Cohen & Steers Tax-Advantaged Preferred Securities and Income Fund (PTA) N-CSRS 6 Jul 23 Certified semi-annual shareholder report (management investment company) Financial data

N-2

N-2	6 Months Ended
	Apr. 30, 2023
Cover [Abstract]
Entity Central Index Key	0001793882
Amendment Flag	false
Document Type	N-CSRS
Entity Registrant Name	Cohen & Steers Tax‑Advantaged Preferred Securities and Income Fund
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk Factors [Table Text Block]	Note 8. Other Risks Risk of Market Price Discount from Net Asset Value: Preferred Securities Risk: Contingent Capital Securities Risk: Concentration Risk: Credit and Below-Investment-Grade Securities Risk: Liquidity Risk: Foreign (Non‑U.S.) Securities Risk: Foreign Currency Risk: Leverage Risk: yield that is greater than the total cost of leverage, the leverage strategy will produce higher current net investment income for the shareholders. On the other hand, to the extent that the total cost of leverage exceeds the incremental income gained from employing such leverage, shareholders would realize lower net investment income. In addition to the impact on net income, the use of leverage will have an effect of magnifying capital appreciation or depreciation for shareholders. Specifically, in an up market, leverage will typically generate greater capital appreciation than if the Fund were not employing leverage. Conversely, in down markets, the use of leverage will generally result in greater capital depreciation than if the Fund had been unlevered. To the extent that the Fund is required or elects to reduce its leverage, the Fund may need to liquidate investments, including under adverse economic conditions which may result in capital losses potentially reducing returns to shareholders. The use of leverage also results in the investment advisory fees payable to the investment advisor being higher than if the Fund did not use leverage and can increase operating costs, which may reduce total return. There can be no assurance that a leveraging strategy will be successful during any period in which it is employed. Derivatives and Hedging Transactions Risk: Geopolitical Risk Although the long-term economic fallout of COVID‑19 is difficult to predict, it has contributed to, and may continue to contribute to, market volatility, inflation and systemic economic weakness. COVID‑19 and efforts to contain its spread may also exacerbate other pre‑existing political, social, economic, market and financial risks. In addition, the U.S. government and other central banks across Europe, Asia, and elsewhere announced and/or adopted economic relief packages in response to COVID‑19. The end of any such program could cause market downturns, disruptions and volatility, particularly if markets view the ending as premature. The COVID‑19 pandemic and its effects are expected to continue, and therefore the economic outlook, particularly for certain industries and businesses, remains inherently uncertain. On January 31, 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) withdrew from the European Union (EU) (referred to as Brexit), commencing a transition period that ended on December 31, 2020. The EU‑UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, a bilateral trade and cooperation deal governing the future relationship between the UK and the EU (TCA), provisionally went into effect on January 1, 2021, and entered into force officially on May 1, 2021, but critical aspects of the relationship remain unresolved and subject to further negotiation and agreement. Brexit has resulted in volatility in European and global markets and could have negative long-term impacts on financial markets in the UK and throughout Europe. There is still considerable uncertainty relating to the potential consequences of the exit, how the negotiations for new trade agreements will be conducted, and whether the UK’s exit will increase the likelihood of other countries also departing the EU. During this period of uncertainty, the negative impact on the UK, European and broader global economies, could be significant, potentially resulting in increased market volatility and illiquidity, political, economic, and legal uncertainty, and lower economic growth for companies that rely significantly on Europe for their business activities and revenues. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine significantly amplifying already existing geopolitical tensions. The United States and many other countries have instituted various economic sanctions against Russia, Russian individuals and entities and Belarus. The extent and duration of the military action, sanctions imposed and other punitive actions taken (including any Russian retaliatory responses to such sanctions and actions), and resulting disruptions in Europe and globally cannot be predicted, but could be significant and have a severe adverse effect on the global economy, securities markets and commodities markets globally, including through global supply chain disruptions, increased inflationary pressures and reduced economic activity. To the extent the Fund has exposure to the energy sector, the Fund may be especially susceptible to these risks. Furthermore, in March 2023, the shut-down of certain financial institutions raised economic concerns over disruption in the U.S. banking system. There can be no certainty that the actions taken by the U.S. government to strengthen public confidence in the U.S. banking system will be effective in mitigating the effects of financial institution failures on the economy and restoring public confidence in the U.S. banking system. These disruptions may also make it difficult to value the Fund’s portfolio investments and cause certain of the Fund’s investments to become illiquid. The strengthening or weakening of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies may, among other things, adversely affect the Fund’s investments denominated in non‑U.S. dollar currencies. It is difficult to predict when similar events affecting the U.S. or global financial markets may occur, the effects that such events may have, and the duration of those effects. LIBOR Risk: (e.g., the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) for U.S. dollar LIBOR and the Sterling Overnight Index Average Rate for GBP LIBOR). Other countries are introducing their own local-currency-denominated alternative reference rates for short-term lending and global consensus on alternative rates is lacking. In March 2022, the U.S. federal government enacted the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act (the LIBOR Act) to establish a process for replacing LIBOR in certain existing contracts that do not already provide for the use of a clearly defined and practicable replacement benchmark rate as described in the LIBOR Act. Generally, for contracts that do not contain clear and practicable fallback provisions as described in the LIBOR Act, a benchmark replacement recommended by the Federal Reserve Board will effectively replace the U.S. dollar LIBOR benchmark after June 30, 2023. The recommended benchmark replacement will be based on SOFR, which is published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and will include certain spread adjustments and benchmark replacement conforming changes. On December 16, 2022, the Federal Reserve Board adopted a final rule that implements the LIBOR Act. The final rule restates safe harbor protections contained in the LIBOR Act for selection or use of the replacement benchmark rate selected by the Federal Reserve Board. Consistent with the LIBOR Act, the final rule is also intended to ensure that LIBOR contracts adopting a benchmark rate selected by the Federal Reserve Board will not be interrupted or terminated following LIBOR’s replacement. The transition away from LIBOR may lead to increased volatility and illiquidity in markets that are tied to LIBOR, reduced values of, inaccurate valuations of, and miscalculations of payment amounts for LIBOR-related investments or investments in issuers that utilize LIBOR, increased difficulty in borrowing or refinancing and reduced effectiveness of hedging strategies, adversely affecting the Fund’s performance or NAV. In addition, any alternative reference rate may be a less effective substitute resulting in prolonged adverse market conditions for the Fund. Since the usefulness of LIBOR as a benchmark could deteriorate during the transition period, these effects could occur prior to the cessation of LIBOR publications. Regulatory Risk:
Risk of Market Price Discount from Net Asset Value [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Risk of Market Price Discount from Net Asset Value:
Preferred Securities Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Preferred Securities Risk:
Contingent Capital Securities Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Contingent Capital Securities Risk:
Concentration Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Concentration Risk:
Credit and Below Investment Grade Securities Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Credit and Below-Investment-Grade Securities Risk:
Liquidity Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Liquidity Risk:
Foreign Non U S Securities Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Foreign (Non‑U.S.) Securities Risk:
Foreign Currency Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Foreign Currency Risk:
Leverage Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Leverage Risk: yield that is greater than the total cost of leverage, the leverage strategy will produce higher current net investment income for the shareholders. On the other hand, to the extent that the total cost of leverage exceeds the incremental income gained from employing such leverage, shareholders would realize lower net investment income. In addition to the impact on net income, the use of leverage will have an effect of magnifying capital appreciation or depreciation for shareholders. Specifically, in an up market, leverage will typically generate greater capital appreciation than if the Fund were not employing leverage. Conversely, in down markets, the use of leverage will generally result in greater capital depreciation than if the Fund had been unlevered. To the extent that the Fund is required or elects to reduce its leverage, the Fund may need to liquidate investments, including under adverse economic conditions which may result in capital losses potentially reducing returns to shareholders. The use of leverage also results in the investment advisory fees payable to the investment advisor being higher than if the Fund did not use leverage and can increase operating costs, which may reduce total return. There can be no assurance that a leveraging strategy will be successful during any period in which it is employed.
Derivatives and Hedging Transactions Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Derivatives and Hedging Transactions Risk:
Geopolitical Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Geopolitical Risk Although the long-term economic fallout of COVID‑19 is difficult to predict, it has contributed to, and may continue to contribute to, market volatility, inflation and systemic economic weakness. COVID‑19 and efforts to contain its spread may also exacerbate other pre‑existing political, social, economic, market and financial risks. In addition, the U.S. government and other central banks across Europe, Asia, and elsewhere announced and/or adopted economic relief packages in response to COVID‑19. The end of any such program could cause market downturns, disruptions and volatility, particularly if markets view the ending as premature. The COVID‑19 pandemic and its effects are expected to continue, and therefore the economic outlook, particularly for certain industries and businesses, remains inherently uncertain. On January 31, 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) withdrew from the European Union (EU) (referred to as Brexit), commencing a transition period that ended on December 31, 2020. The EU‑UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, a bilateral trade and cooperation deal governing the future relationship between the UK and the EU (TCA), provisionally went into effect on January 1, 2021, and entered into force officially on May 1, 2021, but critical aspects of the relationship remain unresolved and subject to further negotiation and agreement. Brexit has resulted in volatility in European and global markets and could have negative long-term impacts on financial markets in the UK and throughout Europe. There is still considerable uncertainty relating to the potential consequences of the exit, how the negotiations for new trade agreements will be conducted, and whether the UK’s exit will increase the likelihood of other countries also departing the EU. During this period of uncertainty, the negative impact on the UK, European and broader global economies, could be significant, potentially resulting in increased market volatility and illiquidity, political, economic, and legal uncertainty, and lower economic growth for companies that rely significantly on Europe for their business activities and revenues. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine significantly amplifying already existing geopolitical tensions. The United States and many other countries have instituted various economic sanctions against Russia, Russian individuals and entities and Belarus. The extent and duration of the military action, sanctions imposed and other punitive actions taken (including any Russian retaliatory responses to such sanctions and actions), and resulting disruptions in Europe and globally cannot be predicted, but could be significant and have a severe adverse effect on the global economy, securities markets and commodities markets globally, including through global supply chain disruptions, increased inflationary pressures and reduced economic activity. To the extent the Fund has exposure to the energy sector, the Fund may be especially susceptible to these risks. Furthermore, in March 2023, the shut-down of certain financial institutions raised economic concerns over disruption in the U.S. banking system. There can be no certainty that the actions taken by the U.S. government to strengthen public confidence in the U.S. banking system will be effective in mitigating the effects of financial institution failures on the economy and restoring public confidence in the U.S. banking system. These disruptions may also make it difficult to value the Fund’s portfolio investments and cause certain of the Fund’s investments to become illiquid. The strengthening or weakening of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies may, among other things, adversely affect the Fund’s investments denominated in non‑U.S. dollar currencies. It is difficult to predict when similar events affecting the U.S. or global financial markets may occur, the effects that such events may have, and the duration of those effects.
LIBOR Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	LIBOR Risk: (e.g., the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) for U.S. dollar LIBOR and the Sterling Overnight Index Average Rate for GBP LIBOR). Other countries are introducing their own local-currency-denominated alternative reference rates for short-term lending and global consensus on alternative rates is lacking. In March 2022, the U.S. federal government enacted the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act (the LIBOR Act) to establish a process for replacing LIBOR in certain existing contracts that do not already provide for the use of a clearly defined and practicable replacement benchmark rate as described in the LIBOR Act. Generally, for contracts that do not contain clear and practicable fallback provisions as described in the LIBOR Act, a benchmark replacement recommended by the Federal Reserve Board will effectively replace the U.S. dollar LIBOR benchmark after June 30, 2023. The recommended benchmark replacement will be based on SOFR, which is published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and will include certain spread adjustments and benchmark replacement conforming changes. On December 16, 2022, the Federal Reserve Board adopted a final rule that implements the LIBOR Act. The final rule restates safe harbor protections contained in the LIBOR Act for selection or use of the replacement benchmark rate selected by the Federal Reserve Board. Consistent with the LIBOR Act, the final rule is also intended to ensure that LIBOR contracts adopting a benchmark rate selected by the Federal Reserve Board will not be interrupted or terminated following LIBOR’s replacement. The transition away from LIBOR may lead to increased volatility and illiquidity in markets that are tied to LIBOR, reduced values of, inaccurate valuations of, and miscalculations of payment amounts for LIBOR-related investments or investments in issuers that utilize LIBOR, increased difficulty in borrowing or refinancing and reduced effectiveness of hedging strategies, adversely affecting the Fund’s performance or NAV. In addition, any alternative reference rate may be a less effective substitute resulting in prolonged adverse market conditions for the Fund. Since the usefulness of LIBOR as a benchmark could deteriorate during the transition period, these effects could occur prior to the cessation of LIBOR publications.
Regulatory Risk [Member]
General Description of Registrant [Abstract]
Risk [Text Block]	Regulatory Risk: