IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC., Plaintiff, v. AIRGAS, INC., PETER MCCAUSLAND, JAMES W. HOVEY, PAULA A. SNEED, DAVID M. STOUT, ELLEN C. WOLF, W. THACHER BROWN, RICHARD C. ILL, LEE M. THOMAS AND JOHN C. VAN RODEN, JR., Defendants. | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) | C.A. No. ________ |
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (“Air Products”), by and through its undersigned attorneys, files this verified complaint (the “Complaint”) against Airgas, Inc. (“Airgas”), and Peter McCausland, James W. Hovey, Paula A. Sneed, David M. Stout, Ellen C. Wolf, W. Thacher Brown, Richard C. Ill, Lee M. Thomas and John C. van Roden, Jr. (collectively, the “Defendant Directors”) upon knowledge as to matters relating to itself and upon information and belief as to all other matters, and alleges as follows:
NATURE AND SUMMARY OF ACTION
1. Today, February 4, 2010, Air Products publicly announced a non-discriminatory, all-cash offer (the “Proposed Transaction”) to purchase all outstanding Airgas shares for $60 per share—a 38% premium to today’s closing price of $43.53. The offer is supported by committed financing. Air Products is offering Airgas’s shareholders consideration equal to the full pre-offer market capitalization of Airgas plus an additional $1.35 billion, all in cash. Moreover, Air Products has committed to increasing its offer price to reflect any incremental value demonstrated by Airgas and to taking the other steps necessary to close a deal.
2. The only obstacles standing between Airgas’s shareholders and due consideration of this high-premium offer are the shareholders’ own entrusted fiduciaries—the Defendant Directors. For months, Air Products has sought to engage the Defendant Directors to present its case for combining Airgas’s North American packaged gas business with Air Products’ global tonnage and liquid bulk gas businesses, creating a premier gas company across all geographies and distribution channels. In its overtures, Air Products has consistently stressed its flexibility on both the price and the form of consideration that Airgas’s shareholders would receive. But the Defendant Directors—led by Airgas’s founder, President, largest shareholder, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Peter McCausland—have refused even to meet with Air Products’ representatives to investigate and understand the proposal in any detail. Upon information and belief, this “just say no” defensive posture is calculated to entrench McCausland as Chief Executive and Chairman and to protect the other Defendant Directors’ positions in Airgas, at the sacrifice of the unique and valuable opportunity offered to Airgas’s shareholders.
3. Air Products brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Defendant Directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties. Air Products is proposing a transaction that is non-coercive, non-discriminatory, backed by committed financing, and priced at a large premium to Airgas’s pre-offer market value today and its 52-week high. As such, it is in the best interests of Airgas shareholders for this offer to be, at the very least, considered and negotiated by a special committee of Airgas’s independent directors advised by independent financial and legal advisors. The Defendant Directors’ refusal even to form an independent committee and to discuss the proposal with Air Products constitutes an unreasonable response to Air Products’ proposal, one that violates the Defendant Directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law. The Defendant Directors cannot inform themselves concerning, or properly assess, the Air Products proposal, consistent with their duty of care, without meeting with Air Products either directly or through advisors. The Defendant Directors’ “just say no” reflexive response, apparently at the behest of their Chairman, represents a violation of their duty of loyalty to Airgas shareholders.
THE PARTIES
4. Plaintiff Air Products is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business at 7201 Hamilton Boulevard, Allentown, Pennsylvania 18195. Air Products serves technology, energy, industrial and healthcare customers globally with a portfolio of products, services and solutions that include atmospheric gases, process and specialty gases, performance materials, equipment and services.
5. Air Products beneficially owns 1,508,255 shares of Airgas common stock.
6. Defendant Airgas is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business at 259 North Radnor-Chester Road, Suite 100, Radnor, Pennsylvania 19087. Airgas is predominately a domestic distributor of gases and hardgoods.
7. Defendant Peter McCausland is the Chief Executive Officer of Airgas and the Chairman of the Airgas Board, positions he has held since May 1987. McCausland has also served as President of Airgas from January 2005 to the present, and formerly served in that position from June 1986 to August 1988, from April 1993 to November 1995 and from April 1997 to January 1999. McCausland founded Airgas in 1982.
8. Defendant Ellen C. Wolf is, and was at all relevant times, a member of the Airgas Board. She is Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of American Water Works Company, Inc.
9. Defendant W. Thacher Brown is, and was at all relevant times, a member of the Airgas Board. He was formerly President of 1838 Investment Advisors, LLC from July 1988 until May 2004.
10. Defendant James W. Hovey is, and was at all relevant times, a member of the Airgas Board. He is President of The Fox Companies, a real estate development firm.
11. Defendant Richard C. Ill is, and was at all relevant times, a member of the Airgas Board. He is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Triumph Group, Inc.
12. Defendant Paula A. Sneed is, and was at all relevant times, a member of the Airgas Board. She is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Phelps Prescott Group LLC.
13. Defendant David M. Stout is, and was at all relevant times, a member of the Airgas Board. He was formerly President of Pharmaceuticals at GlaxoSmithKline from January 2003 to February 2008.
14. Defendant Lee M. Thomas is, and was at all relevant times, a member of the Airgas Board. He is President and Chief Executive Officer of Rayonier, Inc.
15. Defendant John C. van Roden, Jr. is, and was at all relevant times, a member of the Airgas Board. He served as Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of P.H. Glatfelter Company from 2003 to 2006.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Proposed Transaction Would Fuel Higher Growth
16. Air Products has been pursuing a business combination with Airgas for approximately four months. Air Products decided to approach Airgas after Air Products’ management and Board of Directors determined that such a combination would foster growth and shareholder returns superior to those of the respective companies on their own. A key driver of that assessment, in addition to the combination of world-class competencies and cost synergies, was the highly complementary nature of the two businesses.
17. Air Products and Airgas are comparatively strong in different areas. Air Products was founded by the late Leonard P. Pool in 1940 on a simple but revolutionary idea: the concept of “on-site” production and sales of industrial gases. At the time, gas was sold to even the largest consumers only in cylinders. Pool built gas generating facilities adjacent to large-volume gas users, thereby reducing distribution costs. Today, Air Products is a leader in the delivery of tonnage gas (i.e., gas delivered via pipeline) and liquid bulk gas (i.e., gas delivered via tanker trucks). On the other hand, the heart of Airgas’s business—built through over 400 acquisitions—is the delivery of packaged gas (i.e., gas delivered via small cylinders and dewars) to small-volume industrial, medical, and specialty users. Combining these two businesses would marry Air Products’ leading bulk infrastructure, engineering, and low-cost supply with Airgas’s leading packaged gas distribution and sales systems. The result: the leading gas company in America, able to offer a wide variety of gas products more efficiently and at lower cost.
18. Air Products’ analysis also revealed that the two companies are geographically complementary. Air Products has invested heavily in producing a world-wide gas infrastructure, to the point that today Air Products earns a majority of its revenue from international sales. Airgas’s packaged gas business, on the other hand, is primarily confined to the United States. Though Airgas has signaled its desire to expand internationally, building out the necessary infrastructure is slow and costly. A combination with Air Products would immediately provide a preexisting infrastructure for Airgas’s business to expand.
19. Air Products concluded that the combined company would:
| ● | Result in a geographically diverse, full-service business in all three modes of industrial gas supply: packaged, liquid bulk and tonnage; |
| ● | Create the largest industrial gas company in North America and the third largest industrial gas company in the world, headquartered in Pennsylvania; |
| ● | Provide an integrated platform of engineering, operations and back office capabilities; |
| ● | Possess enhanced capabilities to reach and service customers; |
| ● | Increase cash flow and access to capital to fund expansion globally; |
| ● | Propel the combined company to grow materially faster than the respective companies could grow alone. |
20. As a standalone company, Airgas’s performance has faltered. On January 28, 2010, Airgas publicly announced its fiscal third quarter results. The market was surprised by a 25% fall in Airgas’s earnings from the same quarter last year, which translated to reported earnings lower than the low-end of the earnings guidance Airgas had previously issued. Airgas also lowered its future earnings targets.
21. Another benefit arising from the complementary, rather than overlapping, nature of Air Products’ and Airgas’s businesses is the mitigation of regulatory concerns. Before approaching Airgas, Air Products carefully assessed regulatory issues that might arise and determined that any such issues can be addressed through limited, identifiable remedies. In particular, Air Products concluded that a number of credible buyers exist for businesses and facilities that might be at issue, a conclusion bolstered by the fact that these assets are capable of being operated on a standalone or “bolt-on” basis. Indeed, the very assets likely to be divested, to a significant extent, have previously been bought and sold between gas companies. As repeatedly communicated to Airgas, Air Products stands prepared to share the results of its regulatory analyses once representatives from the two companies meet.
22. Air Products’ management is experienced in running packaged gas businesses. For example, Air Products currently operates a large and successful European packaged gas business and a growing Asian packaged gas business, both of which would serve as platforms for Airgas’s growth in these areas. Moreover, Air Products previously operated a packaged gas business in the United States. This business, which at the time held a modest share of domestic sales, and had limited breadth and scope, was sold to Airgas in 2002. As Air Products’ representatives explained at that time, rather than invest its capital in building out this mode of supply, the company instead sought to focus on growing its tonnage (particularly hydrogen) and liquid bulk businesses. With those objectives largely accomplished, a combination with Airgas now would produce a company with first-class competencies across all three modes of supply.
| B. | Air Products Informally Approached Airgas and Was Unreasonably Rebuffed |
23. On October 15, 2009, the Chief Executive Officers of Air Products (John E. McGlade) and Airgas (Peter McCausland) met at Airgas’s headquarters. McGlade suggested the meeting that week to discuss a business proposal. At the meeting, McGlade indicated that Air Products was interested in pursuing a business combination with Airgas in a stock-for-stock deal that would value Airgas at a substantial premium to its then market price and allow Airgas shareholders to share in the value created by the combination.
24. McGlade told McCausland that careful study had convinced Air Products’ managers and directors that joining forces with Airgas would create a premier industrial gas company. Through geographic and business diversification, cost savings, and highly complementary business capabilities, shareholders of both companies could expect to reap significant additional returns.
25. After hearing McGlade’s proposal to join ranks, and Air Products’ rationale behind it, McCausland said that the timing was not right.
26. In response, McGlade stressed that, in Air Products’ view, the best time for a transaction was now. Among other reasons: (1) the economy was emerging from a recession, which created a window to integrate the companies and achieve synergies at lower cost; (2) Airgas is just beginning to implement SAP software systems—a notoriously time-consuming and expensive process—and Air Products could share its seven years of experience implementing SAP; and (3) Airgas is likely to begin spending capital on an international infrastructure, a costly expense that would be made unnecessary by a merger with Air Products’ extensive global infrastructure.
27. Accordingly, McGlade asked McCausland to discuss Air Products’ proposal with Airgas’s Board of Directors and signaled his intent to put Air Products’ offer in writing. McCausland remained noncommittal but asked that nothing be sent to him in writing.
28. On October 31, 2009, one week before Airgas was scheduled to hold its Board of Directors “annual retreat”, McGlade called McCausland to reaffirm Air Products’ commitment to a transaction and the expectation that the offer would be presented to, and duly considered by, Airgas’s Board. McCausland responded that he doubted that the Board of Directors would view the proposal differently than he did and again asked that nothing be sent to him in writing.
29. In early November, the Airgas Board of Directors held its retreat. A few days after the Defendant Directors concluded the multi-day meetings, McCausland returned McGlade’s call. Despite the high-premium offer available to Airgas’s shareholders, McCausland stated that the Defendant Directors had no interest in even exploring the proposal, and rejected the invitation to further discuss it. Upon information and belief, the Defendant Directors failed even to form a special committee of independent directors with independent advisors to evaluate the offer. The Defendant Directors rejected the offer as “undervalued”, despite its high premium to Airgas’s market price and despite knowing that Airgas was performing below its own guidance to the market.
| C. | The Defendant Directors Dismissed Air Products’ Written Offer Without Reasonable Investigation |
30. On November 19, 2009, at a meeting of Air Products’ directors, McGlade reported on Airgas’s response to Air Products’ overture. The Air Products Board of Directors resolved to authorize McGlade to make a written offer to Airgas.
31. The next day, McGlade sent a letter to McCausland setting out the basic terms of Air Products’ offer. See Exhibit A hereto. Air Products offered to acquire all of Airgas’s outstanding shares for $60 per share in an all-stock transaction, equivalent to 0.7296 shares of Air Products common stock based on its then-current market price. That afternoon, Airgas’s stock closed trading on the New York Stock Exchange at $47.05 per share. Thus, the offer’s nearly $13 extra per share represented a premium of 27.5% to the market price of Airgas’s stock.
32. In his letter, McGlade reiterated what he had told McCausland orally: that combining Air Products’ global leadership in liquid bulk and tonnage gases with Airgas’s leadership in North American packaged gases would unleash faster earnings growth, both domestically and internationally.
33. McGlade also wrote that Air Products was ready and willing to negotiate with Airgas if Airgas found the offer unsatisfactory. In particular, Air Products has consistently stated that it will share any additional value that Airgas identifies with Airgas’s shareholders, and the November 20 letter reiterated that point:
| [W]e welcome the opportunity to identify incremental value above and beyond what we have offered and are prepared to engage with you promptly to better understand the sources of that value and how best to share the value between our respective shareholders. To that end, we and our advisors request a meeting with you and your advisors as soon as possible, both to explore such additional sources of value and to move expeditiously towards consummating a transaction. | |
Id. at 1–2.
34. In a November 25 letter, McCausland responded to the written offer tersely. See Exhibit B hereto. McCausland wrote that Airgas’s Board would meet in early December to consider Air Products’ offer and that McCausland would contact McGlade after the meeting.
35. On December 8, 2009, McCausland wrote to McGlade that the Defendant Directors had considered Air Products’ offer and rejected it. See Exhibit C hereto. According to McCausland, the Defendant Directors concluded that Air Products was “undervaluing” Airgas and that Air Products’ stock was a “currency that [was] not attractive”. Id. at 1. For those reasons, the Defendant Directors purportedly had “no interest” in pursuing the possible benefits of such a deal for Airgas’s shareholders. Id. Upon information and belief, the offer was not considered by a special committee of independent directors advised by independent advisors. And the Defendant Directors concluded that Air Products’ offer—despite its high premium to Airgas’s market price—undervalued Airgas, despite knowing that Airgas’s results in the fiscal third quarter would be below market expectations.
36. The Defendant Directors not only rejected the premium offer, but also flatly stated that they had no interest in even continuing a dialogue between the two companies, despite Air Products’ stated willingness to modify the terms of its offer in response to any demonstration that there is value in Airgas which Air Products is overlooking. Instead, McCausland told McGlade that the Defendant Directors “do not believe that any purpose would be served” by having the companies or their advisors meet. Id. at 2. The Defendant Directors did not propose a counter-offer to Air Products’ original offer or tell Air Products why they value Airgas’s stock so differently than do the buyers and sellers of Airgas’s highly liquid stock trading in an efficient market.
| D. | The Defendant Directors Unreasonably Dismissed Air Products’ Improved Offer |
37. Air Products remained committed to pursuing an acquisition of Airgas that would maximize shareholder value and improve the performance of both companies. In a letter dated December 17, 2009, McGlade informed McCausland that, in a good faith effort to start discussions between the two companies, Air Products was raising its offer to $62 per share. See Exhibit D hereto. To address the Defendant Directors’ purported concerns about the attractiveness of Air Products’ stock, Air Products also offered to fund up to half the purchase in cash. Air Products’ revised offer now represented a 33% premium to Airgas’s closing price on the New York Stock Exchange that day.
38. Additionally, McGlade yet again communicated that Air Products would work flexibly with Airgas to reach a mutually acceptable deal, including on price: “If you believe that there is incremental value above and beyond our increased offer, we stand willing to listen and to understand your points on value with a view to sharing increased value appropriately with the Airgas shareholders.” Id. at 5. Believing that a continued exchange of letters could not adequately communicate the details of and rationale for Air Products’ offer, McGlade requested a meeting among the Boards and advisors of each company “as soon as possible to explore additional sources of value in Airgas”. Id.
39. Shortly thereafter, the Defendant Directors again summarily rejected Air Products’ offer, without a good faith evaluation of its benefits for Airgas’s shareholders and without any attempt to investigate or negotiate its terms. Upon information and belief, the Defendant Directors continued to fail to form a special committee of independent directors advised by independent advisors. Instead, on January 4, 2010, McCausland wrote to inform McGlade that the Defendant Directors had purportedly met and concluded that Air Products was “grossly” undervaluing Airgas—despite Airgas’s flexible offer being set at a large premium. See Exhibit E hereto. In his letter, McCausland shut down any exploration of this unique opportunity for Airgas’s shareholders: “[T]he Board is not interested in pursuing your company’s proposal and continues to believe that there is no reason to meet.”
Id. at 1.
40. Upon information and belief, the Defendant Directors’ rejections of Air Products’ proposals were delivered while they had knowledge that Airgas’s financial results for the fiscal third quarter (i.e., the quarter ending December 31, 2009) would be disappointing and would cause a drop in the market price of Airgas’s shares. This became evident on January 28, 2010, when Airgas publicly announced that its fiscal third quarter earnings were below the lowest range of the earnings guidance it had given to the market, and also lowered its future earnings guidance.
| E. | The Director Defendants’ Disregard for the Interests of Airgas’s Shareholders Continues |
41. Since January 4, the Defendant Directors have continued their unreasonable rejections of Air Products’ offer to Airgas’s shareholders. Air Products’ advisors have called Airgas’s advisors and reaffirmed Air Products’ willingness to negotiate. Through their advisors, the Defendant Directors have continued to refuse engagement. On February 1, Air Products’ advisors made one last attempt to persuade the Defendant Directors, through their advisors, to engage in discussions. Airgas’s legal advisors responded that the Defendant Directors’ position on a meeting with Air Products had not and would not change. Airgas’s financial advisors responded that there is a regularly-scheduled meeting of Airgas’s Board of Directors set for next week, but refused to reveal what date the Board meeting is actually scheduled and gave no indication that the Board would be addressing Air Products’ repeated proposals. None of Airgas’s advisors even suggested a willingness to meet with Air Products or its advisors or to otherwise discuss the possibility of a transaction.
42. Today, February 4, 2010, Air Products sent a letter to the Defendant Directors reiterating its proposal to combine with Airgas, with the hope that the Defendant Directors will finally begin to fulfill their fiduciary duties to Airgas’s shareholders. See Exhibit F hereto. Because of the increased costs associated with a non-negotiated deal, and because the current offer is now an all-cash offer with committed financing from J.P. Morgan (which entails additional costs such as financing commitment fees), Air Products is offering $60 per share in cash. The Defendant Directors’ unreasonable responses to the offer have imposed costs that will be borne by Airgas’s shareholders unless the Defendant Directors start to put their shareholders first. At $60 per share, a 38% premium to Airgas’s pre-offer market value, the Proposed Transaction presents Airgas’s shareholders with a very compelling opportunity.
43. The fact that the offer is now all cash negates any purported concern on the Defendant Directors’ part as to the value of Air Products’ shares as “currency” or as to the future performance of the combined company, unfounded as they may be. Air Products has thus demonstrated its willingness to be responsive to the Defendant Directors’ concerns, and in its current offer letter Air Products has reiterated its willingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and to adjust its offer to reflect any incremental value in Airgas that can be demonstrated.
44. Airgas has a Shareholder’s Rights Plan (“poison pill”) and has not opted out of 8 Del. C. § 203. A refusal on the part of the Defendant Directors to take appropriate action relating to the poison pill and Section 203 will prevent Airgas shareholders from receiving the benefits of Air Products’ offer. The actions of the Defendant Directors thus far, as reported by Mr. McCausland, suggest that the Defendant Directors will refuse to take the appropriate action, and may not form a special committee of independent directors, advised by independent advisors, to consider the Air Products offer and to consider whether to engage in discussions with Air Products.
IRREPARABLE HARM
45. Air Products realleges and reaffirms the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
46. Air Products has no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of the Court’s equitable powers will Air Products and Airgas’s shareholders be protected from irreparable injury. Absent equitable relief from the Court, Air Products will be precluded from consummating the Proposed Transaction and Airgas’s shareholders will be deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares to Air Products at a substantial premium. Should that occur, Air Products will have lost the unique opportunity to acquire Airgas, and Airgas shareholders will have lost a unique opportunity to maximize value.
COUNT I
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
47. Air Products realleges and reaffirms the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
48. The Defendant Directors owe fiduciary duties to Airgas’s shareholders, including the duty to act with due care and the utmost good faith and loyalty.
49. The Proposed Transaction is all-cash, non-discriminatory, backed by committed financing, and for all of Airgas’s shares. It is non-coercive and negotiable, is fair to Airgas’s shareholders, and poses no threat to its corporate policy and effectiveness. The Proposed Transaction represents a substantial premium (38%) over today’s closing price for Airgas’s common stock.
50. Peter McCausland, Airgas’s President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board of Directors, is not an independent, outside, or disinterested director. Seeking to entrench himself, he has not recused himself from the Board of Directors’ responses to Air Products’ proposals, but has instead dictated them. The other Defendant Directors, aware of McCausland’s interested status, have failed to insist on forming a special committee with independent advisors. Instead, they have sought to entrench themselves and to further McCausland’s interests. The Defendant Directors’ conduct represents a violation of their duty of loyalty to Airgas shareholders.
51. The Defendant Directors failed to conduct a good faith and reasonable investigation of the Proposed Transaction. Instead, the Defendant Directors summarily refused to engage Air Products in a meaningful dialogue and failed to reasonably inform themselves about the Proposed Transaction. The Defendant Directors could not possibly be well informed concerning the offers to which they have “just said no” without at least engaging in discussion, either directly or through advisors, to learn more about Air Products’ offer and how flexible Air Products might be in response to any showing of incremental value in Airgas. This is a violation of the Defendant Directors’ duty of care.
52. The Defendant Directors’ refusal to negotiate with Air Products deprives Airgas’s shareholders of the opportunity to sell their Airgas shares at a substantial premium and, accordingly, to maximize the value of their shares in an uncertain economic environment.
53. The Defendant Directors’ failure to adequately consider the Proposed Transaction and to negotiate with Air Products has no economic justification, serves no legitimate purpose, is an unreasonable response to the Proposed Transaction, which poses no threat to the interests of Airgas’s shareholders, and is a violation of the Defendant Directors’ duty of loyalty.
54. The Defendant Directors’ actions are in breach of the fiduciary duties they owe to Airgas’s shareholders.
55. The Defendant Directors’ conduct threatens to deprive Air Products of the unique opportunity to acquire Airgas.
56. Air Products has no remedy at law.
COUNT II
(Declaratory and Injunctive Relief)
57. Air Products realleges and reaffirms the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
58. The Defendant Directors owe fiduciary duties to Airgas’s shareholders, including the duty to act with due care and the utmost good faith and loyalty.
59. The Proposed Transaction is all-cash, non-discriminatory, backed by committed financing, and for all of Airgas’s shares. It is non-coercive and negotiable, is fair to Airgas’s shareholders, and poses no threat to its corporate policy and effectiveness. Moreover, the Proposed Transaction represents a substantial premium (38%) over today’s closing price for Airgas’s common stock.
60. Air Products seeks an order declaring that the Defendant Directors’ fiduciary duties require them to form a special committee of independent directors, advised by independent legal and financial advisors, to investigate, consider and negotiate (without impediments) the Proposed Transaction.
61. Air Products seeks an order declaring that the adoption, maintenance or implementation of any defensive measures by Defendants against the Proposed Transaction, or of any measure that would prevent a future board of directors from exercising its fiduciary duties, would itself constitute a breach of fiduciary duties owed to Airgas’s shareholders.
62. Air Products has no remedy at law.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
63. WHEREFORE, Air Products respectfully requests that the Court:
a) declare that Defendant Directors have breached their fiduciary duties to Airgas’s shareholders by refusing to negotiate with Air Products and to inform themselves of the potential parameters of the offer, and by failing to form a special committee of independent directors, with independent advisors, to consider and negotiate the offer;
b) compel the Defendant Directors to form a special committee of Airgas’s independent directors, with its own independent financial and legal advisors, to reasonably consider and negotiate the Proposed Transaction, in good faith;
c) enjoin the Defendant Directors from engaging in any action or inaction that has the effect of improperly impeding, thwarting, frustrating or interfering with the Proposed Transaction with Air Products in a manner inconsistent with their fiduciary duties;
d) enjoin Airgas, its employees, agents and all persons acting on its behalf or in concert with it from taking any action that has the effect of impeding Air Products’ efforts to acquire control of Airgas, in violation of their respective fiduciary duties to Airgas’s shareholders;
e) | | award Air Products its costs and disbursements in this action, including reasonable attorneys’ and experts’ fees; and |
| | |
f) | | grant Air Products such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. |
| | /s/ Kenneth J. Nachbar | |
| | Kenneth J. Nachbar (Bar I.D. 2067) Jon E. Abramczyk (Bar I.D. 2432) Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP 1201 North Market Street, 18th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 658-9200 Attorneys for Plaintiff Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. | |
Dated: February 4, 2010
OF COUNSEL:
Francis P. Barron
David R. Marriott
Gary A. Bornstein
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
Worldwide Plaza
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