions, the poison pill is vaguely

worded as to whether the Riggio family can acquire even more shares. If a person is deemed an

“Acquiring Person,” as defined in the poison pill, then the poison pill is triggered. The definition

generally excludes Leonard Riggio so long as he does not acquire any more shares. However,

the poison pill, as adopted on November 17, 2009, expressly excluded from the definition of an

“acquiring person” other Riggio family members as follows:

(d) (i) any Person who is an immediate family member of an

Excluded Person [i.e., Leonard Riggio or Stephen Riggio] and any

trust for the benefit of (or the trustees of which include) such

immediate family member or such Excluded Person, which Person

or trust acquires from such Excluded Person Common Shares

(such shares, “Excluded Shares”) and (ii) any executor or trustee

for the estate of an Excluded Person or of such immediate family

member, unless and until, in the case of clause (i) and (ii), such

Person, trust, executor or trustee, together with all Affiliates and

Associates of such Person, trust, executor or trustee, shall become

the Beneficial Owner of 20% or more of the Common Shares not

including Excluded Shares.

Under the poison pill’s definition of an Excluded Person, at a minimum, each of Leonard and

Stephen Riggio were Excluded Persons, as each, as brothers, was an immediate family member

of the other. Thus, each could acquire the shares of the other without triggering the poison pill.

In addition, under the original definition of an Acquiring Person, the poison pill purported to

allow Stephen Riggio to acquire an additional 20% or more of the shares of B&N common stock

not including any Excluded Shares he might acquire from Leonard or any other immediate

family member. The poison pill also purports to allow other immediate family members of

either Leonard or Stephen Riggio to acquire shares from one or both of them, or acquire

additional shares equal to 20% of the B&N shares outstanding, effectively giving the Riggio

family the ability to acquire absolute voting control of the Company without triggering the

poison pill.

55. The Board’s adoption of the poison pill is also a transparent attempt to deter or

prevent Yucaipa (or any other public stockholder) from conducting a proxy contest to elect a

slate of directors other than a slate approved by the Riggios and the incumbent Board. The

Board accomplishes this objective by the following mechanisms:

Limiting the number of shares any other stockholders could acquire before

triggering the poison pill, while allowing the Riggios to retain approximately

32.4% of the shares, or approximately 38.2% when taken together with the other

B&N insiders and those beholden to the Riggios.

Allowing the Riggio family members, including Stephen Riggio, to acquire

additional shares until each of those family members owned 20% of the shares.

Including an expansive definition of “beneficial ownership” of shares so that a

person owns the shares of any other person with whom they have any “agreement,

arrangement or understanding (written or oral) for the purpose of . . . voting . . .

any voting securities of the Company . . . [or] . . . to cooperate in . . . influencing

the control of the Company.” This provision is intended to preclude existing,

dissatisfied stockholders of the Company – even if they owned less than 20% of

the B&N shares – from “cooperating” in any way in connection with a proxy

contest which might wrest control from the Riggios, even while the Riggio family

is permitted to own approximately 32.4% of the B&N shares and be excepted

from provisions of the poison pill so that they would be allowed to achieve

absolute voting control.

The poison pill effectively prohibits stockholders owning individually shares,

which if added together would be in excess of 20%, from cooperating, reaching

agreements, arrangements or understandings in connection with a proxy contest

while the Riggio family through the Company is free to engage in all of those

activities. As a result, the pill materially interferes with the stockholder franchise.

Allowing Leonard and Stephen Riggio (and other Company insiders who are

beholden to the Riggio family) to accumulate additional shares under the

Company’s compensation or benefit plans.

Allowing the Board to approve the acquisition of additional shares by the Riggios

without triggering the poison pill, but does not allow the same exception for any

other stockholders, including Yucaipa.

56. When the Board approved and adopted this blatantly discriminatory poison pill,

the Company issued a press release stating that the poison pill was “intended to protect the

Company and its stockholders from efforts to obtain control of the Company that are inconsistent

with the best interests of the Company and its stockholders.” In fact, it is clear that the Board is

only concerned with anyone other than the Riggios having the opportunity to exercise

meaningful control over the company. In July 1998, the Company adopted a poison pill with a

15% ownership trigger. However, at that time Leonard Riggio beneficially owned 24% of the

stock of the Company (in other words, almost 10% above the poison pill trigger), so the Board

“grandfathered” him in and further allowed him to increase his stake by an additional 5% under

the terms of the poison pill. In fact, as a result of his acquisition of additional shares and

Company share buybacks, Leonard Riggio’s beneficial ownership was allowed to increase to

31.9% of the stock before that poison pill expired in July 2008. Thus, the prior poison pill was

used to preclude share accumulations by others while Leonard Riggio increased his percentage

of shares from 24% to almost 32%. Once the Riggio family had obtained effective control, the

poison pill was allowed to expire. Clearly, Riggio family control and ownership accumulation is

viewed differently by the Board than the right of other stockholders to invest in B&N shares, and

to exercise their stockholder franchise as owners of the Company. It was only when Yucaipa

began to acquire sufficient shares to challenge the Riggios’ control and apply pressure to

improve the Company’s inadequate corporate governance policies and practices that the Board

suddenly felt compelled to adopt a new poison pill that protects and entrenches the Riggios and

the other incumbent Directors while depriving outside stockholders of the free exercise of the

stockholder franchise.

57. The adoption of the poison pill was not needed to accomplish the avowed purpose

of “protect[ing] the company and its stockholders from efforts to obtain control.” Even without a

poison pill, it would be impossible for a third party to obtain control of the Company in fewer

than two election cycles, taking no less than two years. In fact, allowing a person to acquire

shares equal to the percentage of shares owned by the Riggios will serve to neutralize the

existing control of the Riggios, enhancing the stockholder franchise and making the public shares

more valuable.

58. B&N’s by-laws and certificate of incorporation provide for a classified Board

consisting of three classes, with each director holding office for a term of three years. A super-

majority vote of 80% of the outstanding shares is required to amend this article in the certificate.

The Board is presently comprised of nine directors, with three seats up for election at B&N’s

upcoming annual meeting. The by-laws provide that the number of directors may be increased

or decreased by resolution of the Board, provided that the Board consists of a minimum of nine

and a maximum of twelve directors. Stockholders can only amend the by-laws at a stockholder

meeting called by the Board or by written consent, but in either case consent of 80% of the

outstanding stock is required. With control of the Board and substantially more than 20% of the

outstanding shares, the Riggios can veto any change to the staggered board or the size of the

Board.

59. Under these circumstances, there can be no reasonable likelihood of an imminent

hostile takeover if Yucaipa or another stockholder acquires a number of shares equal to or less

than the percentage of shares owned by the Riggios, as it would take at least two years to gain

control of the Board.

60. Following the adoption of the poison pill, Mr. Burkle sent a letter to Leonard

Riggio expressing his concern over the poison pill and suggesting ways in which the B&N Board

would better serve the interests of B&N and its stockholders:

1. Run the company for the best interests of all the shareholders.

The world has changed and you have too many conflicts. Sit down

with your advisors and come up with corporate governance

changes that are meaningful and empowering, not those that only

serve to entrench management and the Board, such as the recently

adopted poison pill.

2. If you want to run it like a private company and you want to run

it for your own personal benefit, you should consider making a

proposal to buy the Company.

3. If you in fact hate retail and want to take a half billion dollars

off the table, then the Board should contemplate options in which

all shareholders can participate. Options that increase shareholder

risk, but allow you as a controlling shareholder to decrease yours

by, among other things, cashing out, are not acceptable for a public

company.

I want to make sure you know where I am coming from. I also

want to make sure you know that I believe, and I think many of my

fellow shareholders would agree, that the recent actions by the

Company are not in the best interests of all shareholders. I would

like to meet with you whenever it is convenient.”

See Exhibit F. Mr. Burkle never received from Mr. Riggio a response to his letter.

Yucaipa Seeks a Waiver of the Poison Pill

61. On January 28, 2010, Yucaipa sent a letter to the Board, requesting that the Board

(a) allow Yucaipa to acquire, without triggering the poison pill provision, an amount of shares

equivalent to the amount controlled by the Riggio family, and (b) confirm that the members of

the Riggio family cannot individually or collectively acquire any more common stock without

triggering the poison pill provision.

62. In this letter, Yucaipa expressed its concerns regarding the adequacy and

enforcement of the Company’s corporate governance policies and practices, as evidenced in part

by the Company’s adoption of the poison pill. Specifically, Yucaipa expressed the following

concerns:

We believe Barnes & Noble is currently undervalued, and have

therefore bought approximately 19% of the outstanding Barnes &

Noble common stock in open market purchases. I was surprised to

find that, even though I spoke with Leonard Riggio prior to our

purchasing any shares to make sure he understood our views and

concerns as an investor, the Company has reacted to our stock

purchases by implementing a poison pill prohibiting us (or any

other non-Riggio shareholder) from acquiring stock ownership

above a 20% threshold.

The fact that the Riggio family and other Company insiders own

over 37% of the outstanding stock, and that over the past 3 years

Len was allowed to increase his personal stake by approximately

10% of the outstanding stock (to over 30% of the outstanding

shares), in my view shows that the Board and its Chairman endorse

two sets of rules: one for the Riggio family, and one for the rest of

the Company’s shareholders. I believe the poison pill allows Len

and other Company insiders to exert effective control over the

shareholder franchise, while at the same time Len has taken a great

deal of money off the table by selling his textbook business to the

Company, thereby reducing the Company’s liquidity and

burdening the Company and its shareholders with significant debt

to finance that purchase.

We believe having over 37% of the Company shares in the hands

of the Riggio family and other insiders, coupled with the 20%

ownership limitation enforced on other shareholders under the

poison pill, has a coercive effect on the Company’s other

shareholders and gives the Riggio family a preclusive advantage in

any proxy contest. This has the effect of placing de facto control

of the Company in the Riggio’s hands, despite their owning much

less than a majority of the Company’s shares.

We believe the poison pill is counterproductive, unnecessary, and

inappropriately impairs the free and fair exercise of the shareholder

franchise. Put simply, we believe it hurts the share price and

inappropriately penalizes Barnes & Noble’s “non-Riggio”

shareholders. We also firmly believe that by implementing the

poison pill but nonetheless allowing Len Riggio and other insiders

to own over 37% of the stock, the Board is sending a message to

the other shareholders and the investing community that Barnes &

Noble is a company controlled and operated for the benefit of

selected insiders.

SeeExhibit A.

63. Permitting Yucaipa to raise its stake to equal that of the Riggios without tripping

the poison pill provisions would put Yucaipa “on equal footing” with the Riggio family at the

2010 annual stockholder meeting. Without such changes, winning a proxy contest at the annual

meeting would be either mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable.

G. The

Board Confirms Its Motive in Adopting the Poison Pill

64. In a letter, dated February 17, 2010 (Exhibit B), the Board rejected Yucaipa’s

request to amend the poison pill so Yucaipa could acquire shares not to exceed the percentage

owned or controlled by the Riggios, so that the outcome of a proxy contest would not be

adversely affected by the combination of the poison pill’s percentage limitation and the

preexisting block owned by the Riggios. The Board offered conclusory, self-serving statements

that its actions were intended to “protect our shareholders” from “actions that are inconsistent

with their best interests,” but offered no legitimate explanation as to how it could be in the best

interests of the stockholders of the Company to prevent a third-party from having voting parity

with the Riggios and their fellow insiders. The Board’s refusal of Yucaipa’s request reveals that

it did not have any legitimate justification or valid corporate purpose for adopting such a

discriminatory poison pill, other than to prevent any outside stockholder from challenging the

Riggios’ control and the Directors’ incumbency.

65. Yucaipa’s letter also asked the Board to confirm that the members of the Riggio

family could not acquire additional shares, at least not without the approval of the Board. Rather

than respond to the simple “yes” or “no” question, the Board adopted an amendment to the

poison pill with respect to the definition of “Acquiring Person,” which the Board claimed in its

response letter was intended to “eliminate any ambiguity” as to whether the Riggios could

acquire more shares.” The revision is exceedingly complex and even more confusing and

ambiguous than the flawed provisions it supposedly was designed to fix. The following is a

black line comparing the amendment to the original definition of “Acquiring Person”:

(d)~~(i)~~any Person who is (i)an immediate family member of an

Excluded Person and any trust for the benefit of (or the trustees of

which include) such immediate family member or such Excluded

Person, which Person or trust acquiresCommon Sharesfrom such

Excluded Person ~~Common Shares (such shares, “Excluded~~

~~Shares”) and~~, (ii) ~~any~~an executor or trustee for the estate of an

Excluded Person or of such immediate family member,~~unless and~~

~~until, in the case of clause (i) and (ii), such Person~~which executor

or trustee acquires Common Shares from such Excluded Person or

family member (the shares acquired by any such family member,

trust, executor or trustee~~, together with all~~ as described in clause

(d)(i) or (d)(ii), the “Specified Shares” and any Person so acquiring

Specified Shares, a “Specified Person”) or (iii) an Affiliate or

Associate of a Specified Person; provided that, with respect to any

Specified Person and its Affiliates and Associates ~~of such Person,~~

~~trust, executor or trustee, shall become the Beneficial Owner of~~

~~20% or more of the Common Shares not including Excluded~~

~~Shares.~~, this clause (d) shall only be applicable if:

(x) in the event the Specified Shares acquired by a Specified

Person after the date of this Rights Agreement are more than 20%

of the Common Shares then outstanding, (1) within 90 days from

such acquisition (or such earlier or later time as the Board may

determine and so advise the Specified Person in writing), such

Specified Person and/or any or all of its Affiliates and Associates

take the necessary actions (if any) to reduce their aggregate

Beneficial Ownership of Common Shares to an amount not more

than the Specified Shares acquired by such Specified Person, (2)

such Specified Person and its Affiliates and Associates vote (which

shall include action by written consent for purposes of this

definition), with respect to any matter submitted to a vote of the

holders of Common Shares, any Common Shares then beneficially

owned by any of them (other than such Specified Person’s

Specified Shares) on a pro rata basis proportionate to all other

votes of Common Shares actually cast on the matter and (3) at all

times following a Specified Person’s acquisition of Specified

Shares, none of such Specified Person or any of its Affiliates and

Associates acquire, without the prior approval of the Board,

Beneficial Ownership of any additional Common Shares (other

than any such ownership resulting from the exercise of any options

or the vesting of any restricted shares, in each case, granted prior to

or after the date hereof under any employee benefit or

compensation plan of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries); and

(y) in the event the Specified Shares acquired by a Specified

Person after the date of this Rights Agreement are not more than

20% of the Common Shares then outstanding and, after giving

effect to the acquisition of such Specified Shares, such Specified

Person and its Affiliates and Associates then beneficially own

collectively more than 20% of the Common Shares then

outstanding, (1) within 90 days from such acquisition (or such

earlier or later time as the Board may determine and so advise the

Specified Person in writing), such Specified Person and/or any or

all of its Affiliates and Associates take the necessary actions to

reduce their aggregate Beneficial Ownership of Common Shares to

20% or less of the Common Shares then outstanding, (2) until such

Beneficial Ownership is so reduced and solely with respect to the

Common Shares beneficially owned by such Specified Person and

its Affiliates and Associates in excess of 20% of the Common

Shares then outstanding, such Specified Person and its Affiliates

and Associates vote, with respect to any matter submitted to a vote

of the holders of Common Shares, all such excess Common Shares

on a pro rata basis proportionate to all other votes of Common

Shares actually cast on the matter, (3) following its acquisition of

Specified Shares and until they comply with the requirements of

clause (y)(1) above, none of such Specified Person or any of its

Affiliates or Associates acquire, without the prior approval of the

Board, Beneficial Ownership of any additional Common Shares

(other than any such ownership resulting from the exercise of any

options or the vesting of any restricted shares, in each case, granted

prior to or after the date hereof under any employee benefit or

compensation plan of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries) and

(4) at all times following their compliance with the requirements of

clause (y)(1) above, such Specified Person and its Affiliates and

Associates, taken together, do not, without the prior approval of

the Board, become the Beneficial Owners of more than 20% of the

Common Shares then outstanding (other than any such ownership

resulting from the exercise of any options or the vesting of any

restricted shares, in each case, granted prior to or after the date

hereof under any employee benefit or compensation plan of the

Company or any of its Subsidiaries).

. . .

Any Specified Person subject to clause (x) of the proviso to clause

(d) of the second preceding sentence shall, for so long as such

Specified Person complies with the requirements of such clause

(x), be considered an “Excluded Person” for purposes of clause (d)

of such sentence (including for purposes of the definition of

“Specified Shares” and “Specified Person”). Any Excluded Person

who transfers more than 20% of the Common Shares then

outstanding to a Specified Person shall, following such transfer, no

longer be considered an Excluded Person for purposes of clause (c)

of the third preceding sentence.”

66. While the foregoing amendment places certain restrictions on family members

who acquire Specified Shares from an Excluded Person, the amendment still does not answer the

fundamental question of whether members of the Riggio family other than Leonard Riggio can

acquire shares in excess of the shares owned by them at the time the poison pill was adopted

other than from other Riggio family members. If such purchases are permitted, and there is

nothing in the poison pill that limits such purchases, the poison pill would allow the Riggio

family to acquire absolute voting control over the Company. As noted above, even if the intent

and interpretation of this amendment was to limit the Riggios’ ability to acquire additional

shares, it still allows additional share acquisition by members of the Riggio family with Board

approval, an exception that is not authorized or available to any outside stockholder.

67. There is nothing in the poison pill that would prevent the Board from amending

the terms of the poison pill to raise the trigger and allow other stockholders the potential for

voting parity with the Riggios. The poison pill expressly provides that “the Company may . . .

amend any provision of this Rights Agreement in any manner which the Company may deem

necessary or desirable,” at any time prior to the time a triggering event occurs, except that no

amendment can be made extending the expiration date or reducing the redemption price. The

poison pill also provides that the B&N Board may terminate the poison pill or redeem the Rights

prior to the time the Rights are triggered. Accordingly, the only thing preventing the Board

members from amending the poison pill to treat all stockholders the same is their desire to

protect the Riggio family and their own effective control over the Company.

Yucaipa’s Response to the Board’s February 17th Letter

68. On February 25, 2010, Yucaipa sent a letter to the Board of the Company

expressing disappointment in the Board’s refusal to permit Yucaipa to acquire additional shares

of B&N common stock without triggering the poison pill. Yucaipa repeated the fundamental

question from its January 28th letter as to whether the poison pill would allow the Riggio family

to acquire complete voting control without triggering the poison pill:

I asked a very simple question – can the Riggio family collectively

own 50% or more of the common stock without triggering the

poison pill?

Instead of responding to that straightforward question, this Board

amended the poison pill to add new provisions that in my view are

even more confusing and ambiguous than the flawed provisions

they presumably were designed to fix.

So I ask you again – can the Riggio family collectively own 50%

or more of the common stock without triggering the poison pill?

See Exhibit D. Yucaipa also requested that the Riggios not be allowed to vote their shares in any

stockholder vote on the poison pill due to the “custom-crafted provisions that create personal

rights and exceptions for the Riggio family” because “the Riggios have a clear personal interest

in the benefits this poison pill gives to them and to no other stockholders, they have a clear

conflict of interests and should not be able to exercise their disproportionate voting power (which

the poison pill itself enshrines and protects) on the question of whether to retain the poison pill.”

69. In response to other statements contained in the Board’s February 17th letter,

Yucaipa noted:

• You state that the Company adopted the current poison pill “in

response to a rapid accumulation of a significant portion of Barnes

& Noble’s outstanding common stock.” However, after the Board

implemented its prior poison pill in July 1998 (which had an

exception to the ownership limitation allowing Leonard Riggio to

hold a greater percentage of stock and even increase his

ownership), the Board endorsed actions that allowed Leonard

Riggio to increase his share ownership from 24% to 31.9% of the

outstanding stock (according to the Company’s Proxy Statements).

In denying my request, the Board has, once again, demonstrated

that it acts to protect the interests of the Riggio family in

maintaining effective control of Barnes & Noble.

• You state that the Riggio family and other Company insiders own

31% of the outstanding stock (which as you know is 11% more

than any non-Riggio shareholder is entitled to own, due to the

poison pill). However, the Company’s own public filings report

that these insiders beneficially own more than 37% of the

outstanding stock. Unless the Company has restricted the insiders’

ability to exercise their options or the insiders have committed not

to vote any shares issued upon exercise of their options, your

statements as to the insiders’ voting power are in our view

misleading. In the absence of such restrictions or commitments,

the exercise of the options and the right to vote the resulting shares

is entirely within the control of these insiders, and they absolutely

can vote 37% of the Company’s shares if they choose to do so.

• You state that the Company has previously announced it would

put the poison pill to a shareholder vote within 12 months of its

adoption. Please confirm that the poison pill will be on the ballot

at the upcoming 2010 annual meeting of shareholders (which the

Company has announced will be held as soon as reasonably

practicable after May 1, 2010 but no later than September 30,

2010).

70. The letter requested a meeting with the non-management directors. A meeting

with two B&N directors took place in New York on March 29, 2010. At that meeting, Mr.

Burkle, on behalf of Yucaipa, discussed with the directors the Company’s corporate governance

practices and Mr. Burkle reiterated (a) Yucaipa’s request that the Company’s poison pill, which

was implemented on November 17, 2009 without stockholder approval, either be cancelled or

amended to allow any stockholder to acquire the same level of share ownership as the Riggio

family, and (b) Yucaipa’s request for clarification that the Riggio family cannot acquire

additional shares under the terms of the poison pill. He also recommended that the Company

improve its corporate governance practices by adding three to four new independent directors

to the Company’s Board of Directors. The B&N directors said that they would get back to Mr.

Burkle.

71. To date, the B&N Board has not substantively responded to any of the issues

raised in the meeting or Yucaipa’s letters.

I. Irreparable Harm

72. The adoption and continuation of the poison pill is causing irreparable injury to

Yucaipa and the other stockholders of B&N in numerous respects, including:

Precluding Yucaipa from acquiring additional shares of the Company to equal or

approach the voting power of the Riggios and other insiders;

Allowing the Riggios to acquire additional shares of the Company while Yucaipa

is precluded from doing so;

Precluding Yucaipa from cooperating with or reaching an agreement, arrangement

or understanding with other stockholders of the Company for the purpose of

nominating individuals to serve as directors of the Company, conducting a proxy

contest to elect directors to the Board of the Company, or sharing expense in

connection with such a proxy contest;

Allowing the Company to utilize the assets of the Company in support of a proxy

contest to re-elect the incumbent board and maintain the control of the Riggios

while Yucaipa and other stockholders are precluded from doing so;

Precluding Yucaipa and other non-Riggio stockholders owning shares, which if

added together would be in excess of 20%, from reaching agreements,

arrangements or understandings in connection with a proxy contest while the

Riggio family through the Company is free to engage in all of those activities. As

a result, the poison pill materially interferes with the stockholder franchise. In

adopting the poison pill, the Board did not and cannot identify either a compelling

corporate justification or a threat to an important corporate policy which would

outweigh the harm to the stockholder franchise.

73. In the absence of expedited judicial relief, Yucaipa and the other public

stockholders will suffer or continue to suffer irreparable harm from the Board’s wrongful use of

the poison pill. Yucaipa expects to nominate a slate of three directors to be elected to the B&N

board. It is also considering whether to put before the stockholders other matters, such as a vote

on the poison pill, at the 2010 annual meeting (the “2010 Meeting”). Waging an effective proxy

contest is expensive and involves time and resources as well as communication and coordination

with other stockholders. The Company and the Board are free to communicate with stockholders

and to solicit views on board candidates, including reaching understandings or agreements to

place representatives of a stockholder or group of stockholders on the Board.

74. In order for Yucaipa to be able to wage a meaningful proxy contest and the B&N

stockholders – other than the Riggios and those beholden to them – to effectively exercise their

stockholder franchise, Yucaipa needs relief from this Court to level the playing field without

triggering the poison pill (1) in advance of the record date for the 2010 Meeting in order to buy

additional shares and (2) well in advance of the advance notice by law date in order to

communicate, coordinate and reach agreements or understandings with other stockholders, on

such subjects as who would be good candidates for the slate of directors to be nominated for

election at the 2010 Meeting, what issues to bring to the stockholders at the 2010 Meeting and

the possible sharing of the expense of the proxy contest.

75. B&N has not set the date for the 2010 Meeting. It has publicly stated that it will

be held not later than September 30, 2010. B&N has an advance notice by-law that requires

Yucaipa to give notice of and information regarding any nominees and proposals not less than 30

days in advance of the meeting date, provided that B&N has publicly announced the date of the

2010 Meeting at least 40 days in advance of the date of the Meeting. If notice of the meeting

date is less than 40 days, then the notice and information must be provided 10 days in advance of

the meeting date.

76. Assuming that the 2010 Meeting is to be held in mid-September, Yucaipa and the

B&N stockholders will need relief from the Court by mid-July or sooner. Unless the provisions

of the poison pill precluding cooperation or agreements among stockholders with respect to the

nomination of directors or the conduct of a proxy contest are enjoined, Yucaipa will be unable,

or irreparably impaired in its ability, to nominate candidates before the deadline established by

the advance notice provisions of the bylaw.

77. Unless the provisions of the poison pill setting the level of stock ownership at

which the poison pill is triggered are modified, Yucaipa will be unable to acquire shares

sufficient to equal or approach the number of shares owned by the Riggios in advance of the

record date to be set by the Board for the unscheduled stockholder meeting.

78. Yucaipa has suffered and is suffering irreparable injury as a consequence of the

Board’s misuse of the poison pill.

COUNT I – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Refusal to Amend the Poison Pill: Violation ofUnocal)

79. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

80. The individual defendants owed Yucaipa and B&N’s other stockholders

uncompromising fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and due care.

81. Delaware law imposes a fiduciary duty on the Director Defendants to act

reasonably and not to invoke defensive measures unless they are in response to a legitimate

threat to the Company’s policy and effectiveness.

82. The Director Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties by refusing to

amend the poison pill’s 20% trigger because their actions were not reasonable in light of any

perceived threat. The Riggios effectively control approximately 38.2% of the shares of B&N,

and there are staggered Board elections. The Company has a classified Board structure that

requires an 80% stockholder vote to change, and therefore it is effectively “locked in” under the

By-laws and Certificate of Incorporation. There is no reasonable likelihood of a hostile takeover

of the Company or the Board under these circumstances. The poison pill was not adopted in

response to any legitimate threat to corporate policy but, rather, was expressly designed and

adopted to prevent an outside stockholder from acquiring sufficient shares to challenge the

Riggios’ control and the entrenchment of the incumbent Directors. The Director Defendants

should be ordered to amend the poison pill’s trigger to an amount equal to that owned by the

Riggio family. Alternatively, the Riggio family should be enjoined from exercising voting rights

for any of their shares above the 20% ownership limit that the poison pill imposes on other

stockholders. In addition, the Director Defendants should be ordered to amend the poison pill to

make explicit that all members of the Riggio family cannot individually or collectively acquire

any more common stock without triggering the poison pill.

83. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT II – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Refusal to Amend the Poison Pill: Violation ofBlasius)

84. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

85. The Director Defendants were under a fiduciary duty to refrain from acting to

interfere with the stockholder franchise in the absence of a compelling corporate justification.

86. The Director Defendants’ refusal to increase the 20% trigger in the poison pill to

amount equivalent to those shares controlled by the Riggio family was for the principal purpose

of disenfranchising the stockholders and preventing the legitimate exercise of the stockholder

franchise, including a proxy contest. Because the Riggios effectively control approximately

38.2% of B&N’s shares, and the poison pill prevents any other stockholder from obtaining 20%

of the shares, a successful proxy contest is realistically unattainable.

87. No “compelling justification” existed for the Director Defendants’ actions. The

Director Defendants should be ordered to amend the poison pill’s trigger to an amount equal to

that owned by the Riggio family. Alternatively, the Riggio family should be enjoined from

exercising voting rights for any of their shares above the 20% ownership limit that the poison pill

imposes on other stockholders. In addition, the Director Defendants should be ordered to amend

the poison pill to make explicit that all members of the Riggio family cannot individually or

collectively acquire any more common stock without triggering the poison pill.

88. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT III – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Refusal to Amend the Poison Pill Constituted Gross Negligence)

89. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

90. The Director Defendants owe Plaintiffs and B&N’s other stockholders the utmost

duty of care.

91. The Director Defendants were grossly negligent in refusing to amend the 20%

trigger in the poison pill. The Director Defendants should be ordered to amend the poison pill’s

trigger to an amount equal to that owned by the Riggio family. Alternatively, the Riggio family

should be enjoined from exercising voting rights for any of their shares above the 20%

ownership limit that the poison pill imposes on other stockholders. In addition, the Director

Defendants should be ordered to amend the poison pill to make explicit that all members of the

Riggio family cannot individually or collectively acquire any more common stock without

triggering the poison pill.

92. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT IV – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Refusal to Amend the Poison Pill Constituted Bad Faith)

93. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

94. The Director Defendants owe Plaintiffs and B&N’s other stockholders

uncompromising fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith and due care. They must act in the good

faith belief that their actions are in the Company’s best interest.

95. By refusing to amend the 20% trigger in the poison pill, the Director Defendants

have breached their fiduciary duties by acting for an improper purpose. The Director Defendants

breached their duty of loyalty by making a bad faith decision to refuse to amend the poison pill

to allow Plaintiffs to collectively acquire shares equal to those beneficially owned by the Riggio

family without triggering the poison pill for reasons inimical to the interests of B&N and its

stockholders. The Director Defendants’ action in refusing to amend the poison pill was taken for

entrenchment purposes, and not in reaction to any perceived threat of a hostile takeover. The

Director Defendants should be ordered to amend the poison pill’s trigger to an amount equal to

that beneficially owned by the Riggio family. Alternatively, the Riggio family should be

enjoined from exercising voting rights for any of their shares above the 20% ownership limit that

the poison pill imposes on other stockholders. In addition, the Director Defendants should be

ordered to amend the poison pill to make explicit that all members of the Riggio family cannot

individually or collectively acquire any more common stock without triggering the poison pill.

96. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT V – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Entire Fairness)

97. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

98. The Board’s adoption of the poison pill and issuance of the Rights to the Riggios

was but one in a long line of self-dealing transactions between the Company and the Riggios.

The poison pill is replete with provisions that operate to the advantage of the Riggios and to the

detriment of B&N’s public stockholders. For example:

Leonard Riggio, who beneficially owned approximately 30.6% of the Company’s

common stock at the time the Board adopted the poison pill, is exempted from the

poison pill’s 20% trigger.

Even though the “grandfather” provision of the poison pill is drafted as a general

provision of purportedly neutral application, the only stockholder who can

possibly qualify for the exception to the general 20% ownership rule is Leonard

Riggio and other Riggio family members (or trusts for their benefit);

The poison pill allows for transfers of shares among the members of the Riggio

family or trusts for their benefit without triggering the poison pill, establishing

members of the Riggio family as part of a special class of stockholders with

preferential rights.

The poison pill is triggered if stockholders owning more than 20% of the stock of

the Company enter into any “agreement, arrangement or understanding (written or

oral) for the purpose of . . . voting . . . any voting securities of the Company . . .

[or] . . . cooperate in . . . influencing the control of the Company.” This provision

is intended to stifle stockholder dissent by preventing existing, dissatisfied

stockholders of the Company from “cooperating” in connection with a proxy

contest which might dislodge the Riggios from wielding de facto control of the

Company, notwithstanding that the Riggios and others beholden to them own

approximately 38.2% of the Company’s stock.

The poison pill is written with a calculated and artful ambiguity as to whether the

entire Riggio family is “grandfathered” under the poison pill but unable to acquire

any additional shares, or whether members of the family other than Leonard

Riggio could acquire additional stock of the Company, such that the family could

collectively acquire over 50% of the Company’s stock without triggering the

poison pill. Indeed, when Yucaipa twice asked in letters whether any member of

the Riggio family could acquire additional shares without triggering the poison

pill, the Board twice refused to directly answer the question.

The poison pill operates to preclude collective action by public stockholders –

none of whom own more than 20% of the Company’s stock – but apparently

allows members of the Riggio family, which already beneficially owns

approximately 32.4% of the stock, to achieve absolute voting control.

The poison pill expressly allows the Board to approve additional share

acquisitions by the Riggio family so that the poison pill is not triggered by such

acquisitions, but the poison pill does not provide the same approval mechanism

for share acquisitions by persons other than the Riggios.

The poison pill is not triggered by additional shares being issued to Leonard or

Stephen Riggio, who already beneficially own approximately 32.4% of the

Company’s stock, pursuant to the Company’s compensation plans. Thus, the

Riggios will be able to augment their share position under the poison pill.

99. The terms of the poison pill are not entirely fair to the other stockholders of the

Company. The Court should enjoin the effectuation of the offending provisions of the poison

pill identified by Plaintiffs.

100. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT VI – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Adoption of the Poison Pill With a 20% Trigger And With Exclusive Benefits

to the Riggio Family: Violation ofUnocal)

101. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

102. The Director Defendants owe Plaintiffs and B&N’s other stockholders

uncompromising fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith and due care.

103. Delaware law imposes a fiduciary duty on the Director Defendants to act

reasonably and not to invoke defensive measures unless they are in response to a legitimate

threat to the Company’s policy and effectiveness.

104. The Director Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties by approving and

implementing the poison pill with a 20% trigger and creating preferential exceptions and special

rights for the exclusive benefit of members of the Riggio family, because their actions were not

reasonable in light of any perceived threat. The Riggios effectively control approximately 38.2%

of B&N’s shares, and there are staggered Board elections that cannot be changed without Riggio

family approval due to the 80% vote required to amend the By-Laws and Certificate. There is no

reasonable likelihood of a hostile takeover under these circumstances. The poison pill was

created not to address a threat to important corporate policy, but rather to prevent another

stockholder from acquiring an equal number of shares as the Riggios, thereby counterbalancing

their influence on the Board. The poison pill also impermissibly interferes with Yucaipa’s and

other public stockholders’ right to conduct proxy contests and engage in other protected

activities in furtherance of their stockholder franchise. The Court should enjoin the effectuation

of the offending provisions of the poison pill identified by Plaintiffs.

105. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT VII – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Adoption of the Poison Pill With a 20% Trigger And With Exclusive Benefits

to the Riggio Family: Violation ofBlasius)

106. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

107. The Director Defendants owe Plaintiffs and B&N’s other stockholders

uncompromising fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith and due care.

108. The Director Defendants were under a fiduciary duty to refrain from acting to

interfere with the stockholder franchise in the absence of a compelling corporate justification.

109. By virtue of the facts set forth above, and specifically by adopting the poison pill

with a 20% trigger and creating preferential exceptions and special rights for the exclusive

benefit of members of the Riggio family in order to prevent a proxy contest, the Director

Defendants breached their fiduciary duties. Because the Riggios effectively control

approximately 38.2% of B&N’s shares and the poison pill prevents any other stockholder from

obtaining 20% of the shares, a successful proxy contest is not realistically attainable.

110. No “compelling justification” existed for the Director Defendants’ actions.

111. The Director Defendants were not acting in good faith, were not acting with an

honest belief that the actions were in the best interest of the company or its stockholders, and

wholly disregarded the best interest of B&N in taking these actions. B&N was also acting

disloyally to Plaintiffs. The poison pill impermissibly interferes with Yucaipa’s and other public

stockholders’ right to conduct proxy contests and engage in other protected activities in

furtherance of their stockholder franchise. The Court should enjoin the effectuation of the

offending provisions of the poison pill identified by Plaintiffs.

112. The Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT VIII – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Adoption of the Poison Pill With a 20% Trigger And With Exclusive Benefits

to the Riggio Family Constituted Gross Negligence)

113. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

114. The Director Defendants owe Plaintiffs and B&N’s other stockholders the utmost

duty of care.

115. The Director Defendants were grossly negligent in approving the poison pill with

a 20% trigger and when creating preferential exceptions and special rights for the exclusive

benefit of members of the Riggio family. The terms of the poison pill were established without

any independent advice to the Director Defendants with respect to its terms. The Court should

enjoin the effectuation of the offending provisions of the poison pill identified by Plaintiffs.

116. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT IX – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(Adoption of the Poison Pill With a 20% Trigger And With Exclusive Benefits to the Riggio

Family Constituted Bad Faith)

117. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

118. The Director Defendants owe Plaintiffs and B&N’s other stockholders

uncompromising fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith and due care. They must act in the good

faith belief that their actions are in the Company’s best interest.

119. By approving and implementing the poison pill with a 20% trigger, the Director

Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties by acting for an improper purpose. The Director

Defendants breached their duty of loyalty by making a bad faith decision to approve the poison

pill with a 20% trigger and by creating preferential exceptions and special rights for the

exclusive benefit of members of the Riggio family for reasons inimical to the interests of B&N

and its stockholders. The Director Defendants’ action in approving the poison pill was taken for

entrenchment purposes, and not in reaction to any perceived threat of a hostile takeover. The

Court should enjoin the effectuation of the offending provisions of the poison pill identified by

Plaintiffs.

120. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT X – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

121. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

122. Pursuant to Chapter 65 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code and Court of Chancery

Rule 57, this Court has the power to declare the rights, status or other legal relations of the

parties before it. More specifically, Section 6502 of Title 10 permits any person interested under

a written contract to obtain a declaration of that person’s rights, status or other legal relations

thereunder.

123. Plaintiffs request that this Court declare the following: All members of the

Riggio family are “Excluded Persons” under the terms of the poison pill and no member of that

family may acquire additional shares of the Company without triggering the poison pill.

124. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT XI – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

125. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs

as if fully set forth herein.

126. Pursuant to Chapter 65 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code and Court of Chancery

Rule 57, this Court has the power to declare the rights, status or other legal relations of the

parties before it. More specifically, Section 6502 of Title 10 permits any person interested under

a written contract to obtain a declaration of that person’s rights, status or other legal relations

thereunder.

127. Plaintiffs request that this Court declare the following: Any cooperation,

agreements, arrangements, or understanding with any other stockholder of the Company with

respect to a proxy contest for the election of directors or a vote of the stockholders with respect

to the poison pill does not trigger the poison pill or that any provision of the poison pill for such

is invalid and void.

128. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

* * * * * *

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court enter an Order:

A. Declaring the Director Defendants in breach of their fiduciary duties of loyalty,

care and good faith;

B. Enjoining the effectuation of the offending provisions of the poison pill identified

by Plaintiffs;

C. Directing the Directors Defendants to amend the poison pill’s trigger to an

amount equal to that controlled by the Riggio family or, alternatively, permanently enjoin the

Riggio family from exercising voting rights for any of their shares above the 20% ownership

limit that the poison pill imposes on other stockholders;

D. Declaring that all members of the Riggio family are “Excluded Persons” under the

terms of the poison pill and no member of that family may acquire additional shares of the

Company without triggering the poison pill;

E. Directing the Director Defendants to amend the poison pill to make explicit that

all members of the Riggio family cannot individually or collectively acquire any more common

stock without triggering the poison pill;

F. Declaring that cooperating and/or entering into any agreements, arrangements, or

understandings with any other stockholder of the Company with respect to a proxy contest for

the election of directors or a vote of the stockholders with respect to the poison pill or any other

proposal to be presented to stockholders for vote does not trigger the poison pill or, alternatively,

that any provision of the poison pill prohibiting such action is invalid and void;

G. Awarding Plaintiffs damages for Defendants’ illegal and improper conduct in an

amount to be determined at trial;

H. Awarding Plaintiffs’ costs and expenses incurred in this action, including, but not

limited to, experts’ and attorneys’ fees; and

I. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems just, equitable, and

proper.


		YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP

		/s/ David C. McBride


OF COUNSEL: Stephen D. Alexander J. Warren Rissier Karen J. Pazzani BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP Suite 4400 355 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90071-3106 Date: May 5, 2010		David C. McBride (# 408) William D. Johnston (# 2123) Martin S. Lessner (# 3109) Kristen Salvatore DePalma (# 4908) Emily V. Burton (# 5142) The Brandywine Building 1000 West Street, 17th Floor P.O. Box 391 Wilmington, DE 19899-0391 (302) 571-6600 Counsel for Plaintiffs

Burkle Ronald W SC 13D/ABARNES & NOBLE / BURKLE RONALD W ownership change