| Legal and Regulatory Proceedings | 3 Months Ended |
| Mar. 31, 2014 |
| Legal and Regulatory Proceedings [Abstract] | ' |
| Legal and Regulatory Proceedings | ' |
| Legal and Regulatory Proceedings |
| MasterCard is a party to legal and regulatory proceedings with respect to a variety of matters in the ordinary course of business. Some of these proceedings are based on complex claims involving substantial uncertainties and unascertainable damages. Accordingly, except as discussed below, it is not possible to determine the probability of loss or estimate damages, and therefore, MasterCard has not established reserves for any of these proceedings. When the Company determines that a loss is both probable and estimable, MasterCard records a liability and discloses the amount of the liability if it is material. When a material loss contingency is only reasonably possible, MasterCard does not record a liability, but instead discloses the nature and the amount of the claim, and an estimate of the loss or range of loss, if such an estimate can be made. Unless otherwise stated below with respect to these matters, MasterCard cannot provide an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss based on one or more of the following reasons: (1) actual or potential plaintiffs have not claimed an amount of monetary damages or the amounts are unsupportable or exaggerated, (2) the matters are in early stages, (3) there is uncertainty as to the outcome of pending appeals or motions, (4) there are significant factual issues to be resolved, (5) the existence in many such proceedings of multiple defendants or potential defendants whose share of any potential financial responsibility has yet to be determined, and/or (6) there are novel legal issues presented. Furthermore, except as identified with respect to the matters below, MasterCard does not believe that the outcome of any existing legal or regulatory proceedings to which it is a party will have a material adverse effect on its results of operations, financial condition or overall business. However, with respect to the matters discussed below, an adverse judgment or other outcome or settlement with respect to any such proceedings could result in fines or payments by MasterCard and/or could require MasterCard to change its business practices. In addition, an adverse outcome in a regulatory proceeding could lead to the filing of civil damage claims and possibly result in damage awards in amounts that could be significant. Any of these events could have a material adverse effect on MasterCard’s results of operations, financial condition and overall business. |
| Department of Justice Antitrust Litigation and Related Private Litigations |
| In April 2005, a complaint was filed in California state court on behalf of a putative class of consumers under California unfair competition law (Section 17200) and the Cartwright Act (the “Attridge action”). The claims in this action seek to leverage a 1998 action by the U.S. Department of Justice against MasterCard International, Visa U.S.A., Inc. and Visa International Corp. In that action, a federal district court concluded that both MasterCard’s Competitive Programs Policy and a Visa bylaw provision that prohibited financial institutions participating in the respective associations from issuing competing proprietary payment cards (such as American Express or Discover) constituted unlawful restraints of trade under the federal antitrust laws. The state court in the Attridge action granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ state antitrust claims but denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Section 17200 unfair competition claims. In September 2009, MasterCard executed a settlement agreement that is subject to court approval in the separate California consumer litigations (see “U.S. Merchant and Consumer Litigations”). The agreement includes a release that the parties believe encompasses the claims asserted in the Attridge action. In August 2010, the Court in the California consumer actions granted final approval to the settlement. The plaintiff from the Attridge action and three other objectors filed appeals of the settlement approval. In January 2012, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s settlement approval and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. In August 2012, the parties in the California consumer actions filed a motion seeking approval of a revised settlement agreement. The trial court granted final approval of the settlement in April 2013, to which the objectors have appealed. |
| U.S. Merchant and Consumer Litigations |
| Commencing in October 1996, several class action suits were brought by a number of U.S. merchants against MasterCard International and Visa U.S.A., Inc. challenging certain aspects of the payment card industry under U.S. federal antitrust law. The plaintiffs claimed that MasterCard’s “Honor All Cards” rule (and a similar Visa rule), which required merchants who accept MasterCard cards to accept for payment every validly presented MasterCard card, constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In June 2003, MasterCard International signed a settlement agreement to settle the claims brought by the plaintiffs in this matter, which the Court approved in December 2003. Pursuant to the settlement, MasterCard agreed, among other things, to create two separate “Honor All Cards” rules in the United States - one for debit cards and one for credit cards. |
| In addition, individual or multiple complaints have been brought in 19 states and the District of Columbia alleging state unfair competition, consumer protection and common law claims against MasterCard International (and Visa) on behalf of putative classes of consumers. The claims in these actions largely mirror the allegations made in the U.S. merchant lawsuit and assert that merchants, faced with excessive interchange fees, have passed these overhead charges to consumers in the form of higher prices on goods and services sold. MasterCard has successfully resolved the cases in all of the jurisdictions except California, where there continues to be outstanding cases. As discussed above under “Department of Justice Antitrust Litigation and Related Private Litigations,” in September 2009, the parties to the California state court actions executed a settlement agreement subject to approval by the California state court. In August 2010, the court granted final approval of the settlement, subsequent to which MasterCard made a payment of $6 million required by the settlement agreement. As noted above in more detail, the plaintiff from the Attridge action and three other objectors have filed appeals of the trial court’s final approval in April 2013 of a revised settlement. |
| ATM Non-Discrimination Rule Surcharge Complaints |
| In October 2011, a trade association of independent Automated Teller Machine (“ATM”) operators and 13 independent ATM operators filed a complaint styled as a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against both MasterCard and Visa (the “ATM Operators Complaint”). Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of non-bank operators of ATM terminals that operate ATM terminals in the United States with the discretion to determine the price of the ATM access fee for the terminals they operate. Plaintiffs allege that MasterCard and Visa have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by imposing rules that require ATM operators to charge non-discriminatory ATM surcharges for transactions processed over MasterCard’s and Visa’s respective networks that are not greater than the surcharge for transactions over other networks accepted at the same ATM. Plaintiffs seek both injunctive and monetary relief equal to treble the damages they claim to have sustained as a result of the alleged violations and their costs of suit, including attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs have not quantified their damages although they allege that they expect damages to be in the tens of millions of dollars. |
| Subsequently, multiple related complaints were filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging both federal antitrust and multiple state unfair competition, consumer protection and common law claims against MasterCard and Visa on behalf of putative classes of users of ATM services (the “ATM Consumer Complaints”). The claims in these actions largely mirror the allegations made in the ATM Operators Complaint described above, although these complaints seek damages on behalf of consumers of ATM services who pay allegedly inflated ATM fees at both bank and non-bank ATM operators as a result of the defendants’ ATM rules. Plaintiffs seek both injunctive and monetary relief equal to treble the damages they claim to have sustained as a result of the alleged violations and their costs of suit, including attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs have not quantified their damages although they allege that they expect damages to be in the tens of millions of dollars. |
| In January 2012, the plaintiffs in the ATM Operators Complaint and the ATM Consumer Complaints filed amended class action complaints that largely mirror their prior complaints. MasterCard moved to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a claim. In February 2013, the district court granted MasterCard’s motion to dismiss the complaints. The plaintiffs’ motion seeking approval to amend their complaints was denied by the district court in December 2013. The plaintiffs have appealed the dismissal of both their complaints and their motion to amend their complaints. |
| Interchange Litigation and Regulatory Proceedings |
| Interchange fees represent a sharing of payment system costs among the financial institutions participating in a four-party payment card system such as MasterCard’s. Typically, interchange fees are paid by the acquirer to the issuer in connection with purchase transactions initiated with the payment system’s cards. These fees reimburse the issuer for a portion of the costs incurred by it in providing services which are of benefit to all participants in the system, including acquirers and merchants. MasterCard or financial institutions establish default interchange fees in certain circumstances that apply when there is no other interchange fee arrangement between the issuer and the acquirer. MasterCard establishes a variety of interchange rates depending on such considerations as the location and the type of transaction, collects the interchange fee on behalf of the institutions entitled to receive it and remits the interchange fee to eligible institutions. MasterCard’s interchange fees and other practices are subject to regulatory and/or legal review and/or challenges in a number of jurisdictions, including the proceedings described below. At this time, it is not possible to determine the ultimate resolution of, or estimate the liability related to, any of these interchange proceedings (except as otherwise indicated below), as the proceedings involve complex claims and/or substantial uncertainties and, in some cases, could include unascertainable damages or fines. Except as described below, no provision for losses has been provided in connection with them. Some of the proceedings described below could have a significant impact on our customers in the applicable country and on MasterCard’s level of business in those countries. The proceedings reflect the significant and intense legal, regulatory and legislative scrutiny worldwide that interchange fees and acceptance practices have been receiving. When taken as a whole, the resulting decisions, regulations and legislation with respect to interchange fees and acceptance practices may have a material adverse effect on the Company’s prospects for future growth and its overall results of operations, financial position and cash flows. |
| United States. In June 2005, the first of a series of complaints were filed on behalf of merchants (the majority of the complaints are styled as class actions, although a few complaints were filed on behalf of individual merchant plaintiffs) against MasterCard International Incorporated, Visa U.S.A., Inc., Visa International Service Association and a number of financial institutions. Taken together, the claims in the complaints are generally brought under both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibit monopolization and attempts or conspiracies to monopolize a particular industry, and some of these complaints contain unfair competition law claims under state law. The complaints allege, among other things, that MasterCard, Visa, and certain financial institutions conspired to set the price of interchange fees, enacted point of sale acceptance rules (including the no surcharge rule) in violation of antitrust laws and engaged in unlawful tying and bundling of certain products and services. The cases have been consolidated for pre-trial proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in MDL No. 1720. The plaintiffs have filed a consolidated class action complaint that seeks treble damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief. |
| In July 2006, the group of purported merchant class plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint alleging that MasterCard’s initial public offering of its Class A Common Stock in May 2006 (the “IPO”) and certain purported agreements entered into between MasterCard and financial institutions in connection with the IPO: (1) violate U.S. antitrust laws and (2) constituted a fraudulent conveyance because the financial institutions allegedly attempted to release, without adequate consideration, MasterCard’s right to assess them for MasterCard’s litigation liabilities. In November 2008, the district court granted MasterCard’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ supplemental complaint in its entirety with leave to file an amended complaint. The class plaintiffs repled their complaint. The causes of action and claims for relief in the complaint generally mirror those in the plaintiffs’ original IPO-related complaint although the plaintiffs have attempted to expand their factual allegations based upon discovery that has been garnered in the case. The class plaintiffs seek treble damages and injunctive relief including, but not limited to, an order reversing and unwinding the IPO. In July 2009, the class plaintiffs and individual plaintiffs served confidential expert reports detailing the plaintiffs’ theories of liability and alleging damages in the tens of billions of dollars. The defendants served their expert reports in December 2009 rebutting the plaintiffs’ assertions both with respect to liability and damages. |
| In February 2011, MasterCard and MasterCard International Incorporated entered into each of: (1) an omnibus judgment sharing and settlement sharing agreement with Visa Inc., Visa U.S.A. Inc. and Visa International Service Association and a number of financial institutions; and (2) a MasterCard settlement and judgment sharing agreement with a number of financial institutions. The agreements provide for the apportionment of certain costs and liabilities which MasterCard, the Visa parties and the financial institutions may incur, jointly and/or severally, in the event of an adverse judgment or settlement of one or all of the cases in the merchant litigations. Among a number of scenarios addressed by the agreements, in the event of a global settlement involving the Visa parties, the financial institutions and MasterCard, MasterCard would pay 12% of the monetary portion of the settlement. In the event of a settlement involving only MasterCard and the financial institutions with respect to their issuance of MasterCard cards, MasterCard would pay 36% of the monetary portion of such settlement. |
| In October 2012, the parties entered into a definitive settlement agreement with respect to the merchant class litigation and the defendants separately entered into a settlement agreement with the individual merchant plaintiffs (the terms of which were consistent with a memorandum of understanding that was executed by the parties in July 2012). The settlements included cash payments that were apportioned among the defendants pursuant to the omnibus judgment sharing and settlement sharing agreement described above. MasterCard also agreed to provide class members with a short-term reduction in default credit interchange rates and to modify certain of its business practices, including its No Surcharge Rule. The court granted final approval of the settlement in December 2013, which has been appealed by objectors to the settlement. |
| Merchants representing slightly more than 25% of the MasterCard and Visa purchase volume over the relevant period chose to opt out of the class settlement. MasterCard anticipates that most of the larger merchants who opted out of the settlement will initiate separate actions seeking to recover damages, and over 30 opt-out complaints have been filed on behalf of numerous merchants in various jurisdictions. Those cases are in the early stages and the defendants have consolidated all of these matters (except for one state court action) in front of the same court that is overseeing the approval of the settlement. In addition, certain competitors have raised objections to the settlement, including Discover. Discover’s objections include a challenge to the settlement on the grounds that certain of the rule changes agreed to in the settlement constitute a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. |
| MasterCard recorded a pre-tax charge of $770 million in the fourth quarter of 2011 and an additional $20 million pre-tax charge in the second quarter of 2012 relating to the settlement agreements described above. In 2012, MasterCard paid $790 million with respect to the settlements, of which $726 million was paid into a qualified cash settlement fund related to the merchant class litigation. At December 31, 2013 and March 31, 2014, MasterCard had $723 million and $540 million, respectively, in the qualified cash settlement fund classified as restricted cash on its balance sheet. The class settlement agreement provided for a return to the defendants of a portion of the class cash settlement fund, based upon the percentage of purchase volume represented by the opt out merchants. This resulted in $164 million from the cash settlement fund being returned to MasterCard in January 2014 and reclassified at that time from restricted cash to cash and cash equivalents. In the fourth quarter of 2013, MasterCard recorded an incremental net pre-tax charge of $95 million related to these opt out merchants, representing a change in its estimate of probable losses relating to these matters. Accordingly, as of March 31, 2014, MasterCard had accrued a liability of $799 million as a reserve for both the merchant class litigation and the filed and anticipated opt out merchant cases. |
| The portion of the accrued liability relating to the opt out merchants does not represent an estimate of a loss, if any, if the opt out merchant matters were litigated to a final outcome, in which case MasterCard cannot estimate the potential liability. MasterCard’s estimate involves significant judgment and may change depending on progress in settlement negotiations or depending upon decisions in any opt out merchant cases. In addition, in the event that the merchant class litigation settlement approval is overturned on appeal, a negative outcome in the litigation could have a material adverse effect on MasterCard’s results of operations, financial position and cash flows. |
| Canada. In December 2010, the Canadian Competition Bureau (the “CCB”) filed an application with the Canadian Competition Tribunal to strike down certain MasterCard rules related to point-of-sale acceptance, including the “honor all cards” and “no surcharge” rules. In July 2013, the Competition Tribunal issued a decision in MasterCard’s favor and dismissed the CCB’s application, which was not appealed. In December 2010, a complaint styled as a class action lawsuit was commenced against MasterCard in Quebec on behalf of Canadian merchants. That suit essentially repeated the allegations and arguments of the CCB application to the Canadian Competition Tribunal and sought compensatory and punitive damages in unspecified amounts, as well as injunctive relief. In March 2011, a second purported class action lawsuit was commenced in British Columbia against MasterCard, Visa and a number of large Canadian financial institutions, and in May 2011 a third purported class action lawsuit was commenced in Ontario against the same defendants. These suits allege that MasterCard, Visa and the financial institutions have engaged in a conspiracy to increase or maintain the fees paid by merchants on credit card transactions and establish rules which force merchants to accept all MasterCard and Visa credit cards and prevent merchants from charging more for payments with MasterCard and Visa premium cards. The British Columbia suit seeks compensatory damages in unspecified amounts, and the Ontario suit seeks compensatory damages of $5 billion. The British Columbia and Ontario suits also seek punitive damages in unspecified amounts, as well as injunctive relief, interest and legal costs. In April 2012, the Quebec suit was amended to include the same defendants and similar claims as in the British Columbia and Ontario suits. With respect to the status of the proceedings: (1) the Quebec suit has been stayed, (2) the Ontario suit is being temporarily suspended while the British Columbia suit proceeds, and (3) the British Columbia court issued an order in March 2014 certifying a number of the merchants’ causes of action. The parties have appealed the certification decision. Additional complaints styled as class actions have been filed in Saskatchewan and Alberta. The claims in these complaints largely mirror the claims in the British Columbia and Ontario suits. If the class action lawsuits are ultimately successful, negative decisions could have a significant adverse impact on the revenue of MasterCard’s Canadian customers and on MasterCard’s overall business in Canada and could result in substantial damage awards. |
| European Union. In September 2003, the European Commission issued a Statement of Objections challenging MasterCard Europe’s cross-border default interchange fees and, in June 2006, it issued a supplemental Statement of Objections covering credit, debit and commercial card fees. In December 2007, the European Commission announced a decision that applies to MasterCard’s default cross-border interchange fees for MasterCard and Maestro branded consumer payment card transactions in the European Economic Area (“EEA”) (the European Commission refers to these as “MasterCard’s MIF”), but not to commercial card transactions (the European Commission stated publicly that it has not yet finished its investigation of commercial card interchange fees). The decision required MasterCard to stop applying the MasterCard MIF, to refrain from repeating the conduct, and not apply its then recently adopted (but never implemented) Maestro SEPA and Intra-Eurozone default interchange fees to debit card payment transactions within the Eurozone. The decision did not impose a fine on MasterCard, but provides for a daily penalty of up to 3.5% of MasterCard’s daily consolidated global turnover in the preceding business year (which MasterCard estimates to be approximately $0.8 million per day) in the event that MasterCard fails to comply. To date, MasterCard has not been assessed any such penalty. In March 2008, MasterCard filed an application for annulment of the European Commission’s decision with the General Court of the European Union. |
| Following discussions with the European Commission, MasterCard announced that, effective in June 2008, MasterCard would temporarily repeal its then current default intra-EEA cross-border consumer card interchange fees in conformity with the decision. In October 2008, MasterCard received an information request from the European Commission in connection with the decision concerning certain pricing changes that MasterCard implemented as of October 2008. In March 2009, MasterCard gave certain undertakings to the European Commission and, in response, in April 2009, the Commissioner for competition policy and the Directorate-General for Competition informed MasterCard that, subject to MasterCard’s fulfilling its undertakings, they do not intend to pursue proceedings for non-compliance with or circumvention of the December 2007 decision or for infringing the antitrust laws in relation to the October 2008 pricing changes, the introduction of new cross-border consumer default interchange fees or any of the other MasterCard undertakings. MasterCard’s undertakings include: (1) repealing the October 2008 pricing changes; (2) adopting a specific methodology for the setting of cross-border consumer default interchange fees; (3) establishing new default cross-border consumer card interchange fees as of July 2009 such that the weighted average interchange fee for credit card transactions does not exceed 30 basis points and for debit card transactions does not exceed 20 basis points; (4) introducing a new rule prohibiting its acquirers from requiring merchants to process all of their MasterCard and Maestro transactions with the acquirer; and (5) introducing a new rule requiring its acquirers to provide merchants with certain pricing information in connection with MasterCard and Maestro transactions. The undertakings were effective until the General Court of the European Union issued a judgment in May 2012. |
| In May 2012, the General Court of the European Union issued a judgment dismissing the Company’s appeal and upholding the European Commission’s decision. In August 2012, the Company appealed the judgment to the European Union Court of Justice (the “ECJ”). The Advocate General to the ECJ issued a non-binding opinion in January 2014 recommending that the ECJ reject MasterCard’s appeal. Historically, in a majority of cases, the ECJ has followed the Advocate General’s opinions. MasterCard anticipates that the ECJ will issue its final decision sometime in 2014. Should the ECJ ultimately reject MasterCard’s appeal, the European Commission’s December 2007 decision will be upheld. Although the interim agreement with the European Commission, by its terms, formally ended on the day of the General Court’s judgment, MasterCard intends to act consistent with the terms of the agreement. |
| In addition, the European Commission decision could lead to additional competition authorities in European Union member states commencing investigations or proceedings regarding domestic interchange fees or initiating regulation. The possibility of such actions has increased due to the judgment of the General Court. The judgment also increases the possibility of an adverse outcome for the Company in related and pending matters (such as the interchange proceedings in Hungary, Italy and Poland, as indicated below). In addition, the European Commission’s decision could lead, and in the case of the United Kingdom and Belgium (as described below) has led, to the filing of private actions against MasterCard Europe by merchants and/or consumers which, if MasterCard is unsuccessful in its appeal of the General Court decision, could result in MasterCard owing substantial damages. |
| In April 2013, the European Commission announced that it has opened proceedings to investigate: (1) MasterCard’s interregional interchange fees that apply when a card issued outside the EEA is used at a merchant location in the EEA, (2) central acquiring rules, which apply when a merchant uses the services of an acquirer established in another country and (3) other business rules and practices (including the “honor all cards” rule). |
| Additional Litigations in Europe. In the United Kingdom, beginning in May 2012, a number of retailers filed claims against MasterCard seeking damages for alleged anti-competitive conduct with respect to MasterCard’s cross-border interchange fees and its U.K. and Ireland domestic interchange fees. More than 20 different retailers have filed claims or notice of claims. An additional 13 potential claimant retailers have agreed to delay filing their claims in exchange for MasterCard agreeing to suspend the running of the time limitations on their damages claims. Although the claimants have not quantified the full extent of their compensatory and punitive damages, their purported damages exceed $2 billion. MasterCard has submitted statements of defense to the retailers’ claims disputing liability and damages. The litigations are at an early stage, and the courts in two of the actions will address preliminary issues (such as the time period for which the retailers could seek damages) before addressing issues concerning any liability and damages. Similarly, in Belgium, a retailer filed claims in December 2012 for unspecified damages with respect to MasterCard’s cross-border and domestic interchange fees paid in Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg. |
| Additional Interchange Proceedings. In February 2007, the Office for Fair Trading of the United Kingdom (the “OFT”) commenced an investigation of MasterCard’s current U.K. default credit card interchange fees and so-called “immediate debit” cards to determine whether such fees contravene U.K. and European Union competition law. The OFT had informed MasterCard that it did not intend to issue a Statement of Objections or otherwise commence formal proceedings with respect to the investigation prior to the judgment of the General Court of the European Union with respect to MasterCard’s appeal of the December 2007 cross-border interchange fee decision of the European Commission, and this period was extended until the completion of MasterCard’s appeal to the Court of Justice. If the OFT ultimately determines that any of MasterCard’s U.K. interchange fees contravene U.K. and European Union competition law, it may issue a new decision and possibly levy fines accruing from the date of its first decision. Such a decision could lead to the filing of private actions against MasterCard by merchants and/or consumers which could result in an award or awards of substantial damages and could have a significant adverse impact on the revenue of MasterCard International’s U.K. customers and MasterCard’s overall business in the U.K. |
| Regulatory authorities in a number of other jurisdictions around the world, including Hungary, Italy and Poland, have commenced competition-related proceedings or inquiries into interchange fees and acceptance practices. In some of these jurisdictions, fines have been or could be assessed against MasterCard. These matters could have a negative impact on MasterCard’s business in the specific country where the regulatory authority is located but would not be expected to have a material impact on MasterCard’s overall revenue. In addition, regulatory authorities and/or central banks in certain other jurisdictions, including Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Russia, Singapore and South Africa, are reviewing MasterCard’s and/or its customers’ interchange fees and/or other practices and may seek to commence proceedings related to, or otherwise regulate, the establishment of such fees and/or such practices. |
| Other Regulatory Proceedings |
| In addition to challenges to interchange fees, MasterCard’s other standards and operations are also subject to regulatory and/or legal review and/or challenges in a number of jurisdictions from time to time. These proceedings tend to reflect the increasing global regulatory focus to which the payments industry is subject and, when taken as a whole with other regulatory and legislative action, such actions could result in the imposition of costly new compliance burdens on MasterCard and its customers and may lead to increased costs and decreased transaction volumes and revenue. |
