| CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 21036P108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | STZ | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US21036P1084 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935670706 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-May-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-May-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 18-Jul-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 1 | Jennifer M. Daniels | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | Jeremy S.G. Fowden | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 3 | Jose M. Madero Garza | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Daniel J. McCarthy | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the selection of KPMG LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending February 28, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, by an advisory vote, the compensation of the Company's named executive officers as disclosed in the Proxy Statement. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 707 | | | | | 0 | | | 01-Jul-2022 | 01-Jul-2022 | |
| LINDE PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G5494J103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | LIN | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | IE00BZ12WP82 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935660200 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 28-Apr-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 28-Apr-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United Kingdom | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 22-Jul-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Stephen F. Angel | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Sanjiv Lamba | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Prof. DDr. Ann-Kristin Achleitner | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Dr. Thomas Enders | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Edward G. Galante | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Joe Kaeser | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Dr. Victoria Ossadnik | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Prof. Dr. Martin H. Richenhagen | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Alberto Weisser | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Robert L. Wood | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2a. | To ratify, on an advisory and non-binding basis, the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PWC") as the independent auditor. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 2b. | To authorize the Board, acting through the Audit Committee, to determine PWC's remuneration. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on an advisory and non- binding basis, the compensation of Linde plc's Named Executive Officers, as disclosed in the 2022 Proxy statement. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To approve, on an advisory and non- binding basis, the Directors' Remuneration Report (excluding the Directors' Remuneration Policy) as set forth in the Company's IFRS Annual Report for the financial year ended December 31, 2021, as required under Irish law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To determine the price range at which Linde plc can re-allot shares that it acquires as treasury shares under Irish law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | To consider and vote on a shareholder proposal regarding supermajority voting requirements in Linde's Irish Constitution. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: For the reasons stated below and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we believe that the advantages of eliminating supermajority provisions outweigh the benefits of maintaining it as a voting standard. We believe that a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore, paving way for a more meaningful voting outcome. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Resolution. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 406 | | | | | 0 | | | 06-Jul-2022 | 06-Jul-2022 | |
| TESLA, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 88160R101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TSLA | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-Aug-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US88160R1014 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935679540 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Jun-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Jun-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-Aug-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director: Ira Ehrenpreis | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.2 | Election of Director: Kathleen Wilson- Thompson | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Tesla proposal for adoption of amendments to certificate of incorporation to reduce director terms to two years. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: While we recognize the Company's efforts to reduce director terms to two years, we believe that the election of directors is an important means for shareholders to influence corporate governance policies and for the Board to reiterate its commitment to good corporate governance and accountability to shareholders. We prefer that the entire board of a company be elected annually to provide appropriate responsiveness to shareholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Tesla proposal for adoption of amendments to certificate of incorporation and bylaws to eliminate applicable supermajority voting requirements. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Tesla proposal for adoption of amendments to certificate of incorporation to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock by 4,000,000,000 shares. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Tesla proposal to ratify the appointment of independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal regarding proxy access. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. We believe that because the board of directors serves as the representatives of shareholders, shareholders should have the right to nominate their own representatives. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder proposal regarding annual reporting on anti-discrimination and harassment efforts. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder proposal regarding annual reporting on Board diversity. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. We believe that the proposal would encourage good governance and enhance shareholder value by bringing together a diverse range of skills and experience necessary in building a constructive and challenging board. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Stockholder proposal regarding reporting on employee arbitration. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 10. | Stockholder proposal regarding reporting on lobbying. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 11. | Stockholder proposal regarding adoption of a freedom of association and collective bargaining policy. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 12. | Stockholder proposal regarding additional reporting on child labor. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 13. | Stockholder proposal regarding additional reporting on water risk. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that improved transparency and accountability will enhance the Company's commitment to long-term sustainability. In accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 299 | | | | | 0 | | | 27-Jul-2022 | 27-Jul-2022 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 780 | | | | | 0 | | | 27-Jul-2022 | 27-Jul-2022 | |
| NIKE, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 654106103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NKE | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6541061031 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935692803 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Jul-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 08-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Class B Director: Alan B. Graf, Jr. | | | Management | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Class B Director: Peter B. Henry | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Class B Director: Michelle A. Peluso | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve executive compensation by an advisory vote. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | To ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To approve the amendment of the NIKE, Inc. Employee Stock Purchase Plan to increase authorized shares. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To consider a shareholder proposal regarding a policy on China sourcing, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,605 | | | | 0 | | | 31-Aug-2022 | 31-Aug-2022 | |
| TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 874054109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TTWO | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 16-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8740541094 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935695366 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 25-Jul-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 25-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Strauss Zelnick | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Michael Dornemann | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: J. Moses | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Michael Sheresky | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: LaVerne Srinivasan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Susan Tolson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Paul Viera | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Roland Hernandez | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: William "Bing" Gordon | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Ellen Siminoff | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, on a non-binding advisory basis, of the compensation of the Company's "named executive officers" as disclosed in the Proxy Statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 433 | | | | | 0 | | | 25-Aug-2022 | 25-Aug-2022 | |
| FEDEX CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 31428X106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | FDX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US31428X1063 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935696306 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 25-Jul-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 25-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: MARVIN R. ELLISON | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: STEPHEN E. GORMAN | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: SUSAN PATRICIA GRIFFITH | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: KIMBERLY A. JABAL | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: AMY B. LANE | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: R. BRAD MARTIN | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: NANCY A. NORTON | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: FREDERICK P. PERPALL | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: JOSHUA COOPER RAMO | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: SUSAN C. SCHWAB | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: FREDERICK W. SMITH | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: DAVID P. STEINER | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1m. | Election of Director: RAJESH SUBRAMANIAM | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1n. | Election of Director: V. JAMES VENA | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1o. | Election of Director: PAUL S. WALSH | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as FedEx's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval of amendment to the FedEx Corporation 2019 Omnibus Stock Incentive Plan to increase the number of authorized shares. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal regarding independent board chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal regarding report on alignment between company values and electioneering contributions. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Stockholder proposal regarding lobbying activity and expenditure report. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 8. | Stockholder proposal regarding assessing inclusion in the workplace. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise, and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that the adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Proposal not applicable | | | | | | Shareholder | Against | | | None | | | | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 625 | | | | | 0 | | | 14-Sep-2022 | 14-Sep-2022 | |
| GENERAL MILLS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 370334104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | GIS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US3703341046 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935697877 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 29-Jul-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 29-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: R. Kerry Clark | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: David M. Cordani | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: C. Kim Goodwin | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Jeffrey L. Harmening | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Rating of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Rating. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Maria G. Henry | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jo Ann Jenkins | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Elizabeth C. Lempres | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Diane L. Neal | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Steve Odland | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Maria A. Sastre | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Eric D. Sprunk | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Jorge A. Uribe | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Approval of the 2022 Stock Compensation Plan. | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seeks to align CEO pay more closely with the company's performance and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratify Appointment of the Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal - Independent Board Chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding a Plastic Packaging Report. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 855 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-Sep-2022 | 12-Sep-2022 | |
| CENTENE CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 15135B101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Special | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CNC | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US15135B1017 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935702870 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Aug-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Aug-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | To adopt an amendment to Centene Corporation's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to declassify the Board of Directors immediately. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To adopt an amendment to Centene Corporation's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to eliminate the prohibition on stockholders calling special meetings. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | To adopt an amendment to Centene Corporation's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to grant stockholders the right to act by written consent, subject to certain terms and conditions. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To approve the adjournment of the Special Meeting to a later date or time if necessary or appropriate, including to solicit additional proxies in favor of any of Proposals 1, 2 or 3 if there are insufficient votes at the time of the Special Meeting to approve any such Proposal. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,279 | | | | 0 | | | 19-Sep-2022 | 19-Sep-2022 | |
| PROLOGIS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 74340W103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Special | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PLD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 28-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US74340W1036 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935697651 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 29-Jul-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 29-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 27-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | To approve the "Prologis common stock issuance proposal" (as defined in the Proxy Statement), which involves the issuance of common stock of Prologis, Inc. in connection with the merger of Duke Realty Corporation with and into Compton Merger Sub LLC, pursuant to which each outstanding share of Duke Realty Corporation common stock will be converted into the right to receive 0.475 of a newly issued share of Prologis, Inc. common stock, on the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of June 11, 2022. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve one or more adjournments of the Prologis, Inc. special meeting to another date, time or place, if necessary or appropriate, to solicit additional proxies in favor of the Prologis common stock issuance proposal (the "Prologis adjournment proposal"). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 684 | | | | | 0 | | | 19-Sep-2022 | | |
| PROLOGIS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 74340W103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Special | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PLD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 28-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US74340W1036 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935699554 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Aug-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Aug-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 27-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | To approve the "Prologis common stock issuance proposal" (as defined in the Proxy Statement), which involves the issuance of common stock of Prologis, Inc. in connection with the merger of Duke Realty Corporation with and into Compton Merger Sub LLC, pursuant to which each outstanding share of Duke Realty Corporation common stock will be converted into the right to receive 0.475 of a newly issued share of Prologis, Inc. common stock, on the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of June 11, 2022. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve one or more adjournments of the Prologis, Inc. special meeting to another date, time or place, if necessary or appropriate, to solicit additional proxies in favor of the Prologis common stock issuance proposal (the "Prologis adjournment proposal"). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 30 | | | | | 0 | | | 19-Sep-2022 | 19-Sep-2022 | |
| THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 742718109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PG | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7427181091 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935703149 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 12-Aug-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 12-Aug-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-Oct-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: B. Marc Allen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Angela F. Braly | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Amy L. Chang | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Joseph Jimenez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Christopher Kempczinski | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Debra L. Lee | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Terry J. Lundgren | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Christine M. McCarthy | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Jon R. Moeller | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Rajesh Subramaniam | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Patricia A. Woertz | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratify Appointment of the Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve the Company's Executive Compensation (the "Say on Pay" vote) | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,934 | | | | 0 | | | 19-Sep-2022 | 19-Sep-2022 | |
| PAYCHEX, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 704326107 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PAYX | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 13-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7043261079 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935704812 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 15-Aug-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 15-Aug-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 12-Oct-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Martin Mucci | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Thomas F. Bonadio | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Joseph G. Doody | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: David J.S. Flaschen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: B. Thomas Golisano | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Pamela A. Joseph | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Kevin A. Price | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Joseph M. Tucci | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Joseph M. Velli | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Kara Wilson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | ADVISORY VOTE TO APPROVE NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICER COMPENSATION. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | RATIFICATION OF SELECTION OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP TO SERVE AS THE INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 878 | | | | | 0 | | | 21-Sep-2022 | 21-Sep-2022 | |
| COPART, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 217204106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Special | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CPRT | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 31-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US2172041061 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935722480 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Oct-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 28-Oct-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | To approve an amendment and restatement of Copart, Inc.'s Certificate of Incorporation to increase the number of shares of our common stock authorized for issuance from 400,000,000 shares to 1,600,000,000 shares, primarily to facilitate a 2-for-1 split of the Company's common stock in the form of a stock dividend (the "Authorized Share Increase Proposal"). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To authorize the adjournment of the special meeting, if necessary, to solicit additional proxies if there are insufficient votes in favor of the Authorized Share Increase Proposal. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 905 | | | | | 0 | | | 26-Oct-2022 | 26-Oct-2022 | |
| KLA CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 482480100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | KLAC | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4824801009 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935712681 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 12-Sep-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 12-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Robert Calderoni | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Jeneanne Hanley | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Emiko Higashi | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Kevin Kennedy | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Gary Moore | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Marie Myers | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Kiran Patel | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Victor Peng | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Robert Rango | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Richard Wallace | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve on a non-binding, advisory basis our named executive officer compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To consider a stockholder proposal requesting our Board to issue a report regarding net zero targets and climate transition planning, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' SRI Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 329 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-Oct-2022 | 12-Oct-2022 | |
| FOX CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 35137L105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | FOXA | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US35137L1052 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935714039 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 12-Sep-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 12-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | Non Voting agenda | | | | | | Management | Abstain | | | None | | | | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,849 | | | | 0 | | | 26-Oct-2022 | 26-Oct-2022 | |
| LAM RESEARCH CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 512807108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | LRCX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5128071082 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935711728 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 09-Sep-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 09-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Sohail U. Ahmed | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Timothy M. Archer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Eric K. Brandt | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Michael R. Cannon | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Bethany J. Mayer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jyoti K. Mehra | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Abhijit Y. Talwalkar | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Lih Shyng (Rick L.) Tsai | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Leslie F. Varon | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve the compensation of the named executive officers of Lam Research, or "Say on Pay." | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Ratification of the appointment of the independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 166 | | | | | 0 | | | 17-Oct-2022 | 17-Oct-2022 | |
| AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 053015103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ADP | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0530151036 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935711829 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 12-Sep-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 12-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 08-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Peter Bisson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: David V. Goeckeler | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Linnie M. Haynesworth | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: John P. Jones | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Francine S. Katsoudas | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Nazzic S. Keene | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Thomas J. Lynch | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Scott F. Powers | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: William J. Ready | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Carlos A. Rodriguez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Sandra S. Wijnberg | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Ratification of the Appointment of Auditors. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Amendment to the Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Employees' Savings-Stock Purchase Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 602 | | | | | 0 | | | 26-Oct-2022 | 26-Oct-2022 | |
| CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 21036P108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Special | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | STZ | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US21036P1084 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935714990 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Sep-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 08-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | To approve and adopt the Amended and Restated Charter, which will effectuate the Reclassification described in the Proxy Statement. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To adjourn the Special Meeting to a later date or dates, if necessary or appropriate, to solicit additional proxies if there are insufficient votes to approve the Reclassification Proposal at the time of the Special Meeting. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 707 | | | | | 0 | | | 31-Oct-2022 | 31-Oct-2022 | |
| ORACLE CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 68389X105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ORCL | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 16-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US68389X1054 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935715182 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Awo Ablo | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | Jeffrey S. Berg | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 3 | Michael J. Boskin | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 4 | Safra A. Catz | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 5 | Bruce R. Chizen | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 6 | George H. Conrades | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 7 | Lawrence J. Ellison | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| | | | 8 | Rona A. Fairhead | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 9 | Jeffrey O. Henley | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 10 | Renee J. James | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 11 | Charles W. Moorman | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 12 | Leon E. Panetta | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 13 | William G. Parrett | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 14 | Naomi O. Seligman | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 15 | Vishal Sikka | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve the Compensation of our Named Executive Officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of the Selection of our Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,096 | | | | 0 | | | 03-Nov-2022 | 03-Nov-2022 | |
| THE ESTEE LAUDER COMPANIES INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 518439104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | EL | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5184391044 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935714659 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Class II Director: Ronald S. Lauder | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Class II Director: William P. Lauder | | | Management | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Inside director serving as a member of a Key Board Committee Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1c. | Election of Class II Director: Richard D. Parsons | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Class II Director: Lynn Forester de Rothschild | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Class II Director: Jennifer Tejada | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Class II Director: Richard F. Zannino | | Management | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Ratification of appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as independent auditors for the 2023 fiscal year. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 436 | | | | | 0 | | | 03-Nov-2022 | 03-Nov-2022 | |
| SYSCO CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 871829107 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SYY | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8718291078 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935717427 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Daniel J. Brutto | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Ali Dibadj | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Larry C. Glasscock | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Jill M. Golder | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Bradley M. Halverson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: John M. Hinshaw | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Kevin P. Hourican | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Hans-Joachim Koerber | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Alison Kenney Paul | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Edward D. Shirley | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | �� | Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Sheila G. Talton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, by advisory vote, the compensation paid to Sysco's named executive officers, as disclosed in Sysco's 2022 proxy statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Sysco's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To consider a stockholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, related to a third party civil rights audit. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 5. | To consider a stockholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, related to third party assessments of supply chain risks. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | To consider a stockholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, related to a report on the reduction of plastic packaging use. | Shareholder | Against | | | None | | | | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,480 | | | | 0 | | | 07-Nov-2022 | 07-Nov-2022 | |
| COPART, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 217204106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CPRT | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US2172041061 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935730552 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 11-Oct-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 11-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-Dec-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Willis J. Johnson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: A. Jayson Adair | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Matt Blunt | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Steven D. Cohan | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Daniel J. Englander | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: James E. Meeks | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Thomas N. Tryforos | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Diane M. Morefield | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Stephen Fisher | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Attending less than 75% of the Aggregate Board and Committee Meetings Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that directors, specifically members/Chairmen of any of the key Board committees must actively participate and attend Board and Committee meetings to ensure effective and prudent exercise of their fiduciary duties as directors. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Cherylyn Harley LeBon | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Carl D. Sparks | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory (non-binding) stockholder vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay vote). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending July 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 905 | | | | | 0 | | | 14-Nov-2022 | 14-Nov-2022 | |
| CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 17275R102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CSCO | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US17275R1023 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935723216 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Oct-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Dec-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: M. Michele Burns | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Wesley G. Bush | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Michael D. Capellas | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Mark Garrett | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: John D. Harris II | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Dr. Kristina M. Johnson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Roderick C. Mcgeary | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Sarah Rae Murphy | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Charles H. Robbins | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Brenton L. Saunders | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Dr. Lisa T. Su | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Marianna Tessel | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Ratification of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Cisco's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Stockholder Proposal - Approval to have Cisco's Board issue a tax transparency report in consideration of the Global Reporting Initiative's Tax Standard. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 6,222 | | | | 0 | | | 23-Nov-2022 | 23-Nov-2022 | |
| MEDTRONIC PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G5960L103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MDT | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | IE00BTN1Y115 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935723610 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 11-Oct-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 11-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Dec-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Richard H. Anderson | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Craig Arnold | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Scott C. Donnelly | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Lidia L. Fonseca | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Andrea J. Goldsmith, Ph.D. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Randall J. Hogan, III | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Kevin E. Lofton | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Geoffrey S. Martha | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1i. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Elizabeth G. Nabel, M.D. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Denise M. O'Leary | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2023 Annual General Meeting: Kendall J. Powell | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Ratifying, in a non-binding vote, the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent auditor for fiscal year 2023 and authorizing, in a binding vote, the Board of Directors, acting through the Audit Committee, to set the auditor's remuneration. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
| 3. | Approving, on an advisory basis, the Company's executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
| 4. | Renewing the Board of Directors' authority to issue shares under Irish law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Renewing the Board of Directors' authority to opt out of pre-emption rights under Irish law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Authorizing the Company and any subsidiary of the Company to make overseas market purchases of Medtronic ordinary shares. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal could be detrimental to the interests of the shareholders and could unintentionally manipulate the Company's true value. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,677 | | | | 0 | | | 30-Nov-2022 | 30-Nov-2022 | |
| MICROSOFT CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 594918104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MSFT | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 13-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5949181045 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935722567 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 12-Oct-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 12-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 12-Dec-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Reid G. Hoffman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Hugh F. Johnston | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Teri L. List | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Satya Nadella | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Sandra E. Peterson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Penny S. Pritzker | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Carlos A. Rodriguez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Charles W. Scharf | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: John W. Stanton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: John W. Thompson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Emma N. Walmsley | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Padmasree Warrior | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of the Selection of Deloitte & Touche LLP as our Independent Auditor for Fiscal Year 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Shareholder Proposal - Cost/Benefit Analysis of Diversity and Inclusion | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Hiring of Persons with Arrest or Incarceration Records | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Investment of Retirement Funds in Companies Contributing to Climate Change | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Government Use of Microsoft Technology | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Development of Products for Military | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 9. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Tax Transparency | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 515 | | | | | 0 | | | 05-Dec-2022 | 05-Dec-2022 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 7,340 | | | | 0 | | | 05-Dec-2022 | 05-Dec-2022 | |
| FACTSET RESEARCH SYSTEMS INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 303075105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | FDS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 15-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US3030751057 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935726161 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Oct-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 14-Dec-2022 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve a three-year term expiring in 2025: James J. McGonigle | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve a three-year term expiring in 2025: F. Philip Snow | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve a three-year term expiring in 2025: Maria Teresa Tejada | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the appointment of the accounting firm of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending August 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To vote on a non-binding advisory resolution to approve the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To approve an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to declassify the Board of Directors, including procedures relating to Board composition. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To approve an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to remove certain business combination restrictions. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | To approve an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to add a Delaware forum selection provision. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | To approve an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to add a federal forum selection provision. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 8. | To approve an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to remove a creditor compromise provision. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 9. | To approve amendment and restatement of the Certificate of Incorporation to clarify, streamline and modernize the Certificate of Incorporation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 186 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-Dec-2022 | 07-Dec-2022 | |
| MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 595112103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MU | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 12-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5951121038 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935742177 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 14-Nov-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 14-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 11-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Richard M. Beyer | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1b. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Lynn A. Dugle | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Steven J. Gomo | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Linnie M. Haynesworth | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Mary Pat McCarthy | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Sanjay Mehrotra | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Robert E. Switz | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: MaryAnn Wright | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | PROPOSAL BY THE COMPANY TO APPROVE A NON-BINDING RESOLUTION TO APPROVE THE COMPENSATION OF OUR NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AS DESCRIBED IN THE PROXY STATEMENT. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | PROPOSAL BY THE COMPANY TO APPROVE OUR AMENDED AND RESTATED 2007 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN TO INCREASE THE SHARES RESERVED FOR ISSUANCE THERUNDER BY 50 MILLION AS DESCRIBED IN THE PROXY STATEMENT. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | PROPOSAL BY THE COMPANY TO RATIFY THE APPOINTMENT OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP AS THE INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM OF THE COMPANY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING AUGUST 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,395 | | | | 0 | | | 29-Dec-2022 | 29-Dec-2022 | |
| LINDE PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G5494J103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Special | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | LIN | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | IE00BZ12WP82 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935750819 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Dec-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United Kingdom | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | To approve, subject to the approval by the requisite majorities at the Court Meeting, the scheme of arrangement that is included in Linde's Proxy Statement, referred to as the "Scheme" or "Scheme of Arrangement," in its original form or with or subject to any modification, addition or condition approved or imposed by the Irish High Court. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, subject to the Scheme becoming effective, an amendment to the articles of association of Linde, which are part of the Linde constitution, referred to as the "Articles," in respect of certain mechanics to effect the Scheme as set forth in Linde's Proxy Statement. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | To approve the Common Draft Terms of Merger dated December 2, 2022 between Linde and New Linde, that are included in Linde's Proxy Statement, whereupon and assuming the other conditions to the merger are satisfied, Linde would be merged with and into New Linde, with New Linde surviving the merger, and the directors of Linde be authorized to take all steps necessary or appropriate to execute and carry the merger into effect. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 498 | | | | | 0 | | | 27-Dec-2022 | 27-Dec-2022 | |
| LINDE PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G5494J111 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Special | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935750821 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Dec-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United Kingdom | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | To approve the Scheme of Arrangement under Irish Law between Linde plc and the Scheme Shareholders, in its original form or with or subject to any modification(s), addition(s) or condition(s) approved or imposed by the Irish High Court. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 498 | | | | | 0 | | | 13-Jan-2023 | 13-Jan-2023 | |
| INTUIT INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 461202103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | INTU | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4612021034 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935744006 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Nov-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 18-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Eve Burton | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Scott D. Cook | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Richard L. Dalzell | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Sasan K. Goodarzi | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Deborah Liu | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Tekedra Mawakana | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Suzanne Nora Johnson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Thomas Szkutak | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Raul Vazquez | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve Intuit's executive compensation (say-on-pay) | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Ratification of the selection of Ernst & Young LLP as Intuit's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending July 31, 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval of the Amended and Restated Employee Stock Purchase Plan to increase the share reserve by an additional 2,000,000 shares | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 399 | | | | | 0 | | | 03-Jan-2023 | 03-Jan-2023 | |
| COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 22160K105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | COST | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US22160K1051 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935745933 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 11-Nov-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 11-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 18-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Susan L. Decker | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Kenneth D. Denman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Richard A. Galanti | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Hamilton E. James | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: W. Craig Jelinek | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Sally Jewell | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Charles T. Munger | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Jeffrey S. Raikes | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: John W. Stanton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Ron M. Vachris | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Maggie Wilderotter | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of selection of independent auditors. | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal regarding report on risks of state policies restricting reproductive rights. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 137 | | | | | 0 | | | 05-Jan-2023 | 05-Jan-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 340 | | | | | 0 | | | 05-Jan-2023 | 05-Jan-2023 | |
| VISA INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 92826C839 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | V | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US92826C8394 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935745779 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 25-Nov-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 25-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Lloyd A. Carney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Kermit R. Crawford | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Francisco Javier Fernández-Carbajal | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Alfred F. Kelly, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Ramon Laguarta | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Teri L. List | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: John F. Lundgren | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Denise M. Morrison | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Linda J. Rendle | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Maynard G. Webb, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To hold an advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes to approve executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of KPMG LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | To vote on a stockholder proposal requesting an independent board chair policy. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,001 | | | | 0 | | | 10-Jan-2023 | 10-Jan-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,360 | | | | 0 | | | 10-Jan-2023 | 10-Jan-2023 | |
| BECTON, DICKINSON AND COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 075887109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | BDX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0758871091 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935749789 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 05-Dec-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 05-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1A. | Election of Director: William M. Brown | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1B. | Election of Director: Catherine M. Burzik | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1C. | Election of Director: Carrie L. Byington | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1D. | Election of Director: R Andrew Eckert | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1E. | Election of Director: Claire M. Fraser | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1F. | Election of Director: Jeffrey W. Henderson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1G. | Election of Director: Christopher Jones | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1H. | Election of Director: Marshall O. Larsen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1I. | Election of Director: Thomas E. Polen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1J. | Election of Director: Timothy M. Ring | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1K. | Election of Director: Bertram L. Scott | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the selection of the independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote to approve the frequency of named executive officer compensation advisory votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Approval of amendments to the 2004 Employee and Director Equity-Based Compensation Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seeks to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | A shareholder proposal to require prior shareholder approval of certain termination payments, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 726 | | | | | 0 | | | 09-Jan-2023 | 09-Jan-2023 | |
| AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 009158106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | APD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 26-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0091581068 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935746365 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 30-Nov-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 30-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 25-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Tonit M. Calaway | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Charles Cogut | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Lisa A. Davis | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Seifollah Ghasemi | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: David H.Y. Ho | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Edward L. Monser | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Matthew H. Paull | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Wayne T. Smith | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory vote approving the compensation of the Company's executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratify the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 386 | | | | | 0 | | | 10-Jan-2023 | 10-Jan-2023 | |
| ACCENTURE PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G1151C101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ACN | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 01-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | IE00B4BNMY34 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935750174 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Dec-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 31-Jan-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Appointment of Director: Jaime Ardila | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Appointment of Director: Nancy McKinstry | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Appointment of Director: Beth E. Mooney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Appointment of Director: Gilles C. Pélisson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Appointment of Director: Paula A. Price | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Appointment of Director: Venkata (Murthy) Renduchintala | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Appointment of Director: Arun Sarin | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Appointment of Director: Julie Sweet | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Appointment of Director: Tracey T. Travis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, in a non-binding vote, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | To approve, in a non-binding vote, the frequency of future non-binding votes to approve the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify, in a non-binding vote, the appointment of KPMG LLP ("KPMG") as independent auditor of Accenture and to authorize, in a binding vote, the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors to determine KPMG's remuneration. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | To grant the Board of Directors the authority to issue shares under Irish law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | To grant the Board of Directors the authority to opt-out of pre-emption rights under Irish law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | To determine the price range at which Accenture can re-allot shares that it acquires as treasury shares under Irish law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 555 | | | | | 0 | | | 17-Jan-2023 | 17-Jan-2023 | |
| EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 291011104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | EMR | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 07-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US2910111044 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935748600 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 29-Nov-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 29-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 06-Feb-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR TERMS ENDING IN 2026: Martin S. Craighead | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR TERMS ENDING IN 2026: Gloria A. Flach | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR TERMS ENDING IN 2026: Matthew S. Levatich | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Ratification of KPMG LLP as Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, by non-binding advisory vote, of Emerson Electric Co. executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory vote on frequency of future shareholder advisory approval of the Company's executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,199 | | | | 0 | | | 19-Jan-2023 | 19-Jan-2023 | |
| THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 254687106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Contested-Annual | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DIS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US2546871060 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935763816 - Opposition | | | |
| Record Date | | | 23-Jan-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 23-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 08-Feb-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a | TRIAN RECOMMENDED NOMINEE: Nelson Peltz | | Management | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1b | OPPOSED COMPANY NOMINEE: Michael B.G. Froman | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1c | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Mary T. Barra | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1d | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Safra A. Catz | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1e | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Amy L. Chang | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1f | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Francis A. deSouza | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1g | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Carolyn N. Everson | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1h | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Robert A. Iger | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1i | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Maria Elena Lagomasino | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1j | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Calvin R. McDonald | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1k | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Mark G. Parker | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 1l | ACCEPTABLE COMPANY NOMINEE: Derica W. Rice | Management | Withheld | | | Withheld | | | * | | | | | None | | | | |
| 2 | RATIFICATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP AS THE COMPANY'S INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS FOR FISCAL 2023. | Management | Abstain | | | None | | | | | | | | None | | | | |
| 3 | CONSIDERATION OF AN ADVISORY VOTE TO APPROVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. | Management | Abstain | | | None | | | | | | | | None | | | | |
| 4 | CONSIDERATION OF AN ADVISORY VOTE ON THE FREQUENCY OF VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. | Management | Abstain | | | None | | | | | | | | None | | | | |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal requesting a business operations report. | Shareholder | Abstain | | | None | | | | | | | | None | | | | |
| 6 | Shareholder Proposal requesting charitable contributions disclosure. | Shareholder | Abstain | | | None | | | | | | | | None | | | | |
| 7 | Shareholder Proposal requesting a political expenditures report. | Shareholder | Abstain | | | None | | | | | | | | None | | | | |
| 8 | Trian's proposal to repeal certain bylaws. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | None | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 329 | | | | | 0 | | | 10-Feb-2023 | | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,630 | | | | 0 | | | 10-Feb-2023 | | |
| DEERE & COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 244199105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DE | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 22-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US2441991054 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935755009 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Dec-2022 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 21-Feb-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Leanne G. Caret | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Tamra A. Erwin | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Alan C. Heuberger | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Charles O. Holliday, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Michael O. Johanns | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Clayton M. Jones | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: John C. May | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Gregory R. Page | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Sherry M. Smith | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Dmitri L. Stockton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Sheila G. Talton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation("say-on-pay"). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future say-on-pay votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as Deere's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal regarding termination pay. | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer a competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 240 | | | | | 0 | | | 06-Feb-2023 | 06-Feb-2023 | |
| QUALCOMM INCORPORATED | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 747525103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | QCOM | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7475251036 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935757281 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 09-Jan-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 09-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Sylvia Acevedo | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Cristiano R. Amon | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Mark Fields | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Jeffrey W. Henderson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Gregory N. Johnson | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Ann M. Livermore | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Mark D. McLaughlin | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Jamie S. Miller | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Irene B. Rosenfeld | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1j. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Kornelis (Neil) Smit | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Jean- Pascal Tricoire | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director to hold office until the next annual meeting of stockholders: Anthony J. Vinciquerra | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent public accountants for our fiscal year ending September 24, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval of the QUALCOMM Incorporated 2023 Long-Term Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 970 | | | | | 0 | | | 23-Feb-2023 | 23-Feb-2023 | |
| ANALOG DEVICES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 032654105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ADI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0326541051 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935758740 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Jan-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Vincent Roche | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: James A. Champy | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: André Andonian | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Anantha P. Chandrakasan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Edward H. Frank | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Laurie H. Glimcher | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Karen M. Golz | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Mercedes Johnson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Kenton J. Sicchitano | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Ray Stata | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Susie Wee | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the selection of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 636 | | | | | 0 | | | 16-Feb-2023 | 16-Feb-2023 | |
| JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G51502105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | JCI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | IE00BY7QL619 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935759590 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 05-Jan-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 05-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: Jean Blackwell | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: Pierre Cohade | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: Michael E. Daniels | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: W. Roy Dunbar | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: Gretchen R. Haggerty | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: Ayesha Khanna | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: Simone Menne | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: George R. Oliver | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: Jürgen Tinggren | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: Mark Vergnano | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director for a period of one year, expiring at the end of the Company's Annual General Meeting in 2024: John D. Young | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2.a | To ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the independent auditors of the Company. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 2.b | To authorize the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors to set the auditors' remuneration. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To authorize the Company and/or any subsidiary of the Company to make market purchases of Company shares. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We note, however, that in absence of the purpose of the proposed share repurchase, we believe that approval of the proposal could be detrimental to the interests of the shareholders and could unintentionally manipulate the Company's true value. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
| 4. | To determine the price range at which the Company can re-allot shares that it holds as treasury shares (Special Resolution). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To approve, in a non-binding advisory vote, the compensation of the named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | To approve, in a non-binding advisory vote, the frequency of the non-binding advisory vote on the compensation of the named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | To approve the Directors' authority to allot shares up to approximately 20% of issued share capital. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 8. | To approve the waiver of statutory preemption rights with respect to up to 5% of the issued share capital (Special Resolution). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 3,150 | | | | 0 | | | 27-Feb-2023 | 27-Feb-2023 | |
| APPLIED MATERIALS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 038222105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AMAT | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0382221051 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935760858 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 11-Jan-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 11-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 08-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Rani Borkar | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Judy Bruner | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Xun (Eric) Chen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Aart J. de Geus | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Gary E. Dickerson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Thomas J. Iannotti | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Alexander A. Karsner | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Kevin P. March | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Yvonne McGill | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Scott A. McGregor | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of Applied Materials' named executive officers for fiscal year 2022. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the frequency of holding an advisory vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of KPMG LLP as Applied Materials' independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal to amend the appropriate company governing documents to give the owners of a combined 10% of our outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareholder meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe it is appropriate to enable holders of at least 10% or more of the common stock to have an unlimited ability to call special meetings for any purpose at any time. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal to improve the executive compensation program and policy to include the CEO pay ratio factor. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that CEO-to-worker pay ratio is material to shareholders as this would provide a valuable additional metric for evaluating and voting on executive compensation practices and Say-on-Pay proxy proposals. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 842 | | | | | 0 | | | 23-Feb-2023 | 23-Feb-2023 | |
| APPLE INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 037833100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AAPL | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0378331005 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935757700 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 09-Jan-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 09-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a | Election of Director: James Bell | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b | Election of Director: Tim Cook | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c | Election of Director: Al Gore | | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d | Election of Director: Alex Gorsky | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e | Election of Director: Andrea Jung | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f | Election of Director: Art Levinson | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1g | Election of Director: Monica Lozano | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h | Election of Director: Ron Sugar | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i | Election of Director: Sue Wagner | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Apple's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of advisory votes on executive compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | A shareholder proposal entitled "Civil Rights and Non-Discrimination Audit Proposal" | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity in the community it serves. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | A shareholder proposal entitled "Communist China Audit" | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | A shareholder proposal on Board policy for communication with shareholder proponents | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 8. | A shareholder proposal entitled "Racial and Gender Pay Gaps" | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay disparities by gender and race in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | A shareholder proposal entitled "Shareholder Proxy Access Amendments" | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that adopting a proxy access bylaw in accordance to the shareholder proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,609 | | | | 0 | | | 01-Mar-2023 | 01-Mar-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 14,080 | | | | 0 | | | 01-Mar-2023 | 01-Mar-2023 | |
| AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 00846U101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | A | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US00846U1016 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935762218 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Jan-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 14-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director for a three-year term: Heidi K. Kunz | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.2 | Election of Director for a three-year term: Susan H. Rataj | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.3 | Election of Director for a three-year term: George A. Scangos, Ph.D. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.4 | Election of Director for a three-year term: Dow R. Wilson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, on a non-binding advisory basis, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To ratify the Audit and Finance Committee's appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To approve amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation to create a new stockholder right to call a special meeting. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe it is appropriate to enable holders of 20% of the common stock to have an unlimited ability to call special meetings for any purpose at any time. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | An advisory vote on the frequency of the stockholder vote to approve the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 622 | | | | | 0 | | | 02-Mar-2023 | 02-Mar-2023 | |
| STARBUCKS CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 855244109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SBUX | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 23-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8552441094 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935762193 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Jan-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Jan-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 22-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Richard E. Allison, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Andrew Campion | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Beth Ford | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Mellody Hobson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Jørgen Vig Knudstorp | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Satya Nadella | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Laxman Narasimhan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Howard Schultz | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, on a nonbinding basis, of the compensation paid to our named executive officers | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on a nonbinding basis, of the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratify the selection of Deloitte & Touche LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Report on Plant-Based Milk Pricing | | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe that producing the requested report would be in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | CEO Succession Planning Policy Amendment | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will enable to expand and formalize CEO succession in order to recruit the best candidate who is fit to the role. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Annual Reports on Company Operations in China | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Investors favor policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of their investments. There is increasing recognition that company risks related to human rights violations, such as litigation, reputational damage, and production disruptions, can adversely affect shareholder value. To manage such risks effectively, companies must assess the risks posed by human rights practices in their operations and supply chain, as well as by the use of their products. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Assessment of Worker Rights Commitments | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Creation of Board Committee on Corporate Sustainability | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will strengthen the Company's commitment to sustainability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,144 | | | | 0 | | | 15-Mar-2023 | 15-Mar-2023 | |
| BROADCOM INC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 11135F101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AVGO | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US11135F1012 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935766189 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 31-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Diane M. Bryant | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Gayla J. Delly | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Raul J. Fernandez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Eddy W. Hartenstein | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Check Kian Low | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Justine F. Page | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Henry Samueli | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Hock E. Tan | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Harry L. You | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm of Broadcom for the fiscal year ending October 29, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approve an amendment and restatement of the 2012 Stock Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote to approve the named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Advisory vote on the frequency of the advisory vote on named executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 356 | | | | | 0 | | | 22-Mar-2023 | 22-Mar-2023 | |
| THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 254687106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DIS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US2546871060 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935766595 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 31-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Mary T. Barra | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Safra A. Catz | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Amy L. Chang | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Francis A. deSouza | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Carolyn N. Everson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Michael B.G. Froman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Robert A. Iger | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Maria Elena Lagomasino | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Calvin R. McDonald | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Mark G. Parker | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Derica W. Rice | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accountants for fiscal 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Consideration of an advisory vote to approve executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Consideration of an advisory vote on the frequency of advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, requesting a report on operations related to China. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, requesting charitable contributions disclosure. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company carefully evaluates and reviews the Company's charitable activities, and makes information regarding the Company's corporate giving publicly available, and we do not believe that implementing the proposal would justify the administrative costs and efforts, nor would it provide a corresponding meaningful benefit to the Company's shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, requesting a political expenditures report. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 281 | | | | | 0 | | | 23-Mar-2023 | 23-Mar-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,630 | | | | 0 | | | 23-Mar-2023 | 23-Mar-2023 | |
| SCHLUMBERGER LIMITED (SCHLUMBERGER N.V.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 806857108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SLB | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 05-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | AN8068571086 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935767105 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 04-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Peter Coleman | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Patrick de La Chevardière | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Miguel Galuccio | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Olivier Le Peuch | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Samuel Leupold | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Tatiana Mitrova | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Maria Moraeus Hanssen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Vanitha Narayanan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Mark Papa | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Jeff Sheets | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Ulrich Spiesshofer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory approval of our executive compensation. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approval of our consolidated balance sheet at December 31, 2022; our consolidated statement of income for the year ended December 31, 2022; and the declarations of dividends by our Board of Directors in 2022, as reflected in our 2022 Annual Report to Shareholders. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent auditors for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 3,393 | | | | 0 | | | 13-Mar-2023 | 13-Mar-2023 | |
| A.O. SMITH CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 831865209 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AOS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8318652091 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935771267 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Ronald D Brown | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 2 | Earl E. Exum | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 3 | Michael M. Larsen | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Idelle K. Wolf | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Proposal to approve, by nonbinding advisory vote, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Proposal to ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm of the corporation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Proposal to approve, by nonbinding advisory vote, whether the company will conduct future advisory votes on the compensation of our named executive officers every year, two years or three years. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal requesting a Board report assessing inclusion in our workplace, if properly presented at the Annual Meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,321 | | | | 0 | | | 29-Mar-2023 | 29-Mar-2023 | |
| SYNOPSYS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 871607107 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SNPS | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 12-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8716071076 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935768599 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 11-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Aart J. de Geus | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Luis Borgen | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Marc N. Casper | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Janice D. Chaffin | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Bruce R. Chizen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Mercedes Johnson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Jeannine P. Sargent | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: John G. Schwarz | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Roy Vallee | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | To approve our 2006 Employee Equity Incentive Plan, as amended, in order to, among other items, increase the number of shares available for issuance under the plan by 3,300,000 shares. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency of an advisory vote on the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of our named executive officers, as disclosed in the Proxy Statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | To ratify the selection of KPMG LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending October 28, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | To vote on a stockholder proposal regarding special stockholder meetings, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 210 | | | | | 0 | | | 27-Mar-2023 | 27-Mar-2023 | |
| LENNAR CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 526057104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | LEN | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 12-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5260571048 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935769159 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 15-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 15-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 11-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Amy Banse | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Rick Beckwitt | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Tig Gilliam | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Sherrill W. Hudson | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Jonathan M. Jaffe | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Sidney Lapidus | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Teri P. McClure | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Stuart Miller | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. |
| 1i. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Armando Olivera | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Jeffrey Sonnenfeld | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the frequency of the stockholder vote on the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for our fiscal year ending November 30, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Vote on a stockholder proposal regarding the elimination of our dual-class common stock voting structure. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that shareholder approval is warranted. We oppose such differential voting power as it may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic importance to them. We prefer that companies do not utilize multiple class capital structures to provide equal voting rights to all shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,642 | | | | 0 | | | 29-Mar-2023 | 29-Mar-2023 | |
| U.S. BANCORP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 902973304 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | USB | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US9029733048 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935771914 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Warner L. Baxter | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Dorothy J. Bridges | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Elizabeth L. Buse | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Andrew Cecere | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Alan B. Colberg | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Kimberly N. Ellison- Taylor | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g | Election of Director: Kimberly J. Harris | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Roland A. Hernandez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Richard P. McKenney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Yusuf I. Mehdi | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Loretta E. Reynolds | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: John P. Wiehoff | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Scott W. Wine | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | An advisory vote to approve the compensation of our executives disclosed in the proxy statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | An advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | The ratification of the selection of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent auditor for the 2023 fiscal year. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,099 | | | | 0 | | | 20-Mar-2023 | 20-Mar-2023 | |
| M&T BANK CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 55261F104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MTB | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US55261F1049 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935775873 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 23-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 23-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: John P. Barnes | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Robert T. Brady | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Carlton J. Charles | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Jane Chwick | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: William F. Cruger, Jr. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: T. Jefferson Cunningham III | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Gary N. Geisel | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Leslie V. Godridge | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: René F. Jones | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1j. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Richard H. Ledgett, Jr. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Melinda R. Rich | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1l. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Robert E. Sadler, Jr. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Denis J. Salamone | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1n. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: John R. Scannell | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1o. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Rudina Seseri | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1p. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Kirk W. Walters | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1q. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR FOR ONE- YEAR TERM AND UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED: Herbert L. Washington | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | TO APPROVE THE 2022 COMPENSATION OF M&T BANK CORPORATION'S NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | TO RECOMMEND THE FREQUENCY OF FUTURE ADVISORY VOTES ON THE COMPENSATION OF M&T BANK CORPORATION'S NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | TO APPROVE THE AMENDMENT AND RESTATEMENT OF THE M&T BANK CORPORATION 2019 EQUITY INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | TO RATIFY THE APPOINTMENT OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP AS THE INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM OF M&T BANK CORPORATION FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 186 | | | | | 0 | | | 20-Mar-2023 | 20-Mar-2023 | |
| EQT CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 26884L109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | EQT | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US26884L1098 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935772601 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 18-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Lydia I. Beebe | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Lee M. Canaan | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Janet L. Carrig | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Frank C. Hu | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Kathryn J. Jackson, Ph.D | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: John F. McCartney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: James T. McManus II | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Anita M. Powers | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Daniel J. Rice IV | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Toby Z. Rice | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Hallie A. Vanderhider | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve the 2022 compensation of EQT Corporation's named executive officers (say-on-pay) | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of advisory votes on named executive officer compensation (say-on-frequency) | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as EQT Corporation's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year ending December 31, 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,051 | | | | 0 | | | 21-Mar-2023 | 21-Mar-2023 | |
| HCA HEALTHCARE, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 40412C101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | HCA | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US40412C1018 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935776902 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 18-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Thomas F. Frist III | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Samuel N. Hazen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Meg G. Crofton | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Robert J. Dennis | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Nancy-Ann DeParle | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: William R. Frist | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Hugh F. Johnston | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Michael W. Michelson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Wayne J. Riley, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Andrea B. Smith | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve the HCA Healthcare, Inc. 2023 Employee Stock Purchase Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, regarding political spending disclosure. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, regarding amendment to Patient Safety and Quality of Care Committee charter. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is not in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 173 | | | | | 0 | | | 04-Apr-2023 | 04-Apr-2023 | |
| ADOBE INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 00724F101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ADBE | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 20-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US00724F1012 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935770126 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 19-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Amy Banse | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Brett Biggs | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Melanie Boulden | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Frank Calderoni | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Laura Desmond | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Shantanu Narayen | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1g. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Spencer Neumann | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Kathleen Oberg | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Dheeraj Pandey | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: David Ricks | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: Daniel Rosensweig | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1l. | Election of Director to serve for a one-year term: John Warnock | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approve the 2019 Equity Incentive Plan, as amended, to increase the available share reserve by 12,000,000 shares. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratify the appointment of KPMG LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for our fiscal year ending on December 1, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency of the advisory vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Stockholder Proposal - Report on Hiring of Persons with Arrest or Incarceration Records. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 542 | | | | | 0 | | | 09-Apr-2023 | 09-Apr-2023 | |
| KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 494368103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | KMB | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 20-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4943681035 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935770140 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 19-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Sylvia M. Burwell | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: John W. Culver | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Michael D. Hsu | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Mae C. Jemison, M.D. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: S. Todd Maclin | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Deirdre A. Mahlan | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Sherilyn S. McCoy | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Christa S. Quarles | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Jaime A. Ramirez | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Dunia A. Shive | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Mark T. Smucker | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director for a term expire at 2024 Annual Meeting: Michael D. White | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Auditor. | | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 771 | | | | | 0 | | | 27-Mar-2023 | 27-Mar-2023 | |
| HUMANA INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 444859102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | HUM | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 20-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4448591028 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935775467 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 28-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 28-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 19-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a) | Election of Director: Raquel C. Bono, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b) | Election of Director: Bruce D. Broussard | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c) | Election of Director: Frank A. D'Amelio | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d) | Election of Director: David T. Feinberg, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e) | Election of Director: Wayne A. I. Frederick, M.D. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f) | Election of Director: John W. Garratt | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g) | Election of Director: Kurt J. Hilzinger | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h) | Election of Director: Karen W. Katz | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i) | Election of Director: Marcy S. Klevorn | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j) | Election of Director: William J. McDonald | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k) | Election of Director: Jorge S. Mesquita | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l) | Election of Director: Brad D. Smith | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | The ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Non-binding advisory vote for the approval of the compensation of the named executive officers as disclosed in the 2023 proxy statement. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Non-binding advisory vote for the approval of the frequency with which future stockholder votes on the compensation of the named executive officers will be held. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 96 | | | | | 0 | | | 27-Mar-2023 | 27-Mar-2023 | |
| CORTEVA INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 22052L104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CTVA | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 21-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US22052L1044 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935773920 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 20-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Lamberto Andreotti | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Klaus A. Engel | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: David C. Everitt | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Janet P. Giesselman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Karen H. Grimes | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Michael O. Johanns | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Rebecca B. Liebert | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Marcos M. Lutz | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Charles V. Magro | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Nayaki R. Nayyar | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Gregory R. Page | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Kerry J. Preete | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Patrick J. Ward | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory resolution to approve executive compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,293 | | | | 0 | | | 28-Mar-2023 | 28-Mar-2023 | |
| L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 502431109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | LHX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 21-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5024311095 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935775532 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 20-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Sallie B. Bailey | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Peter W. Chiarelli | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Thomas A. Dattilo | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Roger B. Fradin | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Joanna L. Geraghty | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Harry B. Harris, Jr. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Lewis Hay III | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Christopher E. Kubasik | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Rita S. Lane | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Robert B. Millard | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Edward A. Rice, Jr. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director for a Term Expiring at the 2024 Annual Meeting: Christina L. Zamarro | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, in an Advisory Vote, of the Compensation of Named Executive Officers as Disclosed in the Proxy Statement | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, in an Advisory Vote, of the Frequency of Future Shareholder Votes Regarding the Compensation of Named Executive Officers | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of Appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for Fiscal Year 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal titled "Transparency in Regard to Lobbying" | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 255 | | | | | 0 | | | 04-Apr-2023 | 04-Apr-2023 | |
| FASTENAL COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 311900104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | FAST | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 22-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US3119001044 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935770669 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 22-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 22-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 21-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Scott A. Satterlee | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Michael J. Ancius | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Stephen L. Eastman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Daniel L. Florness | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Rita J. Heise | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Hsenghung Sam Hsu | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Daniel L. Johnson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Nicholas J. Lundquist | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Sarah N. Nielsen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Reyne K. Wisecup | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of KPMG LLP as independent registered public accounting firm for the 2023 fiscal year. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, by non-binding vote, of executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval, by non-binding vote, of the frequency of future executive compensation votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 3,114 | | | | 0 | | | 13-Apr-2023 | 13-Apr-2023 | |
| MSCI INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 55354G100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MSCI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US55354G1004 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935774554 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Henry A. Fernandez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Robert G. Ashe | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Wayne Edmunds | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Catherine R. Kinney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Robin Matlock | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jacques P. Perold | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: C.D. Baer Pettit | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Sandy C. Rattray | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Linda H. Riefler | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Marcus L. Smith | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Rajat Taneja | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Paula Volent | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, by non-binding vote, our executive compensation, as described in these proxy materials. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To recommend, by non-binding vote, the frequency of future advisory votes to approve executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as independent auditor. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 357 | | | | | 0 | | | 30-Mar-2023 | 30-Mar-2023 | |
| INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 459200101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | IBM | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4592001014 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935775405 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Thomas Buberl | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: David N. Farr | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Alex Gorsky | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Michelle J. Howard | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Arvind Krishna | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Andrew N. Liveris | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: F. William McNabb III | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Martha E. Pollack | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Joseph R. Swedish | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Peter R. Voser | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Frederick H. Waddell | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director for a Term of One Year: Alfred W. Zollar | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory Vote Regarding the Frequency of the Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal to Have an Independent Board Chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder Proposal Requesting a Public Report on Lobbying Activities. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder Proposal Requesting a Public Report on Congruency in China Business Operations and ESG Activities. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder Proposal Requesting a Public Report on Harassment and Discrimination Prevention Efforts. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,218 | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| THE COCA-COLA COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 191216100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | KO | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1912161007 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935776685 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Herb Allen | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Marc Bolland | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Ana Botín | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Christopher C. Davis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Barry Diller | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Carolyn Everson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Helene D. Gayle | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Alexis M. Herman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Maria Elena Lagomasino | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Amity Millhiser | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: James Quincey | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Caroline J. Tsay | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: David B. Weinberg | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes to approve executive compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as independent Auditors of the Company to serve for the 2023 fiscal year | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareowner proposal requesting an audit of the Company's impact on nonwhite stakeholders | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareowner proposal requesting a global transparency report | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareowner proposal regarding political expenditures values alignment | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareowner proposal requesting an independent Board chair policy | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareowner proposal requesting a report on risks from state policies restricting reproductive rights | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,997 | | | | 0 | | | 09-Apr-2023 | 09-Apr-2023 | |
| WELLS FARGO & COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 949746101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | WFC | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US9497461015 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935776774 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Steven D. Black | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Mark A. Chancy | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Celeste A. Clark | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Theodore F. Craver, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Richard K. Davis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Wayne M. Hewett | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: CeCelia ("CeCe") G. Morken | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Maria R. Morris | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Felicia F. Norwood | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Richard B. Payne, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Ronald L. Sargent | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Charles W. Scharf | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Suzanne M. Vautrinot | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory resolution to approve executive compensation (Say on Pay). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory resolution on the frequency of future advisory votes to approve executive compensation (Say on Frequency). | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratify the appointment of KPMG LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal - Adopt Simple Majority Vote. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: For the reasons stated below and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we believe that the advantages of eliminating supermajority provisions outweigh the benefits of maintaining it as a voting standard. We believe that a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore, paving way for a more meaningful voting outcome. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Congruency of Political Spending. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal - Climate Lobbying Report. | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the policy change requested by the proposal is unnecessary and would restrict the company's ability to implement its own climate strategy. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder Proposal - Climate Transition Report. | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder Proposal - Fossil Fuel Lending Policy. | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the policy change requested by the proposal is unnecessary and would restrict the company's ability to implement its own climate strategy. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 10. | Shareholder Proposal - Annual Report on Prevention of Workplace Harassment and Discrimination. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks related to discrimination and human rights, and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | Shareholder Proposal - Policy on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe approval of this resolution will help address human rights risks at Wells Fargo's operations in other countries. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 3,868 | | | | 0 | | | 12-Apr-2023 | 12-Apr-2023 | |
| WEST PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 955306105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | WST | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US9553061055 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935779453 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Mark A. Buthman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: William F. Feehery | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Robert F. Friel | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Eric M. Green | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Thomas W. Hofmann | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Molly E. Joseph | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Deborah L. V. Keller | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Myla P. Lai-Goldman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Stephen H. Lockhart | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Douglas A. Michels | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Paolo Pucci | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of an advisory vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal regarding Fair Elections. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interest of the Company to have such policy so that all shareholders are aware and may vote on any new nominations to the Board. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 312 | | | | | 0 | | | 13-Apr-2023 | 13-Apr-2023 | |
| THE WILLIAMS COMPANIES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 969457100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | WMB | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US9694571004 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935779706 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Alan S. Armstrong | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Stephen W. Bergstrom | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Michael A. Creel | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Stacey H. Doré | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Carri A. Lockhart | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Richard E. Muncrief | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Peter A. Ragauss | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Rose M. Robeson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Scott D. Sheffield | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Murray D. Smith | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k. | Election of Director for a one-year term: William H. Spence | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Jesse J. Tyson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratify the selection of Ernst & Young LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency of future advisory votes to approve the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,573 | | | | 0 | | | 03-Apr-2023 | 03-Apr-2023 | |
| BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 060505104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | BAC | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0605051046 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935779782 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Sharon L. Allen | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: José (Joe) E. Almeida | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Frank P. Bramble, Sr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Pierre J. P. de Weck | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Arnold W. Donald | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Linda P. Hudson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Monica C. Lozano | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Brian T. Moynihan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Lionel L. Nowell III | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Denise L. Ramos | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Clayton S. Rose | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Michael D. White | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Thomas D. Woods | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1n. | Election of Director: Maria T. Zuber | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approving our executive compensation (an advisory, non-binding "Say on Pay" resolution) | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | A vote on the frequency of future "Say on Pay" resolutions (an advisory, non-binding "Say on Frequency" resolution) | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratifying the appointment of our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Amending and restating the Bank of America Corporation Equity Plan | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal requesting an independent board chair | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal requesting shareholder ratification of termination pay | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder proposal requesting greenhouse gas reduction targets | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' SRI Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder proposal requesting report on transition planning | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | Shareholder proposal requesting adoption of policy to cease financing new fossil fuel supplies | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the policy change requested by the proposal is unnecessary and would restrict the company's ability to implement its own climate strategy. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 11. | Shareholder proposal requesting a racial equity audit | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will allow the Company to protect the Company's brand value and reputation on diversity issues. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 34 | | | | | 0 | | | 06-Apr-2023 | 06-Apr-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 8,957 | | | | 0 | | | 06-Apr-2023 | 06-Apr-2023 | |
| CONSTELLATION ENERGY CORP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 21037T109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CEG | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US21037T1097 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935780684 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Joseph Dominguez | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | Julie Holzrichter | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 3 | Ashish Khandpur | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To consider and act on an advisory vote regarding the approval of compensation paid to named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | To consider and act on an advisory vote regarding the frequency of the approval of compensation paid to named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,494 | | | | 0 | | | 31-Mar-2023 | 31-Mar-2023 | |
| CITIGROUP INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 172967424 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | C | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1729674242 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935781030 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Ellen M. Costello | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Grace E. Dailey | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Barbara J. Desoer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: John C. Dugan | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Jane N. Fraser | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Duncan P. Hennes | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Peter B. Henry | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1h. | Election of Director: S. Leslie Ireland | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Renée J. James | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Gary M. Reiner | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Diana L. Taylor | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 1l. | Election of Director: James S. Turley | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Casper W. von Koskull | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future |
| 2. | Proposal to ratify the selection of KPMG LLP as Citi's independent registered public accountants for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to Approve our 2022 Executive Compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval of additional shares for the Citigroup 2019 Stock Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Advisory vote to Approve the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal requesting that shareholders ratify the termination pay of any senior manager. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. | |
| 7. | Stockholder proposal requesting an Independent Board Chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder proposal requesting a report on the effectiveness of Citi's policies and practices in respecting Indigenous Peoples' rights in Citi's existing and proposed financing. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Stockholder proposal requesting that the Board adopt a policy to phase out new fossil fuel financing. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: However, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 439 | | | | | 0 | | | 11-Apr-2023 | 11-Apr-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,700 | | | | 0 | | | 11-Apr-2023 | 11-Apr-2023 | |
| NEWMONT CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 651639106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NEM | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 26-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6516391066 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935776938 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 25-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Patrick G. Awuah, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Gregory H. Boyce | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Bruce R. Brook | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Maura J. Clark | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Emma FitzGerald | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Mary A. Laschinger | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: José Manuel Madero | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: René Médori | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Jane Nelson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Tom Palmer | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Julio M. Quintana | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Susan N. Story | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval of the advisory resolution on Newmont's executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of the Audit Committees appointment of Ernst and Young LLP as Newmont's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 681 | | | | | 0 | | | 10-Apr-2023 | 10-Apr-2023 | |
| THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 38141G104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | GS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 26-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US38141G1040 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935777702 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 25-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Michele Burns | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Mark Flaherty | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Kimberley Harris | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Kevin Johnson | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Ellen Kullman | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Lakshmi Mittal | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Adebayo Ogunlesi | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Peter Oppenheimer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: David Solomon | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Jan Tighe | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Jessica Uhl | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: David Viniar | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Say on Pay | | | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding a Report on Lobbying | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding a Policy for an Independent Chair | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Chinese Congruency of Certain ETFs | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding a Racial Equity Audit | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will allow the Company to protect the Company's brand value and reputation on diversity issues. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding a Policy to Phase Out Fossil Fuel-Related Lending & Underwriting Activities | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe that the expenditure of the additional human and financial resources that would be required to produce another report on this subject matter would be a necessary or prudent use of Company and shareholder assets. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 10. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of 2030 Absolute Greenhouse Gas Reduction Goals | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Climate Transition Report | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 12. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Reporting on Pay Equity | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay disparities er in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 501 | | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| JOHNSON & JOHNSON | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 478160104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | JNJ | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4781601046 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935776813 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 28-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 28-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Darius Adamczyk | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Mary C. Beckerle | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: D. Scott Davis | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Jennifer A. Doudna | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Joaquin Duato | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Marillyn A. Hewson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Paula A. Johnson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Hubert Joly | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F12 Affiliation - Professional Services, Consulting, Legal - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director who has professional services contract regarding such matters as aircraft rental contract, real property lease, or similar contract with the Company or affiliate, or with a member of the Company's senior management, or provides legal or consulting services to the Company within the previous three years, is considered affiliated. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1I. | Election of Director: Mark B. McClellan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Anne M. Mulcahy | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Mark A. Weinberger | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Nadja Y. West | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Voting to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of Appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Proposal Withdrawn (Federal Securities Laws Mandatory Arbitration Bylaw) | Shareholder | Against | | | None | | | | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is not in the best interests of the shareholders. The adoption of such a bylaw likely would expose the company to unnecessary litigation or other actions challenging the bylaw and its consequences. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Vaccine Pricing Report | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Executive Compensation Adjustment Policy | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Impact of Extended Patent Exclusivities on Product Access | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 185 | | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,810 | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 882508104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TXN | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8825081040 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935777120 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Mark A. Blinn | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Todd M. Bluedorn | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Janet F. Clark | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Carrie S. Cox | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Martin S. Craighead | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Curtis C. Farmer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Jean M. Hobby | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Haviv Ilan | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Ronald Kirk | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Pamela H. Patsley | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Robert E. Sanchez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Richard K. Templeton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Board proposal to approve amendment and restatement of the TI Employees 2014 Stock Purchase Plan to extend the termination date. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Board proposal regarding advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Board proposal regarding advisory approval of the Company's executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Board proposal to ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal to permit a combined 10% of stockholders to call a special meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder proposal to report on due diligence efforts to trace end-user misuse of company products. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 501 | | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| PFIZER INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 717081103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PFE | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7170811035 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935778451 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Ronald E. Blaylock | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Albert Bourla | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Susan Desmond- Hellmann | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Joseph J. Echevarria | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Scott Gottlieb | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Helen H. Hobbs | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Susan Hockfield | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Dan R. Littman | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Shantanu Narayen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Suzanne Nora Johnson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: James Quincey | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: James C. Smith | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Ratify the selection of KPMG LLP as independent registered public accounting firm for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | 2023 advisory approval of executive compensation | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on frequency of future advisory votes to approve executive compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal regarding ratification of termination pay | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal regarding independent board chairman policy | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal regarding transfer of intellectual property to potential COVID-19 manufacturers feasibility report | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder proposal regarding impact of extended patent exclusivities on product access report | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder proposal regarding political contributions congruency report | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 5,858 | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 539830109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | LMT | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5398301094 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935779655 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Daniel F. Akerson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: David B. Burritt | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Bruce A. Carlson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: John M. Donovan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: James O. Ellis, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Thomas J. Falk | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Ilene S. Gordon | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Vicki A. Hollub | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Jeh C. Johnson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Debra L. Reed-Klages | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: James D. Taiclet | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Patricia E. Yarrington | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve the Compensation of our Named Executive Officers (Say-on-Pay). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Advisory Votes to Approve the Compensation of our Named Executive Officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the Appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our Independent Auditors for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal Requiring Independent Board Chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder Proposal to Issue a Human Rights Impact Assessment Report. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that human rights are of the utmost importance for their own sake as well as for the enhancement of economic potential of a nation. By adopting these standards, Companies will embody good corporate governance responsibility and enhance shareholder value. As a result, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder Proposal to Issue a Report on the Company's Intention to Reduce Full Value Chain GHG Emissions. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 275 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-Apr-2023 | 12-Apr-2023 | |
| INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 46120E602 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ISRG | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US46120E6023 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935779744 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 28-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 28-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Craig H. Barratt, Ph.D. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Joseph C. Beery | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Gary S. Guthart, Ph.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Amal M. Johnson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Don R. Kania, Ph.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Amy L. Ladd, M.D. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Keith R. Leonard, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Alan J. Levy, Ph.D. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Jami Dover Nachtsheim | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Monica P. Reed, M.D. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Mark J. Rubash | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, by advisory vote, the compensation of the Company's Named Executive Officers | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, by advisory vote, the frequency of the advisory vote on the compensation of the Company's Named Executive Officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | The ratification of appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | The stockholder proposal regarding pay equity disclosure. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay disparities by gender in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 370 | | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| HEALTHPEAK PROPERTIES, INC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 42250P103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PEAK | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US42250P1030 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935782361 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Scott M. Brinker | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Brian G. Cartwright | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: James B. Connor | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Christine N. Garvey | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: R. Kent Griffin, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: David B. Henry | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Sara G. Lewis | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Katherine M. Sandstrom | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Approval of 2022 executive compensation on an advisory basis. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approval of the Healthpeak Properties, Inc. 2023 Performance Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as Healthpeak Properties, Inc.'s independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,762 | | | | 0 | | | 09-Apr-2023 | 09-Apr-2023 | |
| ABBOTT LABORATORIES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 002824100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ABT | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 28-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0028241000 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935777865 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 27-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: R. J. Alpern | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: C. Babineaux-Fontenot | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: S. E. Blount | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: R. B. Ford | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: P. Gonzalez | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: M. A. Kumbier | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: D. W. McDew | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: N. McKinstry | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: M. G. O'Grady | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: M. F. Roman | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: D. J. Starks | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: J. G. Stratton | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Ernst & Young LLP As Auditors | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Say on Pay - An Advisory Vote on the Approval of Executive Compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Say When on Pay - An Advisory Vote on the Approval of the Frequency of Shareholder Votes on Executive Compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal - Special Shareholder Meeting Threshold | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal - Independent Board Chairman | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal - Lobbying Disclosure | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder Proposal - Incentive Compensation | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,305 | | | | 0 | | | 13-Apr-2023 | 13-Apr-2023 | |
| ELI LILLY AND COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 532457108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | LLY | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 01-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5324571083 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935784769 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 28-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve a three-year term: William G. Kaelin, Jr. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve a three-year term: David A. Ricks | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve a three-year term: Marschall S. Runge | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director to serve a three-year term: Karen Walker | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation paid to the company's named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory vote on frequency of future advisory votes on named executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the independent auditor for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approval of amendments to the company's Articles of Incorporation to eliminate the classified board structure. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Approval of amendments to the company's Articles of Incorporation to eliminate supermajority voting provisions. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal to publish an annual report disclosing lobbying activities. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder proposal to eliminate supermajority voting requirements. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: For the reasons stated below and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we believe that the advantages of eliminating supermajority provisions outweigh the benefits of maintaining it as a voting standard. We believe that a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore, paving way for a more meaningful voting outcome. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder proposal to establish and report on a process by which the impact of extended patent exclusivities on product access would be considered in deciding whether to apply for secondary and tertiary patents. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | Shareholder proposal to report on risks of supporting abortion. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe that the review and report requested by this proposal are warranted or that the report would be informative to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 11. | Shareholder proposal to disclose lobbying activities and alignment with public policy positions and statements. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 12. | Shareholder proposal to report on effectiveness of the company's diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 13. | Shareholder proposal to adopt a policy to require certain third-party organizations to annually report expenditures for political activities before Lilly contributes to an organization. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 331 | | | | | 0 | | | 25-Apr-2023 | 25-Apr-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 700 | | | | | 0 | | | 25-Apr-2023 | 25-Apr-2023 | |
| AFLAC INCORPORATED | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 001055102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AFL | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 01-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0010551028 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935785038 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 28-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Daniel P. Amos | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: W. Paul Bowers | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Arthur R. Collins | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Miwako Hosoda | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Thomas J. Kenny | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Georgette D. Kiser | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Karole F. Lloyd | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Nobuchika Mori | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Joseph L. Moskowitz | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Barbara K. Rimer, DrPH | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director to serve until the next annual meeting: Katherine T. Rohrer | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To consider the following non-binding advisory proposal: "Resolved, on an advisory basis, the shareholders of Aflac Incorporated approve the compensation of the named executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to the compensation disclosure rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission, including the Compensation Discussion and Analysis and accompanying tables and narrative in the Notice of 2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement". | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Non-binding, advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To consider and act upon the ratification of the appointment of KPMG LLP as independent registered public accounting firm of the Company for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 3,081 | | | | 0 | | | 12-Apr-2023 | 12-Apr-2023 | |
| PAYCOM SOFTWARE, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 70432V102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PAYC | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 01-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US70432V1026 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935812227 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 28-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Class I director: Sharen J. Turney | | | Management | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the Board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1.2 | Election of Class I director: J.C. Watts, Jr. | | | Management | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the Board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of Grant Thornton LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approval of the Paycom Software, Inc. 2023 Long-Term Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approval of an amendment to the Company's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to limit the liability of certain officers of the Company. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal to adopt a majority vote standard in uncontested director elections, if properly presented at the Annual Meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: For the reasons stated below and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we believe that the advantages of eliminating supermajority provisions outweigh the benefits of maintaining it as a voting standard. We believe that a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore, paving way for a more meaningful voting outcome. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 105 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-Apr-2023 | 12-Apr-2023 | |
| EVERGY, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 30034W106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | EVRG | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US30034W1062 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935779059 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: David A. Campbell | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Thomas D. Hyde | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: B. Anthony Isaac | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Paul M. Keglevic | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Senator Mary L. Landrieu | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Sandra A.J. Lawrence | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Ann D. Murtlow | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Sandra J. Price | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Mark A. Ruelle | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: James Scarola | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: C. John Wilder | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approve the 2022 compensation of our named executive officers on an advisory non-binding basis. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratify the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,306 | | | | 0 | | | 18-Apr-2023 | 18-Apr-2023 | |
| RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 75513E101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | RTX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US75513E1010 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935780468 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 07-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 07-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Tracy A. Atkinson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Leanne G. Caret | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Bernard A. Harris, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Gregory J. Hayes | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: George R. Oliver | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Robert K. (Kelly) Ortberg | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Dinesh C. Paliwal | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Ellen M. Pawlikowski | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Denise L. Ramos | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Fredric G. Reynolds | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Brian C. Rogers | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: James A. Winnefeld, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Robert O. Work | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Shareowner Votes on Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to Serve as Independent Auditor for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approve an Amendment to the Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Repeal Article Ninth | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Approve an Amendment to the Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Eliminate Personal Liability of Officers for Monetary Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty as an Officer | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Shareowner Proposal Requesting the Board Adopt an Independent Board Chair Policy | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareowner Proposal Requesting a Report on Greenhouse Gas Reduction Plan | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,204 | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 025816109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AXP | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0258161092 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935784808 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Thomas J. Baltimore | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a term of one year: John J. Brennan | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Peter Chernin | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Walter J. Clayton III | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Ralph de la Vega | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Theodore J. Leonsis | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Deborah P. Majoras | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Karen L. Parkhill | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Charles E. Phillips | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Lynn A. Pike | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Stephen J. Squeri | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Daniel L. Vasella | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1m. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Lisa W. Wardell | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1n. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Christopher D. Young | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the Company's executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory resolution to approve the frequency of future advisory say-on-pay votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal relating to shareholder ratification of excessive termination pay. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal relating to abortion & consumer data privacy. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and potential legal risk by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 484 | | | | | 0 | | | 17-Apr-2023 | 17-Apr-2023 | |
| PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 695156109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PKG | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6951561090 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935787397 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 14-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 14-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Cheryl K. Beebe | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Duane C. Farrington | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Donna A. Harman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Mark W. Kowlzan | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Robert C. Lyons | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Thomas P. Maurer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Samuel M. Mencoff | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Roger B. Porter | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Thomas S. Souleles | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Paul T. Stecko | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Proposal to ratify appointment of KPMG LLP as our auditors. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Proposal to approve our executive compensation. | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Proposal on the frequency of the vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 567 | | | | | 0 | | | 16-Apr-2023 | 16-Apr-2023 | |
| BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 110122108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | BMY | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1101221083 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935788286 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1A. | Election of Director: Peter J. Arduini | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1B. | Election of Director: Deepak L. Bhatt, M.D., M.P.H. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1C. | Election of Director: Giovanni Caforio, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1D. | Election of Director: Julia A. Haller, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1E. | Election of Director: Manuel Hidalgo Medina, M.D., Ph.D. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1F. | Election of Director: Paula A. Price | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1G. | Election of Director: Derica W. Rice | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1H. | Election of Director: Theodore R. Samuels | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1I. | Election of Director: Gerald L. Storch | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1J. | Election of Director: Karen H. Vousden, Ph.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1K. | Election of Director: Phyllis R. Yale | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve the Compensation of our Named Executive Officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of the Advisory Vote on the Compensation of our Named Executive Officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the Appointment of an Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal on the Adoption of a Board Policy that the Chairperson of the Board be an Independent Director. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal on Workplace Non- Discrimination Audit. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal on Special Shareholder Meeting Improvement. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure that all shares will have the right to call for a special meeting. After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,524 | | | | 0 | | | 17-Apr-2023 | 17-Apr-2023 | |
| MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 552953101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MGM | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5529531015 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935791788 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 09-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 09-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Barry Diller | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Alexis M. Herman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: William J. Hornbuckle | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Mary Chris Jammet | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Joey Levin | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Rose McKinney-James | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Keith A. Meister | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Paul Salem | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Jan G. Swartz | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Daniel J. Taylor | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Ben Winston | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the selection of Deloitte & Touche LLP, as the independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency with which the Company conducts advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,090 | | | | 0 | | | 14-Apr-2023 | 14-Apr-2023 | |
| CF INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 125269100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CF | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1252691001 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935783616 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Javed Ahmed | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Robert C. Arzbaecher | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Deborah L. DeHaas | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: John W. Eaves | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Stephen J. Hagge | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jesus Madrazo Yris | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Anne P. Noonan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Michael J. Toelle | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Theresa E. Wagler | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Celso L. White | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: W. Anthony Will | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve the compensation of CF Industries Holdings, Inc.'s named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes to approve the compensation of CF Industries Holdings, Inc.'s named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approval and adoption of an amendment and restatement of CF Industries Holdings, Inc.'s certificate of incorporation to limit the liability of certain officers and make various conforming and technical revisions. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Ratification of the selection of KPMG LLP as CF Industries Holdings, Inc.'s independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal regarding an independent board chair, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 399 | | | | | 0 | | | 20-Apr-2023 | 20-Apr-2023 | |
| PEPSICO, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 713448108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PEP | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7134481081 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935784795 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 01-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Segun Agbaje | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Jennifer Bailey | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Cesar Conde | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Ian Cook | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Edith W. Cooper | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Susan M. Diamond | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Dina Dublon | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Michelle Gass | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Ramon L. Laguarta | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Dave J. Lewis | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: David C. Page | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Robert C. Pohlad | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Daniel Vasella | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1n. | Election of Director: Darren Walker | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1o. | Election of Director: Alberto Weisser | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of KPMG LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of the Company's executive compensation | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory vote on frequency of future shareholder advisory approval of the Company's executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal - Independent Board Chair. | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal - Global Transparency Report. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its charitable and political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Impacts of Reproductive Healthcare Legislation | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder Proposal - Congruency Report on Net-Zero Emissions Policies. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe that the review and report requested by this proposal are warranted or that the report would be informative to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 757 | | | | | 0 | | | 25-Apr-2023 | 25-Apr-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,000 | | | | 0 | | | 25-Apr-2023 | 25-Apr-2023 | |
| PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 718172109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PM | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7181721090 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935785040 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Brant Bonin Bough | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: André Calantzopoulos | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Michel Combes | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Juan José Daboub | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Werner Geissler | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Lisa A. Hook | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Jun Makihara | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Kalpana Morparia | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Jacek Olczak | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Robert B. Polet | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Dessislava Temperley | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Shlomo Yanai | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote Approving Executive Compensation | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Say-On-Pay Votes, with the Board of Directors Recommending a Say-On-Pay Vote | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the Selection of Independent Auditors | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal to make nicotine level information available to customers and begin reducing nicotine levels | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 983 | | | | | 0 | | | 30-Apr-2023 | 30-Apr-2023 | |
| GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 369604301 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | GE | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US3696043013 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935786408 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 07-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 07-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Stephen Angel | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Sébastien Bazin | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: H. Lawrence Culp, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Edward Garden | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Isabella Goren | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Thomas Horton | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Catherine Lesjak | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Darren McDew | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Paula Rosput Reynolds | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Jessica Uhl | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Approval of Our Named Executives' Compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes to Approve Our Named Executives' Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of Deloitte as Independent Auditor for 2023. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Independent Board Chairman. | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Sale of the Company. | | | | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe that the sale of the Company as requested by this proposal is warranted. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Fiduciary Carbon-Emission Relevance Report. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Assess Energy-Related Asset Resilience. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,647 | | | | 0 | | | 25-Apr-2023 | 25-Apr-2023 | |
| GILEAD SCIENCES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 375558103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | GILD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US3755581036 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935788438 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Jacqueline K. Barton, Ph.D. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Jeffrey A. Bluestone, Ph.D. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Sandra J. Horning, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Kelly A. Kramer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Kevin E. Lofton | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Harish Manwani | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Daniel P. O'Day | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Javier J. Rodriguez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Anthony Welters | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the selection of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of our Named Executive Officers as presented in the Proxy Statement. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency of future advisory stockholder votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To approve an amendment and restatement of the Gilead Sciences, Inc. Employee Stock Purchase Plan and the Gilead Sciences, Inc. International Employee Stock Purchase Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | To vote on a stockholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, requesting the Board implement a process to nominate at least one more candidate than the number of directors to be elected. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | To vote on a stockholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, requesting the Board amend the company governing documents to give street name shares and non-street name shares an equal right to call a special stockholder meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure that all shares will have the right to call for a special meeting. After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | To vote on a stockholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting, requesting a report on a process by which the impact of extended patent exclusivities on product access would be considered in deciding whether to apply for secondary and tertiary patents. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 795 | | | | | 0 | | | 26-Apr-2023 | 26-Apr-2023 | |
| S&P GLOBAL INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 78409V104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SPGI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US78409V1044 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935790445 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1A. | Election of Director: Marco Alverà | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1B. | Election of Director: Jacques Esculier | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1C. | Election of Director: Gay Huey Evans | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1D. | Election of Director: William D. Green | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1E. | Election of Director: Stephanie C. Hill | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1F. | Election of Director: Rebecca Jacoby | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1G. | Election of Director: Robert P. Kelly | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1H. | Election of Director: Ian P. Livingston | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1I. | Election of Director: Deborah D. McWhinney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1J. | Election of Director: Maria R. Morris | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1K. | Election of Director: Douglas L. Peterson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1L. | Election of Director: Richard E. Thornburgh | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1M. | Election of Director: Gregory Washington | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Approve, on an advisory basis, the executive compensation program for the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency on which the Company conducts an advisory vote on the executive compensation program for the Company's named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the Company's independent auditor for 2023; | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 358 | | | | | 0 | | | 24-Apr-2023 | 24-Apr-2023 | |
| POOL CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 73278L105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | POOL | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 03-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US73278L1052 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935797425 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Peter D. Arvan | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Martha "Marty" S. Gervasi | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: James "Jim" D. Hope | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Debra S. Oler | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Manuel J. Perez de la Mesa | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Carlos A. Sabater | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Robert C. Sledd | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: John E. Stokely | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: David G. Whalen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Ratification of the retention of Ernst & Young LLP, certified public accountants, as our independent registered public accounting firm for the 2023 fiscal year. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Say-on-pay vote: Advisory vote to approve the compensation of our named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Frequency vote: Advisory vote on frequency of future Say-on-pay votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 99 | | | | | 0 | | | 18-Apr-2023 | 18-Apr-2023 | |
| ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 039483102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ADM | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0394831020 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935782335 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 09-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 09-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: M.S. Burke | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: T. Colbert | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: J.C. Collins, Jr. | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: T.K. Crews | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: E. de Brabander | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: S.F. Harrison | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: J.R. Luciano | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: P.J. Moore | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: D.A. Sandler | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: L.Z. Schlitz | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: K.R. Westbrook | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as independent auditors for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal Regarding an Independent Board Chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 673 | | | | | 0 | | | 24-Apr-2023 | 24-Apr-2023 | |
| DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 26441C204 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DUK | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US26441C2044 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935783440 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Derrick Burks | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Annette K. Clayton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Theodore F. Craver, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Robert M. Davis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Caroline Dorsa | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: W. Roy Dunbar | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Nicholas C. Fanandakis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Lynn J. Good | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: John T. Herron | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Idalene F. Kesner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: E. Marie McKee | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Michael J. Pacilio | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Thomas E. Skains | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1n. | Election of Director: William E. Webster, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Deloitte & Touche LLP as Duke Energy's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve Duke Energy's named executive officer compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of an advisory vote on executive compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Approval of the Duke Energy Corporation 2023 Long-Term Incentive Plan | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal regarding simple majority vote | Shareholder | For | | | None | | | | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal regarding formation of committee to evaluate decarbonization risk | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal would be of limited usefulness to shareholders and management and duplicative of past and ongoing Company and regulatory activities. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 918 | | | | | 0 | | | 01-May-2023 | 01-May-2023 | |
| UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 911312106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | UPS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US9113121068 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935783894 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 09-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 09-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Carol B. Tomé | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Rodney C. Adkins | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Eva C. Boratto | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Michael J. Burns | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Wayne M. Hewett | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Angela Hwang | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Kate E. Johnson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: William R. Johnson | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Franck J. Moison | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Christiana Smith Shi | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Russell Stokes | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director to serve until 2024 annual meeting: Kevin Warsh | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | To approve on an advisory basis named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve on an advisory basis the frequency of future advisory votes on named executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as UPS's independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | To reduce the voting power of UPS class A stock from 10 votes per share to one vote per share. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that shareholder approval is warranted. We oppose such differential voting power as it may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic importance to them. We prefer that companies do not utilize multiple class capital structures to provide equal voting rights to all shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | To adopt independently verified science- based greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | To prepare a report on integrating GHG emissions reductions targets into executive compensation. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the alignment of a corporate climate transition strategy with executive compensation metrics and incentives is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | To prepare a report on addressing the impact of UPS's climate change strategy on relevant stakeholders consistent with the "Just Transition" guidelines. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | To prepare a report on risks or costs caused by state policies restricting reproductive rights. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 10. | To prepare a report on the impact of UPS's DE&I policies on civil rights, non- discrimination and returns to merit, and the company's business. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | To prepare an annual report on the effectiveness of UPS's diversity, equity and inclusion efforts. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 668 | | | | | 0 | | | 01-May-2023 | 01-May-2023 | |
| BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 101137107 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | BSX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1011371077 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935784860 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Nelda J. Connors | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Charles J. Dockendorff | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Yoshiaki Fujimori | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Edward J. Ludwig | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Michael F. Mahoney | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: David J. Roux | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: John E. Sununu | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: David S. Wichmann | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Ellen M. Zane | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, on a non-binding, advisory basis, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | To approve, on a non-binding, advisory basis, the frequency of future advisory votes on the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the 2023 fiscal year. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 4,113 | | | | 0 | | | 20-Apr-2023 | 20-Apr-2023 | |
| CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 14040H105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | COF | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US14040H1059 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935786155 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Richard D. Fairbank | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Ime Archibong | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Christine Detrick | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Ann Fritz Hackett | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Peter Thomas Killalea | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Cornelis "Eli" Leenaars | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: François Locoh-Donou | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Peter E. Raskind | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i | Election of Director: Eileen Serra | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Mayo A. Shattuck III | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Bradford H. Warner | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Craig Anthony Williams | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Approval of amendments to Capital One Financial Corporation's Restated Certificate of Incorporation to remove remaining supermajority voting requirements and references to Signet Banking Corporation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory vote on frequency of holding an advisory vote to approve our Named Executive Officer compensation ("Say When On Pay"). | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory vote on our Named Executive Officer compensation ("Say on Pay"). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approval and adoption of the Capital One Financial Corporation Seventh Amended and Restated 2004 Stock Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Ratification of the selection of Ernst & Young LLP as independent registered public accounting firm of Capital One for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder proposal requesting a simple majority vote. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore, paving way for a more meaningful voting outcome. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder proposal requesting a report on Board oversight of risks related to discrimination. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will allow the Company to protect the Company's brand value and reputation on diversity issues. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Stockholder proposal requesting a Board skills and diversity matrix. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. We believe that the proposal would encourage good governance and enhance shareholder value by bringing together a diverse range of skills and experience necessary in building a constructive and challenging board. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 630 | | | | | 0 | | | 25-Apr-2023 | 25-Apr-2023 | |
| PROLOGIS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 74340W103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PLD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US74340W1036 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935786814 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 07-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 07-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Hamid R. Moghadam | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Cristina G. Bita | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: James B. Connor | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: George L. Fotiades | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Lydia H. Kennard | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Irving F. Lyons III | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Avid Modjtabai | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: David P. O'Connor | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Olivier Piani | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Jeffrey L. Skelton | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Carl B. Webb | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve the Company's Executive Compensation for 2022. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes on the Company's Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the Appointment of KPMG LLP as the Company's Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for the Year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 435 | | | | | 0 | | | 24-Apr-2023 | 24-Apr-2023 | |
| CME GROUP INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 12572Q105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CME | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US12572Q1058 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935788034 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Equity Director: Terrence A. Duffy | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Equity Director: Kathryn Benesh | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Equity Director: Timothy S. Bitsberger | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Equity Director: Charles P. Carey | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Equity Director: Bryan T. Durkin | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Equity Director: Harold Ford Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Equity Director: Martin J. Gepsman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Equity Director: Larry G. Gerdes | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Equity Director: Daniel R. Glickman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Equity Director: Daniel G. Kaye | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Equity Director: Phyllis M. Lockett | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Equity Director: Deborah J. Lucas | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Equity Director: Terry L. Savage | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1n. | Election of Equity Director: Rahael Seifu | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1o. | Election of Equity Director: William R. Shepard | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1p. | Election of Equity Director: Howard J. Siegel | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1q. | Election of Equity Director: Dennis A. Suskind | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 507 | | | | | 0 | | | 24-Apr-2023 | 24-Apr-2023 | |
| CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 127387108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CDNS | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 04-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1273871087 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935794126 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Mark W. Adams | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Ita Brennan | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Lewis Chew | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Anirudh Devgan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: ML Krakauer | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Julia Liuson | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: James D. Plummer | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Alberto Sangiovanni- Vincentelli | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: John B. Shoven | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Young K. Sohn | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve the amendment of the Omnibus Equity Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To vote on an advisory resolution to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To vote on the frequency of the advisory vote on named executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Ratification of the selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm of Cadence for its fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal to remove the one- year holding period requirement to call a special stockholder meeting. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal is not advisable and not favorable to the shareholders. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 771 | | | | | 0 | | | 30-Apr-2023 | 30-Apr-2023 | |
| ABBVIE INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 00287Y109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ABBV | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 05-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US00287Y1091 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935786484 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 04-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Class II Director: Robert J. Alpern | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Class II Director: Melody B. Meyer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Class II Director: Frederick H. Waddell | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Ratification of Ernst & Young LLP as AbbVie's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Say on Pay - An advisory vote on the approval of executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approval of a management proposal regarding amendment of the certificate of incorporation to eliminate supermajority voting. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal - to Implement Simple Majority Vote. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company's corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore, paving way for a more meaningful voting outcome. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder Proposal - to Issue an Annual Report on Political Spending. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder Proposal - to Issue an Annual Report on Lobbying. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder Proposal - to Issue a Report on Patent Process. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,283 | | | | 0 | | | 01-May-2023 | 01-May-2023 | |
| OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 674599105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | OXY | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 05-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6745991058 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935786713 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 04-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Vicky A. Bailey | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Andrew Gould | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Carlos M. Gutierrez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Vicki Hollub | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: William R. Klesse | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jack B. Moore | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Claire O'Neill | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Avedick B. Poladian | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Ken Robinson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Robert M. Shearer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of Selection of KPMG as Occidental's Independent Auditor. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal Requesting an Independent Board Chairman Policy. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,349 | | | | 0 | | | 25-Apr-2023 | 25-Apr-2023 | |
| BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 084670702 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | BRKB | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 06-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0846707026 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935785418 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 05-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Warren E. Buffett | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| | | | 2 | Charles T. Munger | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 3 | Gregory E. Abel | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Howard G. Buffett | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 5 | Susan A. Buffett | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 6 | Stephen B. Burke | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 7 | Kenneth I. Chenault | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 8 | Christopher C. Davis | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 9 | Susan L. Decker | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 10 | Charlotte Guyman | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 11 | Ajit Jain | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 12 | Thomas S. Murphy, Jr. | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 13 | Ronald L. Olson | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 14 | Wallace R. Weitz | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 15 | Meryl B. Witmer | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Non-binding resolution to approve the compensation of the Company's Named Executive Officers, as described in the 2023 Proxy Statement. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Non-binding resolution to determine the frequency (whether annual, biennial or triennial) with which shareholders of the Company shall be entitled to have an advisory vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 3 Years | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: It is our opinion that an annual say-on-pay vote is the accepted standard for companies today and a requirement for good corporate governance. Furthermore, we believe that triennial advisory vote on executive compensation will hinder shareholders from providing the Company with direct input on their respective compensation philosophy, policies and practices as disclosed in the proxy statement. We do not concur with the current board's recommendation of a triennial ratification (non-binding vote) on this issue. We recommend a vote AGAINST the option of triennial (every three years) as the frequency with which shareholders will be provided an advisory vote on executive compensation. |
| 4. | Shareholder proposal regarding how the Company manages physical and transitional climate related risks and opportunities. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the report on climate change will develop new methods that can be applied globally when sufficient observations exist. Acknowledging climate change as an inevitable factor, and recognizing the need to adapt, involves bold decisions by business. Therefore, we believe that companies should review how climate change impacts the economy and portfolio companies and evaluate how shareholder resolutions on climate change may impact long-term shareholder value as it votes proxies. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal regarding how climate related risks are being governed by the Company. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the report on climate change will develop new methods that can be applied globally when sufficient observations exist. Acknowledging climate change as an inevitable factor, and recognizing the need to adapt, involves bold decisions by business. Therefore, we believe that companies should review how climate change impacts the economy and portfolio companies and evaluate how shareholder resolutions on climate change may impact long-term shareholder value as it votes proxies. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal regarding how the Company intends to measure, disclose and reduce GHG emissions associated with its underwriting, insuring and investment activities. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal regarding the reporting on the effectiveness of the Corporation's diversity, equity and inclusion efforts. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. We believe that the proposal would encourage good governance and enhance shareholder value by bringing together a diverse range of skills and experience necessary in building a constructive and challenging workforce. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder proposal regarding the adoption of a policy requiring that two separate people hold the offices of the Chairman and the CEO. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder proposal requesting that the Company avoid supporting or taking a public policy position on controversial social and political issues. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is not in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 373 | | | | | 0 | | | 03-May-2023 | 03-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,230 | | | | 0 | | | 03-May-2023 | 03-May-2023 | |
| PARAMOUNT GLOBAL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 92556H206 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PARA | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US92556H2067 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935791372 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 05-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | Non-Voting agenda | | | | | | Management | Abstain | | | None | | | | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,811 | | | | 0 | | | 02-May-2023 | 02-May-2023 | |
| 3M COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 88579Y101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MMM | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US88579Y1010 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935791550 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 14-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 14-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 08-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Thomas "Tony" K. Brown | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Anne H. Chow | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a term of one year: David B. Dillon | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Michael L. Eskew | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a term of one year: James R. Fitterling | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Amy E. Hood | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Suzan Kereere | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Gregory R. Page | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Pedro J. Pizarro | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a term of one year: Michael F. Roman | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as 3M's independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Some Concerns/Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of executive compensation. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory approval on the frequency of advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 994 | | | | | 0 | | | 03-May-2023 | 03-May-2023 | |
| PENTAIR PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G7S00T104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PNR | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | IE00BLS09M33 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935791601 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United Kingdom | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 05-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Re-election of director: Mona Abutaleb Stephenson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Re-election of director: Melissa Barra | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Re-election of director: T. Michael Glenn | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Re-election of director: Theodore L. Harris | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Re-election of director: David A. Jones | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1f. | Re-election of director: Gregory E. Knight | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Re-election of director: Michael T. Speetzen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Re-election of director: John L. Stauch | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Re-election of director: Billie I. Williamson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | To approve, by nonbinding, advisory vote, the compensation of the named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, by nonbinding, advisory vote, the frequency of future advisory votes on the compensation of the named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify, by nonbinding, advisory vote, the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the independent auditor of Pentair plc and to authorize, by binding vote, the Audit and Finance Committee of the Board of Directors to set the auditor's remuneration. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
| 5. | To authorize the Board of Directors to allot new shares under Irish law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | To authorize the Board of Directors to opt- out of statutory preemption rights under Irish law (Special Resolution). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | To authorize the price range at which Pentair plc can re-allot shares it holds as treasury shares under Irish law (Special Resolution). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,862 | | | | 0 | | | 01-May-2023 | 01-May-2023 | |
| DANAHER CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 235851102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DHR | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US2358511028 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935795510 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 08-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Rainer M. Blair | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Feroz Dewan | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Linda Filler | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Teri List | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Walter G. Lohr, Jr. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Jessica L. Mega, MD, MPH | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Mitchell P. Rales | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Steven M. Rales | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Pardis C. Sabeti, MD, D. PHIL | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: A. Shane Sanders | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: John T. Schwieters | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1l. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Alan G. Spoon | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1m. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Raymond C. Stevens, Ph.D | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1n. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Elias A. Zerhouni, MD | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the selection of Ernst & Young LLP as Danaher's independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve on an advisory basis the Company's named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To hold an advisory vote relating to the frequency of future shareholder advisory votes on the Company's executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To act upon a shareholder proposal requesting adoption of a policy separating the chair and CEO roles and requiring an independent Board Chair whenever possible. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | To act upon a shareholder proposal requesting a report to shareholders on the effectiveness of the Company's diversity, equity and inclusion efforts. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise, and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 856 | | | | | 0 | | | 01-May-2023 | 01-May-2023 | |
| STRYKER CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 863667101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SYK | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8636671013 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935785444 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Mary K. Brainerd | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Giovanni Caforio, M.D. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Srikant M. Datar, Ph.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Allan C. Golston | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Kevin A. Lobo (Chair of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President) | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Sherilyn S. McCoy (Lead Independent Director) | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Andrew K. Silvernail | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Lisa M. Skeete Tatum | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Ronda E. Stryker | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F11 Affiliation - Family Member - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director who is an immediate family member of a current or former officer of the company or its affiliates within the previous five years is considered affiliated. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Rajeev Suri | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Our Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes on Named Executive Officer Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal on Political Disclosure. | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 401 | | | | | 0 | | | 04-May-2023 | 04-May-2023 | |
| KINDER MORGAN, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 49456B101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | KMI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US49456B1017 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935785759 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Richard D. Kinder | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Steven J. Kean | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Kimberly A. Dang | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Ted A. Gardner | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Anthony W. Hall, Jr. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Gary L. Hultquist | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Ronald L. Kuehn, Jr. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Deborah A. Macdonald | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Michael C. Morgan | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Arthur C. Reichstetter | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: C. Park Shaper | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: William A. Smith | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Joel V. Staff | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1n. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring in 2024: Robert F. Vagt | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Approval of an Amendment to our Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to limit the liability of certain officers of the company as permitted by recent amendments to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Ratification of the selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of our named executive officers, as disclosed in the Proxy Statement | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,314 | | | | 0 | | | 04-May-2023 | 04-May-2023 | |
| CSX CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 126408103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CSX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1264081035 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935786422 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Donna M. Alvarado | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Thomas P. Bostick | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Steven T. Halverson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Paul C. Hilal | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Joseph R. Hinrichs | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: David M. Moffett | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Linda H. Riefler | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Suzanne M. Vautrinot | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: James L. Wainscott | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: J. Steven Whisler | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: John J. Zillmer | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 2. | The ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory (non-binding) resolution to approve compensation for the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory (non-binding) resolution to approve the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,429 | | | | 0 | | | 03-May-2023 | 03-May-2023 | |
| CENTENE CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 15135B101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CNC | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US15135B1017 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935788375 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Jessica L. Blume | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Kenneth A. Burdick | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Christopher J. Coughlin | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: H. James Dallas | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1e. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Wayne S. DeVeydt | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Frederick H. Eppinger | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Monte E. Ford | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Sarah M. London | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Lori J. Robinson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Theodore R. Samuels | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | ADVISORY VOTE TO APPROVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | ADVISORY VOTE ON FREQUENCY OF FUTURE ADVISORY VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | RATIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF KPMG LLP AS OUR INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL FOR SHAREHOLDER RATIFICATION OF TERMINATION PAY. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL FOR MATERNAL MORBIDITY REDUCTION METRICS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,202 | | | | 0 | | | 04-May-2023 | 04-May-2023 | |
| DOMINION ENERGY, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 25746U109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | D | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US25746U1097 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935788440 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1A. | Election of Director: James A. Bennett | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1B. | Election of Director: Robert M. Blue | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1C. | Election of Director: D. Maybank Hagood | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1D. | Election of Director: Ronald W. Jibson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1E. | Election of Director: Mark J. Kington | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1F. | Election of Director: Kristin G. Lovejoy | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1G. | Election of Director: Joseph M. Rigby | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1H. | Election of Director: Pamela J. Royal, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1I. | Election of Director: Robert H. Spilman, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1J. | Election of Director: Susan N. Story | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1K. | Election of Director: Michael E. Szymanczyk | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory Vote on Approval of Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Say on Pay Votes | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of Appointment of Independent Auditor | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Management's Proposal to Amend Article IV of the Bylaws to Make Certain Changes to the Information Required to be Provided by a Shareholder Requesting a Special Meeting | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Management's Proposal to Amend Article XI of the Bylaws to Make Certain Changes to the Advance Notice Provisions for Director Nominations | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding a Policy to Require an Independent Chair | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,936 | | | | 0 | | | 04-May-2023 | 04-May-2023 | |
| SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 83088M102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SWKS | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US83088M1027 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935790231 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 16-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 16-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: Alan S. Batey | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: Kevin L. Beebe | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: Liam K. Griffin | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1d. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: Eric J. Guerin | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: Christine King | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: Suzanne E. McBride | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: David P. McGlade | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: Robert A. Schriesheim | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director with terms expiring at the next Annual Meeting: Maryann Turcke | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the selection by the Company's Audit Committee of KPMG LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm for the Company for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of the Company's named executive officers, as described in the Company's Proxy Statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency of future advisory votes on the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To approve an amendment to the Company's Restated Certificate of Incorporation to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding exculpation of officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | To approve a stockholder proposal regarding simple majority vote. | Shareholder | For | | | None | | | | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 516 | | | | | 0 | | | 04-May-2023 | 04-May-2023 | |
| AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 026874784 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AIG | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0268747849 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935793629 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: PAOLA BERGAMASCHI | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: JAMES COLE, JR. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: W. DON CORNWELL | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: LINDA A. MILLS | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: DIANA M. MURPHY | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: PETER R. PORRINO | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: JOHN G. RICE | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: THERESE M. VAUGHAN | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: VANESSA A. WITTMAN | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: PETER ZAFFINO | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratify Appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to Serve as Independent Auditor for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Shareholder Proposal Requesting an Independent Board Chair Policy. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,963 | | | | 0 | | | 04-May-2023 | 04-May-2023 | |
| PHILLIPS 66 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 718546104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PSX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7185461040 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935793718 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Class II Director to Hold Office until the 2026 Annual Meeting: Gregory J. Hayes | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Class II Director to Hold Office until the 2026 Annual Meeting: Charles M. Holley | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Class II Director to Hold Office until the 2026 Annual Meeting: Denise R. Singleton | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Class II Director to Hold Office until the 2026 Annual Meeting: Glenn F. Tilton | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Class II Director to Hold Office until the 2026 Annual Meeting: Marna C. Whittington | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Management Proposal to Approve the Declassification of the Board of Directors. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve our executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the Appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal requesting audited report on the impact to chemicals business under the System Change Scenario. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: However, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,029 | | | | 0 | | | 04-May-2023 | 04-May-2023 | |
| AMERICAN WATER WORKS COMPANY, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 030420103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AWK | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 10-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0304201033 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935793782 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 09-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Jeffrey N. Edwards | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Martha Clark Goss | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: M. Susan Hardwick | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Kimberly J. Harris | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Laurie P. Havanec | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Julia L. Johnson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Patricia L. Kampling | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Karl F. Kurz | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Michael L. Marberry | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: James G. Stavridis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the frequency (i.e., every year, every two years or every three years) of the approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment, by the Audit, Finance and Risk Committee of the Board of Directors, of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal on Racial Equity Audit as described in the proxy statement. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 780 | | | | | 0 | | | 03-May-2023 | 03-May-2023 | |
| ASSURANT, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 04621X108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AIZ | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US04621X1081 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935785165 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Elaine D. Rosen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Paget L. Alves | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Rajiv Basu | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: J. Braxton Carter | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Juan N. Cento | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Keith W. Demmings | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Harriet Edelman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Sari Granat | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Lawrence V. Jackson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Debra J. Perry | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Ognjen (Ogi) Redzic | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Paul J. Reilly | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Robert W. Stein | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Assurant's Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of the 2022 compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory approval of the frequency of executive compensation votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 437 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| FORD MOTOR COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 345370860 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | F | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US3453708600 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935790128 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Kimberly A. Casiano | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Alexandra Ford English | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: James D. Farley, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Henry Ford III | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: William Clay Ford, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: William W. Helman IV | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: William E. Kennard | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: John C. May | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Beth E. Mooney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Lynn Vojvodich Radakovich | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: John L. Thornton | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1m. | Election of Director: John B. Veihmeyer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1n. | Election of Director: John S. Weinberg | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Ratification of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Say-on-Pay - An Advisory Vote to Approve the Compensation of the Named Executives. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | An Advisory Vote on the Frequency of a Shareholder Vote to Approve the Compensation of the Named Executives. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Approval of the 2023 Long-Term Incentive Plan. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Relating to Consideration of a Recapitalization Plan to Provide That All of the Company's Outstanding Stock Have One Vote Per Share. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that shareholder approval is warranted. We oppose such differential voting power as it may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic importance to them. We prefer that companies do not utilize multiple class capital structures to provide equal voting rights to all shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Relating to Disclosure of the Company's Reliance on Child Labor Outside of the United States. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Relating to Reporting on the Company's Animal Testing Practices. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the preparation of an additional report to stockholders as requested by the proponent would not be a good use of company resources. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 7,347 | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 92343V104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | VZ | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US92343V1044 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935790700 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1A. | Election of Director: Shellye Archambeau | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1B. | Election of Director: Roxanne Austin | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1C. | Election of Director: Mark Bertolini | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1D. | Election of Director: Vittorio Colao | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1E. | Election of Director: Melanie Healey | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1F. | Election of Director: Laxman Narasimhan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1G. | Election of Director: Clarence Otis, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1H. | Election of Director: Daniel Schulman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1I. | Election of Director: Rodney Slater | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1J. | Election of Director: Carol Tomé | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1K. | Election of Director: Hans Vestberg | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1L. | Election of Director: Gregory Weaver | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes to approve executive compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of appointment of independent registered public accounting firm | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Government requests to remove content | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Prohibit political contributions | | | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Amend clawback policy | | | | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The determination as to whether clawback policies are satisfactory should be made by the Company in a manner consistent with its disclosure policies and procedures. While the SEC has yet to announce specific rules implementing the clawback provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, we believe that the current mandates of the Company's clawback policies are sufficient and appropriate. Until a broader disclosure requirement applicable to all public companies is approved by the SEC, it is suitable for the Company to defer the decision on revising its existing clawback policies. Given the preceding details, we believe that the Company's existing policy strikes an appropriate balance and establishes appropriate standards for recoupment of incentive compensation while providing sufficient detail to appropriately inform and motivate employees. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder ratification of annual equity awards | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Independent chair | | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 3,707 | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 28176E108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | EW | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US28176E1082 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935792261 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director: Kieran T. Gallahue | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.2 | Election of Director: Leslie S. Heisz | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.3 | Election of Director: Paul A. LaViolette | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.4 | Election of Director: Steven R. Loranger | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.5 | Election of Director: Martha H. Marsh | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.6 | Election of Director: Michael A. Mussallem | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1.7 | Election of Director: Ramona Sequeira | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.8 | Election of Director: Nicholas J. Valeriani | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.9 | Election of Director: Bernard J. Zovighian | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Frequency of Future Advisory Votes on Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approval of Amendment of the Certificate of Incorporation to Provide for Exculpation of Officers | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Stockholder Proposal regarding Independent Board Chairman Policy | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,247 | | | | 0 | | | 08-May-2023 | 08-May-2023 | |
| INTEL CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 458140100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | INTC | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4581401001 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935793631 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Patrick P. Gelsinger | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: James J. Goetz | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Andrea J. Goldsmith | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Alyssa H. Henry | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Omar Ishrak | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Risa Lavizzo-Mourey | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Tsu-Jae King Liu | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Barbara G. Novick | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Gregory D. Smith | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Lip-Bu Tan | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Dion J. Weisler | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Frank D. Yeary | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Ratification of selection of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval of amendment and restatement of the 2006 Equity Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Advisory vote on the frequency of holding future advisory votes to approve executive compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal requesting an executive stock retention period policy and reporting, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that requiring senior executives to hold a significant portion of stock obtained through executive pay plans would focus the executives on the Company's long-term success. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder proposal requesting commission and publication of a third party review of Intel's China business ESG congruence, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe that the review and report requested by this proposal are warranted or that the report would be informative to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 6,798 | | | | 0 | | | 08-May-2023 | 08-May-2023 | |
| AMEREN CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 023608102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AEE | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0236081024 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935795750 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: WARNER L. BAXTER | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: CYNTHIA J. BRINKLEY | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: CATHERINE S. BRUNE | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: J. EDWARD COLEMAN | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: WARD H. DICKSON | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: NOELLE K. EDER | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: ELLEN M. FITZSIMMONS | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: RAFAEL FLORES | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: RICHARD J. HARSHMAN | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1j. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: CRAIG S. IVEY | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: JAMES C. JOHNSON | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: MARTIN J. LYONS, JR. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: STEVEN H. LIPSTEIN | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1n. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: LEO S. MACKAY, JR. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | COMPANY PROPOSAL - ADVISORY APPROVAL OF COMPENSATION OF THE NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS DISCLOSED IN THE PROXY STATEMENT. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | COMPANY PROPOSAL - ADVISORY APPROVAL OF THE FREQUENCY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY VOTE. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | COMPANY PROPOSAL - RATIFICATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP AS INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REGARDING THE ADOPTION OF SCOPES 1 AND 2 EMISSIONS TARGETS. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 934 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| STEEL DYNAMICS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 858119100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | STLD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8581191009 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935797805 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Mark D. Millett | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| | | | 2 | Sheree L. Bargabos | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 3 | Kenneth W. Cornew | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Traci M. Dolan | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 5 | James C. Marcuccilli | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 6 | Bradley S. Seaman | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 7 | Gabriel L. Shaheen | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 8 | Luis M. Sierra | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 9 | Steven A. Sonnenberg | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 10 | Richard P. Teets, Jr. | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | RATIFICATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP AS STEEL DYNAMICS, INC.'S INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | APPROVAL OF FREQUENCY OF FUTURE ADVISORY VOTES ON THE COMPENSATION OF THE NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | ADVISORY VOTE TO APPROVE THE COMPENSATION OF THE NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | APPROVAL OF THE STEEL DYNAMICS, INC. 2023 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | APPROVAL OF AN AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY'S AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION TO PROVIDE FOR ELECTION OF DIRECTORS BY MAJORITY VOTE | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 757 | | | | | 0 | | | 06-May-2023 | 06-May-2023 | |
| NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 655844108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NSC | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6558441084 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935801729 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Thomas D. Bell, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Marcela E. Donadio | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: John C. Huffard, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Christopher T. Jones | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Thomas C. Kelleher | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Steven F. Leer | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Michael D. Lockhart | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Amy E. Miles | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Claude Mongeau | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Jennifer F. Scanlon | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Alan H. Shaw | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: John R. Thompson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of KPMG LLP, independent registered public accounting firm, as Norfolk Southern's independent auditors for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval of the advisory resolution on executive compensation, as disclosed in the proxy statement for the 2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Frequency of advisory resolution on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | A shareholder proposal regarding street name and non-street name shareholders' rights to call a special meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 366 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| MASCO CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 574599106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MAS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5745991068 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935811871 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 10-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Keith J. Allman | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Aine L. Denari | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Christopher A. O'Herlihy | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Charles K. Stevens, III | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, by non-binding advisory vote, the compensation paid to the Company's named executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to the compensation disclosure rules of the SEC, including the Compensation Discussion and Analysis, the compensation tables and the related materials disclosed in the Proxy Statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To recommend, by non-binding advisory vote, the frequency of the non-binding advisory votes on the Company's executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as independent auditors for the Company for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,601 | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| TERADYNE, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 880770102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TER | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 12-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8807701029 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935790281 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 16-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 16-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 11-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Timothy E. Guertin | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Peter Herweck | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Mercedes Johnson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Ernest E. Maddock | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Marilyn Matz | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Gregory S. Smith | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Ford Tamer | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Paul J. Tufano | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | To approve, in a non-binding, advisory vote, the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, in a non-binding, advisory vote, that the frequency of an advisory vote on the compensation of the Company's named executive officers as set forth in the Company's proxy statement is every year, every two years, or every three years. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the selection of the firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,228 | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 133131102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CPT | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 12-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1331311027 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935791613 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 16-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 16-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 11-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Trust Manager: Richard J. Campo | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1b. | Election of Trust Manager: Javier E. Benito | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Trust Manager: Heather J. Brunner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Trust Manager: Mark D. Gibson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Trust Manager: Scott S. Ingraham | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Trust Manager: Renu Khator | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Trust Manager: D. Keith Oden | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Trust Manager: Frances Aldrich Sevilla-Sacasa | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Trust Manager: Steven A. Webster | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Trust Manager: Kelvin R. Westbrook | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, by an advisory vote, of executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval, by an advisory vote, of frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 833 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 194162103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CL | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 12-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1941621039 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935795382 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 11-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: John P. Bilbrey | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: John T. Cahill | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Steve Cahillane | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Lisa M. Edwards | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: C. Martin Harris | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Martina Hund-Mejean | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Kimberly A. Nelson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Lorrie M. Norrington | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Michael B. Polk | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Stephen I. Sadove | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Noel R. Wallace | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratify selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Colgate's independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on executive compensation. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal on independent Board Chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal on executives to retain significant stock. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that requiring senior executives to hold a significant portion of stock obtained through executive pay plans would focus the executives on the Company's long-term success. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,406 | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 571903202 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MAR | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 12-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5719032022 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935797564 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 15-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 11-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Anthony G. Capuano | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Isabella D. Goren | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Deborah M. Harrison | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Frederick A. Henderson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Eric Hippeau | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Lauren R. Hobart | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Debra L. Lee | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Aylwin B. Lewis | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1i. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: David S. Marriott | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1j. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Margaret M. McCarthy | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Grant F. Reid | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Horacio D. Rozanski | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1m. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Susan C. Schwab | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | RATIFICATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF ERNST & YOUNG AS THE COMPANY'S INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | ADVISORY VOTE TO APPROVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | ADVISORY VOTE ON THE FREQUENCY OF FUTURE ADVISORY VOTES TO APPROVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | APPROVAL OF THE 2023 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. STOCK AND CASH INCENTIVE PLAN | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | STOCKHOLDER RESOLUTION REQUESTING THAT THE COMPANY PUBLISH A CONGRUENCY REPORT OF PARTNERSHIPS WITH GLOBALIST ORGANIZATIONS | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | STOCKHOLDER RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE COMPANY ANNUALLY PREPARE A PAY EQUITY DISCLOSURE | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay disparities by gender in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,057 | | | | 0 | | | 07-May-2023 | 07-May-2023 | |
| MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 620076307 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MSI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 16-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6200763075 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935792211 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Gregory Q. Brown | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Kenneth D. Denman | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Egon P. Durban | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Ayanna M. Howard | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Clayton M. Jones | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Judy C. Lewent | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Gregory K. Mondre | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a one-year term: Joseph M. Tucci | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Ratification of the Appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Approval of the Company's Executive Compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory Approval of the Frequency of the Advisory Vote to Approve the Company's Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 354 | | | | | 0 | | | 10-May-2023 | 10-May-2023 | |
| CONOCOPHILLIPS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 20825C104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | COP | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 16-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US20825C1045 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935796194 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Dennis V. Arriola | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Jody Freeman | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Gay Huey Evans | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Jeffrey A. Joerres | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Ryan M. Lance | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Timothy A. Leach | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: William H. McRaven | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Sharmila Mulligan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Eric D. Mullins | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Arjun N. Murti | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Robert A. Niblock | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: David T. Seaton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: R.A. Walker | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Proposal to ratify appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as ConocoPhillips' independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Approval of Executive Compensation. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | None | | | | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Adoption of Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation on Right to Call Special Meeting. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is appropriate to enable holders of 10% or more of the common stock to have an unlimited ability to call special meetings for any purpose at any time. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Approval of 2023 Omnibus Stock and Performance Incentive Plan of ConocoPhillips. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Independent Board Chairman. | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Share Retention Until Retirement. | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that requiring senior executives to hold a significant portion of stock obtained through executive pay plans would focus the executives on the Company's long-term success. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Report on Tax Payments. | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | Report on Lobbying Activities. | | | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 197 | | | | | 0 | | | 10-May-2023 | 10-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,250 | | | | 0 | | | 10-May-2023 | 10-May-2023 | |
| JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 46625H100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | JPM | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 16-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US46625H1005 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935797223 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Linda B. Bammann | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Stephen B. Burke | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Todd A. Combs | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: James S. Crown | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Alicia Boler Davis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: James Dimon | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Timothy P. Flynn | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Alex Gorsky | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Mellody Hobson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Michael A. Neal | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Phebe N. Novakovic | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Virginia M. Rometty | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory resolution to approve executive compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on frequency of advisory resolution to approve executive compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of independent registered public accounting firm | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Independent board chairman | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Fossil fuel phase out | | | | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe that the expenditure of the additional human and financial resources that would be required to adopt this proposal would be a necessary or prudent use of Company and shareholder assets. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan- Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Amending public responsibility committee charter to include mandate to oversee animal welfare impact and risk | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Special shareholder meeting improvement | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Report on climate transition planning | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Climate change is one of the most financially significant environmental issues currently facing investors. Data on occupational safety and health, vendor and labor standards, waste and water reduction targets and product-related environmental impacts are important business considerations. Not managing these properly could pose significant regulatory, legal, reputational and financial risks. Tracking and reporting on ESG business practices makes a company more responsive to a global business environment which is characterized by finite natural resources, changing legislation, and heightened public expectations for corporate accountability. Reporting also helps companies better integrate and gain strategic value from existing sustainability efforts, identify gaps and opportunities in products and processes, develop company- wide communications, publicize innovative practices, and receive feedback. We believe that approval of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | Report on ensuring respect for civil liberties | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | Report analyzing the congruence of the company's political and electioneering expenditures | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 12. | Absolute GHG reduction goals | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 507 | | | | | 0 | | | 10-May-2023 | 10-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,260 | | | | 0 | | | 10-May-2023 | 10-May-2023 | |
| TESLA, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 88160R101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TSLA | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 16-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US88160R1014 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935804636 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director: Elon Musk | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.2 | Election of Director: Robyn Denholm | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1.3 | Election of Director: JB Straubel | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Tesla proposal to approve executive compensation on a non- binding advisory basis. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Tesla proposal to approve the frequency of future votes on executive compensation on a non-binding advisory basis. | Management | 1 Year | | | 3 Years | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: It is our opinion that an annual say-on-pay vote is the accepted standard for companies today and a requirement for good corporate governance. Furthermore, we believe that triennial advisory vote on executive compensation will hinder shareholders from providing the Company with direct input on their respective compensation philosophy, policies and practices as disclosed in the proxy statement. We do not concur with the current board's recommendation of a triennial ratification (non-binding vote) on this issue. We recommend a vote AGAINST the option of triennial (every three years) as the frequency with which shareholders will be provided an advisory vote on executive compensation. |
| 4. | Tesla proposal to ratify the appointment of independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal regarding reporting on key-person risk. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will negatively impact the Company's ability to retain, motivate and recruit management. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 229 | | | | | 0 | | | 10-May-2023 | 10-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,340 | | | | 0 | | | 10-May-2023 | 10-May-2023 | |
| IDEXX LABORATORIES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 45168D104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | IDXX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US45168D1046 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935793996 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director (Proposal One): Daniel M. Junius | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director (Proposal One): Lawrence D. Kingsley | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director (Proposal One): Sophie V. Vandebroek, PhD | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. To ratify the selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the current fiscal year (Proposal Two). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. To approve a nonbinding advisory resolution on the Company's executive compensation (Proposal Three). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation. To recommend, by nonbinding advisory vote, the frequency of future advisory votes on the Company's executive compensation (Proposal Four). | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 277 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-May-2023 | 12-May-2023 | |
| CROWN CASTLE INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 22822V101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CCI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US22822V1017 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935796788 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: P. Robert Bartolo | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Jay A. Brown | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Cindy Christy | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Ari Q. Fitzgerald | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Andrea J. Goldsmith | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Tammy K. Jones | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Anthony J. Melone | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: W. Benjamin Moreland | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Kevin A. Stephens | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Matthew Thornton, III | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | The ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accountants for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | The non-binding, advisory vote to approve the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | The amendment to the Company's Restated Certificate of Incorporation, as amended, regarding officer exculpation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 546 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-May-2023 | 12-May-2023 | |
| FISERV, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 337738108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | FISV | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US3377381088 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935806096 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Frank J. Bisignano | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | Henrique de Castro | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 3 | Harry F. DiSimone | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Dylan G. Haggart | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 5 | Wafaa Mamilli | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 6 | Heidi G. Miller | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 7 | Doyle R. Simons | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 8 | Kevin M. Warren | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of the named executive officers of Fiserv, Inc. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of advisory votes on the compensation of the named executive officers of Fiserv, Inc. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm of Fiserv, Inc. for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal requesting an independent board chair policy. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 816 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-May-2023 | 12-May-2023 | |
| QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INCORPORATED | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 74834L100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DGX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US74834L1008 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935807137 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: James E. Davis | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Luis A. Diaz, Jr., M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Tracey C. Doi | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Vicky B. Gregg | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Wright L. Lassiter, III | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Timothy L. Main | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Denise M. Morrison | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Gary M. Pfeiffer | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Timothy M. Ring | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Gail R. Wilensky, Ph.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | An advisory resolution to approve the executive officer compensation disclosed in the Company's 2023 proxy statement | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | An advisory vote to recommend the frequency of the stockholder advisory vote to approve executive officer compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approval of the Amended and Restated Employee Long-Term Incentive Plan | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal regarding a report on the Company's greenhouse gas emissions | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 475 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-May-2023 | 12-May-2023 | |
| MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 609207105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MDLZ | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6092071058 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935809357 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 08-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Lewis W.K. Booth | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Charles E. Bunch | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Ertharin Cousin | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Jorge S. Mesquita | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Anindita Mukherjee | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jane Hamilton Nielsen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Patrick T. Siewert | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F10 Affiliation - Ex-Officio - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director who serves on the Company board in an ex-officio capacity is considered affiliated. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Michael A. Todman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Dirk Van de Put | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Votes to Approve Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the Selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Independent Registered Public Accountants for Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Require Independent Chair of the Board. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Publish Annual Benchmarks for Achieving Company's 2025 Cage-Free Egg Goal. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the preparation of an additional report to stockholders as requested by the proponent would not be a good use of company resources. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Adopt Public Targets to Eradicate Child Labor in Cocoa Supply Chain | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,564 | | | | 0 | | | 10-May-2023 | 10-May-2023 | |
| NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 666807102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NOC | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6668071029 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935809763 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Kathy J. Warden | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: David P. Abney | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Marianne C. Brown | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Ann M. Fudge | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Madeleine A. Kleiner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Arvind Krishna | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Graham N. Robinson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Kimberly A. Ross | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Gary Roughead | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Thomas M. Schoewe | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: James S. Turley | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Mark A. Welsh III | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Mary A. Winston | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Proposal to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of the Company's Named Executive Officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Proposal to vote on the preferred frequency of future advisory votes on the compensation of the Company's Named Executive Officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Proposal to ratify the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the Company's Independent Auditor for fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Proposal to amend the Company's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to reduce the threshold to call a special meeting of shareholders. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is appropriate to enable holders of 10% or more of the common stock to have an unlimited ability to call special meetings for any purpose at any time. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal to annually conduct an evaluation and issue a report describing the alignment of the Company's political activities with its human rights policy | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal to provide for an independent Board chair. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 143 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-May-2023 | 12-May-2023 | |
| VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INCORPORATED | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 92532F100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | VRTX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US92532F1003 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935809852 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 23-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 23-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director: Sangeeta Bhatia | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.2 | Election of Director: Lloyd Carney | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.3 | Election of Director: Alan Garber | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.4 | Election of Director: Terrence Kearney | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1.5 | Election of Director: Reshma Kewalramani | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.6 | Election of Director: Jeffrey Leiden | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1.7 | Election of Director: Diana McKenzie | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.8 | Election of Director: Bruce Sachs | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1.9 | Election of Director: Suketu Upadhyay | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Ernst & Young LLP as independent Registered Public Accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve named executive office compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 305 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-May-2023 | 12-May-2023 | |
| PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 723484101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PNW | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7234841010 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935811857 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Glynis A. Bryan | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | G. A. de la Melena, Jr. | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 3 | Richard P. Fox | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Jeffrey B. Guldner | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| | | | 5 | Kathryn L. Munro | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 6 | Bruce J. Nordstrom | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 7 | Paula J. Sims | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 8 | William H. Spence | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 9 | Kristine L. Svinicki | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 10 | James E. Trevathan, Jr. | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 11 | Director Withdrawn | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To hold an advisory vote to approve executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | To hold an advisory vote on the frequency of our shareholders advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To approve the first amendment to the Pinnacle West Capital Corporation 2021 Long-Term Incentive Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To ratify the appointment of our independent accountant for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | To act upon a shareholder proposal requesting adoption of a policy separating the chairman and CEO roles and requiring an independent Board Chairman whenever possible, if properly presented at the 2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 870 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-May-2023 | 12-May-2023 | |
| CHUBB LIMITED | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | H1467J104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CB | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | CH0044328745 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935813027 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1 | Approval of the management report, standalone financial statements and consolidated financial statements of Chubb Limited for the year ended December 31, 2022 | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2a | Allocation of disposable profit | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2b | Distribution of a dividend out of legal reserves (by way of release and allocation to a dividend reserve) | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3 | Discharge of the Board of Directors | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4a | Election of PricewaterhouseCoopers AG (Zurich) as our statutory auditor | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4b | Ratification of appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (United States) as independent registered public accounting firm for purposes of U.S. securities law reporting | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4c | Election of BDO AG (Zurich) as special audit firm | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5a | Election of Director: Evan G. Greenberg | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Combined CEO and Board Chair positions and the Company earns a board score of Some Concerns Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 5b | Election of Director: Michael P. Connors | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Compensation and Nominating Committees According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 5c | Election of Director: Michael G. Atieh | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5d | Election of Director: Kathy Bonanno | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5e | Election of Director: Nancy K. Buese | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5f | Election of Director: Sheila P. Burke | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5g | Election of Director: Michael L. Corbat | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5h | Election of Director: Robert J. Hugin | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5i | Election of Director: Robert W. Scully | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5j | Election of Director: Theodore E. Shasta | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Audit Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 5k | Election of Director: David H. Sidwell | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5l | Election of Director: Olivier Steimer | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5m | Election of Director: Frances F. Townsend | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6 | Election of Evan G. Greenberg as Chairman of the Board of Directors | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Combined CEO and Board Chair positions and the Company earns a board score of Some Concerns Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability |
| 7a | Election of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors: Michael P. Connors | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Compensation and Nominating Committees According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 7b | Election of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors: David H. Sidwell | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7c | Election of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors: Frances F. Townsend | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 8 | Election of Homburger AG as independent proxy | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 9a | Amendments to the Articles of Association: Amendments relating to Swiss corporate law updates | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 9b | Amendments to the Articles of Association: Amendment to advance notice period | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 10a | Reduction of share capital: Cancellation of repurchased shares | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 10b | Reduction of share capital: Par value reduction | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 11a | Approval of the compensation of the Board of Directors and Executive Management under Swiss law requirements: Maximum compensation of the Board of Directors until the next annual general meeting | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 11b | Approval of the compensation of the Board of Directors and Executive Management under Swiss law requirements: Maximum compensation of Executive Management for the 2024 calendar year | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 11c | Approval of the compensation of the Board of Directors and Executive Management under Swiss law requirements: Advisory vote to approve the Swiss compensation report | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 12 | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation under U.S. securities law requirements | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 13 | Advisory vote on the frequency of the U.S. securities law advisory vote on executive compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 14 | Shareholder proposal on greenhouse gas emissions targets, if properly presented | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Acknowledging climate change as an inevitable factor, and recognizing the need to adapt, involves bold decisions by business. Therefore, we believe that companies should review how climate change impacts the economy and portfolio companies and evaluate how shareholder resolutions on climate change may impact long-term shareholder value as it votes proxies. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 15 | Shareholder proposal on human rights and underwriting, if properly presented. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| A | If a new agenda item or a new proposal for an existing agenda item is put before the meeting, I/we hereby authorize and instruct the independent proxy to vote as follows. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not recommend that shareholders approve in advance matters of which they have no knowledge. Accordingly, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 424 | | | | | 0 | | | 11-May-2023 | 11-May-2023 | |
| ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 770323103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | RHI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 17-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7703231032 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935829765 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Julia L. Coronado | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Dirk A. Kempthorne | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Harold M. Messmer, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Marc H. Morial | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Robert J. Pace | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Frederick A. Richman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: M. Keith Waddell | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Marnie H. Wilking | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation. | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 818 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-May-2023 | 12-May-2023 | |
| THE HOME DEPOT, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 437076102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | HD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4370761029 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935795659 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Gerard J. Arpey | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Ari Bousbib | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Jeffery H. Boyd | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Gregory D. Brenneman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: J. Frank Brown | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Albert P. Carey | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Edward P. Decker | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Linda R. Gooden | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Wayne M. Hewett | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Manuel Kadre | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Stephanie C. Linnartz | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Paula Santilli | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Caryn Seidman-Becker | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Ratification of the Appointment of KPMG LLP | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation ("Say-on-Pay") | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Say-on-Pay Votes | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Amendment of Shareholder Written Consent Right | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We have determined that it is a positive corporate governance measure to allow the stockholders to have the ability to take action by written consent, if such written consent or consents sets forth the action to be taken and is signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting at which all shares entitled to vote on the matter were present and voted. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Board Chair | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Political Contributions Congruency Analysis | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Rescission of Racial Equity Audit Proposal Vote | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Senior Management Commitment to Avoid Political Speech | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 204 | | | | | 0 | | | 15-May-2023 | 15-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,000 | | | | 0 | | | 15-May-2023 | 15-May-2023 | |
| ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 007903107 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AMD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0079031078 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935797728 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 22-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 22-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Nora M. Denzel | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Mark Durcan | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Michael P. Gregoire | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Joseph A. Householder | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: John W. Marren | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jon A. Olson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Lisa T. Su | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Abhi Y. Talwalkar | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Elizabeth W. Vanderslice | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Approve of the Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 2023 Equity Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the current fiscal year. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote to approve the executive compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,574 | | | | 0 | | | 14-May-2023 | 14-May-2023 | |
| ZOETIS INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 98978V103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ZTS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US98978V1035 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935801224 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Paul M. Bisaro | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Vanessa Broadhurst | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Frank A. D'Amelio | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Michael B. McCallister | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines,, the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Gregory Norden | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Louise M. Parent | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Kristin C. Peck | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Robert W. Scully | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve our executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of appointment of KPMG LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval of an amendment to our Restated Certificate of Incorporation to create a right to call a special meeting. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is appropriate to enable holders of 10% or more of the common stock to have an unlimited ability to call special meetings for any purpose at any time. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal regarding ability to call a special meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the ability of shareholders to call special meetings is increasingly considered an important aspect of good corporate governance. We believe that the current threshold of the Company will strike an appropriate balance between the right of shareholders to call a special meeting and the interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 887 | | | | | 0 | | | 13-May-2023 | 13-May-2023 | |
| MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 571748102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MMC | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5717481023 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935801541 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Anthony K. Anderson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: John Q. Doyle | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Hafize Gaye Erkan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Oscar Fanjul | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: H. Edward Hanway | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Judith Hartmann | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Deborah C. Hopkins | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Tamara Ingram | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Jane H. Lute | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Steven A. Mills | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Bruce P. Nolop | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Morton O. Schapiro | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Lloyd M. Yates | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1n. | Election of Director: Ray G. Young | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory (Nonbinding) Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory (Nonbinding) Vote on the Frequency of Future Votes on Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of Selection of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 374 | | | | | 0 | | | 15-May-2023 | 15-May-2023 | |
| ON SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 682189105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ON | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6821891057 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935803468 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Atsushi Abe | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Alan Campbell | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Susan K. Carter | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Thomas L. Deitrich | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Hassane El-Khoury | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Bruce E. Kiddoo | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Paul A. Mascarenas | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Gregory Waters | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Christine Y. Yan | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve the compensation of our named executive officers (Say-on- Pay). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve the frequency of future Say-on-Pay votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,216 | | | | 0 | | | 15-May-2023 | 15-May-2023 | |
| AT&T INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 00206R102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | T | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US00206R1023 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935803937 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Scott T. Ford | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Glenn H. Hutchins | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: William E. Kennard | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Stephen J. Luczo | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Michael B. McCallister | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Beth E. Mooney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Matthew K. Rose | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: John T. Stankey | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Cynthia B. Taylor | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Luis A. Ubiñas | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of independent auditors. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of executive compensation. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory approval of frequency of vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Independent board chairman. | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Racial equity audit. | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 5,489 | | | | 0 | | | 13-May-2023 | 13-May-2023 | |
| ALTRIA GROUP, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 02209S103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MO | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US02209S1033 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935804965 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Ian L.T. Clarke | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Marjorie M. Connelly | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: R. Matt Davis | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: William F. Gifford, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Jacinto J. Hernandez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Debra J. Kelly-Ennis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Kathryn B. McQuade | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: George Muñoz | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Nabil Y. Sakkab | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Virginia E. Shanks | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Ellen R. Strahlman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: M. Max Yzaguirre | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the Selection of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Non-Binding Advisory Vote to Approve the Compensation of Altria's Named Executive Officers | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Non-Binding Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes to Approve the Compensation of Altria's Named Executive Officers | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Congruence of Political and Lobbying Expenditures with Company Values and Policies | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal - Commission a Civil Rights Equity Audit | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 870 | | | | | 0 | | | 14-May-2023 | 14-May-2023 | |
| CVS HEALTH CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 126650100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CVS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1266501006 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935806375 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Fernando Aguirre | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Jeffrey R. Balser, M.D., Ph.D. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: C. David Brown II | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Alecia A. DeCoudreaux | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Nancy-Ann M. DeParle | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Roger N. Farah | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Anne M. Finucane | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Edward J. Ludwig | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Karen S. Lynch | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Jean-Pierre Millon | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Mary L. Schapiro | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the Appointment of Our Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Say on Pay, a Proposal to Approve, on an Advisory Basis, the Company's Executive Compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Proposal to Recommend, on an Advisory Basis, the Frequency of Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation Votes | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal Requesting Paid Sick Leave for All Employees | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder Proposal for Reducing our Ownership Threshold to Request a Special Stockholder Meeting | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the ability of shareholders to call special meetings is increasingly considered an important aspect of good corporate governance. We believe that the current threshold of the Company will strike an appropriate balance between the right of shareholders to call a special meeting and the interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder Proposal Regarding "Fair Elections" and Requiring Stockholder Approval of Certain Types of By-law Amendments | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal that would impose inequitable restrictions. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder Proposal Requesting a Report on a "Worker Rights Assessment" | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 9. | Stockholder Proposal to Prevent Company Directors from Simultaneously Sitting on the Boards of Directors of Any Other Company | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the nature of the proposal is too restrictive that it might affect the Company's ability to hire, retain and motivate directors to serve on the Board. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,443 | | | | 0 | | | 15-May-2023 | 15-May-2023 | |
| NEXTERA ENERGY, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 65339F101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NEE | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US65339F1012 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935808696 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 22-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 22-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Nicole S. Arnaboldi | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Sherry S. Barrat | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: James L. Camaren | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Kenneth B. Dunn | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Naren K. Gursahaney | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Kirk S. Hachigian | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: John W. Ketchum | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Amy B. Lane | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: David L. Porges | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Deborah "Dev" Stahlkopf | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: John A. Stall | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Darryl L. Wilson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Ratification of appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as NextEra Energy's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, by non-binding advisory vote, of NextEra Energy's compensation of its named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Non-Binding advisory vote on whether NextEra Energy should hold a non-binding shareholder advisory vote to approve NextEra Energy's compensation of its named executive officers every 1, 2 or 3 years | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | A proposal entitled "Board Skills Disclosure" requesting a chart of individual board skills | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,456 | | | | 0 | | | 15-May-2023 | 15-May-2023 | |
| THE CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 808513105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SCHW | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8085131055 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935809523 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of director: Marianne C. Brown | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of director: Frank C. Herringer | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of director: Gerri K. Martin- Flickinger | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of director: Todd M. Ricketts | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of director: Carolyn Schwab- Pomerantz | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the selection of Deloitte & Touche LLP as independent auditors | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Frequency of advisory vote on named executive officer compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal requesting pay equity disclosure | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay disparities by gender in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder Proposal requesting company report on discrimination risk oversight and impact | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,868 | | | | 0 | | | 15-May-2023 | 15-May-2023 | |
| AMPHENOL CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 032095101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | APH | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 18-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0320951017 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935823953 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 17-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director: Nancy A. Altobello | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.2 | Election of Director: David P. Falck | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.3 | Election of Director: Edward G. Jepsen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1.4 | Election of Director: Rita S. Lane | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.5 | Election of Director: Robert A. Livingston | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.6 | Election of Director: Martin H. Loeffler | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1.7 | Election of Director: R. Adam Norwitt | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.8 | Election of Director: Prahlad Singh | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.9 | Election of Director: Anne Clarke Wolff | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Deloitte & Touche LLP as Independent Public Accountants of the Company | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Compensation of Named Executive Officers | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes to Approve Compensation of Named Executive Officers | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal: Improve Political Spending Disclosure | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,669 | | | | 0 | | | 14-May-2023 | 14-May-2023 | |
| HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 438516106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | HON | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US4385161066 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935801200 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 18-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1A. | Election of Director: Darius Adamczyk | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1B. | Election of Director: Duncan B. Angove | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1C. | Election of Director: William S. Ayer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1D. | Election of Director: Kevin Burke | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1E. | Election of Director: D. Scott Davis | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1F. | Election of Director: Deborah Flint | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1G. | Election of Director: Vimal Kapur | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1H. | Election of Director: Rose Lee | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1I. | Election of Director: Grace D. Lieblein | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1J. | Election of Director: Robin L. Washington | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1K. | Election of Director: Robin Watson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approval of Independent Accountants. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareowner Proposal - Independent Board Chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareowner Proposal - Environmental and Health Impact Report. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Climate change is one of the most financially significant environmental issues currently facing investors. Data on occupational safety and health, vendor and labor standards, waste and water reduction targets and product-related environmental impacts are important business considerations. Not managing these properly could pose significant regulatory, legal, reputational and financial risks. Tracking and reporting on ESG business practices makes a company more responsive to a global business environment which is characterized by finite natural resources, changing legislation, and heightened public expectations for corporate accountability. Reporting also helps companies better integrate and gain strategic value from existing sustainability efforts, identify gaps and opportunities in products and processes, develop company- wide communications, publicize innovative practices, and receive feedback. We believe that approval of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 538 | | | | | 0 | | | 16-May-2023 | 16-May-2023 | |
| MORGAN STANLEY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 617446448 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US6174464486 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935808646 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 18-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Alistair Darling | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Thomas H. Glocer | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: James P. Gorman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Robert H. Herz | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Erika H. James | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Hironori Kamezawa | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Shelley B. Leibowitz | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Stephen J. Luczo | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Jami Miscik | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Masato Miyachi | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Dennis M. Nally | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Mary L. Schapiro | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Perry M. Traquina | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1n. | Election of Director: Rayford Wilkins, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | To ratify the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as independent auditor | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve the compensation of executives as disclosed in the proxy statement (non- binding advisory vote) | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To vote on the frequency of holding a non- binding advisory vote on the compensation of executives as disclosed in the proxy statement (non-binding advisory vote) | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal requesting adoption of improved shareholder right to call a special shareholder meeting | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal requesting adoption of a policy to cease financing new fossil fuel development | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We do not believe that the expenditure of the additional human and financial resources that would be required to adopt this proposal would be a necessary or prudent use of Company and shareholder assets. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan- Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,773 | | | | 0 | | | 16-May-2023 | 16-May-2023 | |
| INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 45866F104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ICE | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 19-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US45866F1049 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935812621 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 18-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Hon. Sharon Y. Bowen | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Shantella E. Cooper | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Duriya M. Farooqui | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Hague of Richmond | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Mark F. Mulhern | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Thomas E. Noonan | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Caroline L. Silver | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Jeffrey C. Sprecher | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Judith A. Sprieser | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for terms expiring in 2024: Martha A. Tirinnanzi | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, by non-binding vote, the advisory resolution on executive compensation for named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, by non-binding vote, the advisory resolution to approve the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | A stockholder proposal regarding special stockholder meeting improvement, if properly presented at the Annual Meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 843 | | | | | 0 | | | 16-May-2023 | 16-May-2023 | |
| APA CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 03743Q108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | APA | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 23-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US03743Q1085 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935802581 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 22-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | Election of Director: Annell R. Bay | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Election of Director: John J. Christmann IV | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Election of Director: Juliet S. Ellis | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Election of Director: Charles W. Hooper | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Election of Director: Chansoo Joung | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Election of Director: H. Lamar McKay | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Election of Director: Amy H. Nelson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 8. | Election of Director: Daniel W. Rabun | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 9. | Election of Director: Peter A. Ragauss | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 10. | Election of Director: David L. Stover | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 11. | Ratification of Ernst & Young LLP as APA's Independent Auditors | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 12. | Advisory Vote to Approve Compensation of APA's Named Executive Officers | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 13. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of the Advisory Vote to Approve Compensation of APA's Named Executive Officers | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 14. | Approval of an amendment to APA's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to provide for the exculpation of officers | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 444 | | | | | 0 | | | 17-May-2023 | 17-May-2023 | |
| REALTY INCOME CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 756109104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 23-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7561091049 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935806248 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 23-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 23-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 22-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Priscilla Almodovar | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Jacqueline Brady | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: A. Larry Chapman | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Reginald H. Gilyard | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Mary Hogan Preusse | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Priya Cherian Huskins | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Gerardo I. Lopez | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Michael D. McKee | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Gregory T. McLaughlin | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Ronald L. Merriman | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual meeting: Sumit Roy | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | The ratification of the appointment of KPMG LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | A non-binding advisory proposal to approve the compensation of our named executive officers as described in the Proxy Statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | A non-binding advisory vote to approve the frequency of future non-binding advisory votes by stockholders of the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,288 | | | | 0 | | | 18-May-2023 | 18-May-2023 | |
| MERCK & CO., INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 58933Y105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MRK | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 23-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US58933Y1055 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935809080 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 22-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Douglas M. Baker, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Mary Ellen Coe | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Pamela J. Craig | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Robert M. Davis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Thomas H. Glocer | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Risa J. Lavizzo- Mourey, M.D. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Stephen L. Mayo, Ph.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Paul B. Rothman, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Patricia F. Russo | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Christine E. Seidman, M.D. | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Inge G. Thulin | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Kathy J. Warden | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Peter C. Wendell | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Non-binding advisory vote to approve the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Non-binding advisory vote to approve the frequency of future votes to approve the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal regarding business operations in China. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal regarding access to COVID-19 products. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal regarding indirect political spending. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder proposal regarding patents and access. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder proposal regarding a congruency report of partnerships with globalist organizations. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 10. | Shareholder proposal regarding an independent board chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,080 | | | | 0 | | | 18-May-2023 | 18-May-2023 | |
| HENRY SCHEIN, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 806407102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | HSIC | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 23-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8064071025 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935809636 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 22-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Mohamad Ali | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Stanley M. Bergman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: James P. Breslawski | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Deborah Derby | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Joseph L. Herring | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Kurt P. Kuehn | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Philip A. Laskawy | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Anne H. Margulies | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Mark E. Mlotek | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Steven Paladino | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Carol Raphael | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Scott Serota | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Bradley T. Sheares, Ph.D. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1n. | Election of Director: Reed V. Tuckson, M.D., FACP | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Proposal to amend and restate the Company's 2015 Non-Employee Director Stock Incentive Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Proposal to approve, by non-binding vote, the 2022 compensation paid to the Company's Named Executive Officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Proposal to recommend, by non-binding vote, the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Proposal to ratify the selection of BDO USA, LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 30, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 881 | | | | | 0 | | | 18-May-2023 | 18-May-2023 | |
| WELLTOWER INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 95040Q104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | WELL | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 23-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US95040Q1040 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935820173 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 22-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Kenneth J. Bacon | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Karen B. DeSalvo | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Philip L. Hawkins | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Dennis G. Lopez | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Shankh Mitra | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Ade J. Patton | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Diana W. Reid | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Sergio D. Rivera | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Johnese M. Spisso | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Kathryn M. Sullivan | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | The ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | The approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of our named executive officers as disclosed in the 2023 Proxy Statement. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | An advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,272 | | | | 0 | | | 18-May-2023 | 18-May-2023 | |
| THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 883556102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TMO | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8835561023 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935803709 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Marc N. Casper | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Nelson J. Chai | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Ruby R. Chandy | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: C. Martin Harris | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Tyler Jacks | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: R. Alexandra Keith | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: James C. Mullen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Lars R. Sørensen | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Debora L. Spar | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Scott M. Sperling | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Dion J. Weisler | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | An advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | An advisory vote on the frequency of future named executive officer advisory votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the Audit Committee's selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent auditors for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approval of the Company's Amended and Restated 2013 Stock Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Approval of the Company's 2023 Global Employee Stock Purchase Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 476 | | | | | 0 | | | 21-May-2023 | 21-May-2023 | |
| AMERICAN TOWER CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 03027X100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AMT | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US03027X1000 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935806008 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Thomas A. Bartlett | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Kelly C. Chambliss | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Teresa H. Clarke | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Raymond P. Dolan | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Kenneth R. Frank | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Robert D. Hormats | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Grace D. Lieblein | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Craig Macnab | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: JoAnn A. Reed | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Pamela D. A. Reeve | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Bruce L. Tanner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Samme L. Thompson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the selection of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the Company's executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To vote, on an advisory basis, on the frequency with which the Company will hold a stockholder advisory vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 579 | | | | | 0 | | | 19-May-2023 | 19-May-2023 | |
| FIDELITY NAT'L INFORMATION SERVICES,INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 31620M106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | FIS | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US31620M1062 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935815184 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 31-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 31-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Lee Adrean | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Ellen R. Alemany | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Mark D. Benjamin | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Vijay G. D'Silva | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Stephanie L. Ferris | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jeffrey A. Goldstein | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Lisa A. Hook | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Kenneth T. Lamneck | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Gary L. Lauer | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Louise M. Parent | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Brian T. Shea | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: James B. Stallings, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the preferred frequency of stockholder advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | To ratify the appointment of KPMG LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 632 | | | | | 0 | | | 21-May-2023 | 21-May-2023 | |
| BLACKROCK, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 09247X101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | BLK | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US09247X1019 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935821000 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 30-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 30-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Bader M. Alsaad | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Pamela Daley | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Laurence D. Fink | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: William E. Ford | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Fabrizio Freda | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Murry S. Gerber | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Margaret "Peggy" L. Johnson | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Robert S. Kapito | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Cheryl D. Mills | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Gordon M. Nixon | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Kristin C. Peck | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Charles H. Robbins | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Marco Antonio Slim Domit | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1n. | Election of Director: Hans E. Vestberg | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1o. | Election of Director: Susan L. Wagner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1p. | Election of Director: Mark Wilson | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, in a non-binding advisory vote, of the compensation for named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, in a non-binding advisory vote, of the frequency of future executive compensation advisory votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte LLP as BlackRock's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal - Civil rights, non- discrimination and returns to merit audit. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal - Production of a report on BlackRock's ability to "engineer decarbonization in the real economy". | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal - Impact report for climate-related human risks of iShares U.S. Aerospace and Defense Exchange-Traded Fund. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 44 | | | | | 0 | | | 22-May-2023 | 22-May-2023 | |
| PAYPAL HOLDINGS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 70450Y103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | PYPL | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US70450Y1038 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935821036 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 30-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 30-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Rodney C. Adkins | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Jonathan Christodoro | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: John J. Donahoe | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: David W. Dorman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Belinda J. Johnson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Enrique Lores | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Gail J. McGovern | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Deborah M. Messemer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: David M. Moffett | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Ann M. Sarnoff | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Daniel H. Schulman | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Frank D. Yeary | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval of the PayPal Holdings, Inc. 2015 Equity Incentive Award Plan, as Amended and Restated. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Ratification of the Appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Our Independent Auditor for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal - Provision of Services in Conflict Zones. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Stockholder Proposal - Reproductive Rights and Data Privacy. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Stockholder Proposal - PayPal Transparency Reports. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder Proposal - Report on Ensuring Respect for Civil Liberties. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Stockholder Proposal - Adopt Majority Vote Standard for Director Elections. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,458 | | | | 0 | | | 22-May-2023 | 22-May-2023 | |
| AMAZON.COM, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 023135106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AMZN | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0231351067 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935825452 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 30-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 30-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Jeffrey P. Bezos | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Andrew R. Jassy | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Keith B. Alexander | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Edith W. Cooper | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Jamie S. Gorelick | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Daniel P. Huttenlocher | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Judith A. McGrath | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Indra K. Nooyi | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Jonathan J. Rubinstein | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Patricia Q. Stonesifer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Wendell P. Weeks | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | RATIFICATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP AS INDEPENDENT AUDITORS | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | ADVISORY VOTE TO APPROVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | ADVISORY VOTE ON THE FREQUENCY OF FUTURE ADVISORY VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | REAPPROVAL OF OUR 1997 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN, AS AMENDED AND RESTATED, FOR PURPOSES OF FRENCH TAX LAW | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING A REPORT ON RETIREMENT PLAN OPTIONS | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will align the interests of the Company's employees with its climate action goals. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. | |
| 7. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING A REPORT ON CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING REPORTING ON CONTENT AND PRODUCT REMOVAL/RESTRICTIONS | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING A REPORT ON CONTENT REMOVAL REQUESTS | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON STAKEHOLDER IMPACTS | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will enhance the Company's climate commitments, and its human capital management practices as well as its broader stakeholder relationships. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING ALTERNATIVE TAX REPORTING | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. | | |
| 12. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON CLIMATE LOBBYING | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 13. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON GENDER/RACIAL PAY | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay disparities by gender in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 14. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION PROGRAMS | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 15. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING AN AMENDMENT TO OUR BYLAWS TO REQUIRE SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL FOR CERTAIN FUTURE AMENDMENTS | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal that would impose inequitable restrictions. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 16. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that improved transparency and accountability will enhance the Company's commitment to long-term sustainability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 17. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING A NEW POLICY REGARDING OUR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PROCESS | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that disclosure of pay grades is material to shareholders as this would provide a valuable additional metric for evaluating and voting on executive compensation practices and Say-on-Pay proxy proposals. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 18. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON ANIMAL WELFARE STANDARDS | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 19. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING AN ADDITIONAL BOARD COMMITTEE | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 20. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING AN ALTERNATIVE DIRECTOR CANDIDATE POLICY | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's current director nominating and evaluation process already allows the best and most qualified candidates to be elected to the Board of Directors. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 21. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING A REPORT ON WAREHOUSE WORKING CONDITIONS | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Investors favor policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of their investments. There is increasing recognition that company risks related to human rights violations, such as litigation, reputational damage, and production disruptions, can adversely affect shareholder value. To manage such risks effectively, companies must assess the risks posed by human rights practices in their operations and supply chain, as well as by the use of their products. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 22. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING A REPORT ON PACKAGING MATERIALS | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 23. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REQUESTING A REPORT ON CUSTOMER USE OF CERTAIN TECHNOLOGIES | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will enable the Company to extend its efforts in mitigating the risks of hate crimes on the Company's brand and reputation. After reviewing the tenets of the proposal and in accordance to Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 83 | | | | | 0 | | | 21-May-2023 | 21-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 8,000 | | | | 0 | | | 21-May-2023 | 21-May-2023 | |
| NXP SEMICONDUCTORS N.V. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | N6596X109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NXPI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 24-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | NL0009538784 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935858475 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 26-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 26-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | Netherlands | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | Adoption of the 2022 Statutory Annual Accounts | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Discharge the members of the Company's Board of Directors (the "Board") for their responsibilities in the financial year ended December 31, 2022 | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3a. | Re-appoint Kurt Sievers as executive director | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3b. | Re-appoint Annette Clayton as non- executive director | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 3c. | Re-appoint Anthony Foxx as non-executive director | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3d. | Re-appoint Chunyuan Gu as non-executive director | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3e. | Re-appoint Lena Olving as non-executive director | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 3f. | Re-appoint Julie Southern as non-executive director | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3g. | Re-appoint Jasmin Staiblin as non- executive director | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3h. | Re-appoint Gregory Summe as non- executive director | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3i. | Re-appoint Karl-Henrik Sundström as non- executive director | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 3j. | Appoint Moshe Gavrielov as non-executive director | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Authorization of the Board to issue ordinary shares of the Company ("ordinary shares") and grant rights to acquire ordinary shares | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Authorization of the Board to restrict or exclude preemption rights accruing in connection with an issue of shares or grant of rights | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Authorization of the Board to repurchase ordinary shares | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal could be detrimental to the interests of the shareholders and could unintentionally manipulate the Company's true value. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
| 7. | Authorization of the Board to cancel ordinary shares held or to be acquired by the Company | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 8. | Re-appointment of Ernst & Young Accountants LLP as our independent auditors for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023 | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 9. | Non-binding, advisory vote to approve Named Executive Officer compensation | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 168 | | | | | 0 | | | 21-May-2023 | 21-May-2023 | |
| CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 169656105 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CMG | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1696561059 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935815603 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 28-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 28-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director: Albert Baldocchi | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1.2 | Election of Director: Matthew Carey | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.3 | Election of Director: Gregg Engles | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.4 | Election of Director: Patricia Fili-Krushel | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.5 | Election of Director: Mauricio Gutierrez | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.6 | Election of Director: Robin Hickenlooper | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.7 | Election of Director: Scott Maw | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.8 | Election of Director: Brian Niccol | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1.9 | Election of Director: Mary Winston | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | An advisory vote to approve the compensation of our executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement ("say on pay"). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | An advisory vote on the frequency of future say on pay votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder Proposal - Request to limit certain bylaw amendments. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal that would impose inequitable restrictions. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal - Request to adopt a non-interference policy. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 71 | | | | | 0 | | | 23-May-2023 | 23-May-2023 | |
| THE MOSAIC COMPANY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 61945C103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MOS | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US61945C1036 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935817051 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 28-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 28-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Cheryl K. Beebe | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Gregory L. Ebel | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Timothy S. Gitzel | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Denise C. Johnson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Emery N. Koenig | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: James ("Joc") C. O'Rourke | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: David T. Seaton | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Steven M. Seibert | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: João Roberto Gonçalves Teixeira | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Gretchen H. Watkins | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Kelvin R. Westbrook | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval of The Mosaic Company 2023 Stock and Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of the appointment of KPMG LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | An advisory vote to approve the compensation of our named executive officers as disclosed in the Proxy Statement. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | An advisory vote on the frequency of future stockholder advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | A stockholder proposal to reduce the ownership threshold to call a special meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | A stockholder proposal to report on the Company's plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 563 | | | | | 0 | | | 23-May-2023 | 23-May-2023 | |
| MCDONALD'S CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 580135101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MCD | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5801351017 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935819788 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 27-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Anthony Capuano | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Kareem Daniel | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Lloyd Dean | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Catherine Engelbert | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Margaret Georgiadis | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Enrique Hernandez, Jr. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. |
| 1g. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Christopher Kempczinski | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Richard Lenny | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: John Mulligan | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Jennifer Taubert | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Paul Walsh | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Amy Weaver | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director to serve until the 2024 Annual Meeting: Miles White | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve executive compensation. | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory vote to ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as independent auditor for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Advisory Vote on Adoption of Antibiotics Policy (1 of 2). | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal as requested by the proponent would not be a good use of company resources. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Advisory Vote on Adoption of Antibiotics Policy (2 of 2). | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Given the Company's existing policy and efforts regarding antibiotic use, we believe that approval of the proposal as requested by the proponent would not be a good use of company resources. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Advisory Vote on Annual Report on "Communist China." | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Investors favor policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of their investments. There is increasing recognition that company risks related to human rights violations, such as litigation, reputational damage, and production disruptions, can adversely affect shareholder value. To manage such risks effectively, companies must assess the risks posed by human rights practices in their operations and supply chain, as well as by the use of their products. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Advisory Vote on Civil Rights & Returns to Merit Audit. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Advisory Vote on Annual Report on Lobbying Activities. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 10. | Advisory Vote on Annual Report on Global Political Influence. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 11. | Advisory Vote on Poultry Welfare Disclosure. | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the preparation of an additional report to stockholders as requested by the proponent would not be a good use of company resources. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 756 | | | | | 0 | | | 23-May-2023 | 23-May-2023 | |
| EQUINIX, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 29444U700 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | EQIX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US29444U7000 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935820490 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 30-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 30-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Nanci Caldwell | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Adaire Fox- Martin | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Ron Guerrier | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Gary Hromadko | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Charles Meyers | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Thomas Olinger | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Christopher Paisley | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Jeetu Patel | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Sandra Rivera | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Fidelma Russo | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director to the Board of Directors to serve until the next Annual Meeting or until their successors have been duly elected and qualified: Peter Van Camp | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 2. | Approval, by a non-binding advisory vote, of the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, by a non-binding advisory vote, of the frequency with which our stockholders will vote on the compensation of our named executive officers | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | A stockholder proposal related to shareholder ratification of termination pay | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 84 | | | | | 0 | | | 22-May-2023 | 22-May-2023 | |
| SBA COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 78410G104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | SBAC | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 25-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US78410G1040 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935820515 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 24-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director For a three-year term expiring at the 2026 Annual Meeting: Steven E. Bernstein | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.2 | Election of Director For a three-year term expiring at the 2026 Annual Meeting: Laurie Bowen | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.3 | Election of Director For a three-year term expiring at the 2026 Annual Meeting: Amy E. Wilson | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as SBA's independent registered public accounting firm for the 2023 fiscal year. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of SBA's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the frequency of future advisory votes on the compensation of SBA's named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 256 | | | | | 0 | | | 23-May-2023 | 23-May-2023 | |
| LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 548661107 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | LOW | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 26-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5486611073 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935817190 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 20-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 25-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Raul Alvarez | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 2 | David H. Batchelder | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 3 | Scott H. Baxter | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 4 | Sandra B. Cochran | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 5 | Laurie Z. Douglas | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 6 | Richard W. Dreiling | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 7 | Marvin R. Ellison | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| | | | 8 | Daniel J. Heinrich | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 9 | Brian C. Rogers | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 10 | Bertram L. Scott | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 11 | Colleen Taylor | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 12 | Mary Beth West | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve the Company's named executive officer compensation in fiscal 2022. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes to approve the Company's named executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal requesting an independent board chairman. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 952 | | | | | 0 | | | 24-May-2023 | 24-May-2023 | |
| EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 30231G102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | XOM | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 31-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US30231G1022 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935823977 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 05-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 05-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 30-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Michael J. Angelakis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Susan K. Avery | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Angela F. Braly | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Gregory J. Goff | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: John D. Harris II | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Kaisa H. Hietala | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Joseph L. Hooley | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Steven A. Kandarian | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Alexander A. Karsner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Lawrence W. Kellner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Jeffrey W. Ubben | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Darren W. Woods | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of Independent Auditors | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Establish a New Board Committee on Decarbonization Risk | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal would be of limited usefulness to shareholders and management and duplicative of past and ongoing Company and regulatory activities. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Reduce Executive Stock Holding Period | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Given the foregoing, we believe that requiring senior executives to hold a significant portion of stock obtained through executive pay plans would focus the executives on the Company's long-term success. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Additional Carbon Capture and Storage and Emissions Report | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Although the Company describes its general commitment to corporate citizenship on its website, investors increasingly look for more detailed ESG performance metrics. Also, climate change is one of the most financially significant environmental issues currently facing investors. Tracking and reporting on ESG business practices makes a company more responsive to a global business environment. We believe that approval of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Additional Direct Methane Measurement | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Establish a Scope 3 Target and Reduce Hydrocarbon Sales | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Reducing the production of hydrocarbon products by an oil company like Exxon could have potential negative implications for long-term shareholder profits. The decision to meet or not-meet certain social goals decided by society is best left to management because of the ever changing dynamics and politics of those goals. We believe that approval of the proposal is not in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 10. | Additional Report on Worst-case Spill and Response Plans | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | GHG Reporting on Adjusted Basis | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 12. | Report on Asset Retirement Obligations Under IEA NZE Scenario | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 13. | Report on Plastics Under SCS Scenario | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a report of the type requested by the proposal would be of limited usefulness to shareholders and management and duplicative of past and ongoing Company and regulatory activities. Given the limited value of such a report, its preparation would be an inefficient use of corporate resources and an unnecessary expense. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 14. | Litigation Disclosure Beyond Legal and Accounting Requirements | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 15. | Tax Reporting Beyond Legal Requirements | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 16. | Energy Transition Social Impact Report | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 17. | Report on Commitment Against AMAP Work | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan- Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 54 | | | | | 0 | | | 29-May-2023 | 29-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 4,000 | | | | 0 | | | 29-May-2023 | 29-May-2023 | |
| CHEVRON CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 166764100 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CVX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 31-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1667641005 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935829284 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 30-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Wanda M. Austin | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: John B. Frank | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Alice P. Gast | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Enrique Hernandez, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Marillyn A. Hewson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Jon M. Huntsman Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Charles W. Moorman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Dambisa F. Moyo | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Debra Reed-Klages | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: D. James Umpleby III | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Cynthia J. Warner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Michael K. Wirth | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 2. | Ratification of Appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes on Named Executive Officer Compensation | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Rescind the 2021 "Reduce Scope 3 Emissions" Stockholder Proposal | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The decision to meet or not-meet certain social goals decided by society is best left to management because of the ever changing dynamics and politics of those goals. Moreover, we believe that only management has access to the internal data which would allow it to guess when as well as if it should exit or reduce the company's current line of business. As such, we believe that approval of the proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Set a Medium-Term Scope 3 GHG Emissions Reduction Target | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Reducing the production of hydrocarbon products by an oil company like Chevron could have potential negative implications for long-term shareholder profits. The decision to meet or not-meet certain social goals decided by society is best left to management because of the ever changing dynamics and politics of those goals. We believe that approval of the proposal is not in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Recalculate Emissions Baseline to Exclude Emissions from Material Divestitures | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Establish Board Committee on Decarbonization Risk | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal would be of limited usefulness to shareholders and management and duplicative of past and ongoing Company and regulatory activities. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 9. | Report on Worker and Community Impact from Facility Closures and Energy Transitions | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | Report on Racial Equity Audit | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | Report on Tax Practices | | | | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a report of the type requested by the proposal would be of limited usefulness to shareholders and management and duplicative of past and ongoing Company and regulatory activities. Given the limited value of such a report, its preparation would be an inefficient use of corporate resources and an unnecessary expense. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 12. | Independent Chair | | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 290 | | | | | 0 | | | 30-May-2023 | 30-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,200 | | | | 0 | | | 30-May-2023 | 30-May-2023 | |
| META PLATFORMS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 30303M102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | META | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 31-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US30303M1027 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935830960 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 30-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Peggy Alford | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 2 | Marc L. Andreessen | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 3 | Andrew W. Houston | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 4 | Nancy Killefer | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 5 | Robert M. Kimmitt | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 6 | Sheryl K. Sandberg | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 7 | Tracey T. Travis | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 8 | Tony Xu | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 9 | Mark Zuckerberg | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 2. | To ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Meta Platforms, Inc.'s independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | A shareholder proposal regarding government takedown requests. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 4. | A shareholder proposal regarding dual class capital structure. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that shareholder approval is warranted. We oppose such differential voting power as it may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic importance to them. We prefer that companies do not utilize multiple class capital structures to provide equal voting rights to all shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 5. | A shareholder proposal regarding human rights impact assessment of targeted advertising. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | A shareholder proposal regarding report on lobbying disclosures. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | A shareholder proposal regarding report on allegations of political entanglement and content management biases in India. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | A shareholder proposal regarding report on framework to assess company lobbying alignment with climate goals. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 9. | A shareholder proposal regarding report on reproductive rights and data privacy. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 10. | A shareholder proposal regarding report on enforcement of Community Standards and user content. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Given the Company's failure to mitigate the material risks of dangerous and criminal behavior, terrorist content, hate speech, and misinformation on its sites, we believe that approval of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its stakeholders. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | A shareholder proposal regarding report on child safety impacts and actual harm reduction to children. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will enable the Company to gather adequate information on the risks brought by the increasing exploitation of children online, and therefore use such information in addressing the operational and reputational impacts not only within the Company, but also in the communities it serves. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 12. | A shareholder proposal regarding report on pay calibration to externalized costs. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 13. | A shareholder proposal regarding performance review of the audit & risk oversight committee. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 58 | | | | | 0 | | | 29-May-2023 | 29-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,980 | | | | 0 | | | 29-May-2023 | 29-May-2023 | |
| WALMART INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 931142103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | WMT | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 31-May-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US9311421039 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935833144 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 30-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Cesar Conde | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Timothy P. Flynn | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Sarah J. Friar | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Carla A. Harris | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Thomas W. Horton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Marissa A. Mayer | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: C. Douglas McMillon | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Gregory B. Penner | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Randall L. Stephenson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: S. Robson Walton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Steuart L. Walton | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Say-On-Pay Votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Ratification of Ernst & Young LLP as Independent Accountants. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Policy Regarding Worker Pay in Executive Compensation. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay disparities by gender in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Report on Human Rights Due Diligence. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Racial Equity Audit. | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Racial and Gender Layoff Diversity Report. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Request to Require Shareholder Approval of Certain Future Bylaw Amendments. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal that would impose inequitable restrictions. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | Report on Reproductive Rights and Data Privacy. | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and potential legal risk by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 11. | Communist China Risk Audit. | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 12. | Workplace Safety & Violence Review. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Investors favor policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of their investments. There is increasing recognition that company risks related to violence, human rights violations, such as litigation, reputational damage, and production disruptions, can adversely affect shareholder value. To manage such risks effectively, companies must assess the risks posed by human rights practices in their operations and supply chain, as well as by the use of their products. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,532 | | | | 0 | | | 27-May-2023 | 27-May-2023 | |
| SERVICENOW, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 81762P102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NOW | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 01-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US81762P1021 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935821062 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 04-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 04-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 31-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Susan L. Bostrom | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Teresa Briggs | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Jonathan C. Chadwick | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Paul E. Chamberlain | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Lawrence J. Jackson, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Frederic B. Luddy | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: William R. McDermott | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F4 Over-Boarded (Board Chair and CEO) Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that neither Chairman nor CEO, being the most critical roles in a company, should hold more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of their fiduciary duties and that their integrity and efficiency are not compromised, whether the positions are separate or combined. F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Jeffrey A. Miller | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Joseph "Larry" Quinlan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Anita M. Sands | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of our Named Executive Officers ("Say-on-Pay"). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To ratify PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | �� |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To approve the Amended and Restated 2021 Equity Incentive Plan to increase the number of shares reserved for issuance. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | To elect Deborah Black as a director. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 210 | | | | | 0 | | | 26-May-2023 | 26-May-2023 | |
| NETFLIX, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 64110L106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NFLX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 01-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US64110L1061 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935831126 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 31-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Mathias Döpfner | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Reed Hastings | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Jay Hoag | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director to hold office until the 2024 Annual Meeting of Stockholders: Ted Sarandos | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of appointment of independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal entitled, "Proposal 5 - Reform the Current Impossible Special Shareholder Meeting Requirements," if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe it is appropriate to enable holders of at least 10% of a company's common stock to have an ability to call special meetings for any purpose at any time. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal entitled, "Netflix- Exclusive Board of Directors," if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the restriction being imposed by the proposal will limit the Company's ability to attract and retain the right mix of candidates to serve on the Board. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder proposal requesting a report on the Company's 401(K) Plan, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder proposal entitled, "Policy on Freedom of Association," if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 408 | | | | | 0 | | | 29-May-2023 | 29-May-2023 | |
| TRANE TECHNOLOGIES PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G8994E103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TT | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 01-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | IE00BK9ZQ967 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935831897 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 31-May-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Kirk E. Arnold | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Ann C. Berzin | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: April Miller Boise | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Gary D. Forsee | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Compensation and Nominating Committees According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs Attention According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Mark R. George | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: John A. Hayes | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Linda P. Hudson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Myles P. Lee | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: David S. Regnery | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Combined CEO and Board Chair positions and the Company earns a board score of Some Concerns Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Melissa N. Schaeffer | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: John P. Surma | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Audit Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Advisory vote on the frequency of the advisory vote on the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory approval of the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval of the appointment of independent auditors of the Company and authorization of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors to set the auditors' remuneration. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approval of the renewal of the Directors' existing authority to issue shares. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Approval of the renewal of the Directors' existing authority to issue shares for cash without first offering shares to existing shareholders. (Special Resolution) | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Determination of the price range at which the Company can re-allot shares that it holds as treasury shares. (Special Resolution) | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 721 | | | | | 0 | | | 29-May-2023 | 29-May-2023 | |
| ALPHABET INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 02079K305 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | GOOGL | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 02-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US02079K3059 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935830946 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 04-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 04-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 01-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Larry Page | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Sergey Brin | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Sundar Pichai | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: John L. Hennessy | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Frances H. Arnold | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: R. Martin "Marty" Chávez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: L. John Doerr | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model |
| | | According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Roger W. Ferguson Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Ann Mather | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: K. Ram Shriram | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Robin L. Washington | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Alphabet's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval of amendment and restatement of Alphabet's Amended and Restated 2021 Stock Plan to increase the share reserve by 170,000,000 (post stock split) shares of Class C capital stock | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote to approve compensation awarded to named executive officers | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Advisory vote on the frequency of advisory votes to approve compensation awarded to named executive officers | Management | 1 Year | | | 3 Years | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: It is our opinion that an annual say-on-pay vote is the accepted standard for companies today and a requirement for good corporate governance. Furthermore, we believe that triennial advisory vote on executive compensation will hinder shareholders from providing the Company with direct input on their respective compensation philosophy, policies and practices as disclosed in the proxy statement. We do not concur with the current board's recommendation of a triennial ratification (non-binding vote) on this issue. We recommend a vote AGAINST the option of triennial (every three years) as the frequency with which shareholders will be provided an advisory vote on executive compensation. |
| 6. | Stockholder proposal regarding a lobbying report | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Stockholder proposal regarding a congruency report | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Stockholder proposal regarding a climate lobbying report | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 9. | Stockholder proposal regarding a report on reproductive rights and data privacy | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and potential legal risk by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 10. | Stockholder proposal regarding a human rights assessment of data center siting | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the adoption of a more comprehensive human rights policy, coupled with implementation, enforcement, independent monitoring, and transparent, comprehensive reporting will assure shareholders of the Company's global leadership. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 11. | Stockholder proposal regarding a human rights assessment of targeted ad policies and practices | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 12. | Stockholder proposal regarding algorithm disclosures | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 13. | Stockholder proposal regarding a report on alignment of YouTube policies with legislation | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 14. | Stockholder proposal regarding a content governance report | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 15. | Stockholder proposal regarding a performance review of the Audit and Compliance Committee | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 16. | Stockholder proposal regarding bylaws amendment | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal that would impose inequitable restrictions. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 17. | Stockholder proposal regarding "executives to retain significant stock" | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Given the foregoing, we believe that requiring senior executives to hold a significant portion of stock obtained through executive pay plans would focus the executives on the Company's long-term success. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 18. | Stockholder proposal regarding equal shareholder voting | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that shareholder approval is warranted. We oppose such differential voting power as it may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic importance to them. We prefer that companies do not utilize multiple class capital structures to provide equal voting rights to all shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 683 | | | | | 0 | | | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 6,000 | | | | 0 | | | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | |
| UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INCORPORATED | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 91324P102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | UNH | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 05-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US91324P1021 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935835237 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 02-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Timothy Flynn | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Paul Garcia | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Kristen Gil | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Stephen Hemsley | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Michele Hooper | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: F. William McNabb III | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Valerie Montgomery Rice, M.D. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: John Noseworthy, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Andrew Witty | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory approval of the Company's executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory approval of the frequency of holding future say-on-pay votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm for the Company for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | If properly presented at the 2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, the shareholder proposal seeking a third-party racial equity audit. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | If properly presented at the 2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, the shareholder proposal requiring a political contributions congruency report. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | If properly presented at the 2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, the shareholder proposal seeking shareholder ratification of termination pay. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 143 | | | | | 0 | | | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,000 | | | | 0 | | | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | |
| FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 35671D857 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | FCX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 06-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US35671D8570 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935831493 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 05-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: David P. Abney | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Richard C. Adkerson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Marcela E. Donadio | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Robert W. Dudley | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Hugh Grant | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Lydia H. Kennard | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Ryan M. Lance | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Sara Grootwassink Lewis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Dustan E. McCoy | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention |
| | | Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Kathleen L. Quirk | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: John J. Stephens | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Frances Fragos Townsend | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of the frequency of future advisory votes on the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,885 | | | | 0 | | | 01-Jun-2023 | 01-Jun-2023 | |
| DAVITA INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 23918K108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DVA | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 06-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US23918K1088 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935837952 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 14-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 14-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 05-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Pamela M. Arway | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Charles G. Berg | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Barbara J. Desoer | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Jason M. Hollar | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Gregory J. Moore, MD, PhD | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: John M. Nehra | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Javier J. Rodriguez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Adam H. Schechter | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Phyllis R. Yale | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the appointment of KPMG LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency of future advisory votes on named executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To approve an amendment and restatement of the Company's Restated Certificate of Incorporation to provide for the exculpation of officers as permitted by Delaware law. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 427 | | | | | 0 | | | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | |
| BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 09857L108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | BKNG | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 06-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US09857L1089 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935842244 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 11-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 11-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 05-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Glenn D. Fogel | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | Mirian M. Graddick-Weir | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 3 | Wei Hopeman | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Robert J. Mylod, Jr. | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 5 | Charles H. Noski | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 6 | Larry Quinlan | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 7 | Nicholas J. Read | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 8 | Thomas E. Rothman | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 9 | Sumit Singh | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 10 | Lynn V. Radakovich | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| | | | 11 | Vanessa A. Wittman | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve 2022 executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of Deloitte & Touche LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future non-binding advisory votes on the compensation paid by the Company to its named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal requesting a non- binding stockholder vote to ratify termination pay of executives. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 38 | | | | | 0 | | | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | |
| THE TJX COMPANIES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 872540109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TJX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 06-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8725401090 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935847509 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 13-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 13-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 05-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: José B. Alvarez | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Alan M. Bennett | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Rosemary T. Berkery | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: David T. Ching | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: C. Kim Goodwin | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Ernie Herrman | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Amy B. Lane | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Carol Meyrowitz | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Jackwyn L. Nemerov | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers as TJX's independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2024. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of TJX's executive compensation (the say-on-pay vote). | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory approval of the frequency of TJX's say-on-pay votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal for a report on effectiveness of social compliance efforts in TJX's supply chain. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal for a report on risk to TJX from supplier misclassification of supplier's employees. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder proposal to adopt a paid sick leave policy for all Associates. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 405 | | | | | 0 | | | 02-Jun-2023 | 02-Jun-2023 | |
| DEVON ENERGY CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 25179M103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DVN | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 07-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US25179M1036 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935835352 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 06-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Barbara M. Baumann | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | John E. Bethancourt | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 3 | Ann G. Fox | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Gennifer F. Kelly | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 5 | Kelt Kindick | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 6 | John Krenicki Jr. | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 7 | Karl F. Kurz | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 8 | Michael N. Mears | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 9 | Robert A. Mosbacher, Jr | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 10 | Richard E. Muncrief | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 11 | Valerie M. Williams | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratify the selection of the Company's Independent Auditors for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Approve an Amendment to the Company's Bylaws to Designate the Exclusive Forum for the Adjudication of Certain Legal Matters. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Approve Amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation to Adopt Limitations on the Liability of Officers Similar to Those That Already Exist for Directors. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | Stockholder Proposal to Reform the Near Impossible Special Shareholder Meeting Requirements. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 528 | | | | | 0 | | | 02-Jun-2023 | 02-Jun-2023 | |
| COMCAST CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 20030N101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CMCSA | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 07-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US20030N1019 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935845492 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 03-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 03-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 06-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | Kenneth J. Bacon | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | Thomas J. Baltimore Jr. | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 3 | Madeline S. Bell | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Edward D. Breen | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| | | | 5 | Gerald L. Hassell | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its |
| | | shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| | | | 6 | Jeffrey A. Honickman | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 7 | Maritza G. Montiel | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 8 | Asuka Nakahara | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 9 | David C. Novak | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| | | | 10 | Brian L. Roberts | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that |
| | | cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of our independent auditors. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approval of Comcast Corporation 2023 Omnibus Equity Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approval of Amended and Restated Comcast Corporation 2002 Employee Stock Purchase Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Advisory vote on executive compensation. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Advisory vote on the frequency of the vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 7. | To perform independent racial equity audit. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 8. | To report on climate risk in default retirement plan options. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | To set different greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | To report on political contributions and company values alignment. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 11. | To report on business in China. | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Investors favor policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of their investments. There is increasing recognition that company risks related to human rights violations, such as litigation, reputational damage, and production disruptions, can adversely affect shareholder value. To manage such risks effectively, companies must assess the risks posed by human rights practices in their operations and supply chain, as well as by the use of their products. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 44 | | | | | 0 | | | 05-Jun-2023 | 05-Jun-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 4,780 | | | | 0 | | | 05-Jun-2023 | 05-Jun-2023 | |
| BATH & BODY WORKS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 070830104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | BBWI | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0708301041 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935843474 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 10-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 10-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Patricia S. Bellinger | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Alessandro Bogliolo | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Gina R. Boswell | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Lucy O. Brady | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Francis A. Hondal | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Thomas J. Kuhn | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Danielle M. Lee | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Michael G. Morris | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Sarah E. Nash | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Juan Rajlin | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Stephen D. Steinour | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: J.K. Symancyk | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Steven E. Voskuil | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of our independent registered public accountants. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes on named executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal regarding an independent board chairman, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 748 | | | | | 0 | | | 05-Jun-2023 | 05-Jun-2023 | |
| SALESFORCE, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 79466L302 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CRM | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US79466L3024 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935846127 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 14-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 14-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Marc Benioff | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Laura Alber | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Craig Conway | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Arnold Donald | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Parker Harris | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Neelie Kroes | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Sachin Mehra | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Mason Morfit | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Oscar Munoz | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: John V. Roos | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Robin Washington | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Maynard Webb | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Susan Wojcicki | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Amendment and restatement of our 2013 Equity Incentive Plan to increase the number of shares reserved for issuance. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending January 31, 2024. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | An advisory vote to approve the fiscal 2023 compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | An advisory vote on the frequency of holding future advisory votes to approve executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | A stockholder proposal requesting a policy to require the Chair of the Board be an independent member of the Board and not a former CEO of the Company, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | A stockholder proposal requesting a policy to forbid all Company directors from sitting on any other boards, if properly presented at the meeting. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that adoption of this proposal will put the Company at a competitive disadvantage in hiring the best talents suitable to serve as directors. Moreover, we believe that companies benefit from the public company experience the directors possess, and therefore, forbidding and not limiting Company directors from simultaneously sitting on the boards of directors of other companies is not in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 841 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-Jun-2023 | 07-Jun-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 200 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-Jun-2023 | 07-Jun-2023 | |
| COSTAR GROUP, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 22160N109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CSGP | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US22160N1090 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935848234 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 11-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 11-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Michael R. Klein | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Andrew C. Florance | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Michael J. Glosserman | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: John W. Hill | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Laura Cox Kaplan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Robert W. Musslewhite | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Christopher J. Nassetta | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Louise S. Sams | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Proposal to ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Proposal to approve, on an advisory basis, the Company's executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the frequency of future advisory votes to approve executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Stockholder proposal regarding greenhouse gas emissions targets, if properly presented. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,332 | | | | 0 | | | 06-Jun-2023 | 06-Jun-2023 | |
| DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 253868103 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | DLR | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 08-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US2538681030 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935849743 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 06-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 07-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Alexis Black Bjorlin | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: VeraLinn Jamieson | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Kevin J. Kennedy | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: William G. LaPerch | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Jean F.H.P. Mandeville | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Afshin Mohebbi | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Mark R. Patterson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Mary Hogan Preusse | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair) According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Andrew P. Power | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | To ratify the selection of KPMG LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, on a non-binding, advisory basis, the compensation of the Company's named executive officers, as more fully described in the accompanying Proxy Statement (Say-on-Pay). | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To approve, on a non-binding, advisory basis, the frequency of holding future advisory votes on the compensation of our named executive officers (every one, two or three years). | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | A stockholder proposal regarding reporting on concealment clauses. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | A stockholder proposal regarding inclusion in the workplace. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 551 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-Jun-2023 | 07-Jun-2023 | |
| REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 75886F107 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | REGN | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 09-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US75886F1075 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935835338 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 11-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 11-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 08-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Joseph L. Goldstein, M.D. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Christine A. Poon | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Craig B. Thompson, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Huda Y. Zoghbi, M.D. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Proposal to approve, on an advisory basis, executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Proposal to approve, on an advisory basis, the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Non-binding shareholder proposal, if properly presented, requesting report on a process by which access to medicine is considered in matters related to protecting intellectual property. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 100 | | | | | 0 | | | 07-Jun-2023 | 07-Jun-2023 | |
| ROPER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 776696106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ROP | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 13-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US7766961061 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935847989 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 19-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 19-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 12-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Director for a one-year term: Shellye L. Archambeau | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.2 | Election of Director for a one-year term: Amy Woods Brinkley | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.3 | Election of Director for a one-year term: Irene M. Esteves | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.4 | Election of Director for a one-year term: L. Neil Hunn | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1.5 | Election of Director for a one-year term: Robert D. Johnson | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.6 | Election of Director for a one-year term: Thomas P. Joyce, Jr. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.7 | Election of Director for a one-year term: Laura G. Thatcher | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.8 | Election of Director for a one-year term: Richard F. Wallman | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1.9 | Election of Director for a one-year term: Christopher Wright | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To select, on an advisory basis, the frequency of the shareholder vote on the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Approve an amendment to and restatement of our Restated Certificate of Incorporation to permit the exculpation of officers. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 75 | | | | | 0 | | | 08-Jun-2023 | 08-Jun-2023 | |
| ETSY, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 29786A106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ETSY | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 14-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US29786A1060 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935847282 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 13-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Class II Director to serve until our 2026 Annual Meeting: M. Michele Burns | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Class II Director to serve until our 2026 Annual Meeting: Josh Silverman | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Class II Director to serve until our 2026 Annual Meeting: Fred Wilson | Management | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote to approve the frequency of future advisory votes to approve named executive officer compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Stockholder Proposal - Advisory vote requesting a report on the effectiveness of our efforts to prevent harassment and discrimination, if properly presented. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 335 | | | | | 0 | | | 11-Jun-2023 | 11-Jun-2023 | |
| CATERPILLAR INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 149123101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | CAT | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 14-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1491231015 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935854794 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 13-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Kelly A. Ayotte | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: David L. Calhoun | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Daniel M. Dickinson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: James C. Fish, Jr. | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Gerald Johnson | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: David W. MacLennan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Judith F. Marks | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Debra L. Reed-Klages | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Susan C. Schwab | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: D. James Umpleby III | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Rayford Wilkins, Jr. | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Ratification of our Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Executive Compensation Votes. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Approval of Caterpillar Inc. 2023 Long-Term Incentive Plan. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Corporate Climate Lobbying in Line with Paris Agreement. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Shareholder Proposal - Lobbying Disclosure. | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Shareholder Proposal - Report on Activities in Conflict-Affected Areas. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Investors favor policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of their investments. There is increasing recognition that company risks related to human rights violations, such as litigation, reputational damage, and production disruptions, can adversely affect shareholder value. To manage such risks effectively, companies must assess the risks posed by human rights practices in their operations and supply chain, as well as by the use of their products. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Shareholder Proposal - Civil Rights, Non- Discrimination and Returns to Merit Audit. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 825 | | | | | 0 | | | 12-Jun-2023 | 12-Jun-2023 | |
| GENERAC HOLDINGS INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 368736104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | GNRC | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 15-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US3687361044 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935846418 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 14-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1.1 | Election of Class II Director: Marcia J. Avedon | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.2 | Election of Class II Director: Bennett J. Morgan | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1.3 | Election of Class II Director: Dominick P. Zarcone | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Proposal to ratify the selection of Deloitte & Touche LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for the year ended December 31, 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the non-binding "say-on- pay" resolution to approve the compensation of our executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Advisory vote on the non-binding resolution regarding the frequency of our advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 513 | | | | | 0 | | | 13-Jun-2023 | 13-Jun-2023 | |
| T-MOBILE US, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 872590104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | TMUS | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 16-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US8725901040 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935842206 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 17-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 17-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1. | DIRECTOR | | | | | | | | | Management | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | André Almeida | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 2 | Marcelo Claure | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F27 Inside director - Employee of the Beneficial Owner of 50% of the Company stock - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines companies should establish complete key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 3 | Srikant M. Datar | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 4 | Srinivasan Gopalan | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 5 | Timotheus Höttges | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| | | | 6 | Christian P. Illek | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F27 Inside director - Employee of the Beneficial Owner of 50% of the Company stock - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines companies should establish complete key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 7 | Raphael Kübler | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F27 Inside director - Employee of the Beneficial Owner of 50% of the Company stock - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines companies should establish complete key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 8 | Thorsten Langheim | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 9 | Dominique Leroy | | | | | | | | Withheld | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F27 Inside director - Employee of the Beneficial Owner of 50% of the Company stock - Member of a Key Board Committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines companies should establish complete key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | | 10 | Letitia A. Long | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 11 | G. Michael Sievert | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 12 | Teresa A. Taylor | | | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | 13 | Kelvin R. Westbrook | | | | | | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Ratification of the Appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the Company's Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm for Fiscal Year 2023. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory Vote to Approve the Compensation Provided to the Company's Named Executive Officers for 2022. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Advisory Votes to Approve the Compensation Provided to the Company's Named Executive Officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 3 Years | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: It is our opinion that an annual say-on-pay vote is the accepted standard for companies today and a requirement for good corporate governance. Furthermore, we believe that triennial advisory vote on executive compensation will hinder shareholders from providing the Company with direct input on their respective compensation philosophy, policies and practices as disclosed in the proxy statement. We do not concur with the current board's recommendation of a triennial ratification (non-binding vote) on this issue. We recommend a vote AGAINST the option of triennial (every three years) as the frequency with which shareholders will be provided an advisory vote on executive compensation. |
| 5. | Approval of T-Mobile US, Inc. 2023 Incentive Award Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 6. | Approval of T-Mobile US, Inc. Amended and Restated 2014 Employee Stock Purchase Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 403 | | | | | 0 | | | 14-Jun-2023 | 14-Jun-2023 | |
| AON PLC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | G0403H108 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | AON | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 16-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | IE00BLP1HW54 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935852726 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 14-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 14-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 15-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Lester B. Knight | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Gregory C. Case | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Jin-Yong Cai | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Jeffrey C. Campbell | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Fulvio Conti | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Cheryl A. Francis | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Adriana Karaboutis | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Richard C. Notebaert | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are |
| | | centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Gloria Santona | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Sarah E. Smith | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Byron O. Spruell | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Carolyn Y. Woo | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve the compensation of the Company's named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory vote on the frequency of holding an advisory vote on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2023 | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Re-appoint Ernst & Young Chartered Accountants as the Company's statutory auditor under Irish Law | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
| 6. | Authorize the Board or the Audit Committee of the Board to determine the remuneration of Ernst & Young Ireland, in its capacity as the Company's statutory auditor under Irish law. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution. |
| 7. | Approve the Aon plc 2011 Incentive Plan, as amended and restated. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 510 | | | | | 0 | | | 13-Jun-2023 | 13-Jun-2023 | |
| ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 00507V109 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ATVI | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 21-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US00507V1098 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935851762 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 25-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 20-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Reveta Bowers | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Kerry Carr | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Robert Corti | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Brian Kelly | | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Robert Kotick | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Barry Meyer | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Robert Morgado | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Peter Nolan | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Dawn Ostroff | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Advisory vote to approve our executive compensation. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 3. | Advisory vote on frequency of future advisory votes to approve our executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Shareholder proposal regarding shareholder ratification of termination pay. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 6. | Shareholder proposal regarding adoption of a freedom of association and collective bargaining policy. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan- Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Withdrawn by proponent | | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: Investors favor policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of their investments. There is increasing recognition that company risks related to discrimination and human rights violations, such as litigation, reputational damage, and production disruptions, can adversely affect shareholder value. To manage such risks effectively, companies must assess the risks posed by human rights practices in their operations and supply chain, as well as by the use of their products. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,115 | | | | 0 | | | 19-Jun-2023 | 19-Jun-2023 | |
| AUTODESK, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 052769106 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | ADSK | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 21-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US0527691069 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935863351 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 20-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Andrew Anagnost | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Karen Blasing | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Reid French | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Dr. Ayanna Howard | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Blake Irving | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Mary T. McDowell | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Stephen Milligan | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Lorrie M. Norrington | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Betsy Rafael | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Rami Rahim | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Stacy J. Smith | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 2. | Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Autodesk, Inc.'s independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending January 31, 2024. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Approve, on an advisory (non-binding) basis, the compensation of Autodesk, Inc.'s named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | Approve, on an advisory (non-binding) basis, the frequency with which stockholders are provided an advisory (non- binding) vote on the compensation of Autodesk, Inc.'s named executive officers. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 355 | | | | | 0 | | | 15-Jun-2023 | 15-Jun-2023 | |
| NVIDIA CORPORATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 67066G104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | NVDA | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 22-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US67066G1040 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935863224 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 21-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Robert K. Burgess | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Tench Coxe | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1c. | Election of Director: John O. Dabiri | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Persis S. Drell | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Jen-Hsun Huang | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: Dawn Hudson | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Harvey C. Jones | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Michael G. McCaffery | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director: Stephen C. Neal | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Mark L. Perry | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: A. Brooke Seawell | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1l. | Election of Director: Aarti Shah | | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1m. | Election of Director: Mark A. Stevens | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
�� | | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | Advisory approval of our executive compensation. | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of the frequency of holding an advisory vote on our executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of the selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2024. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 73 | | | | | 0 | | | 19-Jun-2023 | 19-Jun-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2,280 | | | | 0 | | | 19-Jun-2023 | 19-Jun-2023 | |
| THE KROGER CO. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 501044101 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | KR | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 22-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US5010441013 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935864579 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 24-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 24-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 21-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director: Nora A. Aufreiter | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director: Kevin M. Brown | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | Election of Director: Elaine L. Chao | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1d. | Election of Director: Anne Gates | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director: Karen M. Hoguet | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director: W. Rodney McMullen | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability. F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1g. | Election of Director: Clyde R. Moore | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| | | F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1h. | Election of Director: Ronald L. Sargent | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 1i. | Election of Director: J. Amanda Sourry Knox | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1j. | Election of Director: Mark S. Sutton | | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1k. | Election of Director: Ashok Vemuri | | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 2. | Approval, on an advisory basis, of Kroger's executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory Vote on Frequency of Future Votes on Executive Compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Ratification of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, as auditors. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 5. | Report on Public Health Costs from Sale of Tobacco Products. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Listing of Charitable Contributions of $10,000 or More. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the requested report is unnecessary and overly burdensome on the Company and would significantly increase administrative costs and divert Company resources from the more relevant and meaningful corporate social responsibility priorities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 7. | Report on Recyclability of Packaging. | | | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Report on Racial and Gender Pay Gaps. | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay disparities by gender in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 9. | Report on EEO Policy Risks. | | | | | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that public disclosure on discrimination in compensation and employment opportunities for women and minorities is an effective incentive to develop and maintain effective programs to break the glass ceiling barriers. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 1,853 | | | | 0 | | | 20-Jun-2023 | 20-Jun-2023 | |
| CARMAX, INC. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 143130102 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | KMX | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US1431301027 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935847535 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 21-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 21-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Peter J. Bensen | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1b. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Ronald E. Blaylock | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1c. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Sona Chawla | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1d. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Thomas J. Folliard | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1e. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Shira Goodman | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: David W. McCreight | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. |
| 1g. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: William D. Nash | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Mark F. O'Neil | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1i. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Pietro Satriano | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Marcella Shinder | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | Election of Director for a one year term expiring at the 2024 Annual Shareholders Meeting: Mitchell D. Steenrod | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice. |
| 2. | To ratify the appointment of KPMG LLP as independent registered public accounting firm. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | To approve, in an advisory (non-binding) vote, the compensation of our named executive officers. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 4. | To determine, in an advisory (non-binding) vote, whether a shareholder vote to approve the compensation of our named executive officers should occur every one, two, or three years. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | To approve the Carmax, Inc. 2002 Stock Incentive Plan, as amended and restated. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 460 | | | | | 0 | | | 21-Jun-2023 | 21-Jun-2023 | |
| MASTERCARD INCORPORATED | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Security | | | | 57636Q104 | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Type | | | | Annual | | | | |
| Ticker Symbol | | MA | | | | | | | | | | | | Meeting Date | | | | 27-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| ISIN | | | | US57636Q1040 | | | | | | | | | | | Agenda | | | | | | 935858437 - Management | | | |
| Record Date | | | 28-Apr-2023 | | | | | | | | | | | | Holding Recon Date | | | 28-Apr-2023 | | | | |
| City / | Country | | | | / | United States | | | | | | | | | Vote Deadline | | | | 26-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET | | | |
| SEDOL(s) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quick Code | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | Proposal | | | | | | | | | Proposed by | Vote | | Management Recommendation | For/Against Management | For/Against Preferred Provider Recommendation | |
| 1a. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Merit E. Janow | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the leadership of the Chairman of the Board. |
| 1b. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Candido Bracher | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1c. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Richard K. Davis | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1d. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Julius Genachowski | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1e. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Choon Phong Goh | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1f. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Oki Matsumoto | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1g. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Michael Miebach | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1h. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Youngme Moon | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1i. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Rima Qureshi | | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1j. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Gabrielle Sulzberger | | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 1k. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Harit Talwar | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 1l. | ELECTION OF DIRECTOR: Lance Uggla | | | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long- term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. |
| 2. | Advisory approval of Mastercard's executive compensation. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 3. | Advisory approval of the frequency of future advisory votes on executive compensation. | Management | 1 Year | | | 1 Year | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 4. | Approval of Mastercard Incorporated Employee Stock Purchase Plan. | Management | For | | | For | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| 5. | Ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the independent registered public accounting firm for Mastercard for 2023. | Management | Against | | | For | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model. After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 6. | Consideration of a stockholder proposal requesting a report on ensuring respect for civil liberties. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 7. | Consideration of a stockholder proposal requesting a report on Mastercard's stance on new Merchant Category Code. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 8. | Consideration of a stockholder proposal requesting lobbying disclosure. | Shareholder | Against | | | Against | | | For | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal. |
| 9. | Consideration of a stockholder proposal requesting stockholders approve advance notice bylaw amendments. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal that would impose inequitable restrictions. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
| 10. | Consideration of a stockholder proposal requesting a report on the cost-benefit analysis of diversity and inclusion efforts. | Shareholder | For | | | Against | | | Against | | | | | For | | | | |
| | | Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal. |
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| | Account Number | | | Account Name | | | Internal Account | | | Custodian | | Ballot Shares | | | | Unavailable Shares | Vote Date | Date Confirmed | |
| 19-9867 | | | | | ZIEGLER FAMCO HEDGED EQUITY FUND | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 2 | | | | | 0 | | | 26-Jun-2023 | 26-Jun-2023 | |
| 19-9867MS | | | | SC ZIEGLER FAMCO FUND AND MS | ZFHE | | | | U.S. BANK | | 800 | | | | | 0 | | | 26-Jun-2023 | 26-Jun-2023 | |