Instead, we were met with closed minds and conclusions already in hand. The Committee had obviously decided in advance – even before our conversation – to unhesitatingly back Mr. Moriarty as CEO and to rebuff any arguments in favor of restarting a strategic review process. We were shocked that our fiduciaries were so dismissive of our perspectives, before even listening to us. This stance is contrary to any conception of good corporate governance, especially on the part of individuals who are supposed to be our fiduciaries.
We were also surprised that the Committee has rejected the opportunity, as a supposedly independent group of directors, to avail itself of independent, outside advice. Rather, the Committee has elected to use the Company’s incumbent counsel, Goodwin Procter, which has long served at the pleasure of the current CEO. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Johnson of Goodwin Procter interjected into our conversation to protect the interests of his longstanding benefactor, Mr. Moriarty.
Most troubling, the Committee had the audacity to tell us that we do not understand or represent the views or best interests of Leaf’s shareholders. But if not us, then who? The Committee’s position relies on the faulty premise that it somehow understands the views of the other 60% of holders and that those other shareholders would wholesale disagree with our perspectives. This mythical 60% of shareholders, we are expected to believe, are pleased with a negative 43% shareholder return over the last year. They are, apparently, satisfied that shareholders have lost 60% of their capital during Mr. Moriarty’s tenure as CEO. We doubt that.
The Committee told us, effectively, that even though owners of 40% of the Company were gravely concerned about the management and strategic direction of the Company, the Board knows better and is comfortable that the “silent majority” is supportive of a value-destroying CEO and failed strategy. We cannot think of another Board that has been so confident in its views in the face of such significant value destruction and substantial, public shareholder opposition to the status quo.
We know that it is convenient for this Board to find excuses to justify its own inaction and failure to oversee effectively management and the strategic alternatives process. Perhaps it is easier to conjure a “silent majority” than face the reality of failed oversight and leadership. But we expect better. Candor demands that the Board admit the current CEO and strategy have failed and, even more importantly, fiduciary duty demands that the Board align itself with the interests of actual shareholders.
Given the cavalier conduct of the Committee and this Board in response to our concerns about the management and strategy of the Company, we do not believe shareholders should trust the incumbent directors to make critical decisions about the leadership or strategy of the Company or its Board composition. While the Committee admitted there are legitimate concerns regarding the independence of the Board, it appears to believe the Board can be trusted to fix these problems on its own, without shareholder input. To the contrary, we believe that shareholders must be given a direct voice in the composition of the Board and the leadership of the Company. Our conviction on this critical point has only grown, given the dismissive attitude of the Committee toward our legitimate concerns.
With respect to allowing shareholders’ voices to be heard, the Board should also permit its former directors – Brian Regan, a Managing Director of Spectrum Equity, and John Hawkins, a Managing Director of Generation Partners – to speak candidly to fellow shareholders about the strategic review process.
Mr. Regan and Mr. Hawkins are signatories to this letter on behalf of the investment funds each is affiliated with, which are each large shareholders of the Company. In its July 2nd letter, the Board claimed that these former directors knew the strategic alternatives process was well executed. However, the rest of the Investors in this group and the broader shareholder base are not aware of Mr. Regan’s and Mr. Hawkins’ perspectives on the strategic review process – aside from what we can infer based on the fact that they desired to join the Investors in this campaign – because, as the Board knows, they are bound by confidentiality agreements with the Company that prevent them from speaking about their observations.