Commitments and Contingencies | 3 Months Ended |
Mar. 31, 2014 |
Commitments And Contingencies Disclosure [Abstract] | ' |
Commitments and Contingencies | ' |
Note 13 – Commitments and Contingencies |
Litigation. The Company is subject to various asserted and unasserted claims during the course of business. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the litigation process, except for those matters for which an accrual is described below, the Company is unable to reasonably estimate the range of loss, if any, in connection with the asserted and unasserted legal actions against it. Although the outcome of many of these matters is currently not determinable, the Company believes that it has meritorious defenses and that the ultimate cost to resolve these matters will not have a material adverse effect on the Company’s consolidated financial statements. In addition to the legal proceedings discussed below, the Company is subject to various legal proceedings arising from normal business operations. |
The Company assesses the materiality of litigation by reviewing a range of qualitative and quantitative factors. These factors include the size of the potential claims, the merits of the Company’s defenses and the likelihood of plaintiffs’ success on the merits, the regulatory environment that could impact such claims and the potential impact of the litigation on its business. The Company evaluates the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome of the legal or regulatory proceedings to which it is a party in accordance with accounting guidance. This assessment is subjective based on the status of the legal proceedings and is based on consultation with in-house and external legal counsel. The actual outcomes of these proceedings may differ from the Company’s assessments. |
North Carolina. On February 8, 2005, the Company, two of its subsidiaries, including its subsidiary doing business in North Carolina, and Mr. Don Early, the Company’s Chairman of the Board, were sued in Superior Court of New Hanover County, North Carolina in a putative class action lawsuit filed by James B. Torrence, Sr. and Ben Hubert Cline, who were customers of a Delaware state-chartered bank for whom the Company provided certain services in connection with the bank’s origination of payday loans in North Carolina, prior to the closing of the Company’s North Carolina branches in fourth quarter 2005. The lawsuit alleges that the Company violated various North Carolina laws, including the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act, the North Carolina Check Cashers Act, the North Carolina Loan Brokers Act, the state unfair trade practices statute and the state usury statute, in connection with payday loans made by the bank to the two plaintiffs through the Company’s retail locations in North Carolina. The lawsuit alleges that the Company made the payday loans to the plaintiffs in |
violation of various state statutes, and that if the Company is not viewed as the “actual lenders or makers” of the payday loans, its services to the bank that made the loans violated various North Carolina statutes. Plaintiffs are seeking certification as a class, unspecified monetary damages, and treble damages and attorney fees under specified North Carolina statutes. Plaintiffs have not sued the bank in this matter and have specifically stated in the complaint that plaintiffs do not challenge the right of out-of-state banks to enter into loans with North Carolina residents at such rates as the bank’s home state may permit, all as authorized by North Carolina and federal law. |
In July 2011, the parties completed a weeklong hearing on the Company’s motion to enforce its class action waiver provision and its arbitration provision. In January 2012, the trial court denied the Company’s motion to enforce its class action and arbitration provisions. The Company has appealed that ruling to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. On February 4, 2014, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred, and ordered the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit and that the parties proceed to arbitration. It is now expected that plaintiffs will seek review of this decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court. That review is discretionary, however, so there is a possibility that the Supreme Court will refuse review. It is expected that the Company will know if the Supreme Court will review the case by mid-2014. If the Supreme Court accepts review, the parties will file briefs and argue the matter before the Supreme Court. That would likely result in an issued decision from the Supreme Court no earlier than mid-2015. |
There were three similar purported class action lawsuits filed in North Carolina against three other companies unrelated to the Company. The plaintiffs in those three cases were represented by the same law firms as the plaintiffs in the case filed against the Company. Settlements in each of the three companion cases were reached by the end of 2010; however, the settlements do not provide reasonable guidance on settlements in the Company’s case, especially in light of the favorable decision by North Carolina Court of Appeals on the Company arbitration clause. |
Canada. On September 30, 2011, the Company acquired all the outstanding shares of Direct Credit, a British Columbia company engaged in short-term, consumer Internet lending in certain Canadian provinces. On October 18, 2011, Matthew Lee, an alleged Alberta, Canada resident sued Direct Credit, all of its subsidiaries and three former directors of those subsidiaries in the Supreme Court of British Columbia in a purported class action. The plaintiff alleges that Direct Credit and its subsidiaries violated Canada’s criminal usury laws by charging interest on its loans at rates higher than 60%. The plaintiff purports to represent all Canadian borrowers of the subsidiary who resided outside of British Columbia. |
Plaintiff sought (i) class certification for the class described above, (ii) a declaration that loan fees collected in excess of the 60% limit in the cited usury statute are held by the defendants in constructive trust for the benefit of the class members, (iii) an accounting and restitution to plaintiff and class members of all loan fees received by the defendants, (iv) a declaration that the collection of the loan fees in excess of 60% per annum constitutes an unconscionable trade act or practice under the Canadian Business Practices Consumer Protection Act, (v) an order to restore to the class members the loan fees collected by defendants in excess of 60% per annum, and (vi) interest thereon. |
On March 19, 2014, the Supreme Court of British Columbia entered a judgment regarding certain procedural matters relating to the class action, including (i) a formal rule certifying the class (which Direct Credit had not opposed), (ii) setting a 10-year statute of limitation period for the covered claims from the date the complaint was filed on October 18, 2011, (iii) setting end dates for the class period, which varies from province and territory, (iv) providing that all class members that entered into loan agreements on or after June 20, 2009 will be class members unless they opt out of the class, (v) proving that all other class members must opt into the class within three months after the notice of class certification is issued, and (vi) certain related matters. |
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The parties have reached an oral settlement of this matter, subject to negotiation and execution of a written settlement agreement and receipt of required court approval of the settlement terms. The Company’s share of the proposed settlement amount and ancillary expenses, net of indemnification from the prior owners of Direct Credit, is expected to be approximately $500,000. The Company has reserved in the accompanying financial statements the estimated gross liability for settling this litigation or the agreed upon terms and recorded an indemnification asset due from the prior owners. |
California. On August 13, 2012, the Company was sued in the United States District Court for the South District of California in a putative class action lawsuit filed by Paul Stemple. Mr. Stemple alleges that the Company used an automatic telephone dialing system with an “artificial or prerecorded voice” in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, et seq. The complaint does not identify any other members of the proposed class, nor how many members may be in the proposed class. This matter is in the early stages of litigation. The Company has filed an answer denying all claims. It is expected that class briefing will occur in the second quarter of 2014. |
Other Matters. The Company is also currently involved in ordinary, routine litigation and administrative proceedings incidental to its business, including customer bankruptcies and employment-related matters from time to time. The Company believes the likely outcome of any other pending cases and proceedings will not be material to its business or its financial condition. |