Domino's Pizza 8K Regulation FD Disclosure | DPZ 28 Oct 08

Domino’s Pizza Investor Day 2008

Domino’s Pizza Leadership Team

October 28, 2008

Exhibit 99.1

Forward-Looking Statements

This presentation and our accompanying comments may contain “forward-looking

statements.”

These statements relate to future events or our future financial

performance and involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors

that may cause our actual results, levels of activity, performance or achievements to

differ materially from these expressed or implied by these forward-looking

statements. Although we believe that the expectations reflected in the forward-

looking statements are reasonable, we cannot guarantee future results, levels of

activity, performance or achievements. We caution you not to place undue reliance

on forward-looking statements, which reflect our analysis only and speak only as of

the date of this presentation. We undertake no obligation to update the forward-

looking statements to reflect subsequent events or circumstances.

This

presentation

contains

trade

names,

trademarks

and

service

marks

other

companies.

not

intend

our

use

display

other

parties’

trade

names,

trademarks

and

service

marks

imply

relationship

with,

endorsement

sponsorship

of,

these

other

parties.

Today’s Agenda

A Context: When the “Game Began to Change”

The Turnaround Plan –

Our Current Position

2009 and Beyond…

Supply Chain Costs –

a Range of Possibilities

Q&A

Lunch: New Store Concept and Test Product Review

Financial Overview

Q&A

International –

Master Franchisee Perspective

Q&A

Closing

A Context:

When the “Game Began to Change”

Domino’s Pizza 2005 –

2008

David A. Brandon

Chairman & CEO

Pizza Industry Traffic & Check

Percent Change vs. Year Ago

Essentially a 6-Year Negative Trend

-1.5%

-2.4%

-4.5%

2.6%

3.0%

1.7%

3.8%

3.3%

0.5%

0.0%

-1.5%

2.5%

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Party Check

Transactions

Source:

The

NPD

Group/CREST

-2%

-3%

-1%

-2%

Party Check

Transactions

Percent Change vs. Year Ago

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Source:

The

NPD

Group/CREST

Domino’s Pizza Traffic & Check

Domino’s Overview –

Circa 2005

National Marketing was driving strong results

Franchisee attitudes and behavior

The results of our environment and strategy

–

Store growth

–

Strong unit economics

–

Heavy reliance on national promotions / marketing

–

National Advertising Fund growth

Marketing Spend

National

(TV –

Print PR)

Co-Op

(Spot TV –

Radio –

Print)

Local

(Box-toppers,

local sponsorships)

3% of sales in 2004

4% of sales in 2005

5% of sales in 2006

5% of sales in 2007

4% of sales in 2008

Avg. 2.3% of sales in ‘04

Avg. 1.5% of sales in ‘05

Avg. 0.5% of sales in ‘06

Avg. 0.5% of sales in ‘07

Avg. 2% of sales in ‘08

Store by store decision

Averages 3% -

5% of

sales

Highly dependent on

franchisee resources and

confidence

History of National Promotions

Full Year -

Weeks

of National TV

2008

BFD &

Brooklyn/Philly

(5.2%) Comp

444 Promotion

(5.1%) Comp

Gotham City

Pizza

(6.1%) Comp

Oven-Baked

Sandwiches

2007

Cheesy Garlic

Bread Pizza

(2.9%) Comp

Brooklyn/Philly &

555 promotion

2.1% Comp

Philly/Brooklyn &

1 week of Oreo

(1.6%) Comp

3 weeks Oreo &

Crispy Melt Pizza

(3.5%) Comp

2006

Spectacular

Sevens/555 Deal

(3.8%) Comp

XLP one-topping

$9.99

(4.9%) Comp

Super Six Mix &

Brownies (2 wks)

(3.1%) Comp

Brownies &

Brooklyn Pizza

(4.4%) Comp

2005

555 Deal

11.2% Comp

Cheeseburger

Pizza

6.9% Comp

555 Deal

1.1% Comp

Steak Fanatics

Pizza

1.7% Comp

2004

$.99 Cheesy Dots

w/large 1 topping

(0.9%) Comp

Philly Cheese

Steak Pizza

2.1% Comp

555 Deal

8.0% Comp

Doublemelt

Pizza

(0.2%) Comp

Learning from the Past: 2005

Strategy & Tactics

–

“555”

became a sub-brand of Domino’s Pizza

–

Low cost delivered

pizza option –

VARIETY and VALUE

–

Drove ticket and

traffic

–

Other (LTO) promotions drove only ticket

Implications

–

Traffic decline was happening, but not for DPZ due to the success of

“555”

–

Part of success was securing another national roll-up from franchisees

for 2006

Jan/Feb/March

April

May/June

July/August

Sept/Oct

Nov/Dec

Oct

Learning From the Past: 2006

Strategy & Tactics

–

Knew rolling ’05 comps would be tough

–

Had more national TV weeks (38 vs. 34)

–

Pursued aggressive ticket growth strategy (through LTO/bundles)

–

Delivery charges were rolling out fast

Implications

–

Bad test reads and bad market timing

•

555 success skewed tests from the previous year

•

Missed the consumer (ticket too high –

too fast)

–

Bundles drove ticket, but traffic fell at a faster rate (LTOs

underperformed)

–

Secured another roll-up from franchisees for 2007

–

Delivery charge (“consumer tax”) -

further negative traffic pressure

Feb/Mar

Jan/Feb

Apr/May

May/June

June/July

August

Aug/Sept

Nov/Dec

Oct

Learning from the Past: 2007

Strategy & Tactics

–

Rolling weak comps (9 less TV weeks due to media inflation/alternative

media investments)

–

Continued with LTO promotions –

national events dominated calendar

–

Local store marketing (LSM) campaigns were most successful

•

Q2 positive comps

–

Increased prices (both menu and delivery) during year as costs rose

Implications

–

LTO events didn’t drive traffic

–

The steadily-rising ticket was weakening traffic more

–

Comps were weak –

the system was relying on national promotions that

weren’t working –

no roll-up for 2008!

Nov

Feb/Mar

Jan

April

May

June

July

Oct

Sept

July/Aug

Nov/Dec

Back to the Present: 2008

Strategy & Tactics

–

“You Got 30”

message –

heavy reliance on LSM

–

“Chased”

value message based on consumer malaise (BFD failure led to

444 promotion launch)

–

Started attacking traffic issue (sandwich tests and roll-out)

–

Stepped-up R&D –

get out of LTOs

and into menu/day part expansion

Implications To-Date

–

“You Got 30”

message didn’t change trends

–

444 message performed OK, but didn’t sustain traffic growth

–

Fewer weeks on TV –

competitors gained “share of voice”

advantage

–

Sandwiches growing traffic after years of decline

Feb

Jan.

Feb/Mar

Mar/Apr

Apr/May

May/June

July

Gotham

City Pizza

$9.99

The

Consequences:

Franchisee

Reactions

2005: Happiness!

Love the roll-up

Signed up for increased

roll-up in 2006

National marketing doing

much of the “work”

Costs “in check”

–

making

lots of money!

2006: What Happened?

Must be a blip…rolling

over tough comps

Costs are moving…but

store economics still

good

Let’s “give Ann Arbor

another chance”

–

Rolled-up again for 2007

–

Less local

spending/activity

The

Consequences:

Franchisee

Reactions

2007: What the Hell

Happened?

National promotions “don’t work any more”

Less money for Ann Arbor for 2008 (no roll-up)

Some increase in local store marketing

Environment getting tougher –

increasing costs are

a major problem!

The

Consequences:

Franchisee

Reactions

2008: When will it End?

Agency / client learning curve

Reduced share of voice

–

Less weeks on national TV

than in many years!

Continued traffic declines and

tremendous cost inflation

“No matter what I do, it isn’t

working”

–

store level

economics lousy

Hope on the horizon –

promising

test products and new media

strategy (no more LTOs!)

The

Consequences:

Franchisee

Reactions

The Consequences: Store Growth

Total

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

(’01-’05)

DPZ U.S.

Store Count

4,813

4,848

4,904

5,008

5,092

+279

Pizza Hut

Store Count

6,569

6,503

6,400

6,306

6,254

-315

Papa John’s

Store Count

2,589

2,585

2,574

2,565

2,599

+10

Historically Steady Growth

Consequences: Store Growth

DPZ U.S.

Open

Net

2005

172

2006

126

2007

138

126

2008

(through Q3)

140

(69)

Growth declined as sales declined

Consequences: Unit Economics

Squeezed

Sales

Declines

Profits

Squeezed

Higher

Minimum

Wage

Higher

Food

Cost

Lower

Traffic

Higher

Delivery

Cost

Decreasing

Advertising

Consequences: Unit Economics

Historically

Now

•

Growing Sales

•

Low Cost Volatility

•

High ROI

•

Good stores sold at lower multiples

•

Bad stores sold at “fire-sale”

rates

•

More upside potential than ever

$150-$250K to build

Bargains available

What We’ve Learned…

Traffic growth is key –

bring excitement back to

Domino’s Pizza

–

Sustainable, organic growth

–

Today’s traffic = tomorrow’s same-store sales results

LTOs

don’t drive sustained traffic

–

Need product platforms, not “product-of-the-month”

–

Need day part expansion

Need timely consumer insight and strategic response

–

Delivery charge “management”

–

Better pricing model (“barbell”)

–

Menu strategy

The 2008 Turnaround Plan

Patrick Doyle

President, Domino’s USA

Traffic Builder –

Near Term

New product appeal

New day part

Sandwiches Results from Test

Drove strong traffic and increased sales

40% of sandwich orders included a pizza

Sandwiches increased customer frequency by 30%

–

Improves the overall profitability of each customer

Sandwiches skewed towards carry-out (better margins)

Sandwich customers reported:

–

High product satisfaction

–

High repurchase intent

–

Better perception of Domino’s

Sandwiches –

National Roll-Out

Results from the first couple of weeks show that:

–

Traffic is strong –

the best results in over a year

–

Early sales results promising

–

Sandwiches are over 20% of mix

–

Still skewing towards carry-out (especially at lunch)

–

40% of sandwich orders include a pizza

–

Driving strong lunch sales (but we’re also selling a lot at

dinner)

–

So far, national results are coming in close to test results

Menu Strategy: New Product Platforms

Value –

Large party, small party & carry out

Premium –

Local Legends

Day

part

expansion

variety

–

sandwiches

pasta

Core pizza –

improve!

Ticket –

Desserts, sides and beverage

Online –

Enabler for broader menu, higher ticket

Menu Strategy

New Product Platforms

Pasta Perfecta

Local Legends

Three Cheese Mac-n-Cheese

Italian Sausage Marinara

Chicken Alfredo

Chicken Carbonara

Pasta Primavera

Philly Cheese Steak

Honolulu Hawaiian

Memphis Barbecue Chicken

Cali Chicken Bacon Ranch

Pacific Coast Veggie

Buffalo Chicken Pizza

Menu Strategy

New Product Platforms

Ready-To-Go

Chicken

Traditional and boneless

Six sauce flavors

Only in select stores

Three hot-hold, ready-to-go

items

Improve Current Product

Improved core pizza product

–

Dough

–

Sauce

–

Cheese

–

Toppings

Respect the Food

More Advertising

Asking franchisees for a roll-up in national advertising

Looking at options for partnership funding

Enough advertising to support all product and

promotional initiatives

Average Ticket Per Eater

Year Ending 2007

Source: The NPD Group/CREST

Pizza Delivery

Charge + Tip

$3-

+19%

+15%

+13%

+17%

Pricing: Perception vs. Reality

$4.20

$4.76

$5.72

$6.57

$8.21

$10.00

$5.14

$6.20

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total QSR

QSR Pizza

Pizza Delivery -

Party of 2

Pizza Delivery -

Party of 4

Pricing Lessons: “$-Eye”

Don’t over-price the single pie

Don’t increase delivery charge too much

Cull down coupons

Expand day part (lunch, late night)

Leverage online ordering

“A,”

“B”

and “F”

Franchisees’

YTD Stats

“A”

Franchisees

“B”

Franchisees

“F”

Franchisees

143

829

247

Stores

933

2895

644

Avg. Stores/Fran

6.5

3.5

2.5

2008 AWUS YTD

13,460

11,311

9,412

2008 PCYA

-5.0%

-5.9%

-8.5%

2008 DOT %

77.3%

76.3%

75.5%

Store Development & Recruitment

On track to open 100 -120 stores (125 opened in

2007)

70 new franchisees in the system YTD (vs. 93 for full

year 2007)

58 potential franchisees have attended Discovery Day

Plans are in place to save and transfer as many at-risk

stores as possible

U.S. Store Growth Expectations

Open 100 to 120

Close 225 to 250

Net -100 to -150

Bill Kapp

leading financial effort

–

Working to prevent closures

–

Even A’s and B’s struggling to finance purchases in past few weeks

Transition to store growth driven by sales growth

Prefer Quality vs. Quantity

Gulfport Vision 20/20 store

2009 and Beyond

Russell Weiner, CMO

Domino’s and Michigan: my new home!

“Classically-trained marketer”

–

Consumer brands (Pepsi, Phillip Morris)

–

Company and agency side

General management

–

Large projects, large teams, agency relationships

Collaborative philosophy

–

Attracts talent and drives results

Why I’m Here

The Domino’s team

The Domino’s brand

Upside potential!

Can make a difference

Karma

The next 90 days…

Forge a Lighthouse Identity for the Domino’s brand

–

Grounded in consumer insights

–

Informed by our past and inspired by the future

Lighthouse drives brand decisions

–

Store design

–

Advertising & Communications

–

Innovation

Innovation Philosophy…

Long-Term Approach

•

30 days and 30 years

Quality, Quality, Quality!

•

We’re delivery. We’re service. We’re 30 minutes…

AND the FOOD is great

•

Deliciously Fast

Born out of a rational business need…Developed with an

emotional POV that makes it uniquely Domino’s

Drive incremental growth and profitability

Our Vision for the Menu

Then and Now

(Handouts)

Operators of the Future

Closer to 5+ stores on average per franchisee

All “A”

and “B”

franchisees

No “F”

franchisees

Targeted exceptions for external franchisees

Team USA of the Future

Contribute more EBITDA

Test platforms

People pipeline

Maintain & Grow Stores

Same store sales increases...leverage “the four walls”

Targeted real estate improvements

Focus on struggling stores during tough times

Grow as business improves

Future Unit Economics

Need to assume that costs won’t dramatically change

–

Minimum wage increases staying

–

Commodities might flatten, might not

–

Delivery costs probably won’t improve

–

If costs decrease, we have upside

The way we will strengthen unit economics is to grow

the top line

–

“Grow your way to greatness”

Commodities and Costs

David Mounts, EVP Supply Chain

Q3 2008 Update

Commodities tough, but…

a better outlook

–

Domino’s commodity index

–

Domino’s food basket

Holy cow…

what’s up with cheese?

What we’re doing about it

Commodities Update –

External Real Time

Date

Cheese

Pork

Boxes

Wheat

Wings

Sauce

Beef

Diesel/Fuel

Electric

Kickers

Natural Gas

October 17, 2008

$1.79

$0.88

127.7

$6.40

$1.04

$63.00

$0.91

$77.46

$61.60

$1.29

$6.79

10 Yr Average

$1.41

$0.82

97.16

$3.95

$0.87

$53.22

$0.79

$39.01

$62.19

$0.88

$5.35

Unit

USD / Pound

Index

USD / Bushel

USD / Pound

USD / Barrel

USD / MWh

USD / Pound

USD / MMBTU

Ten Year Average

Domino's

Commodity

Index

Year

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

140.00

160.00

180.00

200.00

DCI

10 Year Avg. of DCI

Commodities –

Last Two Years, Ugh.

Why???

Domino's

Commodity

Index

Year

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

140.00

160.00

180.00

200.00

DCI

2 Year Avg. of DCI

Crude (blue)

vs. Corn Futures

Commodities -

Energy and Food

For 8 of 10 Years Not Correlated

But Then Corn Correlated Two Years

And Corn

Leads Beef, Pork, Chicken, Soy, Wheat

Crude (blue)

vs. Corn Futures

Q3 Culprits –

Fuel on Everything

Cheese Stayed High and…

Kickers

$0.00

$0.20

$0.40

$0.60

$0.80

$1.00

$1.20

$1.40

$1.60

Chicken

Beef

$0.00

$0.20

$0.40

$0.60

$0.80

$1.00

$1.20

Beef

Sauce*

$0.00

$10.00

$20.00

$30.00

$40.00

$50.00

$60.00

$70.00

Paperboard

100

120

140

Sauce

Boxes

Commodities –

Internal Food Basket

Core Products

Fixed or Contract

Pizza Cheese

Dough and Crust

Chicken Wings

Floating

Fuel

Sauce

Vegetables

Meats

Boxes

An indication of food cost to store

Hypothetical store -

$10K/week AWUS

Heavily influenced by price of cheese

Cheese and dough are approximately 50% of the price

of the basket

Competitive comparison quarterly

Commodities –

Internal Food Basket

Price Basket -

Trending

2,000

2,200

2,400

2,600

2,800

3,000

3,200

3,400

3,600

3,800

4,000

Period

2005

2006

2007

2008

Cheese Inc. -

$147

Cheese Inc. -

$165

Dough Inc. –

Phased in P1 & P2

Wing ‘K’

ends –

inc. $55 Cheese inc. $87

Cheese Inc. -

$108

Box ‘K’, P&P, Meat Inc. –

Total of $48

Cheese Inc. -

$106

Increases of DCI and Food Basket

2006

2007

YTD 2008

DCI

(1.74)

(1.53%)

24.82

21.85%

47.01

41.39%

Food Basket

($83.85)

(2.73%)

$230.10

7.48%

$499.25

16.23%

Increase over 2005

3 Party Price Comparison

3 Qtr Differences

Competitor 1

9.15%

Competitor 2

15.50%

Competitor 3

10.71%

Holy Cow…What’s Up With Cheese?

Not moving with oil

Supply / demand tight in dairy, particularly cheese

International prices above U.S. –

strong foreign demand

Butter has not carried its weight until recently

High farm input prices for feed

–

Causing liquidations and productivity reductions

Holy Cow…What’s Up With Cheese?

Summer

High gas and other high prices decreased domestic

demand

Milk flowed into cheese and powder increasing supply

International buying then picked up

Fall

Seasonal school milk tightened domestic demand

Cheese buyers replenished inventories, increasing

demand

Holy Cow…What’s Up With Cheese?

This just in:

Global financial crisis impacting key drivers

–

High export demand

–

High farm cost

Global demand softening

International supply increasing

International prices have dropped, reducing exports of

cheddar

Two forecasts for 2009

Soft demand $1.50 –

$1.60

Moderate demand $1.70 –

$1.80

Sources: USDA, Leprino, IAG

What are We Doing About all This?

New contract strategies:

–

Better supply contracts

–

Locked in prices via forwards

–

End-to-end price and logistics savings

New operating efficiencies:

–

Drove fewer miles

–

Used less fuel

–

More efficient warehouses

Panel Q&A

What’s Next? Lunch!

Brandon Solano, VP Brand Innovation

Vision 20/20 store

New product operations

Sampling test products at our “chef’s table”

in the test

kitchen

–

Taste products that have been or are in test

–

Not guaranteed to roll out nationally

Brand strategy at work!

Web-cast Break for Lunch

Back Around 1:15 p.m. EST

Financial Overview

Wendy Beck, CFO

Agenda

Asset Backed Securitization (ABS)

ABS 101

Revolver

Liquidity

Free Cash Flow

Operational considerations

Labor & Product Mix

Foreign currency impacts

Long Range Outlook

ABS Facility –

Key Terms

$1.6B Senior ABS debt –

5.961% cash interest rate

$0.1B Subordinated debt –

7.629% cash interest rate

$1.7B Total funded debt –

6.059% cash interest rate

$150M revolver facility

Senior debt wrapped with insurance

“Full-company securitization”

secured with most cash

flows of the company

Fixed rate with no amortization for 5 years

Two possible 1-year extensions

ABS Time Line

April 16, 2007 -

$1.7 billion ABS Debt Facility funded

•

6.06% fixed cash interest rate

•

Also includes $150 million unfunded revolver

April 16, 2014 –

Maturity if both 1-year extensions exercised

If not refinanced after 5 or 7 years:

•

30-Year Legal Maturity

•

100% of cash flow beyond servicing fee amortizes

April 16, 2012 –

5-year expected maturity,

•

Extensions likely to be more attractive than refinancing

5 Yrs

7 Yrs

1 Yr

30 Yrs

October 28, 2008 –

Investor Day, 1 year and 6 months after ABS

ABS Waterfall

Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR)

–

Defined as Collections / Senior Interest Expense

–

Collections cannot be calculated using publicly-disclosed

information, but it tracks closest to EBITDA

–

EBITDA performance would need to drop by $65 -

$75M annually

before first

trigger is reached

–

Triggers:

Est EBITDA

% of water-

Trigger

drop

fall trapped (*)

First

$65-$75M

25%

Second

$75-$85M

50%

Third

$95-$105M

100%

–

(*) Waterfall is after interest and minimal G&A service fee

ABS DSCR Extreme Stress Test

2009 Assumptions:

–

Domestic Net Store Growth

(500)

–

Domestic Same Store Sales Growth

(10%)

Results:

–

Our DSCR still exceeds the first

trigger

Current Credit Markets -

Insurers

Bond insurers have experienced credit issues

–

MBIA and Ambac

wrapped our ABS debt facility

Insurer Impact on Domino’s

–

Insurers’

troubles do not impact our current debt

facility or debt costs

–

Availability of future ABS-type debt facility diminished in

current economic climate

Current Credit Markets –

Revolver Lenders

In Q4, one of Domino’s lenders declared bankruptcy

–

Lender’s troubles do not impact our current

senior or subordinated debt or debt costs

–

Our revolver is likely impacted, though

–

However, we do NOT need the revolver for

operating needs

Revolver

Revolver facility

–

Original Capacity

$150.0mm

–

Capacity Lost

($90.0mm)

–

Current Capacity

$60.0mm

–

Less: LCs

outstanding ($38.3mm)

–

Total Currently Available

$21.7mm

Letters of Credit (LCs): unfunded commitments pledged to

insurance companies or lessors

Current LCs: $ 31.2M self-insurance reserves, $7.1M for

supply chain center leases and other

Liquidity

Main source is, and has always been, our free cash flow

We generate FCF of over $1M per week, on average (please see chart

on next page)

We have unrestricted cash of $20.1M at the end of Q3

The current revolver, as well as previous revolver facilities, have not

been used for working capital needs, but instead for dividend payments

and opportunistic share repurchases

We are exploring alternative sources of liquidity for maximum flexibility

but, again, we do not need the revolver for operating needs

Domino’s Free Cash Flow

•

Free Cash Flow = cash flow from operations minus CapEx

•

2005-2007 are pro-forma to reflect the current debt level

$77

$81

$54

$65

2005 PF

2006 PF

2007 PF

LTM Q3 2008

Domino's Free Cash Flow ($ millions)

Uses of Free Cash Flow

Return of Capital

Share Repurchases

Dividend Payments

Debt Repayments

Reinvest in the Business

Debt & Liquidity Summary

Comfortable with our capital structure and terms

of our ABS debt facility

Debt facility with:

–

6.06% fixed interest rates

–

A 5-year term with two 1-year extensions

Business model with low cash needs that

generates strong operating cash flow

Operational Considerations:

Minimum Wage Impact

Most corporate markets had 2008 and 2009 increases:

Min. Rate

2007

2008

2009

–

Fed Min Wage

$5.85

$6.55

$7.25

–

Florida

$6.67

$6.90

$7.25

–

Minnesota

$6.15

$6.55

$7.25

–

Arizona

$6.75

$6.90

$7.25

–

North Carolina

$6.15

$6.55

$7.25

–

Maryland

$6.15

$6.55

$7.25

Expected cost increase in 2008 and 2009 is about 1%

of sales each year, assuming no other changes

Operational Considerations:

Food Cost Comparison

Lowest to Highest Food Cost %

Bread

Pizza

Pasta

Chicken

Sandwich

Beverage

Foreign Currency Impact

International royalties are earned in local currencies

When the U.S. dollar strengthens, we receive fewer

U.S. dollars for the same amount of local currency

Currency has helped us to a limited extent the last

several years, as the U.S. dollar has weakened

This impact has turned negative for the 4 quarter, as

the U.S. dollar has strengthened

Impact for Our Major Currencies

= Weaker $ is Favorable to DPII EBITDA

2008 Full Year

Projected vs. 2007

2009 Projected

vs. 2007

British Pound

Euro

Mexican Peso

Canadian Dollar

Australian Dollar

Japanese Yen

Korean Won

= Flat

= Stronger $ is Unfavorable to DPII EBITDA

* See safe harbor statement relating to forward-looking statements

Foreign Currency Impact

Q4 2008 FX rates are estimated using consensus forecasts taken October 13, 2008

FX rates are volatile and further changes will impact results

Year-Over Year

Figures in $ millions, except per-share data

2008 Q3

2008 Q4

YE 2008

YTD

Forecast

2009

Gross Royalty

Sales Impact

$71.0

($78.3)

($7.3)

Revenues

Impact

$1.5

($2.2)

($0.7)

Estimated

Dilutes EPS

$0.02

($0.02)

($0.01)

Long Range Outlook & Possibilities

•

Long Range Outlook and Possibilities do not constitute specific

earnings guidance. Domino’s does not provide

quarterly or annual earnings estimates. See safe harbor statement relating to forward looking statements.

Long Range

Bull

Middle

Bear

Outlook

Case

Top Line Growth

- Domestic Same Store Sales

+1% to +3%

-2%

- International Same Store Sales

+3% to +5%

- Net Units

200 to 250

300

150

-50

Domestic

-100

-250

International

300

250

200

- Global Retail Sales

+4% to 6%

2009 Possibilities

Q&A

Domino’s Pizza

Michael Lawton

EVP Domino’s Pizza International

International –

A Big Piece of the Pie

Represented 3,469 stores across 60 markets¹

–

3-year store count CAGR of 8.1%

Accounted for over 40% of global retail sales

–

Posted $2.2 billion in Retail Sales in 2007

–

3-year retail sales CAGR of 15%²

Made up 30% of DPZ operating income³

In 2007, Domino’s International Division…

Store count as of YE 2007

International Retail Sales CAGR from 2004 -

2007

Based on adjusted operating income from 2007

Q3 2008 marks the

59 consecutive quarter of

positive same store sales

International Leadership with

Significant Upside

Based on 2007 YE total store count

Potential store count based on Domino’s Pizza International estimates

Top 10 Markets

YE 2007 Delivery Market

Stores

Position

Potential Store Count

Mexico

566

700

United Kingdom

467

900

Australia

405

550

South Korea

289

350

Canada

277

400

Japan

180

700

India

176

400

Taiwan

122

150

France

121

700

Turkey

300

TOTAL

2,687

5,150

Market Highlights

Smaller markets: Greece and Israel

–

Greece reached critical mass and began TV ads for the first time

–

Israel is growing phenomenally lately and Domino’s is the #1 pizza

brand in the country

Medium-sized markets: Malaysia and Saudi Arabia

–

Domino’s stores in Malaysia are expanding outside of Kuala Lumpur

–

46 stores in Saudi Arabia as sales continue to grow

Market Highlights

Continued success: France, Netherlands and India

–

France recently began advertising on TV

Up and coming market: Brazil

–

Strong growth from new partners

–

Building more stores -

currently in Rio and São Paulo is next target

New market: Indonesia, Qatar and Shanghai

–

First store in Jakarta opened in August

Continuing Success: 2008 Milestones!

750

Stores operated by Domino’s Pizza Enterprises

(Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, France, Belgium)

300

Stores operated by Domino’s Pizza Korea

200

Stores operated by Domino’s Pizza India

100

Stores operated by Domino’s Pizza Turkey

25 Anniversary of

Domino’s Pizza International

Michael Berkman

–

Grupo

Mozzarella

International Area Franchisee

Domino’s Pizza International Franchisee

since 1993

Began career as sub-franchisee for

ALSEA in Mexico

–

Became the largest sub-franchisee in

Mexico

Michael is now the Master Franchisee for

Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras

Joint Venture with the Master Franchisee

of Peru

Clipped the ribbon on the 3,000

international store

Domino’s Pizza

Michael Berkman –

Grupo Mozzarella

Agenda

Grupo

Mozzarella -

Current Status

How Did We Get There?

Maintaining One Brand, One System

Continuing Success

Q&A

Grupo Mozzarella

Where We Are Today

International Master Franchise Model

100

DPZ

Ann Arbor, Michigan

Master Franchisee:

ALSEA

Distribution

System

Corporate

Stores

Sub-

Franchise Stores

(Grupo Mozzarella)

Royalty

Store Profits

Distribution

System Profits

Where Grupo

Mozzarella Started

International Master Franchise Model

101

DPZ

Ann Arbor, Michigan

Master Franchisee:

Grupo Mozzarella

Distribution

System

Corporate

Stores

Royalty

Store Profits

Distribution

System Profits

Where Grupo

Mozzarella is Today

1993: Sub-franchised first store in Mexico from ALSEA

•

Quickly became the top sales store in Mexico

1996: Opened stores in two Wal-Mart stores

•

First Domino’s stores in Mexico to open inside another retail

outlet

1997: El Rosario store joins Domino’s Million Dollar Club

2000: Opens first store outside of Mexico City

2004: Becomes Mexico’s biggest sub-franchise with 27

stores

2005: ALSEA purchases all of Grupo Mozzarella’s stores

Grupo Mozzarella -

How it All Began

102

Grupo Mozzarella Mexico

Yearly Sales 1993 –

1998 ($ in Millions)

1995

1996

1997

1998

$2.6

$4.2

$4.8

1994

1993

$.45

$1.4

$6.8

210%

89%

61%

14%

42%

103

2001

2002

2003

2004

$9.3

$9.6

$11.4

2000

1999

$7.3

$8.2

$13.3

13%

18%

17%

104

And the Success Continued…

Yearly Sales 1999 –

2004 ($ in Millions)

How Did We Do It?

People

–

Robust training for all Managers, Customer Service Representatives,

Pizza Makers and Drivers

–

Strong relationships with suppliers, customers and the community

Intense focus on a quality product

Service: store operations built around 30-minute guarantee

Investment in the new store image, computer systems and

store-owned motorcycles.

105

Grupo

Mozzarella’s

Move to Central and South America

Panama

–

1989: First Domino’s store opens in Panama

–

2005: Grupo

Mozarella

enters Panama and opens the sixth store

–

2008: Plans to open the 11 store by year end

Costa Rica

–

1996: First Domino’s Pizza store opens in Costa Rica

–

2006: Grupo

Mozzarella enters Costa Rica and shortly opens the

eighth and ninth stores in the country

106

Grupo

Mozzarella’s

Move to Central and South America

Peru

–

1992: First store opens in Peru

–

2006: Grupo

Mozarella

enters into a Joint Venture with the Bolona

Family

–

2008: Operating 21 stores in Peru

Honduras

–

1987: First ever Domino’s Pizza store opens in Latin America

–

2008: Grupo

Mozarella

enters Honduras with plans to open stores

number 10 and 11 in 2009

Market Opportunity -

Panama

108

Republic of Panama

–

Population of 3.4 Million

Panama Economics

–

Dollarized Economy

–

37% below poverty line and 6.4% unemployment

Economic activities: banking, Panama Canal, construction

and tourism

Competition –

Pizza Hut, Tamburelli, Leonardos

and

Sbarro

Market Opportunity -

Costa Rica

Republic of Costa Rica

–

Population of 4.5 Million…..smaller than West Virginia!

Costa Rican Economics:

–

13% devaluation of currency, the Colon, in 2008

–

16% below poverty line and 4.6% unemployment

Economic activities: agriculture, call centers and tourism

Competition –

Pizza Hut, 2X1 Pizza and Papa John’s

109

Market Opportunity -

Honduras

110

Republic of Honduras

–

Population of 7.4 Million

–

Tegucigalpa–

1.2 Million

Honduras Economics:

–

Currency is the Lempiras

–

50% below poverty line and 27% unemployment

Primary economic activities: agriculture (coffee) and tourism

Competition –

Pizza Hut, Little Caesar’s and Sbarro

Grupo Mozzarella

in Panama

Annual

Sales ($ in millions)

2005

2006

2007

2008

$1.9

$2.5

$3.1

$4.8

32%

21%

56%

$1.1

71%

2004

111

Grupo Mozzarella in Costa Rica

Annual Sales ($ millions)

2005

2006

2007

2008

$1.7

$2.2

$2.4

$2.8

25%

9.5%

18.9%

$1.4

22%

2004

112

Grupo Mozzarella in Honduras

Annual Sales ($ millions)

2005

2006

2007

2008

$1.5

$1.7

$2.5

$2.8

16%

48%

12%

$1.2

17%

2004

113

8,000 Domino’s Pizza Store Opening

January 2006

Grupo

Mozzarella clipped the ribbon on the 3,000

international store in Panama City

–

5,000 store in the U.S. opened simultaneously in Huntley, Illinois

Celebration included fireworks and a visit from Panama’s

First Lady

Kicked off a program, “Gracias, Panama”

where Grupo

Mozzarella donated 8,000 pizzas to local charities

114

115

Best Practices

from Central America

Local store marketing

–

Direct mail

–

Massive door hanging events

Support system of strong area supervisors

Focusing on financial results: sales and profits

116

GRUPO MOZZARELLA CENTRAL AMERICA

Stores before....

Grupo Mozzarella Stores

Before Remodel

117

GRUPO MOZZARELLA CENTRAL AMERICA

New Image

Grupo Mozzarella –

New Image

118

One Brand –

One System

Same Core Strategy:

–

Focus on delivery

Marketing:

–

Same brand, logo and consumer promise

Operations:

–

Same layouts, training and people focus

Quality Control:

–

Same core products across the globe

–

Conduct audits and approve local suppliers

119

Localization

Store Operations

–

Central American stores often have sit-down area

•

People in developing countries prefer dining out

•

Over 50% is carry-out or in-store dining business

Local Product Adaptations

–

Crust, sauce and cheese remain the same as Domino’s

U.S.

–

Toppings and side items, if they meet Domino’s

specifications, are our local twist

120

Teriyaki Pizza in Peru

–

Mozzarella Cheese

–

Peppers

–

Onions

–

Mushrooms

–

Chicken

–

Teriyaki Sauce

121

Local Product Adaptations

GRUPO MOZZARELLA CENTRAL AMERICA

PROMOTIONS

Recognize this Promotion?

122

GRUPO MOZZARELA CENTRAL

AMERICA

PROMOTIONS

“2X Tuesday”

in the United States…

“2X1 Everyday”

Limited-Time Promotion in Costa Rica

123

Continuing Success in

Central America

Change stores to the new Vision 20/20 image

Optimize pricing

Call Center (a single phone number for the region)

Consolidate suppliers for more effective buys

Streamline promotions between the Central American countries

124

What’s Next for Grupo

Mozzarella

Store opening events

–

Company motorcycle caravans

–

Free

pizzas

team

members’

families

–

Mobil unit

–

Massive flyer distribution

–

Press

Expanding to other countries

–

Currently a Joint Venture with Peru

–

Goal is to also be in El Salvador and Nicaragua

Exciting promotions

–

Any pizza $7.99 -

Panamá

–

2X1 for 15 days -

Costa Rica

–

Mega-Deal -

Honduras

125

Thank you!

Questions?

Domino's Pizza (DPZ) 8-KRegulation FD Disclosure