MINDBODY, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company” or “MINDBODY”), filed its definitive proxy statement (the “Proxy Statement”) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on January 23, 2019, relating to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of December 23, 2018 (the “Merger Agreement”), by and among the Company, Torreys Parent, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“Parent”), and Torreys Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Parent (“Merger Sub”), pursuant to which Merger Sub will merge with and into the Company, with the Company surviving the merger and becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent (the “Merger”). Capitalized terms used herein but not defined have the meanings set forth in the Proxy Statement.
Stockholder Litigation
As previously disclosed in the Company’s Form8-K and Schedule 14A filed on January 29, 2019, after the Proxy Statement was filed, the following putative class actions were commenced by purported stockholders of the Company:
(i) in the United States District Court of Delaware, captioned Sabatini v. MINDBODY, Inc., et al., CaseNo. 1:19-cv-00138-UNA (the “Sabatini Complaint”);
(ii) in California Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County, captioned Schmit v. MINDBODY, Inc., et al., Case No. 19CV-0043 (the “Schmit Complaint”), which was subsequently dismissed voluntarily without prejudice on February 1, 2019;
(iii) in the United States District Court of Central District of California, captioned Tran v. MINDBODY, Inc., et al., CaseNo. 2:19-cv-00638 (the “Tran Complaint”); and
(iv) in the Court of Chancery of Delaware, captioned Ryan v. MINDBODY, Inc., et al., Case No. 2019-0061 (the “Ryan Complaint”).
The Ryan Complaint alleges, among other things, that the irrevocable proxies granted by Richard Stollmeyer, the Company’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Company Board, certain parties related to Richard Stollmeyer, and Institutional Venture Partners XIII, L.P. (the “Signing Stockholders”) caused a transfer of voting control of the Signing Stockholders’ Class B common stock, which in turn caused the Signing Stockholders’ shares of Class B common stock to be automatically converted into shares of Class A common stock entitled to one vote for each such share of Class A common stock, as opposed to ten votes for each share of Class B common stock. If, as alleged in the Ryan Complaint, the Class B common stock held by the Signing Stockholders were converted into shares of Class A common stock, then, as of the Record Date: (i) there would have been 47,763,583 shares of Class A common stock and 252,950 shares of Class B common stock outstanding and entitled to vote at the Special Meeting, (ii) 25,146,542 votes would constitute a majority of the voting power of the outstanding shares of MINDBODY common stock required to adopt the Merger Agreement and the holders of such majority of the voting power would constitute a quorum at the Special Meeting, (iii) the Signing Stockholders would have held, in the aggregate, approximately 6.33% of the voting power of the outstanding shares of MINDBODY’s common stock (and approximately 8.43% when taking into account MINDBODY options and RSUs held, in the aggregate, by the Signing Stockholders), and (iv) our directors and executive officers would have held, in the aggregate, approximately 1.33% of the voting power of the outstanding shares of MINDBODY’s common stock (and approximately 9.33% when taking into account MINDBODY options and RSUs held, in the aggregate, by our directors and executive officers). The Company vigorously disputes the allegations in the Ryan Complaint and the claim that the Signing Stockholders’ shares of Class B common stock were converted into Class A common stock, and believes that the numbers and percentages as of the Record Date are as set forth in the Proxy Statement. However, even if the Class B common stock were converted into Class A common stock as alleged in the Ryan Complaint, the Board of Directors nonetheless encourages stockholders to vote “FOR” the adoption of the Merger Agreement and the other proposals set forth in the Proxy Statement.
As previously disclosed in the Company’s Schedule 14A, also filed on January 29, 2019, counsel for Luxor Capital Partners, LP, Luxor Wavefront, LP, Lugard Road Capital Master Fund, LP, Luxor Capital Partners Offshore Master Fund, LP, Luxor Capital Partners Offshore, Ltd., Luxor Capital Group, LP, LCG Holdings, LLC, Lugard Road Capital GP, LLC and Luxor Management, LLC (together, “Luxor”) sent a demand letter (“the Luxor Demand Letter”) to MINDBODY pursuant to Section 220(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”).
After the Company’s January 29th filings, on January 30, 2019, Luxor filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery of Delaware, captionedLuxor Capital Partners, LP, et. al. v. MINDBODY, Inc., Case No. 2019-0070 (the “Luxor Complaint”), included below, on January 31, 2019, Hyan Tang, a purported stockholder of the Company, filed a putative class action suit in the United States District Court of Delaware, captionedTang v. MINDBODY, Inc., et al., Case No.1:19-cv-00210-UNA (the “Tang Complaint”), included below; and on February 4, 2019, Sunil Kumar, a purported stockholder of the Company, filed a putative class action suit in the United States District Court of the Central District of California, captionedKumar v. MINDBODY, Inc. et al., Case No. (the “Kumar Complaint,” included below, and together with the Sabatini Complaint, the Schmit Complaint, the Tran Complaint, the Ryan Complaint, the Luxor Complaint and the Tang Complaint, the “Complaints”).