Expected Losses to be Paid | 9 Months Ended |
Sep. 30, 2014 |
Expected Losses [Abstract] | ' |
Expected Loss to be Paid | ' |
Expected Loss to be Paid |
|
The following table presents a roll forward of the present value of net expected loss to be paid for all contracts, whether accounted for as insurance, credit derivatives or FG VIEs, by sector, after the benefit for net expected recoveries for contractual breaches of representations and warranties ("R&W"). The Company used weighted average risk-free rates for U.S. dollar denominated obligations that ranged from 0.0% to 3.68% as of September 30, 2014 and 0.0% to 4.44% as of December 31, 2013. |
|
Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
After Net Expected Recoveries for Breaches of R&W |
Roll Forward by Sector |
Third Quarter 2014 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net Expected | | Economic Loss | | (Paid) | | Net Expected | | | | | |
Loss to be Paid (Recovered) | Development | Recovered | Loss to be | | | | | |
as of | | Losses(1) | Paid (Recovered) | | | | | |
June 30, 2014 | | | as of | | | | | |
| | | September 30, 2014(2) | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 11 | | | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | — | | | $ | 10 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 301 | | | (18 | ) | | (35 | ) | | 248 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | (51 | ) | | — | | | 20 | | | (31 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 341 | | | (11 | ) | | (23 | ) | | 307 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 602 | | | (30 | ) | | (38 | ) | | 534 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Closed-end second lien | (9 | ) | | 2 | | | 2 | | | (5 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (117 | ) | | (34 | ) | | 3 | | | (148 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (126 | ) | | (32 | ) | | 5 | | | (153 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | 476 | | | (62 | ) | | (33 | ) | | 381 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | 32 | | | (5 | ) | | (1 | ) | | 26 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | 140 | | | 3 | | | 3 | | | 146 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 339 | | | 2 | | | (8 | ) | | 333 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S public finance | 52 | | | (1 | ) | | — | | | 51 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other insurance | (4 | ) | | — | | | — | | | (4 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | $ | 1,035 | | | $ | (63 | ) | | $ | (39 | ) | | $ | 933 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
|
Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
After Net Expected Recoveries for Breaches of R&W |
Roll Forward by Sector |
Third Quarter 2013 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net Expected | | Economic Loss | | (Paid) | | Net Expected | | | | | |
Loss to be | Development | Recovered | Loss to be | | | | | |
Paid (Recovered) | | Losses(1) | Paid (Recovered) | | | | | |
as of | | | as of | | | | | |
30-Jun-13 | | | September 30, 2013 | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 18 | | | $ | 3 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 21 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 288 | | | (85 | ) | | 3 | | | 206 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | (20 | ) | | 25 | | | 2 | | | 7 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 274 | | | 38 | | | (9 | ) | | 303 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 560 | | | (19 | ) | | (4 | ) | | 537 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Closed-end second lien | (14 | ) | | — | | | 1 | | | (13 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (97 | ) | | (42 | ) | | 10 | | | (129 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (111 | ) | | (42 | ) | | 11 | | | (142 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | 449 | | | (61 | ) | | 7 | | | 395 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | 33 | | | 9 | | | 8 | | | 50 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | 158 | | | (13 | ) | | (17 | ) | | 128 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 71 | | | 44 | | | 68 | | | 183 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S public finance | 66 | | | (1 | ) | | (12 | ) | | 53 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other insurance | (3 | ) | | — | | | — | | | (3 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | $ | 774 | | | $ | (22 | ) | | $ | 54 | | | $ | 806 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
|
|
Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
After Net Expected Recoveries for Breaches of R&W |
Roll Forward by Sector |
Nine Months 2014 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net Expected | | Economic Loss | | (Paid) | | Net Expected | | | | | |
Loss to be | Development | Recovered | Loss to be | | | | | |
Paid (Recovered) | | Losses(1) | Paid (Recovered) | | | | | |
as of | | | as of | | | | | |
December 31, 2013(2) | | | September 30, 2014(2) | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 21 | | | $ | (11 | ) | | $ | — | | | $ | 10 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 304 | | | (6 | ) | | (50 | ) | | 248 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | (9 | ) | | (39 | ) | | 17 | | | (31 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 304 | | | (12 | ) | | 15 | | | 307 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 620 | | | (68 | ) | | (18 | ) | | 534 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Closed-end second lien | (11 | ) | | 2 | | | 4 | | | (5 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (116 | ) | | (65 | ) | | 33 | | | (148 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (127 | ) | | (63 | ) | | 37 | | | (153 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | 493 | | | (131 | ) | | 19 | | | 381 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | 51 | | | (24 | ) | | (1 | ) | | 26 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | 120 | | | 27 | | | (1 | ) | | 146 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 264 | | | 107 | | | (38 | ) | | 333 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S public finance | 57 | | | (6 | ) | | — | | | 51 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other insurance | (3 | ) | | (1 | ) | | — | | | (4 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | $ | 982 | | | $ | (28 | ) | | $ | (21 | ) | | $ | 933 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
|
Net Expected Loss to be Paid |
After Net Expected Recoveries for Breaches of R&W |
Roll Forward by Sector |
Nine Months 2013 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net Expected | | Economic Loss | | (Paid) | | Net Expected | | | | | |
Loss to be | Development | Recovered | Loss to be | | | | | |
Paid (Recovered) | | Losses(1) | Paid (Recovered) | | | | | |
as of | | | as of | | | | | |
31-Dec-12 | | | September 30, 2013 | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 6 | | | $ | 16 | | | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | 21 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 315 | | | (83 | ) | | (26 | ) | | 206 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | (131 | ) | | (92 | ) | | 230 | | | 7 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 242 | | | 86 | | | (25 | ) | | 303 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 432 | | | (73 | ) | | 178 | | | 537 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Closed-end second lien | (39 | ) | | 7 | | | 19 | | | (13 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (111 | ) | | (76 | ) | | 58 | | | (129 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (150 | ) | | (69 | ) | | 77 | | | (142 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | 282 | | | (142 | ) | | 255 | | | 395 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | 27 | | | 7 | | | 16 | | | 50 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | 312 | | | (39 | ) | | (145 | ) | | 128 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 7 | | | 138 | | | 38 | | | 183 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S public finance | 52 | | | 13 | | | (12 | ) | | 53 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other insurance | (3 | ) | | (10 | ) | | 10 | | | (3 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | $ | 677 | | | $ | (33 | ) | | $ | 162 | | | $ | 806 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
____________________ |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
-1 | Net of ceded paid losses, whether or not such amounts have been settled with reinsurers. Ceded paid losses are typically settled 45 days after the end of the reporting period. Such amounts are recorded in reinsurance recoverable on paid losses included in other assets. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
-2 | Includes expected loss adjustment expenses ("LAE") to be paid of $28 million as of September 30, 2014 and $34 million as of December 31, 2013. The Company paid $6 million and $12 million in LAE for Third Quarter 2014 and 2013, respectively, and $20 million and $41 million in LAE for Nine Months 2014 and 2013, respectively. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|
Net Expected Recoveries from |
Breaches of R&W Rollforward |
Third Quarter 2014 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Future Net | | R&W Development | | R&W (Recovered) | | Future Net | | | | | |
R&W Benefit as of | and Accretion of | During Third Quarter 2014 | R&W Benefit as of | | | | | |
30-Jun-14 | Discount | | September 30, 2014(1) | | | | | |
| During Third Quarter 2014 | | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 3 | | | $ | 1 | | | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | 3 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 263 | | | 19 | | | (79 | ) | | 203 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | 144 | | | 10 | | | (76 | ) | | 78 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 99 | | | 5 | | | (7 | ) | | 97 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 509 | | | 35 | | | (163 | ) | | 381 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Closed-end second lien | 93 | | | (1 | ) | | (3 | ) | | 89 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOC | 49 | | | 59 | | | — | | | 108 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | 142 | | | 58 | | | (3 | ) | | 197 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | $ | 651 | | | $ | 93 | | | $ | (166 | ) | | $ | 578 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
___________________ |
(1) See the section "Breaches of Representations and Warranties" below for eligible assets held in trust. |
|
Net Expected Recoveries from |
Breaches of R&W Rollforward |
Third Quarter 2013 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Future Net | | R&W Development | | R&W (Recovered) | | Future Net | | | | | |
R&W Benefit as of | and Accretion of | During Third Quarter 2013 | R&W Benefit as of | | | | | |
30-Jun-13 | Discount | | September 30, 2013 | | | | | |
| During Third Quarter 2013 | | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 4 | | | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | — | | | $ | 3 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 348 | | | 37 | | | (16 | ) | | 369 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | 293 | | | 40 | | | (80 | ) | | 253 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 108 | | | 7 | | | — | | | 115 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 753 | | | 83 | | | (96 | ) | | 740 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Closed-end second lien | 102 | | | 1 | | | (3 | ) | | 100 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOC | 109 | | | 2 | | | (56 | ) | | 55 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | 211 | | | 3 | | | (59 | ) | | 155 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | $ | 964 | | | $ | 86 | | | $ | (155 | ) | | $ | 895 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Net Expected Recoveries from |
Breaches of R&W Rollforward |
Nine Months 2014 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Future Net | | R&W Development | | R&W (Recovered) | | Future Net | | | | | |
R&W Benefit as of | and Accretion of | During 2014 | R&W Benefit as of | | | | | |
December 31, 2013 | Discount | | September 30, 2014(1) | | | | | |
| During 2014 | | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 4 | | | $ | — | | | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | 3 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 274 | | | 20 | | | (91 | ) | | 203 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | 173 | | | 30 | | | (125 | ) | | 78 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 118 | | | 34 | | | (55 | ) | | 97 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 569 | | | 84 | | | (272 | ) | | 381 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Closed-end second lien | 98 | | | (4 | ) | | (5 | ) | | 89 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOC | 45 | | | 80 | | | (17 | ) | | 108 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | 143 | | | 76 | | | (22 | ) | | 197 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | $ | 712 | | | $ | 160 | | | $ | (294 | ) | | $ | 578 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
___________________ |
(1) See the section "Breaches of Representations and Warranties" below for eligible assets held in trust. |
|
Net Expected Recoveries from |
Breaches of R&W Rollforward |
Nine Months 2013 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Future Net | | R&W Development | | R&W (Recovered) | | Future Net | | | | | |
R&W Benefit as of | and Accretion of | During 2013 | R&W Benefit as of | | | | | |
31-Dec-12 | Discount | | September 30, 2013 | | | | | |
| During 2013 | | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 4 | | | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | — | | | $ | 3 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 378 | | | 24 | | | (33 | ) | | 369 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | 591 | | | 206 | | | (544 | ) | | 253 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 109 | | | 6 | | | — | | | 115 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 1,082 | | | 235 | | | (577 | ) | | 740 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Closed-end second lien | 138 | | | (11 | ) | | (27 | ) | | 100 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOC | 150 | | | 70 | | | (165 | ) | | 55 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | 288 | | | 59 | | | (192 | ) | | 155 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | $ | 1,370 | | | $ | 294 | | | $ | (769 | ) | | $ | 895 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
|
|
|
The following tables present the present value of net expected loss to be paid for all contracts by accounting model, by sector and after the benefit for estimated and contractual recoveries for breaches of R&W. |
|
Net Expected Loss to be Paid (Recovered) |
By Accounting Model |
As of September 30, 2014 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | | | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives | | | | | |
Insurance | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 3 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 7 | | | $ | 10 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 211 | | | 19 | | | 18 | | | 248 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | (34 | ) | | — | | | 3 | | | (31 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 155 | | | 78 | | | 74 | | | 307 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 335 | | | 97 | | | 102 | | | 534 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Closed-end second lien | (28 | ) | | 28 | | | (5 | ) | | (5 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (145 | ) | | (3 | ) | | — | | | (148 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (173 | ) | | 25 | | | (5 | ) | | (153 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | 162 | | | 122 | | | 97 | | | 381 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | 1 | | | — | | | 25 | | | 26 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | 186 | | | — | | | (40 | ) | | 146 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 333 | | | — | | | — | | | 333 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S. public finance | 50 | | | — | | | 1 | | | 51 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subtotal | $ | 732 | | | $ | 122 | | | $ | 83 | | | 937 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other | | | | | | | (4 | ) | | | | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | 933 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
|
Net Expected Loss to be Paid (Recovered) |
By Accounting Model |
As of December 31, 2013 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | | | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives | | | | | |
Insurance | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | 3 | | | $ | — | | | $ | 18 | | | $ | 21 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 199 | | | 31 | | | 74 | | | 304 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | (18 | ) | | (2 | ) | | 11 | | | (9 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 149 | | | 81 | | | 74 | | | 304 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | 333 | | | 110 | | | 177 | | | 620 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Closed-end second lien | (34 | ) | | 25 | | | (2 | ) | | (11 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (41 | ) | | (75 | ) | | — | | | (116 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (75 | ) | | (50 | ) | | (2 | ) | | (127 | ) | | | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | 258 | | | 60 | | | 175 | | | 493 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | 3 | | | — | | | 48 | | | 51 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | 161 | | | — | | | (41 | ) | | 120 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 264 | | | — | | | — | | | 264 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S. public finance | 55 | | | — | | | 2 | | | 57 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subtotal | $ | 741 | | | $ | 60 | | | $ | 184 | | | 985 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other | | | | | | | (3 | ) | | | | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | 982 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
___________________ |
(1) Refer to Note 9, Consolidated Variable Interest Entities. |
|
|
The following tables present the net economic loss development for all contracts by accounting model, by sector and after the benefit for estimated and contractual recoveries for breaches of R&W. |
|
Net Economic Loss Development (Benefit) |
By Accounting Model |
Third Quarter 2014 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | | | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives(2) | | | | | |
Insurance | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | — | | | $ | — | | | $ | (1 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 6 | | | (2 | ) | | (22 | ) | | (18 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | 7 | | | — | | | (7 | ) | | — | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | (21 | ) | | 8 | | | 2 | | | (11 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | (9 | ) | | 6 | | | (27 | ) | | (30 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Closed-end second lien | 2 | | | 1 | | | (1 | ) | | 2 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (48 | ) | | 14 | | | — | | | (34 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (46 | ) | | 15 | | | (1 | ) | | (32 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | (55 | ) | | 21 | | | (28 | ) | | (62 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | (1 | ) | | — | | | (4 | ) | | (5 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | 5 | | | — | | | (2 | ) | | 3 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 2 | | | — | | | — | | | 2 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S. public finance | (1 | ) | | — | | | — | | | (1 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subtotal | $ | (50 | ) | | $ | 21 | | | $ | (34 | ) | | (63 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other | | | | | | | — | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | (63 | ) | | | | | |
|
Net Economic Loss Development (Benefit) |
By Accounting Model |
Third Quarter 2013 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | | | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives(2) | | | | | |
Insurance | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | — | | | $ | — | | | $ | 3 | | | $ | 3 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | (53 | ) | | 3 | | | (35 | ) | | (85 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | 20 | | | 1 | | | 4 | | | 25 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | 25 | | | 5 | | | 8 | | | 38 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | (8 | ) | | 9 | | | (20 | ) | | (19 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Closed-end second lien | 2 | | | (3 | ) | | 1 | | | — | | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (49 | ) | | 8 | | | (1 | ) | | (42 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (47 | ) | | 5 | | | — | | | (42 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | (55 | ) | | 14 | | | (20 | ) | | (61 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | 1 | | | — | | | 8 | | | 9 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | (13 | ) | | — | | | — | | | (13 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 43 | | | — | | | 1 | | | 44 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S. public finance | (1 | ) | | — | | | — | | | (1 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subtotal | $ | (25 | ) | | $ | 14 | | | $ | (11 | ) | | (22 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other | | | | | | | — | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | (22 | ) | | | | | |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net Economic Loss Development (Benefit) |
By Accounting Model |
Nine Months 2014 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | | | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives(2) | | | | | |
Insurance | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | — | | | $ | — | | | $ | (11 | ) | | $ | (11 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | 32 | | | (12 | ) | | (26 | ) | | (6 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | (32 | ) | | 1 | | | (8 | ) | | (39 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subprime | (25 | ) | | 9 | | | 4 | | | (12 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | (25 | ) | | (2 | ) | | (41 | ) | | (68 | ) | | | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Closed-end second lien | — | | | 4 | | | (2 | ) | | 2 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (138 | ) | | 73 | | | — | | | (65 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (138 | ) | | 77 | | | (2 | ) | | (63 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | (163 | ) | | 75 | | | (43 | ) | | (131 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | (2 | ) | | — | | | (22 | ) | | (24 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | 26 | | | — | | | 1 | | | 27 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 107 | | | — | | | — | | | 107 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S. public finance | (5 | ) | | — | | | (1 | ) | | (6 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subtotal | $ | (37 | ) | | $ | 75 | | | $ | (65 | ) | | (27 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other | | | | | | | (1 | ) | | | | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | (28 | ) | | | | | |
|
Net Economic Loss Development (Benefit) |
By Accounting Model |
Nine Months 2013 |
|
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial | | FG VIEs(1) | | Credit | | Total | | | | | |
Guaranty | Derivatives(2) | | | | | |
Insurance | | | | | | |
| (in millions) | | | | | |
U.S. RMBS: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
First lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Prime first lien | $ | (1 | ) | | $ | — | | | $ | 17 | | | $ | 16 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Alt-A first lien | (60 | ) | | 3 | | | (26 | ) | | (83 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Option ARM | (58 | ) | | (32 | ) | | (2 | ) | | (92 | ) | | | | | |
Subprime | 40 | | | 25 | | | 21 | | | 86 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total first lien | (79 | ) | | (4 | ) | | 10 | | | (73 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Second lien: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Closed-end second lien | — | | | (4 | ) | | 11 | | | 7 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
HELOCs | (66 | ) | | (10 | ) | | — | | | (76 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total second lien | (66 | ) | | (14 | ) | | 11 | | | (69 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Total U.S. RMBS | (145 | ) | | (18 | ) | | 21 | | | (142 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
TruPS | 1 | | | — | | | 6 | | | 7 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other structured finance | (32 | ) | | — | | | (7 | ) | | (39 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
U.S. public finance | 137 | | | — | | | 1 | | | 138 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Non-U.S. public finance | 12 | | | — | | | 1 | | | 13 | | | | | | |
| | | | |
Subtotal | $ | (27 | ) | | $ | (18 | ) | | $ | 22 | | | (23 | ) | | | | | |
| | | | |
Other | | | | | | | (10 | ) | | | | | |
Total | | | | | | | $ | (33 | ) | | | | | |
_________________ |
(1) Refer to Note 9, Consolidated Variable Interest Entities. |
|
(2) Refer to Note 8, Financial Guaranty Contracts Accounted for as Credit Derivatives. |
|
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Approach to Projecting Losses in U.S. RMBS |
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The Company projects losses on its insured U.S. RMBS on a transaction-by-transaction basis by projecting the performance of the underlying pool of mortgages over time and then applying the structural features (i.e., payment priorities and tranching) of the RMBS to the projected performance of the collateral over time. The resulting projected claim payments or reimbursements are then discounted using risk-free rates. For transactions where the Company projects it will receive recoveries from providers of R&W, it projects the amount of recoveries and either establishes a recovery for claims already paid or reduces its projected claim payments accordingly. |
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The further behind a mortgage borrower falls in making payments, the more likely it is that he or she will default. The rate at which borrowers from a particular delinquency category (number of monthly payments behind) eventually default is referred to as the “liquidation rate.” The Company derives its liquidation rate assumptions from observed roll rates, which are the rates at which loans progress from one delinquency category to the next and eventually to default and liquidation. The Company applies liquidation rates to the mortgage loan collateral in each delinquency category and makes certain timing assumptions to project near-term mortgage collateral defaults from loans that are currently delinquent. |
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Mortgage borrowers that are not more than one payment behind (generally considered performing borrowers) have demonstrated an ability and willingness to pay throughout the recession and mortgage crisis, and as a result are viewed as less likely to default than delinquent borrowers. Performing borrowers that eventually default will also need to progress through delinquency categories before any defaults occur. The Company projects how many of the currently performing loans will default and when they will default, by first converting the projected near term defaults of delinquent borrowers derived from liquidation rates into a vector of conditional default rates ("CDR"), then projecting how the conditional default rates will develop over time. Loans that are defaulted pursuant to the conditional default rate after the near-term liquidation of currently delinquent loans represent defaults of currently performing loans and projected re-performing loans. A conditional default rate is the outstanding principal amount of defaulted loans liquidated in the current month divided by the remaining outstanding amount of the whole pool of loans (or “collateral pool balance”). The collateral pool balance decreases over time as a result of scheduled principal payments, partial and whole principal prepayments, and defaults. |
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In order to derive collateral pool losses from the collateral pool defaults it has projected, the Company applies a loss severity. The loss severity is the amount of loss the transaction experiences on a defaulted loan after the application of net proceeds from the disposal of the underlying property. The Company projects loss severities by sector based on its experience to date. The Company continues to update its evaluation of these exposures as new information becomes available. |
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The Company is in the process of enforcing claims for breaches of R&W regarding the characteristics of the loans included in the collateral pools. The Company calculates a credit from the RMBS issuer for such recoveries where the R&W were provided by an entity the Company believes to be financially viable and where the Company already has access to loan files. Where the Company has an agreement with an R&W provider (such as its agreements with Bank of America, Deutsche Bank and UBS, which are described in more detail under "Breaches of Representations and Warranties" below) or where it is in advanced discussions on a potential agreement, that credit is based on the agreement or potential agreement. Where the Company does not have an agreement with the R&W provider but the Company believes the R&W provider to be economically viable, the Company estimates what portion of its past and projected future claims it believes will be reimbursed by that provider. |
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The Company projects the overall future cash flow from a collateral pool by adjusting the payment stream from the principal and interest contractually due on the underlying mortgages for the collateral losses it projects as described above; assumed voluntary prepayments; and servicer advances. The Company then applies an individual model of the structure of the transaction to the projected future cash flow from that transaction’s collateral pool to project the Company’s future claims and claim reimbursements for that individual transaction. Finally, the projected claims and reimbursements are discounted using risk-free rates. The Company runs several sets of assumptions regarding mortgage collateral performance, or scenarios, and probability weights them. |
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The ultimate performance of the Company’s RMBS transactions remains highly uncertain, may differ from the Company's projections and may be subject to considerable volatility due to the influence of many interrelated factors that are difficult to predict, including the level and timing of loan defaults, changes in housing prices, results from the Company’s loss mitigation activities and other variables. The Company will continue to monitor the performance of its RMBS exposures and will adjust its RMBS loss projection assumptions and scenarios based on actual performance and management’s view of future performance. If actual experience differs from the Company’s assumptions, the losses incurred could be materially different from the estimate. |
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Third Quarter 2014 U.S. RMBS Loss Projections |
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The Company's RMBS loss projection methodology assumes that the housing and mortgage markets will continue improving. Each quarter the Company makes a judgment as to whether to change the assumptions it uses to make RMBS loss projections based on its observation during the quarter of the performance of its insured transactions (including early stage delinquencies, late stage delinquencies and, for first liens, loss severity) as well as the residential property market and economy in general. To the extent it observes changes, it makes a judgment as to whether those changes are normal fluctuations or part of a trend. Based on such observations, the Company chose to use the same general assumptions to project RMBS losses as of September 30, 2014 as it used as of June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013, except that, with respect to first lien RMBS projections, it shortened the period it is projecting it will take to reach the final CDR, reflecting the Company's belief that performance of its insured transactions as well as the residential property market and economy in general are improving. In addition, the Company refined its approach to projections for most of its HELOCs as of September 30, 2014 to reflect increased recoveries on defaulted loans as well as incremental defaults associated with increased monthly payments that occur when interest-only payment periods end, both as a result of its observation of HELOC performance. |
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U.S. First Lien RMBS Loss Projections: Alt-A First Lien, Option ARM, Subprime and Prime |
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The majority of projected losses in first lien RMBS transactions are expected to come from non-performing mortgage loans (those that have been modified in the previous 12 months, are two or more payments behind, are in foreclosure or that have been foreclosed and so the RMBS issuer owns the underlying real estate). Changes in the amount of non-performing loans from the amount projected in the previous period are one of the primary drivers of loss development in this portfolio. In order to determine the number of defaults resulting from these delinquent and foreclosed loans, the Company applies a liquidation rate assumption to loans in each of various non-performing categories. The Company arrived at its liquidation rates based on data purchased from a third party provider and assumptions about how delays in the foreclosure process and loan modifications may ultimately affect the rate at which loans are liquidated. The following table shows liquidation assumptions for various non-performing categories. |
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First Lien Liquidation Rates |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 30-Sep-14 | | 30-Jun-14 | | 31-Dec-13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Current Loans Modified in Previous 12 Months | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 35% | | 35% | | 35% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 35 | | 35 | | 35 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 35 | | 35 | | 35 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
30 – 59 Days Delinquent | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 50 | | 50 | | 50 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 50 | | 50 | | 50 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 45 | | 45 | | 45 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
60 – 89 Days Delinquent | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 60 | | 60 | | 60 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 65 | | 65 | | 65 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 50 | | 50 | | 50 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
90+ Days Delinquent | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 75 | | 75 | | 75 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 70 | | 70 | | 70 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 60 | | 60 | | 60 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Bankruptcy | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 60 | | 60 | | 60 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 60 | | 60 | | 60 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 55 | | 55 | | 55 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Foreclosure | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Alt A and Prime | 85 | | 85 | | 85 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Option ARM | 80 | | 80 | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Subprime | 70 | | 70 | | 70 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Real Estate Owned | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
All | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|
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While the Company uses liquidation rates as described above to project defaults of non-performing loans (including current loans modified within the last 12 months), it projects defaults on presently current loans by applying a CDR trend. The start of that CDR trend is based on the defaults the Company projects will emerge from currently nonperforming loans. The total amount of expected defaults from the non-performing loans is translated into a constant CDR (i.e., the CDR plateau), which, if applied for each of the next 36 months, would be sufficient to produce approximately the amount of defaults that were calculated to emerge from the various delinquency categories. The CDR thus calculated individually on the delinquent collateral pool for each RMBS is then used as the starting point for the CDR curve used to project defaults of the presently performing loans. |
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In the base case, after the initial 36-month CDR plateau period, each transaction’s CDR is projected to improve over 12 months to an intermediate CDR (calculated as 20% of its CDR plateau); that intermediate CDR is held constant for 36 months and then trails off in steps to a final CDR of 5% of the CDR plateau. In the base case, the Company assumes the final CDR will be reached eight years and nine months after the initial 36-month CDR plateau period, which is three months shorter than assumed as of June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013 but the same calendar date as it assumed as of June 30, 2014. Under the Company’s methodology, defaults projected to occur in the first 36 months represent defaults that can be attributed to loans that were modified in the last 12 months or that are currently delinquent or in foreclosure, while the defaults projected to occur using the projected CDR trend after the first 36 month period represent defaults attributable to borrowers that are currently performing. |
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Another important driver of loss projections is loss severity, which is the amount of loss the transaction incurs on a loan after the application of net proceeds from the disposal of the underlying property. Loss severities experienced in first lien transactions have reached historic high levels, and the Company is assuming in the base case that these high levels generally will continue for another 18 months, except that in the case of subprime loans, the Company assumes the 90% loss severity rate will continue for another nine months then drop to 80% for nine more months, in each case before following the ramp described below. The Company determines its initial loss severity based on actual recent experience. The Company’s initial loss severity assumptions for September 30, 2014 were the same as it used for June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013. The Company then assumes that loss severities begin returning to levels consistent with underwriting assumptions beginning after the initial 18 month period declining to 40% in the base case over 2.5 years. |
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The following table shows the range as well as the average, weighted by outstanding net insured par, for key assumptions used in the calculation of expected loss to be paid for individual transactions for direct vintage 2004 - 2008 first lien U.S. RMBS. |
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Key Assumptions in Base Case Expected Loss Estimates |
First Lien RMBS(1) |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| As of | | As of | | As of |
30-Sep-14 | 30-Jun-14 | 31-Dec-13 |
| Range | | Weighted Average | | Range | | Weighted Average | | Range | | Weighted Average |
Alt-A First Lien | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Plateau CDR | 2.1 | % | – | 15.70% | | 8.50% | | 2.9 | % | – | 16.80% | | 9.00% | | 2.8 | % | – | 18.40% | | 9.70% |
Intermediate CDR | 0.4 | % | – | 3.10% | | 1.70% | | 0.6 | % | – | 3.40% | | 1.80% | | 0.6 | % | – | 3.70% | | 1.90% |
Period until intermediate CDR | 48 months | | | | 48 months | | | | 48 months | | |
Final CDR | 0.1 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.40% | | 0.1 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.40% | | 0.1 | % | – | 0.90% | | 0.50% |
Initial loss severity | 65% | | | | 65% | | | | 65% | | |
Initial conditional prepayment rate ("CPR") | 0 | % | – | 24.30% | | 7.00% | | 1 | % | – | 23.20% | | 7.00% | | 0 | % | – | 34.20% | | 9.70% |
Final CPR(2) | 15% | | | | 15% | | | | 15% | | |
Option ARM | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Plateau CDR | 3.9 | % | – | 15.70% | | 10.70% | | 5 | % | – | 15.80% | | 11.10% | | 4.9 | % | – | 16.80% | | 11.90% |
Intermediate CDR | 0.8 | % | – | 3.10% | | 2.10% | | 1 | % | – | 3.20% | | 2.20% | | 1 | % | – | 3.40% | | 2.40% |
Period until intermediate CDR | 48 months | | | | 48 months | | | | 48 months | | |
Final CDR | 0.2 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.50% | | 0.2 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.50% | | 0.2 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.50% |
Initial loss severity | 65% | | | | 65% | | | | 65% | | |
Initial CPR | 1 | % | – | 13.00% | | 7.10% | | 0.9 | % | – | 9.00% | | 7.10% | | 0.4 | % | – | 13.10% | | 4.70% |
Final CPR(2) | 15% | | | | 15% | | | | 15% | | |
Subprime | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Plateau CDR | 5.3 | % | – | 15.90% | | 11.20% | | 5.7 | % | – | 16.50% | | 11.50% | | 5.6 | % | – | 16.20% | | 11.80% |
Intermediate CDR | 1.1 | % | – | 3.20% | | 2.20% | | 1.1 | % | – | 3.30% | | 2.30% | | 1.1 | % | – | 3.20% | | 2.40% |
Period until intermediate CDR | 48 months | | | | 48 months | | | | 48 months | | |
Final CDR | 0.3 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.40% | | 0.3 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.40% | | 0.3 | % | – | 0.80% | | 0.40% |
Initial loss severity | 90% | | | | 90% | | | | 90% | | |
Initial CPR | 0 | % | – | 10.80% | | 6.50% | | 0 | % | – | 13.70% | | 6.40% | | 0 | % | – | 15.70% | | 4.10% |
Final CPR(2) | 15% | | | | 15% | | | | 15% | | |
____________________ |
(1) Represents variables for most heavily weighted scenario (the “base case”). |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
(2) | For transactions where the initial CPR is higher than the final CPR, the initial CPR is held constant and the final CPR is not used. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The rate at which the principal amount of loans is voluntarily prepaid may impact both the amount of losses projected (since that amount is a function of the conditional default rate, the loss severity and the loan balance over time) as well as the amount of excess spread (the amount by which the interest paid by the borrowers on the underlying loan exceeds the amount of interest owed on the insured obligations). The assumption for the voluntary CPR follows a similar pattern to that of the conditional default rate. The current level of voluntary prepayments is assumed to continue for the plateau period before gradually increasing over 12 months to the final CPR, which is assumed to be 15% in the base case. For transactions where the initial CPR is higher than the final CPR, the initial CPR is held constant and the final CPR is not used. These assumptions are the same as those the Company used for June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013. |
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In estimating expected losses, the Company modeled and probability weighted sensitivities for first lien transactions by varying its assumptions of how fast a recovery is expected to occur. One of the variables used to model sensitivities was how quickly the conditional default rate returned to its modeled equilibrium, which was defined as 5% of the initial conditional default rate. The Company also stressed CPR and the speed of recovery of loss severity rates. The Company probability weighted a total of five scenarios (including its base case) as of September 30, 2014. The Company used a similar approach to establish its pessimistic and optimistic scenarios as of September 30, 2014 as it used as of June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013, increasing and decreasing the periods of stress from those used in the base case. |
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In a somewhat more stressful environment than that of the base case, where the conditional default rate plateau was extended six months (to be 42 months long) before the same more gradual conditional default rate recovery and loss severities were assumed to recover over 4.5 rather than 2.5 years (and subprime loss severities were assumed to recover only to 60%), expected loss to be paid would increase from current projections by approximately $30 million for Alt-A first liens, $10 million for Option ARM, $73 million for subprime and $4 million for prime transactions. |
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In an even more stressful scenario where loss severities were assumed to rise and then recover over nine years and the initial ramp-down of the conditional default rate was assumed to occur over 15 months and other assumptions were the same as the other stress scenario, expected loss to be paid would increase from current projections by approximately $83 million for Alt-A first liens, $23 million for Option ARM, $107 million for subprime and $10 million for prime transactions. |
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In a scenario with a somewhat less stressful environment than the base case, where conditional default rate recovery was somewhat less gradual and the initial subprime loss severity rate was assumed to be 80% for 18 months and was assumed to recover to 40% over 2.5 years, expected loss to be paid would increase from current projections by approximately $0.1 million for Alt-A first lien and would decrease by $10 million for Option ARM, $23 million for subprime and $1 million for prime transactions. |
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In an even less stressful scenario where the conditional default rate plateau was six months shorter (30 months, effectively assuming that liquidation rates would improve) and the conditional default rate recovery was more pronounced, (including an initial ramp-down of the conditional default rate over nine months), expected loss to be paid would decrease from current projections by approximately $26 million for Alt-A first lien, $25 million for Option ARM, $65 million for subprime and $5 million for prime transactions. |
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U.S. Second Lien RMBS Loss Projections: HELOCs and Closed-End Second Lien |
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The Company believes the primary variable affecting its expected losses in second lien RMBS transactions is the amount and timing of future losses in the collateral pool supporting the transactions. Expected losses are also a function of the structure of the transaction; the voluntary prepayment rate (typically also referred to as CPR of the collateral); the interest rate environment; and assumptions about the draw rate and loss severity. |
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The following table shows the range as well as the average, weighted by outstanding net insured par, for key assumptions for the calculation of expected loss to be paid for individual transactions for direct vintage 2004 - 2008 second lien U.S. RMBS. |
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Key Assumptions in Base Case Expected Loss Estimates |
Second Lien RMBS(1) |
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HELOC key assumptions | As of | | As of | | As of |
30-Sep-14 | 30-Jun-14 | 31-Dec-13 |
| Range | | Weighted Average | | Range | | Weighted Average | | Range | | Weighted Average |
Plateau CDR | 2.8 | % | – | 8.50% | | 4.20% | | 2.2 | % | – | 9.60% | | 4.30% | | 2.3 | % | – | 7.70% | | 4.90% |
Final CDR trended down to | 0.5 | % | – | 3.20% | | 1.20% | | 0.5 | % | – | 3.20% | | 1.20% | | 0.4 | % | – | 3.20% | | 1.10% |
Period until final CDR | 34 months | | | | 34 months | | | | 34 months | | |
Initial CPR | 5.1 | % | – | 16.00% | | 10.30% | | 2.4 | % | – | 19.40% | | 9.30% | | 2.7 | % | – | 21.50% | | 9.90% |
Final CPR(2) | 10% | | | | 10% | | | | 10% | | |
Loss severity | 90% | – | 98.00% | | 91.50% | | 98% | | | | 98% | | |
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Closed-end second lien key assumptions | As of | | As of | | As of |
30-Sep-14 | 30-Jun-14 | 31-Dec-13 |
| Range | | Weighted Average | | Range | | Weighted Average | | Range | | Weighted Average |
Plateau CDR | 6.8 | % | – | 15.10% | | 7.70% | | 4.8 | % | – | 14.90% | | 7.70% | | 7.3 | % | – | 15.10% | | 8.50% |
Final CDR trended down to | 3.5 | % | – | 9.10% | | 4.90% | | 3.5 | % | – | 9.10% | | 5.00% | | 3.5 | % | – | 9.10% | | 5.00% |
Period until final CDR | 34 months | | | | 34 months | | | | 34 months | | |
Initial CPR | 3 | % | – | 11.40% | | 9.20% | | 2.6 | % | – | 10.40% | | 8.40% | | 3.1 | % | – | 12.00% | | 7.10% |
Final CPR(2) | 10% | | | | 10% | | | | 10% | | |
Loss severity | 98% | | | | 98% | | | | 98% | | |
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-1 | Represents variables for most heavily weighted scenario (the “base case”). | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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(2) | For transactions where the initial CPR is higher than the final CPR, the initial CPR is held constant and the final CPR is not used. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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In second lien transactions the projection of near-term defaults from currently delinquent loans is relatively straightforward because loans in second lien transactions are generally “charged off” (treated as defaulted) by the securitization’s servicer once the loan is 180 days past due. Most second lien transactions report the amount of loans in five monthly delinquency categories (i.e., 30-59 days past due, 60-89 days past due, 90-119 days past due, 120-149 days past due and 150-179 days past due). The Company estimates the amount of loans that will default over the next five months by calculating current representative liquidation rates (the percent of loans in a given delinquency status that are assumed to ultimately default) from selected representative transactions and then applying an average of the preceding twelve months’ liquidation rates to the amount of loans in the delinquency categories. The amount of loans projected to default in the first through fifth months is expressed as a CDR. The first four months’ CDR is calculated by applying the liquidation rates to the current period past due balances (i.e., the 150-179 day balance is liquidated in the first projected month, the 120-149 day balance is liquidated in the second projected month, the 90-119 day balance is liquidated in the third projected month and the 60-89 day balance is liquidated in the fourth projected month). For the fifth month the CDR is calculated using the average 30-59 day past due balances for the prior three months, adjusted as necessary to reflect one-time service events. The fifth month CDR is then used as the basis for the plateau period that follows the embedded five months of losses. |
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For the base case scenario, the CDR (the “plateau CDR”) was held constant for one month. Once the plateau period has ended, the CDR is assumed to gradually trend down in uniform increments to its final long-term steady state CDR. (The long-term steady state CDR is calculated as the constant CDR that would have yielded the amount of losses originally expected at underwriting.) In the base case scenario, the time over which the CDR trends down to its final CDR is 28 months. Therefore, the total stress period for second lien transactions is 34 months, comprising five months of delinquent data, a one month plateau period and 28 months of decrease to the steady state CDR, the same as of June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013. |
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HELOC loans generally permit the borrower to pay only interest for an initial period (often ten years) and, after that period, require the borrower to make both the monthly interest payment and a monthly principal payment, and so increase the borrower's aggregate monthly payment. Some of the HELOC loans underlying the Company's insured HELOC transactions have reached their principal amortization period. Based on the Company’s observation, including information obtained over the last quarter on the performance of certain loans reaching their principal amortization period and its views of the efficacy of planned servicer intervention, it introduced this quarter an assumption in the projections for most of its HELOC transactions that 7.5% of loans reaching their amortization periods will default around the time of the payment increase. These projected defaults are in addition to those generated using the CDR curve as described above. |
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When a second lien loan defaults, there is generally a very low recovery. The Company had assumed as of June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013 that it will recover only 2% of the collateral defaulting. However, based on additional information the Company obtained over the last quarter, it increased this recovery assumption in the projections for most of its HELOC transactions as of September 30, 2014 to 10% of collateral defaulting in the future, and also assumed declining additional post-default receipts on previously defaulted collateral. The net impact of the two refinements the Company made to projecting expected losses in certain HELOC transactions described above (increased defaults of loans reaching their amortization period and increased recoveries) was an increase of approximately $36 million in expected losses in the Company's base case. |
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The rate at which the principal amount of loans is prepaid may impact both the amount of losses projected as well as the amount of excess spread. In the base case, the current CPR (based on experience of the most recent three quarters) is assumed to continue until the end of the plateau before gradually increasing to the final CPR over the same period the CDR decreases. For transactions where the initial CPR is higher than the final CPR, the initial CPR is held constant and the final CPR is not used. The final CPR is assumed to be 10% for both HELOC and closed-end second lien transactions, which is lower than the historical average but reflects the Company’s continued uncertainty about the projected performance of the borrowers in these transactions. This pattern is consistent with how the Company modeled the CPR at June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013. To the extent that prepayments differ from projected levels it could materially change the Company’s projected excess spread and losses. |
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The Company uses a number of other variables in its second lien loss projections, including the spread between relevant interest rate indices and HELOC draw rates (the amount of new advances provided on existing HELOCs expressed as a percentage of current outstanding advances). These variables have been relatively stable over the past several quarters and in the relevant ranges have less impact on the projection results than the variables discussed above. However, in a number of HELOC transactions the servicers have been modifying poorly performing loans from floating to fixed rates, and, as a result, rising interest rates would negatively impact the excess spread available from these modified loans to support the transactions. The Company incorporated these modifications in its assumptions. |
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In estimating expected losses, the Company modeled and probability weighted three possible CDR curves applicable to the period preceding the return to the long-term steady state CDR using the same approaches and weightings as it did as of June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2013. The Company believes that the level of the elevated CDR and the length of time it will persist is the primary driver behind the likely amount of losses the collateral will suffer. The Company continues to evaluate the assumptions affecting its modeling results. |
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The Company’s base case assumed a one month CDR plateau and a 28 month ramp-down (for a total stress period of 34 months). The Company also modeled a scenario with a longer period of elevated defaults and another with a shorter period of elevated defaults. Increasing the CDR plateau to four months and increasing the ramp-down by five months to 33 months (for a total stress period of 42 months) would increase the expected loss by approximately $17 million for HELOC transactions and $2 million for closed-end second lien transactions. On the other hand, keeping the CDR plateau at one month but decreasing the length of the CDR ramp-down to 18 months (for a total stress period of 24 months) would decrease the expected loss by approximately $17 million for HELOC transactions and $2 million for closed-end second lien transactions. |
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Breaches of Representations and Warranties |
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Generally, when mortgage loans are transferred into a securitization, the loan originator(s) and/or sponsor(s) provide R&W that the loans meet certain characteristics, and a breach of such R&W often requires that the loan be repurchased from the securitization. In many of the transactions the Company insures, it is in a position to enforce these R&W provisions. The Company has pursued breaches of R&W on a loan-by-loan basis or in cases where a provider of R&W refused to honor its repurchase obligations, the Company sometimes chose to initiate litigation. See “Recovery Litigation” below. The Company's success in pursuing these strategies permitted the Company to enter into agreements with R&W providers under which those providers made payments to the Company, agreed to make payments to the Company in the future, and / or repurchased loans from the transactions, all in return for releases of related liability by the Company. In some instances, the entity providing the R&W (or an affiliate of that entity) also benefited from credit protection sold by the Company through a CDS, and the Company entered into an agreement terminating the CDS protection it provided (and so avoiding future losses on that transaction), again in return for releases of related liability by the Company and in certain instances other consideration. Such agreements with R&W providers provide the Company with many of the benefits of pursuing the R&W claims on a loan by loan basis or through litigation, but without the related expense and uncertainty. The Company continues to pursue these strategies against R&W providers with which it does not yet have agreements. |
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Through September 30, 2014, the Company has caused entities providing R&Ws to pay, or agree to pay, or to terminate insurance protection on future projected losses of, approximately $3.8 billion (gross of reinsurance) in respect of their R&W liabilities for transactions in which the Company has provided insurance. |
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R&W Benefits (Gross of Reinsurance) |
As of September 30, 2014 |
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Benefits already received (1) | $ | 2,954 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Agreement amounts projected to be received in the future | 296 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Repurchase amounts paid into the relevant RMBS prior to settlement (2) | 579 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Total R&W receipts and losses avoided, gross of reinsurance | $ | 3,829 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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-1 | Includes amounts already received plus projected losses avoided based on base case projections at the time of the termination, net of any payments made in connection with the termination. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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-2 | These amounts were paid into the relevant RMBS transactions (rather than to the Company as in most settlements) and distributed in accordance with the priority of payments set out in the relevant transaction documents. Because the Company may insure only a portion of the capital structure of a transaction, such payments will not necessarily directly benefit the Company dollar-for-dollar, especially in first lien transactions. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Based on this success, the Company has included in its net expected loss estimates as of September 30, 2014 an estimated net benefit related to breaches of R&W of $578 million, which includes $284 million from agreements with R&W providers and $294 million in transactions where the Company does not yet have such an agreement, all net of reinsurance. |
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Representations and Warranties Agreements (1) |
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| Agreement Date | | Current Net Par Covered | | Receipts to September 30, 2014 (net of reinsurance) | | Estimated Future Receipts (net of reinsurance) | | Eligible Assets Held in Trust (gross of reinsurance) | | | |
| (in millions) | | | |
Bank of America - First Lien | Apr-11 | | $ | 963 | | | $ | 511 | | | $ | 163 | | | $ | 581 | | | | |
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Bank of America - Second Lien | Apr-11 | | 1,250 | | | 968 | | | NA | | | NA | | | | |
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Deutsche Bank | May 2012 and October 2013 | | 1,226 | | | 249 | | | 73 | | | 135 | | | | |
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UBS | May-13 | | 579 | | | 433 | | | 8 | | | 110 | | | | |
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Others | Various | | 1,211 | | | 501 | | | 40 | | | NA | | | | |
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Total | | | $ | 5,229 | | | $ | 2,662 | | | $ | 284 | | | $ | 826 | | | | |
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-1 | This table relates to past and projected future recoveries under R&W and related agreements. Excluded from this table is the $294 million of future net recoveries the Company projects receiving from R&W counterparties in transactions with $873 million of net par outstanding as of September 30, 2014 not covered by current agreements. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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The Company's agreements with the counterparties specifically named in the table above required an initial payment to the Company to reimburse it for past claims as well as an obligation to reimburse it for a portion of future claims. The named counterparties placed eligible assets in trust to collateralize their future reimbursement obligations, and the amount of collateral they are required to post may be increased or decreased from time to time as determined by rating agency requirements. Reimbursement payments under these agreements are made either monthly or quarterly and have been made timely. With respect to the reimbursement for future claims: |
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• | Bank of America. Under the Company's agreement with Bank of America Corporation and certain of its subsidiaries (“Bank of America”), Bank of America agreed to reimburse the Company for 80% of claims on the first lien transactions covered by the agreement that the Company pays in the future, until the aggregate lifetime collateral losses (not insurance losses or claims) on those transactions reach $6.6 billion. As of September 30, 2014 aggregate lifetime collateral losses on those transactions was $4.0 billion, and the Company was projecting in its base case that such collateral losses would eventually reach $5.1 billion. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | Deutsche Bank. Under the Company's May 2012 agreement with Deutsche Bank AG and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “Deutsche Bank”), Deutsche Bank agreed to reimburse the Company for certain claims it pays in the future on eight first and second lien transactions, including 80% of claims it pays on those transactions until the aggregate lifetime claims (before reimbursement) reach $319 million. As of September 30, 2014, the Company was projecting in its base case that such aggregate lifetime claims would remain below $319 million. In the event aggregate lifetime claims paid exceed $389 million, Deutsche Bank must reimburse the Company for 85% of such claims paid (in excess of $389 million) until such claims paid reach $600 million. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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When the agreement was first signed, Deutsche Bank was also required to reimburse AGC for future claims it pays on certain RMBS resecuritizations. AGC and Deutsche Bank terminated one of the resecuritization transactions on October 10, 2013, another on September 12, 2014 and two more in the fourth quarter of 2014. In the fourth quarter of 2014, AGC and Deutsche Bank also terminated one other below investment grade transaction under which AGC had provided credit protection to Deutsche Bank through a CDS. In connection with the 2014 terminations, AGC and Deutsche Bank agreed to terminate Deutsche Bank’s reimbursement obligation on all of the RMBS resecuritizations, and AGC made a termination payment to Deutsche Bank and released some of the collateral that had been held in trust. Deutsche Bank remains liable to reimburse the Company for certain claims it pays on eight first and second lien transactions, as described above, and such reimbursement obligation remains secured by collateral held in trust for the Company’s benefit. |
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• | UBS. On May 6, 2013, the Company entered into an agreement with UBS Real Estate Securities Inc. and affiliates ("UBS") and a third party resolving the Company’s claims and liabilities related to specified RMBS transactions that were issued, underwritten or sponsored by UBS and insured by AGM or AGC under financial guaranty insurance policies. Under the agreement, UBS agreed to reimburse the Company for 85% of future losses on three first lien RMBS transactions. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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In addition to the agreements mentioned above, the Company entered into several other agreements with other R&W counterparties over the past several years. The results of those settlements have been included in the changes in the benefit for R&W in the appropriate reporting periods. |
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For the expected recovery of $294 million from breaches of R&W in transactions not covered by agreements as of September 30, 2014, the Company did not incorporate any gain contingencies from potential litigation in its estimated repurchases. The amount the Company will ultimately recover related to such contractual R&W is uncertain and subject to a number of factors including the counterparty's ability to pay, the number and loss amount of loans determined to have breached R&W and, potentially, negotiated settlements or litigation recoveries. As such, the Company's estimate of recoveries is uncertain and actual amounts realized may differ significantly from these estimates. In arriving at the expected recovery from breaches of R&W not already covered by agreements, the Company considered the creditworthiness of the provider of the R&W, the number of breaches found on defaulted loans, the success rate in resolving these breaches across those transactions where material repurchases have been made and the potential amount of time until the recovery is realized. The calculation of expected recovery from breaches of such contractual R&W involved a variety of scenarios which ranged from the Company recovering substantially all of the losses it incurred due to violations of R&W to the Company realizing limited recoveries. These scenarios were probability weighted in order to determine the recovery incorporated into the Company's estimate of expected losses. This approach was used for both loans that had already defaulted and those assumed to default in the future. The Company adjusts the calculation of its expected recovery from breaches of R&W based on changing facts and circumstances with respect to each counterparty and transaction. |
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The Company uses the same RMBS projection scenarios and weightings to project its future R&W benefit as it uses to project RMBS losses on its portfolio. To the extent the Company increases its loss projections, the R&W benefit (whether pursuant to an R&W agreement or not) generally will also increase, subject to the agreement limits and thresholds described above. Similarly, to the extent the Company decreases its loss projections, the R&W benefit (whether pursuant to an R&W agreement or not) generally will also decrease, subject to the agreement limits and thresholds described above. |
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U.S. RMBS Risks with R&W Benefit |
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| Number of Risks (1) as of | | Debt Service as of | | | | | | | |
| September 30, 2014 | | December 31, 2013 | | September 30, 2014 | | December 31, 2013 | | | | | | | |
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Prime first lien | 1 | | | 1 | | | $ | 34 | | | $ | 38 | | | | | | | | |
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Alt-A first lien | 21 | | | 19 | | | 1,758 | | | 2,856 | | | | | | | | |
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Option ARM | 8 | | | 9 | | | 184 | | | 641 | | | | | | | | |
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Subprime | 4 | | | 5 | | | 651 | | | 998 | | | | | | | | |
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Closed-end second lien | 4 | | | 4 | | | 143 | | | 158 | | | | | | | | |
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HELOC | 1 | | | 4 | | | 14 | | | 320 | | | | | | | | |
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Total | 39 | | | 42 | | | $ | 2,784 | | | $ | 5,011 | | | | | | | | |
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(1) A risk represents the aggregate of the financial guaranty policies that share the same revenue source for purposes of making Debt Service payments. This table shows the full future Debt Service (not just the amount of Debt Service expected to be reimbursed) for risks with projected future R&W benefit, whether pursuant to an agreement or not. |
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The following table provides a breakdown of the development and accretion amount in the roll forward of estimated recoveries associated with claims for breaches of R&W. |
Components of R&W Development |
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| Third Quarter | | Nine Months | | | | | |
| 2014 | | 2013 | | 2014 | | 2013 | | | | | |
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Inclusion or removal of deals with breaches of R&W during period | $ | — | | | $ | — | | | $ | — | | | $ | 6 | | | | | | |
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Change in recovery assumptions as the result of recovery success | 4 | | | 69 | | | 31 | | | 86 | | | | | | |
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Estimated increase (decrease) in defaults that will result in additional (lower) breaches | (4 | ) | | 13 | | | (15 | ) | | 10 | | | | | | |
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Settlements and anticipated settlements | 90 | | | — | | | 96 | | | 180 | | | | | | |
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Accretion of discount on balance | 3 | | | 4 | | | 48 | | | 12 | | | | | | |
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Total | $ | 93 | | | $ | 86 | | | $ | 160 | | | $ | 294 | | | | | | |
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Trust Preferred Securities Collateralized Debt Obligations |
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The Company has insured or reinsured $4.5 billion of net par (71% of which is in CDS form) of collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) backed by TruPS and similar debt instruments, or “TruPS CDOs.” Of the $4.5 billion, $1.5 billion is rated BIG. The underlying collateral in the TruPS CDOs consists of subordinated debt instruments such as TruPS issued by bank holding companies and similar instruments issued by insurance companies, real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) and other real estate related issuers. |
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The Company projects losses for TruPS CDOs by projecting the performance of the asset pools across several scenarios (which it weights) and applying the CDO structures to the resulting cash flows. At September 30, 2014, the Company has projected expected losses to be paid for TruPS CDOs of $26 million. During Third Quarter 2014, there was positive economic development of approximately $5 million, which was due primarily to redemption and cure activity of some of the underlying assets in the TruPS collateral pools. During Nine Months 2014, there was positive economic development of approximately $24 million, which was due primarily to improving collateral performance throughout Nine Months 2014. |
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“XXX” Life Insurance Transactions |
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The Company’s $2.7 billion net par of XXX life insurance transactions as of September 30, 2014 includes $598 million rated BIG. The BIG “XXX” life insurance reserve securitizations are based on discrete blocks of individual life insurance business. In each such transaction the monies raised by the sale of the bonds insured by the Company were used to capitalize a special purpose vehicle that provides reinsurance to a life insurer or reinsurer. The monies are invested at inception in accounts managed by third-party investment managers. |
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The BIG “XXX” life insurance transactions consist of two transactions, notes issued by each of Ballantyne Re p.l.c and Orkney Re II p.l.c. These transactions had material amounts of their assets invested in U.S. RMBS. Based on its analysis of the information currently available, including estimates of future investment performance, and projected credit impairments on the invested assets and performance of the blocks of life insurance business at September 30, 2014, the Company’s projected net expected loss to be paid is $90 million. The economic loss development during Third Quarter 2014 was approximately $3 million, which was due primarily to modest deterioration in the life insurance cash flow projections as well as a decrease in the risk free rates used to discount the long dated losses. The economic loss development during Nine Months 2014 was approximately $19 million, which was due primarily to changes in lapse assumptions on the underlying life insurance policies, modest deterioration in life insurance cash flow projections, and a decrease in the risk free rates used to discount the losses. |
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Manufactured Housing |
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The Company insures or reinsures a total of $231 million net par of securities backed by manufactured housing loans, of which $164 million is rated BIG. The Company has expected loss to be paid of $25 million as of September 30, 2014. The economic loss development during the Third Quarter 2014 and Nine Months 2014 was relatively flat. |
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Student Loan Transactions |
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The Company has insured or reinsured $2.7 billion net par of student loan securitizations, of which $1.9 billion was issued by private issuers and classified as asset-backed and $0.8 billion was issued by public authorities and classified as public finance. Of these amounts, $198 million and $244 million, respectively, are rated BIG. The Company is projecting approximately $78 million of net expected loss to be paid in these portfolios. In general, the losses are due to: (i) the poor credit performance of private student loan collateral and high loss severities, or (ii) high interest rates on auction rate securities with respect to which the auctions have failed. The economic loss development during Third Quarter 2014 was approximately $5 million, which is primarily due to slower than expected default rate improvement, primarily on the private student loan exposure. The economic loss development during Nine Months 2014 was approximately $13 million, which, in addition to the third quarter effects mentioned above, was also due to a decrease during 2014 in the risk free rates used to discount the losses along with some deterioration in collateral performance during the first six months of 2014. |
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Selected U.S. Public Finance Transactions |
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The Company insures general obligation bonds of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and various obligations of its related authorities and public corporations aggregating $4.9 billion net par. The Company rates $4.7 billion net par of that amount BIG. For additional information regarding the Company's exposure to general obligations of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and various obligations of its related authorities and public corporations, please refer to "Exposure to Puerto Rico" in Note 3, Outstanding Exposure. |
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The Company has net par exposure to the City of Detroit, Michigan of $2.2 billion as of September 30, 2014 to the general obligation, general fund and water and sewer utility sectors, as described below. On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The City has filed a proposed plan of adjustment and disclosure statement with the Bankruptcy Court. |
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• | The Company has net par exposure to $1.1 billion of sewer revenue bonds and $882 million of water revenue bonds. The Company rates the bonds, which are secured by a lien on "special revenues," BBB. The exposure reflects the City's issuance in September 2014 of new series of sewer and water revenue bonds to finance (i) the purchase of outstanding sewer and water revenue bonds offered and accepted under a tender offer commenced by the City and (ii) the refunding of certain other sewer revenue and revenue refunding bonds, and the Company's insurance of a portion of such issuance. In connection with these transactions, approximately $677 million of the Company's then combined $1.8 billion net par exposure to the sewer and water revenue bonds was purchased in the tender offer or refunded, and the Company insured approximately $841 million gross par of the new sewer and water revenue bonds. Under the City's amended plan of adjustment, the impairment of all outstanding sewer and water revenue bonds (even those not purchased pursuant to the tender offer or refunded) that had been proposed was removed, including those provisions which provided for the impairment of interest rates and call protection on such bonds. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | The Company has net par exposure of $128 million to the City's general obligation bonds, which are secured by a pledge of the unlimited tax, full faith, credit and resources of the City and the specific ad valorem taxes approved by the voters solely to pay debt service on the general obligation bonds. The Company rates this exposure BIG. On April 9, 2014, the City and the Company reached a tentative settlement with respect to the treatment of the unlimited tax general obligation bonds insured by the Company. The agreement provides for the confirmation of both the secured status of such general obligation bonds and the existence of a valid lien on the City’s pledged property tax revenues, a finding that such revenues constitute “special revenues” under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and the provision of additional security for such general obligation bonds in the form of a subordinate statutory lien on, and intercept of, the City’s distributable state aid. After giving effect to post-petition payments made by Assured Guaranty on such general obligation bonds, the settlement results in an ultimate recovery of approximately 74% on such general obligation bonds. The settlement is subject to a number of conditions, including confirmation of a plan of adjustment. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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• | The Company has net par exposure of $175 million to the City's Certificates of Participation, which are unsecured unconditional contractual obligations of the City that the Company rates BIG. On October 26, 2014, AG Re and Financial Guaranty Insurance Co. ("FGIC") entered into a commutation agreement pursuant to which FGIC will commute all the reinsurance AG Re provides to FGIC with respect to the Certificates of Participation. The effectiveness of the commutation agreement is subject to the occurrence of the effective date of the City’s plan of adjustment. The Company currently anticipates the plan of adjustment will be confirmed in November 2014. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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On June 28, 2012, the City of Stockton, California filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The Company's net exposure to the City's general fund is $117 million, consisting of pension obligation bonds. The Company also had exposure to lease revenue bonds; as of September 30, 2014, the Company owned all of such bonds and held them in its investment portfolio. On October 3, 2013, the Company reached a settlement with the City regarding the treatment of the bonds insured by the Company in the City's plan of adjustment. Under the terms of the settlement, the Company will continue to receive net revenues from an office building and an option to take title to that building, and will be entitled to certain fixed payments and certain variable payments contingent on the City's revenue growth. On October 30, 2014, the bankruptcy court confirmed the City's plan of adjustment, which includes the terms of such settlement. The Company expects the plan of adjustment to become effective by the end of 2014. |
The Company has $338 million of net par exposure to the Louisville Arena Authority. The bond proceeds were used to construct the KFC Yum Center, home to the University of Louisville men's and women's basketball teams. Actual revenues available for Debt Service are well below original projections, and under the Company's internal rating scale, the transaction is BIG. |
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The Company projects that its total net expected loss across its troubled U.S. public finance credits as of September 30, 2014, which incorporated the likelihood of the outcomes mentioned above, will be $333 million, compared with a net expected loss of $339 million as of June 30, 2014 and $264 million as of December 31, 2013. Economic loss development in Third Quarter 2014 was $2 million. Economic loss development in Nine Months 2014 was approximately $107 million, which was primarily attributable to Puerto Rico and Detroit exposures. |
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Certain Selected European Country Transactions |
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The Company insures and reinsures credits with sub-sovereign exposure to various Spanish and Portuguese issuers where a Spanish and Portuguese sovereign default may cause the regions also to default. The Company's gross exposure to these Spanish and Portuguese credits is $544 million and $120 million, respectively and exposure net of reinsurance for Spanish and Portuguese credits is $390 million and $106 million, respectively. The Company rates most of these issuers in the BB category due to the financial condition of Spain and Portugal and their dependence on the sovereign. The Company's Hungary exposure is to infrastructure bonds dependent on payments from Hungarian governmental entities and covered mortgage bonds issued by Hungarian banks. The Company's gross exposure to these Hungarian credits is $555 million and its exposure net of reinsurance is $524 million, all of which all is rated BIG. The Company estimated net expected losses of $50 million related to these Spanish, Portuguese and Hungarian credits. The economic loss development during the Third Quarter and Nine Months 2014 was relatively flat. |
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Infrastructure Finance |
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The Company has insured exposure of approximately $3.0 billion to infrastructure transactions with refinancing risk as to which the Company may need to make claim payments that it did not anticipate paying when the policies were issued. Although the Company may not experience ultimate loss on a particular transaction, the aggregate amount of the claim payments may be substantial and reimbursement may not occur for an extended time, if at all. These transactions generally involve long-term infrastructure projects that were financed by bonds that mature prior to the expiration of the project concession. The Company expected the cash flows from these projects to be sufficient to repay all of the debt over the life of the project concession, but also expected the debt to be refinanced in the market at or prior to its maturity. If the issuer is unable to refinance the debt due to market conditions, the Company may have to pay a claim when the debt matures, and then recover its payment from cash flows produced by the project in the future. The Company generally projects that in most scenarios it will be fully reimbursed for such payments. However, the recovery of the payments is uncertain and may take from 10 to 35 years, depending on the transaction and the performance of the underlying collateral. The Company estimates total claims for the two largest transactions with significant refinancing risk, assuming no refinancing, and based on certain performance assumptions could be $1.8 billion on a gross basis; such claims would be payable from 2017 through 2022. |
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Recovery Litigation |
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RMBS Transactions |
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As of the date of this filing, AGM and AGC have a lawsuit pending against DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. (“DLJ”) and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“Credit Suisse”), which had provided representations and warranties on first lien U.S. RMBS transactions insured by them, seeking damages for alleged breaches of R&W in respect of the underlying loans in the transactions, and failure to cure or repurchase defective loans identified by AGM and AGC. AGM also had sued Deutsche Bank AG affiliates DB Structured Products, Inc. and ACE Securities Corp. on a second lien U.S. RMBS transaction that it had insured; AGM signed an agreement to resolve its claims against Deutsche Bank in November 2014 and expects to file a stipulation with the court to dismiss the lawsuit shortly. |
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With respect to the Credit Suisse action, on May 6, 2014, the Appellate Division, First Department unanimously reversed certain aspects of the partial dismissal by the Supreme Court of the State of New York of certain claims for relief by holding as a matter of law that AGM’s and AGC’s remedies for breach of R&W are not limited to the repurchase remedy. AGM and AGC filed an amended complaint against DLJ and Credit Suisse (and added Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. as a defendant), asserting claims of fraud and material misrepresentation in the inducement of an insurance contract, in addition to their existing breach of contract claims. |
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On July 3, 2014, the Supreme Court of the State of New York issued decisions in both the Credit Suisse and the recently settled Deutsche Bank litigations and noted they were intended to be read together. In the Deutsche Bank action, Deutsche Bank had filed a motion to dismiss certain of AGM’s claims as well as a motion for partial summary judgment against AGM. The decision provided that AGM continued to have claims for a breach of contract cause of action, which the court deemed to consist of a claim for recovery of the portion of AGM’s paid claims attributable to all loans that breached R&W, not solely for claims attributable to loans that AGM had demanded that Deutsche Bank repurchase prior to the litigation. The court also held that sampling and expert evidence could be used to calculate damages, and that AGM could recover its reasonable litigation costs and expenses. In the Credit Suisse action, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss certain of AGM’s and AGC’s fraud claims and all of the claims against Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., along with the remaining fraud claims and claims of material misrepresentation in the inducement of an insurance contract. On July 10, 2014, AGM and AGC filed a notice of appeal of the court’s dismissal action. AGM and AGC continue to have claims for breach of R&W and breach of DLJ’s repurchase obligations. |
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Separately, AGM had filed a lawsuit against RBS Securities Inc., RBS Financial Products Inc. and Financial Asset Securities Corp. (collectively, “RBS”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on a first lien U.S. RMBS transaction that it had insured, alleging that RBS made fraudulent misrepresentations to AGM regarding the quality of the underlying mortgage loans in the transaction and that RBS's misrepresentations induced AGM into issuing a financial guaranty insurance policy in respect of the certificates issued in the transaction. AGM has resolved its claims against RBS and the lawsuit has been dismissed. |
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“XXX” Life Insurance Transactions |
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In December 2008, AGUK filed an action against J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. (“JPMIM”), the investment manager in the Orkney Re II transaction, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York alleging that JPMIM engaged in breaches of fiduciary duty, gross negligence and breaches of contract based upon its handling of the investments of Orkney Re II. After AGUK’s claims were dismissed with prejudice in January 2010, AGUK was successful in its subsequent motions and appeals and, as of December 2011, all of AGUK’s claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, gross negligence and contract were reinstated in full. Separately, at the trial court level, discovery is ongoing. |