Shareholder Proposal #2
Discussion. In our earlier letters to Broadway, dated February 10, 2020 and February 18, 2020, we described the shareholders’ disappointment with the value-destroying “shareholder rights plan” adopted by the Board on September 10, 2019 (the “Poison Pill”). We noted that the Poison Pill makes no commercial sense for a company whose publicly traded shares already suffer from very limited liquidity. After implementation of the Poison Pill, Broadway’s shares traded down from $1.73 the day before the Poison Pill was announced to as low as $1.26 in February—a 27% decline even prior to the market impact of the novel coronavirus. In March, Broadway’s shares have traded as low as $1.04, representing a 40% decline in share price. We also noted that Broadway’s stated rationale for the Poison Pill—that the Board does not believe Broadway’s trading price reflects the Company’s true value3—rings hollow where the same Board regularly grants itself and management stock and stock equivalents at market price. This price is now further depressed as a result of the Poison Pill. Moreover, we observed that the Poison Pill violates Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis best practices, runs counter to the best interests of disinterested stockholders and in favor of Broadway’s nearly 40% shareholder, an affiliate of Gapstow Capital Partners, which also holds a seat on the Board. We therefore make the following shareholder proposal:
Proposal #2: RESOLVED, thatthe Board of Directors take all action to cause as soon as practicable and in any event prior to June 30, 2020 (i) the termination and redemption of the Rights Agreement dated as of September 10, 2019, and (ii) the adoption of a bylaw or charter amendment providing that any subsequent shareholder rights plan or “poison pill” shall be subject to a mandatory shareholder vote.
Shareholder Proposal #3
Discussion. In our review of Broadway’s governance documents, we have encountered numerous provisions that conflict with best practices , the stated goals of the Board, and the recommendations of the leading public company governance and proxy advisory services.4 These provisions are intended to make it difficult for concerned shareholders to enhance governance and protect the value of their holdings. Instead, entrenched and underperforming members of the Board can put the integrity of Broadway and its subsidiary thrift at risk without shareholder oversight. (For example, Broadway’s bylaws (the “Bylaws”) permit removal of a director only upon conviction of a felony or a court judgment of misconduct or gross negligence. However, bank regulators, customers and investors rightly apply a more stringent standard to the behavior of bank board members.) We therefore make the following shareholder proposal:
Proposal #3: RESOLVED, that the Board conduct a review of the Bylaws and other governance documents and revise these to comply in all material respects with the governance recommendations of ISS and Glass Lewis & Co., to the extent appropriate, to correct typographical errors, internal inconsistencies and any conflicts with applicable laws and regulations, including the following:
1. To amend and restate Section 4.12 of the Company’s Bylaws by deleting the last sentence thereof and to read in its entirety as follows:
“A director may be removed only for cause as determined by the affirmative vote of the holders of at least a majority of the shares then entitled to vote in an election of directors, which vote may only be taken at an annual meeting or a special meeting.”
2. To amend and restate Section 3.5 of the Company’s Bylaws to read in its entirety as follows, to include the underlined new language:
“Special meetings of stockholders for the purpose of taking any action permitted the stockholders by law and the certificate of incorporation of this corporation may be called at any time by the Boardor at the written request of holders ofone-third or more of the shares entitled to vote at such special meeting. Except in special cases where another express provision is made by statute, notice of such special meetings shall be given in the same manner as for annual meetings of stockholders.”
The submission of shareholder proposals #1 through #3 is timely. Pursuant to Section 3.2.2 of the Bylaws, shareholder proposals must be submitted on or before the date that is 30 days in advance of the date of the previous year’s annual meeting. Since the 2019 annual meeting was held on June 26, 2019, shareholder proposals are timely if submitted by Wednesday, May 27, 2020.
Director Nomination
Discussion. We note that director Daniel A. Medina reaches the end of his appointed term on the Board this June. We believe this presents the necessary opportunity to improve the composition of the Board by replacing Mr. Medina with a more relevant and capable community-focused leader to guide Broadway in its mission and challenges.
3 | Per Broadway’s letter to Steven Sugarman et al., dated February 12, 2020. |
4 | Moreover, we noted several typographical errors and missing or garbled provisions, which suggest the need for a thorough professional review of these important governance documents. |
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