Expected Loss to be Paid | 12 Months Ended |
Dec. 31, 2013 |
Expected Losses [Abstract] | ' |
Expected Loss to be Paid | ' |
Expected Loss to be Paid |
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Accounting Policy |
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The insured portfolio includes policies accounted for under three separate accounting models depending on the characteristics of the contract and the Company's control rights. The Company has paid and expects to pay future losses on policies which fall under each of the three accounting models. The following provides a summarized description of the three accounting models, with references to additional information provided throughout this report. The three models are insurance, derivative and VIE consolidation. |
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In order to effectively evaluate and manage the economics and liquidity of the entire insured portfolio, management compiles and analyzes loss information for all policies on a consistent basis. The Company monitors and assigns ratings and calculates expected losses in the same manner for all its exposures regardless of form or differing accounting models. |
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The discussion of expected loss to be paid within this note encompasses all policies in the insured portfolio. Net expected loss to be paid in the tables below consists of the present value of future: expected claim and LAE payments, expected recoveries of excess spread in the transaction structures, cessions to reinsurers, and expected recoveries for breaches of representations and warranties ("R&W") and other loss mitigation strategies. |
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Accounting Models: |
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The following is a summary of each of the accounting models prescribed by GAAP with a reference to the notes that describe the accounting policies and required disclosures. This note provides information regarding expected claim payments to be made under all insured contracts. |
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Insurance Accounting |
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For contracts accounted for as financial guaranty insurance, loss and LAE reserve is recorded only to the extent and for the amount that expected losses to be paid exceed unearned premium reserve. As a result, the Company has expected loss to be paid that have not yet been expensed. Such amounts will be expensed in future periods as deferred premium revenue amortizes into income. Expected loss to be paid is important from a liquidity perspective in that it represents the present value of amounts that the Company expects to pay or recover in future periods. Expected loss to be expensed is important because it presents the Company's projection of incurred losses that will be recognized in future periods (excluding accretion of discount). See Note 7, Financial Guaranty Insurance Losses. |
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Derivative Accounting, at Fair Value |
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For contracts that do not meet the financial guaranty scope exception in the derivative accounting guidance (primarily due to the fact that the insured is not required to be exposed to the insured risk throughout the life of the contract), the Company records such credit derivative contracts at fair value on the consolidated balance sheet with changes in fair value recorded in the consolidated statement of operations. Expected loss to be paid is an important measure used by management to analyze the net economic loss on credit derivatives. The fair value recorded on the balance sheet represents an exit price in a hypothetical market because the Company does not trade its credit derivative contracts. The fair value is determined using significant Level 3 inputs in an internally developed model while the expected loss to be paid (which represents the net present value of expected cash outflows) uses methodologies and assumptions consistent with financial guaranty insurance expected losses to be paid. See Note 8, Fair Value Measurement and Note 9, Financial Guaranty Contracts Accounted for as Credit Derivatives. |
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VIE Consolidation, at Fair Value |
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For financial guaranty insurance contracts issued on the debt of variable interest entities over which the Company is deemed to be the primary beneficiary due to its control rights, as defined in accounting literature, the Company consolidates the FG VIE. The Company carries the assets and liabilities of the FG VIEs at fair value under the fair value option election. Management assesses the losses on the insured debt of the consolidated FG VIEs in the same manner as other financial guaranty insurance and credit derivative contracts. Expected loss to be paid for FG VIEs pursuant to AGC's and AGM's financial guaranty insurance policies is calculated in a manner consistent with the Company's other financial guaranty insurance contracts. See Note 10, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities. |
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Expected Loss to be Paid |
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The expected loss to be paid is equal to the present value of expected future cash outflows for claim and LAE payments, net of inflows for expected salvage and subrogation (i.e. excess spread on the underlying collateral, and estimated and contractual recoveries for breaches of representations and warranties), using current risk-free rates. When the Company becomes entitled to the cash flow from the underlying collateral of an insured credit under salvage and subrogation rights as a result of a claim payment or estimated future claim payment, it reduces the expected loss to be paid on the contract. Net expected loss to be paid is defined as expected loss to be paid, net of amounts ceded to reinsurers. |
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The current risk-free rate is based on the remaining period of the contract used in the premium revenue recognition calculation (i.e., the contractual or expected period, as applicable). The Company updates the discount rate each quarter and records the effect of such changes in economic loss development. Expected cash outflows and inflows are probability weighted cash flows that reflect the likelihood of all possible outcomes. The Company estimates the expected cash outflows and inflows using management's assumptions about the likelihood of all possible outcomes based on all information available to it. Those assumptions consider the relevant facts and circumstances and are consistent with the information tracked and monitored through the Company's risk-management activities. |
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Economic Loss Development |
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Economic loss development represents the change in net expected loss to be paid attributable to the effects of changes in assumptions based on observed market trends, changes in discount rates, accretion of discount and the economic effects of loss mitigation efforts. |
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Expected loss to be paid and economic loss development include the effects of loss mitigation strategies such as negotiated and estimated recoveries for breaches of representations and warranties, and purchases of insured debt obligations. Additionally, in certain cases, issuers of insured obligations elected, or the Company and an issuer mutually agreed as part of a negotiation, to deliver the underlying collateral or insured obligation to the Company. |
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In circumstances where the Company has acquired its own insured obligations that have expected losses, either as part of loss mitigation strategy or via delivery of underlying collateral, expected loss to be paid is reduced by the proportionate share of the insured obligation that is held in the investment portfolio. The difference between the purchase price of the obligation and the fair value excluding the value of the Company's insurance, is treated as a paid loss for both purchased bonds and delivered collateral or insured obligations. Assets that are purchased or put to the Company are recorded in the investment portfolio, at fair value, excluding the value of the Company's insurance. See Note 11, Investments and Cash and Note 8, Fair Value Measurement. |
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Loss Estimation Process |
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The Company’s loss reserve committees estimate expected loss to be paid for all contracts. Surveillance personnel present analyses related to potential losses to the Company’s loss reserve committees for consideration in estimating the expected loss to be paid. Such analyses include the consideration of various scenarios with potential probabilities assigned to them. Depending upon the nature of the risk, the Company’s view of the potential size of any loss and the information available to the Company, that analysis may be based upon individually developed cash flow models, internal credit rating assessments and sector-driven loss severity assumptions or judgmental assessments. In the case of its assumed business, the Company may conduct its own analysis as just described or, depending on the Company’s view of the potential size of any loss and the information available to the Company, the Company may use loss estimates provided by ceding insurers. The Company’s loss reserve committees review and refresh the estimate of expected loss to be paid each quarter. The Company’s estimate of ultimate loss on a policy is subject to significant uncertainty over the life of the insured transaction due to the potential for significant variability in credit performance as a result of economic, fiscal and financial market variability over the long duration of most contracts. The determination of expected loss to be paid is an inherently subjective process involving numerous estimates, assumptions and judgments by management. |
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The following table presents a roll forward of the present value of net expected loss to be paid for all contracts, whether accounted for as insurance, credit derivatives or FG VIEs, by sector, after the benefit for net expected recoveries for contractual breaches of R&W. The Company used weighted average risk-free rates for U.S. dollar denominated obligations, which ranged from 0.0% to 4.44% as of December 31, 2013 and 0.0% to 3.28% as of December 31, 2012. |
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Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
Before Recoveries for Breaches of R&W |
Roll Forward by Sector |
Year Ended December 31, 2013 |
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| Net Expected | | Economic Loss | | (Paid) | | Net Expected | | |
Loss to be | Development | Recovered | Loss to be | | |
Paid as of | | Losses(1) | Paid as of | | |
December 31, 2012(2) | | | December 31, 2013(2) | | |
| (in millions) | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Prime first lien | $ | 10 | | | $ | 16 | | | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | 25 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 693 | | | (40 | ) | | (75 | ) | | 578 | | | |
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Option ARM | 460 | | | 63 | | | (359 | ) | | 164 | | | |
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Subprime | 351 | | | 101 | | | (30 | ) | | 422 | | | |
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Total first lien | 1,514 | | | 140 | | | (465 | ) | | 1,189 | | | |
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Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | 99 | | | (3 | ) | | (9 | ) | | 87 | | | |
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HELOCs | 39 | | | 3 | | | (113 | ) | | (71 | ) | | |
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Total second lien | 138 | | | 0 | | | (122 | ) | | 16 | | | |
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Total U.S. RMBS | 1,652 | | | 140 | | | (587 | ) | | 1,205 | | | |
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TruPS | 27 | | | 7 | | | 17 | | | 51 | | | |
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Other structured finance | 312 | | | (41 | ) | | (151 | ) | | 120 | | | |
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U.S. public finance | 7 | | | 239 | | | 18 | | | 264 | | | |
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Non-U.S public finance | 52 | | | 17 | | | (12 | ) | | 57 | | | |
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Other insurance | (3 | ) | | (10 | ) | | 10 | | | (3 | ) | | |
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Total | $ | 2,047 | | | $ | 352 | | | $ | (705 | ) | | $ | 1,694 | | | |
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Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
Before Recoveries for Breaches of R&W |
Roll Forward by Sector |
Year Ended December 31, 2012 |
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| Net Expected | | Economic Loss | | (Paid) | | Expected | | |
Loss to be | Development | Recovered | Loss to be | | |
Paid as of | | Losses(1) | Paid as of | | |
December 31, 2011 | | | December 31, 2012 | | |
| (in millions) | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Prime first lien | $ | 5 | | | $ | 5 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 10 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 702 | | | 102 | | | (111 | ) | | 693 | | | |
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Option ARM | 935 | | | 128 | | | (603 | ) | | 460 | | | |
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Subprime | 342 | | | 57 | | | (48 | ) | | 351 | | | |
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Total first lien | 1,984 | | | 292 | | | (762 | ) | | 1,514 | | | |
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Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | 138 | | | (5 | ) | | (34 | ) | | 99 | | | |
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HELOCs | 159 | | | 80 | | | (200 | ) | | 39 | | | |
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Total second lien | 297 | | | 75 | | | (234 | ) | | 138 | | | |
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Total U.S. RMBS | 2,281 | | | 367 | | | (996 | ) | | 1,652 | | | |
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TruPS | 64 | | | (30 | ) | | (7 | ) | | 27 | | | |
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Other structured finance | 342 | | | 2 | | | (32 | ) | | 312 | | | |
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U.S. public finance | 16 | | | 74 | | | (83 | ) | | 7 | | | |
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Non-U.S public finance | 51 | | | 221 | | | (220 | ) | | 52 | | | |
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Other insurance | 2 | | | (17 | ) | | 12 | | | (3 | ) | | |
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Total | $ | 2,756 | | | $ | 617 | | | $ | (1,326 | ) | | $ | 2,047 | | | |
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____________________ |
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-1 | Net of ceded paid losses, whether or not such amounts have been settled with reinsurers. Ceded paid losses are typically settled 45 days after the end of the reporting period. Such amounts are recorded in reinsurance recoverable on paid losses included in other assets. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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-2 | Includes expected LAE to be paid for mitigating claim liabilities of $34 million as of December 31, 2013 and $39 million as of December 31, 2012. The Company paid $54 million and $47 million in LAE for the years ended December 31, 2013 and 2012, respectively. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Net Expected Recoveries from |
Breaches of R&W Rollforward |
Year Ended December 31, 2013 |
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| Future Net | | R&W Development | | R&W Recovered | | Future Net | | |
R&W Benefit as of | and Accretion of | During 2013(1) | R&W Benefit as of | | |
December 31, 2012 | Discount | | December 31, 2013(2) | | |
| During 2013 | | | | |
| (in millions) | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 4 | | | $ | — | | | $ | — | | | $ | 4 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 378 | | | 41 | | | (145 | ) | | 274 | | | |
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Option ARM | 591 | | | 161 | | | (579 | ) | | 173 | | | |
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Subprime | 109 | | | 9 | | | — | | | 118 | | | |
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Total first lien | 1,082 | | | 211 | | | (724 | ) | | 569 | | | |
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Second lien: | | | | | | | | | |
Closed end second lien | 138 | | | (9 | ) | | (31 | ) | | 98 | | | |
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HELOC | 150 | | | 94 | | | (199 | ) | | 45 | | | |
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Total second lien | 288 | | | 85 | | | (230 | ) | | 143 | | | |
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Total | $ | 1,370 | | | $ | 296 | | | $ | (954 | ) | | $ | 712 | | | |
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Net Expected Recoveries from |
Breaches of R&W Rollforward |
Year Ended December 31, 2012 |
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| Future Net | | R&W Development | | R&W Recovered | | Future Net | | |
R&W Benefit as of | and Accretion of | During 2012(1) | R&W Benefit as of | | |
December 31, 2011 | Discount | | December 31, 2012 | | |
| During 2012 | | | | |
| (in millions) | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 3 | | | $ | 1 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 4 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 407 | | | 40 | | | (69 | ) | | 378 | | | |
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Option ARM | 725 | | | 89 | | | (223 | ) | | 591 | | | |
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Subprime | 101 | | | 8 | | | — | | | 109 | | | |
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Total first lien | 1,236 | | | 138 | | | (292 | ) | | 1,082 | | | |
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Second lien: | | | | | | | | | |
Closed end second lien | 224 | | | 5 | | | (91 | ) | | 138 | | | |
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HELOC | 190 | | | 36 | | | (76 | ) | | 150 | | | |
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Total second lien | 414 | | | 41 | | | (167 | ) | | 288 | | | |
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Total | $ | 1,650 | | | $ | 179 | | | $ | (459 | ) | | $ | 1,370 | | | |
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____________________ |
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-1 | Gross amounts recovered were $986 million and $485 million for years ended December 31, 2013 and 2012, respectively. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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-2 | Includes excess spread that the Company will receive as salvage as a result of a settlement agreement with a R&W provider. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
After Net Expected Recoveries for Breaches of R&W |
Roll Forward |
Year Ended December 31, 2013 |
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| Net Expected | | Economic Loss | | (Paid) | | Net Expected | | |
Loss to be | Development | Recovered | Loss to be | | |
Paid as of | | Losses(1) | Paid as of | | |
December 31, 2012 | | | December 31, 2013 | | |
| (in millions) | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Prime first lien | $ | 6 | | | $ | 16 | | | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | 21 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 315 | | | (81 | ) | | 70 | | | 304 | | | |
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Option ARM | (131 | ) | | (98 | ) | | 220 | | | (9 | ) | | |
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Subprime | 242 | | | 92 | | | (30 | ) | | 304 | | | |
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Total first lien | 432 | | | (71 | ) | | 259 | | | 620 | | | |
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Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | (39 | ) | | 6 | | | 22 | | | (11 | ) | | |
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HELOCs | (111 | ) | | (91 | ) | | 86 | | | (116 | ) | | |
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Total second lien | (150 | ) | | (85 | ) | | 108 | | | (127 | ) | | |
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Total U.S. RMBS | 282 | | | (156 | ) | | 367 | | | 493 | | | |
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TruPS | 27 | | | 7 | | | 17 | | | 51 | | | |
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Other structured finance | 312 | | | (41 | ) | | (151 | ) | | 120 | | | |
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U.S. public finance | 7 | | | 239 | | | 18 | | | 264 | | | |
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Non-U.S public finance | 52 | | | 17 | | | (12 | ) | | 57 | | | |
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Other | (3 | ) | | (10 | ) | | 10 | | | (3 | ) | | |
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Total | $ | 677 | | | $ | 56 | | | $ | 249 | | | $ | 982 | | | |
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Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
After Net Expected Recoveries for Breaches of R&W |
Roll Forward |
Year Ended December 31, 2012 |
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| Net Expected | | Economic Loss | | (Paid) | | Expected | | |
Loss to be | Development | Recovered | Loss to be | | |
Paid as of | | Losses(1) | Paid as of | | |
December 31, 2011 | | | December 31, 2012 | | |
| (in millions) | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Prime first lien | $ | 2 | | | $ | 4 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 6 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 295 | | | 62 | | | (42 | ) | | 315 | | | |
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Option ARM | 210 | | | 39 | | | (380 | ) | | (131 | ) | | |
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Subprime | 241 | | | 49 | | | (48 | ) | | 242 | | | |
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Total first lien | 748 | | | 154 | | | (470 | ) | | 432 | | | |
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Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | (86 | ) | | (10 | ) | | 57 | | | (39 | ) | | |
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HELOCs | (31 | ) | | 44 | | | (124 | ) | | (111 | ) | | |
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Total second lien | (117 | ) | | 34 | | | (67 | ) | | (150 | ) | | |
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Total U.S. RMBS | 631 | | | 188 | | | (537 | ) | | 282 | | | |
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TruPS | 64 | | | (30 | ) | | (7 | ) | | 27 | | | |
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Other structured finance | 342 | | | 2 | | | (32 | ) | | 312 | | | |
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U.S. public finance | 16 | | | 74 | | | (83 | ) | | 7 | | | |
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Non-U.S public finance | 51 | | | 221 | | | (220 | ) | | 52 | | | |
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Other | 2 | | | (17 | ) | | 12 | | | (3 | ) | | |
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Total | $ | 1,106 | | | $ | 438 | | | $ | (867 | ) | | $ | 677 | | | |
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____________________ |
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-1 | Net of ceded paid losses, whether or not such amounts have been settled with reinsurers. Ceded paid losses are typically settled 45 days after the end of the reporting period. Such amounts are recorded in reinsurance recoverable on paid losses included in other assets. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The following tables present the present value of net expected loss to be paid for all contracts by accounting model, by sector and after the benefit for estimated and contractual recoveries for breaches of R&W. |
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Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
By Accounting Model |
As of December 31, 2013 |
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| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives | | |
Insurance | | | |
| (in millions) | | |
US RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Prime first lien | $ | 3 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 18 | | | $ | 21 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 199 | | | 31 | | | 74 | | | 304 | | | |
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Option ARM | (18 | ) | | (2 | ) | | 11 | | | (9 | ) | | |
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Subprime | 149 | | | 81 | | | 74 | | | 304 | | | |
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Total first lien | 333 | | | 110 | | | 177 | | | 620 | | | |
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Second Lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | (34 | ) | | 25 | | | (2 | ) | | (11 | ) | | |
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HELOCs | (41 | ) | | (75 | ) | | — | | | (116 | ) | | |
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Total second lien | (75 | ) | | (50 | ) | | (2 | ) | | (127 | ) | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | 258 | | | 60 | | | 175 | | | 493 | | | |
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TruPS | 3 | | | — | | | 48 | | | 51 | | | |
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Other structured finance | 161 | | | — | | | (41 | ) | | 120 | | | |
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U.S. public finance | 264 | | | — | | | — | | | 264 | | | |
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Non-U.S. public finance | 55 | | | — | | | 2 | | | 57 | | | |
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Subtotal | $ | 741 | | | $ | 60 | | | $ | 184 | | | 985 | | | |
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Other | | | | | | | (3 | ) | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | 982 | | | |
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Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
By Accounting Model |
As of December 31, 2012 |
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| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives | | |
Insurance | | | |
| (in millions) | | |
US RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Prime first lien | $ | 4 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 2 | | | $ | 6 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 164 | | | 27 | | | 124 | | | 315 | | | |
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Option ARM | (114 | ) | | (37 | ) | | 20 | | | (131 | ) | | |
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Subprime | 118 | | | 50 | | | 74 | | | 242 | | | |
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Total first lien | 172 | | | 40 | | | 220 | | | 432 | | | |
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Second Lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | (60 | ) | | 31 | | | (10 | ) | | (39 | ) | | |
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HELOCs | 56 | | | (167 | ) | | — | | | (111 | ) | | |
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Total second lien | (4 | ) | | (136 | ) | | (10 | ) | | (150 | ) | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | 168 | | | (96 | ) | | 210 | | | 282 | | | |
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TruPS | 1 | | | — | | | 26 | | | 27 | | | |
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Other structured finance | 224 | | | — | | | 88 | | | 312 | | | |
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U.S. public finance | 7 | | | — | | | — | | | 7 | | | |
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Non-U.S. public finance | 51 | | | — | | | 1 | | | 52 | | | |
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Subtotal | $ | 451 | | | $ | (96 | ) | | $ | 325 | | | 680 | | | |
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Other | | | | | | | (3 | ) | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | 677 | | | |
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___________________ |
(1) Refer to Note 10, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities. |
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The following tables present the net economic loss development for all contracts by accounting model, by sector and after the benefit for estimated and contractual recoveries for breaches of R&W. |
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Net Economic Loss Development |
By Accounting Model |
Year Ended December 31, 2013 |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives(2) | | |
Insurance | | | |
| (in millions) | | |
US RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Prime first lien | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | — | | | $ | 17 | | | $ | 16 | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | (54 | ) | | 5 | | | (32 | ) | | (81 | ) | | |
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Option ARM | (62 | ) | | (36 | ) | | — | | | (98 | ) | | |
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Subprime | 48 | | | 32 | | | 12 | | | 92 | | | |
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Total first lien | (69 | ) | | 1 | | | (3 | ) | | (71 | ) | | |
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Second Lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | 30 | | | (34 | ) | | 10 | | | 6 | | | |
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HELOCs | (91 | ) | | (1 | ) | | 1 | | | (91 | ) | | |
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Total second lien | (61 | ) | | (35 | ) | | 11 | | | (85 | ) | | |
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Total U.S. RMBS | (130 | ) | | (34 | ) | | 8 | | | (156 | ) | | |
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TruPS | — | | | — | | | 7 | | | 7 | | | |
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Other structured finance | (36 | ) | | — | | | (5 | ) | | (41 | ) | | |
| |
U.S. public finance | 239 | | | — | | | — | | | 239 | | | |
| |
Non-U.S. public finance | 16 | | | — | | | 1 | | | 17 | | | |
| |
Subtotal | $ | 89 | | | $ | (34 | ) | | $ | 11 | | | 66 | | | |
| |
Other | | | | | | | (10 | ) | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | 56 | | | |
| |
Net Economic Loss Development |
By Accounting Model |
Year Ended December 31, 2012 |
|
| | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives(2) | | |
Insurance | | | |
| (in millions) | | |
US RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| |
Prime first lien | $ | 2 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 2 | | | $ | 4 | | | |
| |
Alt-A first lien | 38 | | | (10 | ) | | 34 | | | 62 | | | |
| |
Option ARM | 37 | | | (8 | ) | | 10 | | | 39 | | | |
| |
Subprime | 31 | | | 7 | | | 11 | | | 49 | | | |
| |
Total first lien | 108 | | | (11 | ) | | 57 | | | 154 | | | |
| |
Second Lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| |
Closed-end second lien | 13 | | | (23 | ) | | — | | | (10 | ) | | |
| |
HELOCs | 37 | | | 7 | | | — | | | 44 | | | |
| |
Total second lien | 50 | | | (16 | ) | | — | | | 34 | | | |
| |
Total U.S. RMBS | 158 | | | (27 | ) | | 57 | | | 188 | | | |
| |
TruPS | (11 | ) | | — | | | (19 | ) | | (30 | ) | | |
| |
Other structured finance | 15 | | | — | | | (13 | ) | | 2 | | | |
| |
U.S. public finance | 75 | | | — | | | (1 | ) | | 74 | | | |
| |
Non-U.S. public finance | 222 | | | — | | | (1 | ) | | 221 | | | |
| |
Subtotal | $ | 459 | | | $ | (27 | ) | | $ | 23 | | | 455 | | | |
| |
Other | | | | | | | (17 | ) | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | 438 | | | |
| |
___________________ |
(1) Refer to Note 10, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities. |
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(2) Refer to Note 9, Financial Guaranty Contracts Accounted for as Credit Derivatives. |
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Approach to Projecting Losses in U.S. RMBS |
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The Company projects losses on its insured U.S. RMBS on a transaction-by-transaction basis by projecting the performance of the underlying pool of mortgages over time and then applying the structural features (i.e., payment priorities and tranching) of the RMBS to the projected performance of the collateral over time. The resulting projected claim payments or reimbursements are then discounted using risk-free rates. For transactions where the Company projects it will receive recoveries from providers of R&W, it projects the amount of recoveries and either establishes a recovery for claims already paid or reduces its projected claim payments accordingly. |
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The further behind a mortgage borrower falls in making payments, the more likely it is that he or she will default. The rate at which borrowers from a particular delinquency category (number of monthly payments behind) eventually default is referred to as the “liquidation rate.” The Company derives its liquidation rate assumptions from observed roll rates, which are the rates at which loans progress from one delinquency category to the next and eventually to default and liquidation. The Company applies liquidation rates to the mortgage loan collateral in each delinquency category and makes certain timing assumptions to project near-term mortgage collateral defaults from loans that are currently delinquent. |
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Mortgage borrowers that are not more than one payment behind (generally considered performing borrowers) have demonstrated an ability and willingness to pay throughout the recession and mortgage crisis, and as a result are viewed as less likely to default than delinquent borrowers. Performing borrowers that eventually default will also need to progress through delinquency categories before any defaults occur. The Company projects how many of the currently performing loans will default and when they will default, by first converting the projected near term defaults of delinquent borrowers derived from liquidation rates into a vector of conditional default rates ("CDR"), then projecting how the conditional default rates will develop over time. Loans that are defaulted pursuant to the conditional default rate after the near-term liquidation of currently delinquent loans represent defaults of currently performing loans and projected re-performing loans. A conditional default rate is the outstanding principal amount of defaulted loans liquidated in the current month divided by the remaining outstanding amount of the whole pool of loans (or “collateral pool balance”). The collateral pool balance decreases over time as a result of scheduled principal payments, partial and whole principal prepayments, and defaults. |
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In order to derive collateral pool losses from the collateral pool defaults it has projected, the Company applies a loss severity. The loss severity is the amount of loss the transaction experiences on a defaulted loan after the application of net proceeds from the disposal of the underlying property. The Company projects loss severities by sector based on its experience to date. Further detail regarding the assumptions and variables the Company used to project collateral losses in its U.S. RMBS portfolio may be found below in the sections “U.S. First Lien RMBS Loss Projections: Alt-A First Lien, Option ARM, Subprime and Prime” and “U.S. Second Lien RMBS Loss Projections: HELOCs and Closed-End Second Lien” |
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The Company is in the process of enforcing claims for breaches of R&W regarding the characteristics of the loans included in the collateral pools. The Company calculates a credit from the RMBS issuer for such recoveries where the R&W were provided by an entity the Company believes to be financially viable and where the Company already has access or believes it will attain access to the underlying mortgage loan files. Where the Company has an agreement with an R&W provider (e.g., the Bank of America Agreement, the Deutsche Bank Agreement or the UBS Agreement) or where it is in advanced discussions on a potential agreement, that credit is based on the agreement or potential agreement. Where the Company does not have an agreement with the R&W provider but the Company believes the R&W provider to be economically viable, the Company estimates what portion of its past and projected future claims it believes will be reimbursed by that provider. Further detail regarding how the Company calculates these credits may be found under “Breaches of Representations and Warranties” below. |
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The Company projects the overall future cash flow from a collateral pool by adjusting the payment stream from the principal and interest contractually due on the underlying mortgages for (a) the collateral losses it projects as described above, (b) assumed voluntary prepayments and (c) servicer advances. The Company then applies an individual model of the structure of the transaction to the projected future cash flow from that transaction’s collateral pool to project the Company’s future claims and claim reimbursements for that individual transaction. Finally, the projected claims and reimbursements are discounted using risk-free rates. As noted above, the Company runs several sets of assumptions regarding mortgage collateral performance, or scenarios, and probability weights them. |
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The ultimate performance of the Company’s RMBS transactions remains highly uncertain, may differ from the Company's projections and may be subject to considerable volatility due to the influence of many factors, including the level and timing of loan defaults, changes in housing prices, results from the Company’s loss mitigation activities and other variables. The Company will continue to monitor the performance of its RMBS exposures and will adjust its RMBS loss projection assumptions and scenarios based on actual performance and management’s view of future performance. |
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Year-End 2013 Compared to Year-End 2012 U.S. RMBS Loss Projections |
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The Company's RMBS loss projection methodology assumes that the housing and mortgage markets will continue improving. Each quarter the Company makes a judgment as to whether to change the assumptions it uses to make RMBS loss projections based on its observation during the quarter of the performance of its insured transactions (including early stage delinquencies, late stage delinquencies and, for first liens, loss severity) as well as the residential property market and economy in general, and, to the extent it observes changes, it makes a judgment as whether those changes are normal fluctuations or part of a trend. Based on such observations the Company chose to use the same general methodology (with the refinements described below) to project RMBS losses as of December 31, 2013 as it used as of December 31, 2012. The Company's use of the same general approach to project RMBS losses as of December 31, 2013 as it used as of December 31, 2012 was consistent with its view at December 31, 2013 that the housing and mortgage market recovery was occurring at a slower pace than it anticipated at December 31, 2012. |
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The Company refined its first lien RMBS loss projection methodology as of December 31, 2013 to model explicitly the behavior of borrowers with loans that had been modified. The Company has observed that mortgage loan servicers were modifying more mortgage loans (reducing or forbearing from collecting interest or principal or both due on mortgage loans) to reduce the borrowers’ monthly payments and so improve their payment performance than was the case before the mortgage crisis. Borrowers who are current based on their new, reduced monthly payments are generally reported as current, but are more likely to default than borrowers who are current and whose loans have not been modified. The Company believes modified loans are most likely to default again during the first year after modification. The Company set its liquidation rate assumptions as of December 31, 2012 based on observed roll rates and with modification activity in mind. As of December 31, 2013 the Company made a number of refinements to its first lien RMBS loss projection assumptions to treat loan modifications explicitly. Specifically, in the base case approach, it: |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
• | established a liquidation rate assumption for loans reported as current but that had been reported as modified in the previous 12 months, | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
• | assumed that currently delinquent loans that did not roll to liquidation would behave like modified loans, and so applied the modified loan liquidation rate to them, | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
• | increased from two to three years the period over which it calculates the initial CDR based on assumed liquidations of non-performing loans and modified loans, to account for the longer period modified loans will take to default, | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
• | increased the period it assumes the transactions will experience the initial loss severity assumption before it improves and the period during which the transaction will experience low voluntary prepayment rates, | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
• | established an assumption for servicers not to advance loan payments on all delinquent loans | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The methodology and revised assumptions the Company uses to project first lien RMBS losses and the scenarios it employs are described in more detail below under " - U.S. First Lien RMBS Loss Projections: Alt A First Lien, Option ARM, Subprime and Prime". The refinement in assumptions described above resulted in a reduction of the initial CDRs but the application of the initial CDRs for a longer period, which generally resulted in a higher amount of loans being liquidated at the initial CDR under the refined assumptions than under the initial CDR under the previous assumptions. The Company estimated the impact of all of the refinements to its assumptions described above to be an increase of expected losses of approximately $8 million (before adjustments for settlements or loss mitigation purchases) by running on the first lien RMBS portfolio as of December 31, 2013 base case assumptions similar to what it used as of December 31, 2012 and comparing those results to those results from the refined assumptions. |
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During 2013 the Company observed improvements in the performance of its second lien RMBS transactions that, when viewed in the context of their performance prior to 2013, suggested those transactions were beginning to respond to the improvements in the residential property market and economy being widely reported by market observers. Based on such observations, in projecting losses for second lien RMBS the Company chose to decrease by two months in its base scenario and by three months in its optimistic scenario the period it assumed it would take the mortgage market to recover as compared to December 31, 2012. Also during 2013 the Company observed material improvements in the delinquency measures of certain second lien RMBS for which the servicing had been transferred, and made certain adjustments on just those transactions to reflect its view that much of this improvement was due to loan modifications and reinstatements made by the new servicer and that such recently modified and reinstated loans may have a higher likelihood of defaulting again. The methodology and assumptions the Company uses to project second lien RMBS losses and the scenarios it employs are described in more detail below under " - U.S. Second Lien RMBS Loss Projections: HELOCs and Closed-End Second Lien". |
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The Company observed some improvement in delinquency trends in most of its RMBS transactions during 2013, with some of that improvement in second liens driven by servicing transfers it effectuated. Such improvement is naturally transmitted to its projections for each individual RMBS transaction, since the projections are based on the delinquency performance of the loans in that individual transaction. |
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Year-End 2012 Compared to Year-End 2011 U.S. RMBS Loss Projections |
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Based on the Company’s observation during 2012 of the performance of its insured transactions (including early stage delinquencies, late stage delinquencies and, for first liens, loss severity) as well as the residential property market and economy in general, the Company chose to use essentially the same assumptions and scenarios to project RMBS loss as of December 31, 2012 as it used as of December 31, 2011, except that as compared to December 31, 2011: |
|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
• | in its most optimistic scenario, it reduced by three months the period it assumed it would take the mortgage market to recover; and | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
• | in its most pessimistic scenario, it increased by three months the period it assumed it would take the mortgage market to recover. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The Company's use of essentially the same assumptions and scenarios to project RMBS losses as of December 31, 2012 as at December 31, 2011 was consistent with its view at December 31, 2012 that the housing and mortgage market recovery was occurring at a slower pace than it anticipated at December 31, 2011. The Company's changes during 2012 to the period it would take the mortgage market to recover in its most optimistic scenario and its most pessimistic scenario allowed it to consider a wider range of possibilities for the speed of the recovery. Since the Company's projections for each RMBS transaction are based on the delinquency performance of the loans in that individual RMBS transaction, improvement or deterioration in that aspect of a transaction's performance impacts the projections for that transaction. The methodology and assumptions the Company uses to project RMBS losses and the scenarios it employs are described in more detail below under " – U.S. First Lien RMBS Loss Projections: Alt A First Lien, Option ARM, Subprime and Prime" and "– U.S. Second Lien RMBS Loss Projections: HELOCs and Closed-End Second Lien." |
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U.S. First Lien RMBS Loss Projections: Alt-A First Lien, Option ARM, Subprime and Prime |
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The majority of projected losses in first lien RMBS transactions are expected to come from non-performing mortgage loans (those that have been modified in the previous 12 months or are delinquent or in foreclosure or that have been foreclosed and so the RMBS issuer owns the underlying real estate). Changes in the amount of non-performing loans from the amount projected in the previous period are one of the primary drivers of loss development in this portfolio. In order to determine the number of defaults resulting from these delinquent and foreclosed loans, the Company applies a liquidation rate assumption to loans in each of various non-performing categories. The liquidation rate is a standard industry measure that is used to estimate the number of loans in a given non-performing category that will default within a specified time period. The Company arrived at its liquidation rates based on data purchased from a third party provider and assumptions about how delays in the foreclosure process and loan modifications may ultimately affect the rate at which loans are liquidated. As described above under “ - Year-End 2013 Compared to Year-End 2012 U.S. RMBS Loss Projections”, the Company refined its methodology as of December 31, 2013 to establishing liquidation rates to explicitly consider loans modifications and revised the period over which it projects these liquidations to occur from two to three years. Based on its review of that data, the Company made the changes described in the following table as of December 31, 2013 and maintained the same liquidation assumptions at December 31, 2012 and December 31, 2011. The following table shows liquidation assumptions for various non-performing categories. |
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|
First Lien Liquidation Rates |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 31-Dec-13 | | 31-Dec-12 | | 31-Dec-11 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Current Loans Modified in Previous 12 Months | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 35% | | N/A | | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 35 | | N/A | | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 35 | | N/A | | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | |
30 – 59 Days Delinquent | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 50 | | 35% | | 35% | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 50 | | 50 | | 50 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 45 | | 30 | | 30 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
60 – 89 Days Delinquent | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 60 | | 55 | | 55 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 65 | | 65 | | 65 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 50 | | 45 | | 45 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
90+ Days Delinquent | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 75 | | 65 | | 65 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 70 | | 75 | | 75 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 60 | | 60 | | 60 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Bankruptcy | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 60 | | 55 | | 55 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 60 | | 70 | | 70 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 55 | | 50 | | 50 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Foreclosure | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 85 | | 85 | | 85 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 80 | | 85 | | 85 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 70 | | 80 | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Real Estate Owned | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
All | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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While the Company uses liquidation rates as described above to project defaults of non-performing loans, it projects defaults on presently current loans by applying a CDR trend. The start of that CDR trend is based on the defaults the Company projects will emerge from currently nonperforming loans. The total amount of expected defaults from the non-performing loans is translated into a constant CDR (i.e., the CDR plateau), which, if applied for each of the next 36 months (up from 24 months as of December 31, 2012), would be sufficient to produce approximately the amount of defaults that were calculated to emerge from the various delinquency categories. The CDR thus calculated individually on the delinquent collateral pool for each RMBS is then used as the starting point for the CDR curve used to project defaults of the presently performing loans. The refinement in assumptions described above under “ - Year-End 2013 Compared to Year-End 2012 U.S. RMBS Loss Projections” resulted in a reduction of the initial CDRs but the application of the initial CDRs for a longer period generally resulted in a higher amount of loans being liquidated at the initial CDR under the December 31, 2013 assumptions than under the initial CDR under the December 31, 2012 assumptions. |
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In the base case, after the initial 36-month CDR plateau period, each transaction’s CDR is projected to improve over 12 months to an intermediate CDR (calculated as 20% of its CDR plateau); that intermediate CDR is held constant for 36 months and then trails off in steps to a final CDR of 5% of the CDR plateau. Under the Company’s methodology, defaults projected to occur in the first 36 months represent defaults that can be attributed to loans that are currently delinquent or in foreclosure, while the defaults projected to occur using the projected CDR trend after the first 36 month period represent defaults attributable to borrowers that are currently performing. |
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Another important driver of loss projections is loss severity, which is the amount of loss the transaction incurs on a loan after the application of net proceeds from the disposal of the underlying property. Loss severities experienced in first lien transactions have reached historic high levels, and the Company is assuming in the base case that these high levels generally will continue for another 18 months (up from a twelve months as of December 31, 2012), except that in the case of subprime loans, the Company assumes the unprecedented 90% loss severity rate will continue for another nine months (up from six months as of December 31, 2012) then drop to 80% for nine more months (up from six months as of December 31, 2012), in each case before following the ramp described below. The Company determines its initial loss severity based on actual recent experience. The Company’s initial loss severity assumptions for December 31, 2013 were the same as it used for December 31, 2012 and December 31, 2011. The Company then assumes that loss severities begin returning to levels consistent with underwriting assumptions beginning after the initial 18 month period, declining to 40% in the base case over 2.5 years (up from two years as of December 31, 2012). |
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The following table shows the range of key assumptions used in the calculation of expected loss to be paid for individual transactions for direct vintage 2004 - 2008 first lien U.S. RMBS. |
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Key Assumptions in Base Case Expected Loss Estimates |
First Lien RMBS(1) |
| | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| As of | | As of | | As of | | | |
31-Dec-13 | 31-Dec-12 | 31-Dec-11 | | | |
Alt-A First Lien | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Plateau CDR | 2.8 | % | – | 18.40% | | 3.8 | % | – | 23.20% | | 2.8 | % | – | 41.30% | | | |
Intermediate CDR | 0.6 | % | – | 3.70% | | 0.8 | % | – | 4.60% | | 0.6 | % | – | 8.30% | | | |
Period until intermediate CDR | 48 months | | 36 months | | 36 months | | | |
Final CDR | 0.1 | % | – | 0.90% | | 0.2 | % | – | 1.20% | | 0.1 | % | – | 2.10% | | | |
Initial loss severity | 65% | | 65% | | 65% | | | |
Initial conditional prepayment rate ("CPR") | 0 | % | – | 34.20% | | 0 | % | – | 39.40% | | 0 | % | – | 37.50% | | | |
Final CPR | 15% | | 15% | | 15% | | | |
Option ARM | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Plateau CDR | 4.9 | % | – | 16.80% | | 7 | % | – | 26.10% | | 9.6 | % | – | 31.50% | | | |
Intermediate CDR | 1 | % | – | 3.40% | | 1.4 | % | – | 5.20% | | 1.9 | % | – | 6.30% | | | |
Period until intermediate CDR | 48 months | | 36 months | | 36 months | | | |
Final CDR | 0.2 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.4 | % | – | 1.30% | | 0.5 | % | – | 1.60% | | | |
Initial loss severity | 65% | | 65% | | 65% | | | |
Initial CPR | 0.4 | % | – | 13.10% | | 0 | % | – | 10.70% | | 0 | % | – | 29.10% | | | |
Final CPR | 15% | | 15% | | 15% | | | |
Subprime | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Plateau CDR | 5.6 | % | – | 16.20% | | 7.3 | % | – | 26.20% | | 8.3 | % | – | 29.90% | | | |
Intermediate CDR | 1.1 | % | – | 3.20% | | 1.5 | % | – | 5.20% | | 1.7 | % | – | 6% | | | |
Period until intermediate CDR | 48 months | | 36 months | | 36 months | | | |
Final CDR | 0.3 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.4 | % | – | 1.30% | | 0.4 | % | – | 1.50% | | | |
Initial loss severity | 90% | | 90% | | 90% | | | |
Initial CPR | 0 | % | – | 15.70% | | 0 | % | – | 17.60% | | 0 | % | – | 16.30% | | | |
Final CPR | 15% | | 15% | | 15% | | | |
____________________ |
(1) Represents variables for most heavily weighted scenario (the “base case”). |
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The rate at which the principal amount of loans is voluntarily prepaid may impact both the amount of losses projected (since that amount is a function of the conditional default rate, the loss severity and the loan balance over time) as well as the amount of excess spread (the amount by which the interest paid by the borrowers on the underlying loan exceeds the amount of interest owed on the insured obligations). The assumption for the voluntary CPR follows a similar pattern to that of the conditional default rate. The current level of voluntary prepayments is assumed to continue for the plateau period before gradually increasing over 12 months to the final CPR, which is assumed to be 15% in the base case. For transactions where the initial CPR is higher than the final CPR, the initial CPR is held constant. These assumptions are the same as those the Company used for December 31, 2012 and December 31, 2011 except that, as of December 31, 2013 the period of initial CDRs were assumed to last 12 months longer than they were assumed to last as of December 31, 2012 and 2011, so the initial CPR is also held constant 12 months longer as of December 31, 2013 than it was as of December 31, 2012 or 2011. |
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In estimating expected losses, the Company modeled and probability weighted sensitivities for first lien transactions by varying its assumptions of how fast a recovery is expected to occur. One of the variables used to model sensitivities was how quickly the conditional default rate returned to its modeled equilibrium, which was defined as 5% of the initial conditional default rate. The Company also stressed CPR and the speed of recovery of loss severity rates. The Company probability weighted a total of five scenarios (including its base case) as of December 31, 2013, using the same number of scenarios and weightings as it used as of December 31, 2012 and 2011. The Company used a similar approach to establish its pessimistic and optimistic scenarios as of December 31, 2013 as it used as of December 31, 2012 and 2011, increasing and decreasing the periods of stress from those used in the base case, except that all of the stress periods were longer as of December 31, 2013 than they were as of December 31, 2012 and 2011. In a somewhat more stressful environment than that of the base case, where the conditional default rate plateau was extended six months (to be 42 months long) before the same more gradual conditional default rate recovery and loss severities were assumed to recover over 4.5 rather than 2.5 years (and subprime loss severities were assumed to recover only to 60%), expected loss to be paid would increase from current projections by approximately $41 million for Alt-A first liens, $12 million for Option ARM, $93 million for subprime and $4 million for prime transactions. In an even more stressful scenario where loss severities were assumed to rise and then recover over nine years and the initial ramp-down of the conditional default rate was assumed to occur over 15 months and other assumptions were the same as the other stress scenario, expected loss to be paid would increase from current projections by approximately $111 million for Alt-A first liens, $30 million for Option ARM, $136 million for subprime and $12 million for prime transactions. The Company also considered two scenarios where the recovery was faster than in its base case. In a scenario with a somewhat less stressful environment than the base case, where conditional default rate recovery was somewhat less gradual and the initial subprime loss severity rate was assumed to be 80% for 18 months and was assumed to recover to 40% over 2.5 years, expected loss to be paid would increase from current projections by approximately $1 million for Alt-A first lien and would decrease by $11 million for Option ARM, $24 million for subprime and $1 million for prime transactions. In an even less stressful scenario where the conditional default rate plateau was six months shorter (30 months, effectively assuming that liquidation rates would improve) and the conditional default rate recovery was more pronounced, (including an initial ramp-down of the conditional default rate over nine months rather than 12 months), expected loss to be paid would decrease from current projections by approximately $38 million for Alt-A first lien, $29 million for Option ARM, $77 million for subprime and $4 million for prime transactions. |
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U.S. Second Lien RMBS Loss Projections: HELOCs and Closed-End Second Lien |
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The Company believes the primary variable affecting its expected losses in second lien RMBS transactions is the amount and timing of future losses in the collateral pool supporting the transactions. Expected losses are also a function of the structure of the transaction; the voluntary prepayment rate (typically also referred to as CPR of the collateral); the interest rate environment; and assumptions about the draw rate and loss severity. These variables are interrelated, difficult to predict and subject to considerable volatility. If actual experience differs from the Company’s assumptions, the losses incurred could be materially different from the estimate. The Company continues to update its evaluation of these exposures as new information becomes available. |
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The following table shows the range of key assumptions for the calculation of expected loss to be paid for individual transactions for direct vintage 2004 - 2008 second lien U.S. RMBS. |
|
Key Assumptions in Base Case Expected Loss Estimates |
Second Lien RMBS(1) |
|
| | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
HELOC key assumptions | | As of | | As of | | As of | | |
31-Dec-13 | 31-Dec-12 | 31-Dec-11 | | |
Plateau CDR | | 2.3 | % | – | 7.70% | | 3.8 | % | – | 15.90% | | 4 | % | – | 27.40% | | |
Final CDR trended down to | | 0.4 | % | – | 3.20% | | 0.4 | % | – | 3.20% | | 0.4 | % | – | 3.20% | | |
Period until final CDR | | 34 months | | 36 months | | 36 months | | |
Initial CPR | | 2.7 | % | – | 21.50% | | 2.9 | % | – | 15.40% | | 1.4 | % | – | 25.80% | | |
Final CPR | | 10% | | 10% | | 10% | | |
Loss severity | | 98% | | 98% | | 98% | | |
|
| | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Closed-end second lien key assumptions | | As of | | As of | | As of | | |
31-Dec-13 | 31-Dec-12 | 31-Dec-11 | | |
Plateau CDR | | 7.3 | % | – | 15.10% | | 7.3 | % | – | 20.70% | | 6.9 | % | – | 29.50% | | |
Final CDR trended down to | | 3.5 | % | – | 9.10% | | 3.5 | % | – | 9.10% | | 3.5 | % | – | 9.10% | | |
Period until final CDR | | 34 months | | 36 months | | 36 months | | |
Initial CPR | | 3.1 | % | – | 12.00% | | 1.9 | % | – | 12.50% | | 0.9 | % | – | 14.70% | | |
Final CPR | | 10% | | 10% | | 10% | | |
Loss severity | | 98% | | 98% | | 98% | | |
____________________ |
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-1 | Represents variables for most heavily weighted scenario (the “base case”). | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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In second lien transactions the projection of near-term defaults from currently delinquent loans is relatively straightforward because loans in second lien transactions are generally “charged off” (treated as defaulted) by the securitization’s servicer once the loan is 180 days past due. Most second lien transactions report the amount of loans in five monthly delinquency categories (i.e., 30-59 days past due, 60-89 days past due, 90-119 days past due, 120-149 days past due and 150-179 days past due). The Company estimates the amount of loans that will default over the next five months by calculating current representative liquidation rates (the percent of loans in a given delinquency status that are assumed to ultimately default) from selected representative transactions and then applying an average of the preceding twelve months’ liquidation rates to the amount of loans in the delinquency categories. The amount of loans projected to default in the first through fifth months is expressed as a CDR. The first four months’ CDR is calculated by applying the liquidation rates to the current period past due balances (i.e., the 150-179 day balance is liquidated in the first projected month, the 120-149 day balance is liquidated in the second projected month, the 90-119 day balance is liquidated in the third projected month and the 60-89 day balance is liquidated in the fourth projected month). For the fifth month the CDR is calculated using the average 30-59 day past due balances for the prior three months, adjusted as necessary to reflect one time service events. The fifth month CDR is then used as the basis for the plateau period that follows the embedded five months of losses. During 2013 the Company observed material improvements in the delinquency measures of certain second lien RMBS for which the servicing had been transferred, and determined that much of this improvement was due to loan modifications and reinstatements made by the new servicer. To reflect the possibility that such recently modified and reinstated loans may have a higher likelihood of defaulting again, for such transactions the Company treated as severely delinquent a portion of the loans that are current or less than 150 days delinquent and that it identified as having been recently modified or reinstated. Even with that adjustment, the improvement in delinquency measures for those transactions resulted in a lower initial CDR for those transactions than the initial CDR calculated as of December 31, 2012. |
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As of December 31, 2013, for the base case scenario, the CDR (the “plateau CDR”) was held constant for one month. Once the plateau period has ended, the CDR is assumed to gradually trend down in uniform increments to its final long-term steady state CDR. The long-term steady state CDR is calculated as the constant CDR that would have yielded the amount of losses originally expected at underwriting. In the base case scenario, the time over which the CDR trends down to its final CDR is 28 months. Therefore, the total stress period for second lien transactions is 34 months, comprising five months of delinquent data, a one month plateau period and 28 months of decrease to the steady state CDR. This is two months shorter than used for December 31, 2012 and 2011. When a second lien loan defaults, there is generally a very low recovery. Based on current expectations of future performance, the Company assumes that it will only recover 2% of the collateral, the same as December 31, 2012 and December 31, 2011. |
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The rate at which the principal amount of loans is prepaid may impact both the amount of losses projected as well as the amount of excess spread. In the base case, the current CPR (based on experience of the most recent three quarters) is assumed to continue until the end of the plateau before gradually increasing to the final CPR over the same period the CDR decreases. For transactions where the initial CPR is higher than the final CPR, the initial CPR is held constant. The final CPR is assumed to be 10% for both HELOC and closed-end second lien transactions. This level is much higher than current rates for most transactions, but lower than the historical average, which reflects the Company’s continued uncertainty about the projected performance of the borrowers in these transactions. This pattern is consistent with how the Company modeled the CPR at December 31, 2012 and December 31, 2011. To the extent that prepayments differ from projected levels it could materially change the Company’s projected excess spread and losses. |
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The Company uses a number of other variables in its second lien loss projections, including the spread between relevant interest rate indices, the loss severity, and HELOC draw rates (the amount of new advances provided on existing HELOCs expressed as a percentage of current outstanding advances). These variables have been relatively stable over the past several quarters and in the relevant ranges have less impact on the projection results than the variables discussed above. |
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In estimating expected losses, the Company modeled and probability weighted three possible CDR curves applicable to the period preceding the return to the long-term steady state CDR. The Company believes that the level of the elevated CDR and the length of time it will persist is the primary driver behind the likely amount of losses the collateral will suffer (before considering the effects of repurchases of ineligible loans). The Company continues to evaluate the assumptions affecting its modeling results. |
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As of December 31, 2013, the Company’s base case assumed a one month CDR plateau and a 28 month ramp-down (for a total stress period of 34 months). The Company also modeled a scenario with a longer period of elevated defaults and another with a shorter period of elevated defaults and weighted them the same as of December 31, 2012 and 2011. Increasing the CDR plateau to four months and increasing the ramp-down by five months to 33-months (for a total stress period of 42 months) would increase the expected loss by approximately $26 million for HELOC transactions and $2 million for closed-end second lien transactions. On the other hand, keeping the CDR plateau at one month but decreasing the length of the CDR ramp-down to 18 months (for a total stress period of 24 months) would decrease the expected loss by approximately $24 million for HELOC transactions and $2 million for closed-end second lien transactions. |
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Breaches of Representations and Warranties |
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Generally, when mortgage loans are transferred into a securitization, the loan originator(s) and/or sponsor(s) provide R&W that the loans meet certain characteristics, and a breach of such R&W often requires that the loan be repurchased from the securitization. In many of the transactions the Company insures, it is in a position to enforce these R&W provisions. Soon after the Company observed the deterioration in the performance of its insured RMBS following the deterioration of the residential mortgage and property markets, the Company began using internal resources as well as third party forensic underwriting firms and legal firms to pursue breaches of R&W on a loan-by-loan basis. Where a provider of R&W refused to honor its repurchase obligations, the Company sometimes chose to initiate litigation. See “Recovery Litigation” below. The Company's success in pursuing these strategies permitted the Company to enter into agreements with R&W providers under which those providers made payments to the Company, agreed to make payments to the Company in the future, and / or repurchased loans from the transactions, all in return for releases of related liability by the Company. Such agreements provide the Company with many of the benefits of pursuing the R&W claims on a loan by loan basis or through litigation, but without the related expense and uncertainty. The Company continues to pursue these strategies against R&W providers with which it does not yet have agreements. |
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Using these strategies, through December 31, 2013 the Company has caused entities providing R&Ws to pay or agree to pay approximately $3.6 billion (gross of reinsurance) in respect of their R&W liabilities for transactions in which the Company has provided insurance. |
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| (in millions) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Agreement amounts already received | $ | 2,608 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Agreement amounts projected to be received in the future | 425 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Repurchase amounts paid into the relevant RMBS prior to settlement (1) | 578 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Total R&W payments, gross of reinsurance | $ | 3,611 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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____________________ |
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-1 | These amounts were paid into the relevant RMBS transactions (rather than to the Company as in most settlements) and distributed in accordance with the priority of payments set out in the relevant transaction documents. Because the Company may insure only a portion of the capital structure of a transaction, such payments will not necessarily directly benefit the Company dollar-for-dollar, especially in first lien transactions. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Based on this success, the Company has included in its net expected loss estimates as of December 31, 2013 an estimated net benefit related to breaches of R&W of $712 million, which includes $413 million from agreements with R&W providers and $299 million in transactions where the Company does not yet have such an agreement, all net of reinsurance. |
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Representations and Warranties Agreements (1) |
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| Agreement Date | | Current Net Par Covered | | Receipts to December 31, 2013 (net of reinsurance) | | Estimated Future Receipts (net of reinsurance) | | Eligible Assets Held in Trust (gross of reinsurance) |
| (in millions) |
Bank of America - First Lien | Apr-11 | | $ | 1,059 | | | $ | 474 | | | $ | 201 | | | $ | 593 | |
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Bank of America - Second Lien | Apr-11 | | 1,387 | | | 968 | | | NA | | | NA | |
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Deutsche Bank | May-12 | | 1,711 | | | 179 | | | 107 | | | 151 | |
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UBS | May-13 | | 807 | | | 394 | | | 59 | | | 174 | |
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Others | Various | | 994 | | | 385 | | | 46 | | | NA | |
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Total | | | $ | 5,958 | | | $ | 2,400 | | | $ | 413 | | | $ | 918 | |
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____________________ |
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-1 | This table relates to past and projected future recoveries under R&W and related agreements. Excluded is the $299 million of future net recoveries the Company projects receiving from R&W counterparties in transactions with $1,617 million of net par outstanding as of December 31, 2013 not covered by current agreements and $806 million of net par partially covered by agreements but for which the Company projects receiving additional amounts. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The Company's agreements with the counterparties specifically named in the table above required an initial payment to the Company to reimburse it for past claims as well as an obligation to reimburse it for a portion of future claims. The named counterparties placed eligible assets in trust to collateralize their future reimbursement obligations, and the amount of collateral they are required to post may be increased or decreased from time to time as determined by rating agency requirements. Reimbursement payments under these agreements are made either monthly or quarterly and have been made timely. With respect to the reimbursement for future claims: |
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• | Bank of America. Under the Company's agreement with Bank of America Corporation and certain of its subsidiaries (“Bank of America”), Bank of America agreed to reimburse the Company for 80% of claims on the first lien transactions covered by the agreement that the Company pays in the future, until the aggregate lifetime collateral losses (not insurance losses or claims) on those transactions reach $6.6 billion. As of December 31, 2013 aggregate lifetime collateral losses on those transactions was $3.7 billion, and the Company was projecting in its base case that such collateral losses would eventually reach $5.1 billion. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | Deutsche Bank. Under the Company's May 2012 agreement with Deutsche Bank AG and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “Deutsche Bank”), Deutsche Bank agreed to reimburse the Company for certain claims it pays in the future on eight first and second lien transactions, including 80% of claims it pays on those transactions until the aggregate lifetime claims (before reimbursement) reach $319 million. As of December 31, 2013, the Company was projecting in its base case that such aggregate lifetime claims would remain below $319 million. In the event aggregate lifetime claims paid exceed $389 million, Deutsche Bank must reimburse Assured Guaranty for 85% of such claims paid (in excess of $389 million) until such claims paid reach $600 million. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The agreement also requires Deutsche Bank to reimburse AGC for future claims it pays on certain RMBS re-securitizations. The amount available for reimbursement of claim payments is based on a percentage of the losses that occur in certain uninsured tranches (“Uninsured Tranches”) within the eight transactions described above: 60% of losses on the Uninsured Tranches (up to $141 million of losses), 60% of such losses (for losses between $161 million and $185 million), and 100% of such losses (for losses from $185 million to $248 million). Losses on the Uninsured Tranches from $141 million to $161 million and above $248 million are not included in the calculation of AGC's reimbursement amount for re-securitization claim payments. As of December 31, 2013, the Company was projecting in its base case that losses on the Uninsured Tranches would be $150 million. Pursuant to the CDS termination on October 10, 2013 described below, a portion of Deutsche Bank's reimbursement obligation was applied to the terminated CDS. After giving effect to application of the portion of the reimbursement obligation to the terminated CDS, as well as to reimbursements related to other covered RMBS re-securitizations, and based on the Company's base case projections for losses on the Uninsured Tranches, the Company expects that $30 million will be available to reimburse AGC for re-securitization claim payments on the remaining re-securitizations. Except for the reimbursement obligation based on losses occurring on the Uninsured Tranches and the termination agreed to described below, the agreement with Deutsche Bank does not cover transactions where the Company has provided protection to Deutsche Bank on RMBS transactions in CDS form. |
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On October 10, 2013, the Company and Deutsche Bank terminated one below investment grade transaction under which the Company had provided credit protection to Deutsche Bank through a CDS. The transaction had a net par outstanding of $294 million at the time of termination. In connection with the termination, Assured Guaranty agreed to release to Deutsche Bank $60 million of assets held in trust that was in excess of the amount of assets required to be held in trust for regulatory and rating agency capital relief. |
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• | UBS. On May 6, 2013, the Company entered into an agreement with UBS Real Estate Securities Inc. and affiliates ("UBS") and a third party resolving the Company’s claims and liabilities related to specified RMBS transactions that were issued, underwritten or sponsored by UBS and insured by AGM or AGC under financial guaranty insurance policies. Under the agreement, UBS agreed to reimburse the Company for 85% of future losses on three first lien RMBS transactions. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | Flagstar. On June 21, 2013, AGM entered into a settlement agreement with Flagstar Bank in connection with its litigation for breach of contract against Flagstar on the Flagstar Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-1 and Series 2006-2 second lien transactions. The agreement followed judgments by the court in February and April 2013 in favor of AGM, which Flagstar had planned to appeal. As part of the settlement, AGM received a cash payment of $105 million and Flagstar withdrew its appeal. Flagstar also will reimburse AGM in full for all future claims on AGM’s financial guaranty insurance policies for such transactions. This settlement resolved all RMBS claims that AGM had asserted against Flagstar and each party agreed to release the other from any and all other future RMBS-related claims between them. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The Company calculated an expected recovery of $299 million from breaches of R&W in transactions not covered by agreements with $1,617 million of net par outstanding as of December 31, 2013 and $806 million of net par partially covered by agreements but for which the Company projects receiving additional amounts. The Company did not incorporate any gain contingencies from potential litigation in its estimated repurchases. The amount the Company will ultimately recover related to such contractual R&W is uncertain and subject to a number of factors including the counterparty's ability to pay, the number and loss amount of loans determined to have breached R&W and, potentially, negotiated settlements or litigation recoveries. As such, the Company's estimate of recoveries is uncertain and actual amounts realized may differ significantly from these estimates. In arriving at the expected recovery from breaches of R&W not already covered by agreements, the Company considered the creditworthiness of the provider of the R&W, the number of breaches found on defaulted loans, the success rate in resolving these breaches across those transactions where material repurchases have been made and the potential amount of time until the recovery is realized. The calculation of expected recovery from breaches of such contractual R&W involved a variety of scenarios which ranged from the Company recovering substantially all of the losses it incurred due to violations of R&W to the Company realizing limited recoveries. These scenarios were probability weighted in order to determine the recovery incorporated into the Company's estimate of expected losses. This approach was used for both loans that had already defaulted and those assumed to default in the future. The Company adjusts the calculation of its expected recovery from breaches of R&W based on changing facts and circumstances with respect to each counterparty and transaction. |
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The Company uses the same RMBS projection scenarios and weightings to project its future R&W benefit as it uses to project RMBS losses on its portfolio. To the extent the Company increases its loss projections, the R&W benefit (whether pursuant to an R&W agreement or not) generally will also increase, subject to the agreement limits and thresholds described above. Similarly, to the extent the Company decreases its loss projections, the R&W benefit (whether pursuant to an R&W agreement or not) generally will also decrease, subject to the agreement limits and thresholds described above. |
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The Company accounts for the loss sharing obligations under the R&W agreements on financial guaranty insurance contracts as subrogation, offsetting the losses it projects by an R&W benefit from the relevant party for the applicable portion of the projected loss amount. Proceeds projected to be reimbursed to the Company on transactions where the Company has already paid claims are viewed as a recovery on paid losses. For transactions where the Company has not already paid claims, projected recoveries reduce projected loss estimates. In either case, projected recoveries have no effect on the amount of the Company's exposure. See Notes 8, Fair Value Measurement and 9, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities. |
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U.S. RMBS Risks with R&W Benefit |
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| Number of Risks (1) as of | | Debt Service as of | | | | |
| December 31, 2013 | | December 31, 2012 | | December 31, 2013 | | December 31, 2012 | | | | |
| | | | | (dollars in millions) | | | | |
Prime first lien | 1 | | | 1 | | | $ | 38 | | | $ | 44 | | | | | |
| | | |
Alt-A first lien | 19 | | | 26 | | | 2,856 | | | 4,173 | | | | | |
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Option ARM | 9 | | | 10 | | | 641 | | | 1,183 | | | | | |
| | | |
Subprime | 5 | | | 5 | | | 998 | | | 989 | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | 4 | | | 4 | | | 158 | | | 260 | | | | | |
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HELOC | 4 | | | 7 | | | 320 | | | 549 | | | | | |
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Total | 42 | | | 53 | | | $ | 5,011 | | | $ | 7,198 | | | | | |
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____________________ |
(1) A risk represents the aggregate of the financial guaranty policies that share the same revenue source for purposes of making Debt Service payments.This table shows the full future Debt Service (not just the amount of Debt Service expected to be reimbursed) for risks with projected future R&W benefit, whether pursuant to an agreement or not. |
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The following table provides a breakdown of the development and accretion amount in the roll forward of estimated recoveries associated with alleged breaches of R&W. |
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Components of R&W Development |
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| Year Ended December 31, | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2013 | | 2012 | | | | | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | | | | | | |
Inclusion (removal) of deals with breaches of R&W during period | $ | 6 | | | $ | (3 | ) | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Change in recovery assumptions as the result of additional file review and recovery success | (6 | ) | | (10 | ) | | | | | | | | | | |
Estimated increase (decrease) in defaults that will result in additional (lower) breaches | (8 | ) | | 63 | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Results of settlements | 289 | | | 120 | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Accretion of discount on balance | 15 | | | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Total | $ | 296 | | | $ | 179 | | | | | | | | | | | |
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“XXX” Life Insurance Transactions |
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The Company’s $2.7 billion net par of XXX life insurance transactions as of December 31, 2013 include $598 million rated BIG. The BIG “XXX” life insurance reserve securitizations are based on discrete blocks of individual life insurance business. In each such transaction the monies raised by the sale of the bonds insured by the Company were used to capitalize a special purpose vehicle that provides reinsurance to a life insurer or reinsurer. The monies are invested at inception in accounts managed by third-party investment managers. |
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The BIG “XXX” life insurance transactions consist of two transactions: Ballantyne Re p.l.c and Orkney Re II p.l.c. These transactions had material amounts of their assets invested in U.S. RMBS transactions. Based on its analysis of the information currently available, including estimates of future investment performance, and projected credit impairments on the invested assets and performance of the blocks of life insurance business at December 31, 2013, the Company’s projected net expected loss to be paid is $73 million. The overall decrease of approximately $66 million in expected loss to be paid during 2013 is due primarily to the purchase of insured notes during the year. |
Student Loan Transactions |
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The Company has insured or reinsured $2.8 billion net par of student loan securitizations, of which $1.9 billion was issued by private issuers and classified as asset-backed and $0.9 billion was issued by public authorities and classified as public finance. Of these amounts, $206 million and $253 million, respectively, are rated BIG. The Company is projecting approximately $64 million of net expected loss to be paid in these portfolios. In general, the losses are due to: (i) the poor credit performance of private student loan collateral and high loss severities, or (ii) high interest rates on auction rate securities with respect to which the auctions have failed. The largest of these losses was approximately $26 million and related to a transaction backed by a pool of private student loans assumed by AG Re from another monoline insurer. The guaranteed bonds were issued as auction rate securities that now bear a high rate of interest due to the downgrade of the primary insurer’s financial strength rating. Further, the underlying loan collateral has performed below expectations. The overall increase of $10 million in net expected loss during 2013 was primarily due to worse than expected collateral performance. |
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Trust Preferred Securities Collateralized Debt Obligations |
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The Company has insured or reinsured $5.0 billion of net par (72% of which is in CDS form) of collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) backed by TruPS and similar debt instruments, or “TruPS CDOs.” Of the $5.0 billion, $1.7 billion is rated BIG. The underlying collateral in the TruPS CDOs consists of subordinated debt instruments such as TruPS issued by bank holding companies and similar instruments issued by insurance companies, real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) and other real estate related issuers. |
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The Company projects losses for TruPS CDOs by projecting the performance of the asset pools across several scenarios (which it weights) and applying the CDO structures to the resulting cash flows. At December 31, 2013, the Company has projected expected losses to be paid for TruPS CDOs of $51 million. The increase of approximately $24 million in 2013 was due primarily to additional defaults and deferrals in the underlying collateral as well as the receipt during the year of $9 million in reimbursements for claims previously paid. |
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Selected U.S. Public Finance Transactions |
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The Company insures general obligation bonds of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and various obligations of its related authorities and public corporations aggregating $5.4 billion net par. The Company rates $5.2 billion net par of that amount BIG. Although recent announcements and actions by the current Governor and his administration indicate officials of the Commonwealth are focused on measures that are intended to help Puerto Rico operate within its financial resources and maintain its access to the capital markets, Puerto Rico faces significant challenges, including high debt levels, a declining population and an economy that has been in recession since 2006. Puerto Rico has been operating with a structural budget deficit in recent years, and its two largest pension funds are significantly underfunded. In February 2014, S&P, Moody's and Fitch Ratings downgraded much of the debt of Puerto Rico and its related authorities and public corporations to below investment grade, citing various factors including limited liquidity and market access risk. The Commonwealth has not defaulted on any of its debt. Neither Puerto Rico nor its related authorities and public corporations are eligible debtors under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Information regarding the Company's exposure general obligations of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and various obligations of its related authorities and public corporations, please refer "Puerto Rico Exposure" in Note 3, Outstanding Exposure. |
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Many U.S. municipalities and related entities continue to be under increased pressure, and a few have filed for protection under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, entered into state processes designed to help municipalities in fiscal distress or otherwise indicated they may consider not meeting their obligations to make timely payments on their debts. Given some of these developments, and the circumstances surrounding each instance, the ultimate outcome cannot be certain and may lead to an increase in defaults on some of the Company's insured public finance obligations. The Company will continue to analyze developments in each of these matters closely. The municipalities whose obligations the Company has insured that have filed for protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S Bankruptcy Code are: Detroit, Michigan; Jefferson County, Alabama; and Stockton, California. The City Council of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania had also filed a purported bankruptcy petition, which was later dismissed by the bankruptcy court; a receiver for the City of Harrisburg was appointed by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on December 2, 2011. |
The Company has net par exposure to the City of Detroit, Michigan of $2.1 billion as of December 31, 2013. On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Most of the Company's net par exposure relates to $1.0 billion of sewer revenue bonds and $784 million of water revenue bonds, both of which the Company rates BBB. Both the sewer and water systems provide services to areas that extend beyond the city limits, and the bonds are secured by a lien on "special revenues." The Company also has net par exposure of $146 million to the City's general obligation bonds (which are secured by a pledge of the unlimited tax, full faith, credit and resources of the City and the specific ad valorem taxes approved by the voters solely to pay debt service on the general obligation bonds) and $175 million of the City's Certificates of Participation (which are unsecured unconditional contractual obligations of the City), both of which the Company rates below investment grade. AGM has filed a complaint in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the City seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to the City’s unlawful treatment of its Unlimited Tax General Obligation Bonds. Detail about the lawsuit is set forth under "Recovery Litigation -- Public Finance Transactions" below. On December 3, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that the City is eligible for protection under Chapter 9. On February 21, 2014, the City filed a proposed plan of adjustment and disclosure statement with the Bankruptcy Court. |
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During 2013 the Company has resolved, or is in the process of resolving, several of the credits that filed or attempted to file for protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code: |
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• | Stockton. On June 28, 2012, the City of Stockton, California filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The Company's net exposure to the City's general fund is $119 million, consisting of pension obligation bonds. The Company also had exposure to lease obligation bonds; as of December 31, 2013, the Company owned all of such bonds and held them in its investment portfolio. As of December 31, 2013, the Company had paid $26 million in net claims. On October 3, 2013, the Company reached a tentative settlement with the City regarding the treatment of the bonds insured by the Company in the City's proposed plan of adjustment. Under the terms of the settlement, the Company received title to an office building, the ground lease of which secures the lease revenue bonds, and will also be entitled to certain fixed payments and certain variable payments contingent on the City's revenue growth. The settlement is subject to a number of conditions, including a sales tax increase (which was approved by voters on November 5, 2013), confirmation of a plan of adjustment that implements the terms of the settlement and definitive documentation. Pursuant to an order of the Bankruptcy Court, the City held a vote of its creditors on its proposed plan of adjustment; all but one of the classes polled voted to accept the plan. The court proceeding to determine whether to confirm the plan of adjustment is expected to begin in May 2014. The Company expects the plan to be confirmed and implemented during 2014. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | Jefferson County. On November 9, 2011, Jefferson County filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. After several years of negotiations and litigation with various parties, Jefferson County's revised plan of adjustment was approved by the bankruptcy court and in December 2013 became effective. In order for Jefferson County to refund and retire the sewer warrants that it had previously issued, and to make other payments under the plan of adjustment, Jefferson County issued approximately $1,785 million of new sewer warrants on December 3, 2013. In that issuance, AGM insured approximately $600 million in initial aggregate principal amount of the senior lien sewer warrants, which AGM internally rates investment grade. The sewer system emerged from bankruptcy with a significantly lower debt burden and a rate structure that is approved through the life of the new sewer warrants. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | Mashantucket Pequot Foxwoods Casino. During 2013 and as part of a negotiated restructuring, the Company paid off the insured bonds secured by the excess free cash flow of the Foxwoods Casino run by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe. The Company made cumulative claims payments of $116 million (net of reinsurance) on the insured bonds. In return for participating in the restructuring, the Company received new notes with a principal amount of $145 million with the same seniority as the bonds the Company had insured. The new notes are held as an investment and accounted for as such. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | Harrisburg. In December 2011, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania appointed a receiver for the City . The Company had insured bonds for a resource recovery facility sponsored by the City. In December 2013 the defaulted recourse recovery facility bonds were paid in full with funds from the sale of the resource recovery facility, the sale of parking system revenue bonds issued by the Pennsylvania Economic Development Financing Authority (“PEDFA”) and claim payments made by the Company. AGM insured $189 million of the parking facility revenue bonds issued by PEDFA and is entitled to receive reimbursements for claims it paid from residual cash flow on the parking system after the payment of debt service on the PEDFA bonds. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The Company has $336 million of net par exposure to the Louisville Arena Authority. The bond proceeds were used to construct the KFC Yum Center, home to the University of Louisville men's and women's basketball teams. Actual revenues available for Debt Service are well below original projections, and under the Company's internal rating scale, the transaction is BIG. |
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The Company projects that its total future expected net loss across its troubled U.S. public finance credits as of December 31, 2013 will be $264 million. As of December 31, 2012 the Company was projecting a net expected loss of $7 million across it troubled U.S. public finance credits. The net increase of $257 million in expected loss was primarily attributable to deterioration in the credit of Puerto Rico and its related related authorities and public corporations, the bankruptcy filing by the City of Detroit, and a final resolution in Harrisburg that was somewhat worse for the Company than it projected as of December 31, 2012, offset in part primarily by the final resolution of the Company's Jefferson County exposure. |
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Certain Selected European Country Transactions |
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The Company insures and reinsures credits with sub-sovereign exposure to various Spanish and Portuguese issuers where a Spanish and Portuguese sovereign default may cause the regions also to default. The Company's gross exposure to these Spanish and Portuguese credits is €437 million and €92 million, respectively and exposure net of reinsurance for Spanish and Portuguese credits is €313 million and €80 million, respectively. The Company rates most of these issuers in the BB category due to the financial condition of Spain and Portugal and their dependence on the sovereign. The Company's Hungary exposure is to infrastructure bonds dependent on payments from Hungarian governmental entities and covered mortgage bonds issued by Hungarian banks. The Company's gross exposure to these Hungarian credits is $645 million and its exposure net of reinsurance is $608 million of which all is rated BIG. The Company estimated net expected losses of $51 million related to these Spanish, Portuguese and Hungarian credits, up from $41 million as of December 31, 2012 largely due to minor movements in exchange rates, interest rates and timing of potential defaults, and the general deterioration of the Company's view of its Hungarian exposure during the year. Information regarding the Company's exposure to other Selected European Countries may be found under "Direct Economic Exposure to the Selected European Countries" in Note 3, Outstanding Exposure. |
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Manufactured Housing |
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The Company insures or reinsures a total of $257 million net par of securities backed by manufactured housing loans, of which $180 million is rated BIG. The Company has expected loss to be paid of $26 million as of December 31, 2013, down from $33 million as of December 31, 2012, due primarily to the higher risk free rates used to discount losses and additional amortization on certain transactions. |
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Infrastructure Finance |
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The Company has insured exposure of approximately $3.0 billion to infrastructure transactions with refinancing risk as to which the Company may need to make claim payments that it did not anticipate paying when the policies were issued. Although the Company may not experience ultimate loss on a particular transaction, the aggregate amount of the claim payments may be substantial and reimbursement may not occur for an extended time, if at all. These transactions generally involve long-term infrastructure projects that were financed by bonds that mature prior to the expiration of the project concession. The Company expected the cash flows from these projects to be sufficient to repay all of the debt over the life of the project concession, but also expected the debt to be refinanced in the market at or prior to its maturity. Due to market conditions, the Company may have to pay a claim when the debt matures, and then recover its payment from cash flows produced by the project in the future. The Company generally projects that in most scenarios it will be fully reimbursed for such payments. However, the recovery of the payments is uncertain and may take a long time, ranging from 10 to 35 years, depending on the transaction and the performance of the underlying collateral. The Company’s exposure to infrastructure transactions with refinancing risk was reduced during 2013 by the termination of its insurance on A$413 million of infrastructure securities having maturities commencing in 2014. The Company estimates total claims for the remaining two largest transactions with significant refinancing risk, assuming no refinancing and based on certain performance assumptions, could be $1.8 billion on a gross basis; such claims would be payable from 2017 through 2022. |
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Recovery Litigation |
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RMBS Transactions |
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As of the date of this filing, AGM and AGC have lawsuits pending against a number of providers of representations and warranties in U.S. RMBS transactions insured by them, seeking damages. In all the lawsuits, AGM and AGC have alleged breaches of R&W in respect of the underlying loans in the transactions, and failure to cure or repurchase defective loans identified by AGM and AGC to such persons. |
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• | Deutsche Bank: AGM has sued Deutsche Bank AG affiliates DB Structured Products, Inc. and ACE Securities Corp. in the Supreme Court of the State of New York on the ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-GP1 second lien transaction. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | Credit Suisse: AGM and AGC have sued DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. (“DLJ”) and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“Credit Suisse”) on first lien U.S. RMBS transactions insured by them. The ones insured by AGM are: CSAB Mortgage-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-2; CSAB Mortgage-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-3; CSAB Mortgage-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-4; and CMSC Mortgage-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-3. The ones insured by AGC are: CSAB Mortgage-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-1 and TBW Mortgage-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-2. Although DLJ and Credit Suisse successfully dismissed certain causes of action and claims for relief asserted in the complaint, the primary causes of action against DLJ for breach of R&W and breach of its repurchase obligations remained. On February 27, 2014 the Appellate Division, First Department unanimously reversed certain aspects of the partial dismissal by the Supreme Court of the State of New York of certain claims for relief by holding as a matter of law that AGM’s and AGC’s remedies for breach of R&W are not limited to the repurchase remedy. On October 21, 2013, AGM and AGC filed an amended complaint against DLJ and Credit Suisse (and added Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. as a defendant), asserting claims of fraud and material misrepresentation in the inducement of an insurance contract, in addition to their existing breach of contract claims. The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss certain aspects of the fraud claim against Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., and AGM's and AGC's claims for compensatory damages in the form of all claims paid and to be paid by AGM and AGC. The motion to dismiss is currently pending. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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On March 26, 2013, AGM filed a lawsuit against RBS Securities Inc., RBS Financial Products Inc. and Financial Asset Securities Corp. (collectively, “RBS”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on the Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-WMC1 transaction. The complaint alleges that RBS made fraudulent misrepresentations to AGM regarding the quality of the underlying mortgage loans in the transaction and that RBS's misrepresentations induced AGM into issuing a financial guaranty insurance policy in respect of the Class II-A-1 certificates issued in the transaction. On July 19, 2013, AGM amended its complaint to add a claim under Section 3105 of the New York Insurance Law. RBS has filed motions to dismiss AGM's complaint. |
In May 2012, AGM sued GMAC Mortgage, LLC (formerly GMAC Mortgage Corporation; Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc.; Ally Bank (formerly GMAC Bank); Residential Funding Company, LLC (formerly Residential Funding Corporation); Residential Capital, LLC (formerly Residential Capital Corporation, "ResCap"); Ally Financial (formerly GMAC, LLC); and Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc. on the GMAC RFC Home Equity Loan-Backed Notes, Series 2006-HSA3 and GMAC Home Equity Loan-Backed Notes, Series 2004-HE3 second lien transactions. On May 14, 2012, ResCap and several of its affiliates filed for Chapter 11 protection with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. The debtors' Joint Chapter 11 Plan became effective in December 2013 and AGM received a settlement amount. Accordingly, AGM dismissed its lawsuit at year-end 2013. |
“XXX” Life Insurance Transactions |
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In December 2008, Assured Guaranty (UK) Ltd. (“AGUK”) filed an action against J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. (“JPMIM”), the investment manager in the Orkney Re II transaction, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York alleging that JPMIM engaged in breaches of fiduciary duty, gross negligence and breaches of contract based upon its handling of the investments of Orkney Re II. After AGUK’s claims were dismissed with prejudice in January 2010, AGUK was successful in its subsequent motions and appeals and, as of December 2011, all of AGUK’s claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, gross negligence and contract were reinstated in full. Separately, at the trial court level, discovery is ongoing. |
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Public Finance Transactions |
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On December 23, 2013, AGM filed an amended complaint in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the City seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to the City’s unlawful treatment of its Unlimited Tax General Obligation Bonds (the “Unlimited Tax Bonds”). The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment and court order establishing, among other things, that, under Michigan law, the proceeds of ad valorem taxes levied and collected by the City for the sole purpose of repaying the Unlimited Tax Bonds are “restricted funds” which must be segregated and not comingled with other funds of the City, that the City is prohibited from using the restricted funds for any purposes other than repaying holders of the Unlimited Tax Bonds, and that holders of the Unlimited Tax Bonds and AGM, as subrogee of the holders, have a statutory lien on the restricted funds which constitutes a lien on special revenues within the meaning of Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. A hearing was held on this matter on February 19, 2014. |
In June 2010, AGM had sued JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and JPMorgan Securities, Inc. (together, “JPMorgan”), the underwriter of debt issued by Jefferson County, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York alleging that JPMorgan induced AGM to issue its insurance policies in respect of such debt through material and fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, including concealing that it had secured its position as underwriter and swap provider through bribes to Jefferson County commissioners and others. AGM dismissed the litigation after Jefferson County's Chapter 9 plan of adjustment became effective in December 2013. |
In September 2010, AGM, together with TD Bank, National Association and Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company, as trustees, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania against The Harrisburg Authority, The City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the Treasurer of the City in connection with certain Resource Recovery Facility bonds and notes issued by The Harrisburg Authority, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract by both The Harrisburg Authority and The City of Harrisburg, and seeking remedies including an order of mandamus compelling the City to satisfy its obligations on the defaulted bonds and notes and the appointment of a receiver for The Harrisburg Authority. In connection with the consummation of Harrisburg's fiscal recovery plan in December 2013, AGM dismissed such litigation. |