Activism should be welcomed. If nothing else, it spurs debate about the most effective way to run companies. At best, it can prompt changes that benefit all investors. But there are shades of grey. Why, for instance, should an investor who may account for less than 5 per cent - as is believed to be the case with Heinz - get direct representation on the board? Nelson Peltz, chief executive of Trian Fund Management, as well as Peter May, president, are on the list as the potential nominees that Trian could push for in a Heinz proxy battle. Independent nominees - as with Wendy's and Time Warner - seem fairer. Other investors may also want to gauge how long-term the activists are. Do they, for instance, intend to sell into the buybacks they have advocated? It is their right to do so but other investors may wish to know this before supporting them.
June 12, 1997 | | Dow Jones WebReprint Service® |
Peltz’s Pay and the
Spirit of the Age
By ROGER LOWENSTEIN
Ordinarily, the news that Nelson Peltz, chairman of Triarc, had taken a $2 million bonus would hardly merit a footnote. By current fat-cat standards, $2 million doesn’t rate. And compared with Mr. Peltz’s ne worth, which Forbes magazine put at $620 million, it is chump change. Mr. Peltz, after all, is a titan of industry, a man who travels by private helicopter.
But Mr. Peltz’s bonus was not, as the recent proxy statement notes, an ordinary award, but a “special bonus,” and in this, it was emblematic of the spirit of chief executive officers all over. Get what you can—however you can get it.
Mr. Peltz bought control of Triarc in 1993 from one Victor Posner, who, in a sort of lifetime-achievement award for various misdeeds, would be barred by a federal judge from running a public company.
Triarc, a struggling conglomerate, owned Arby’s restaurants, RC Cola, a propane business and other interests. The day after Mr. Peltz got control, he took 600,000 options for himself and 400,000 for his faithful Sancho Panza, Peter May. These options were, according to Triarc, then worth $10.2 million.
The next year, in March, Messrs. Peltz and May took a total of 125,000 more options, worth $1.5 million. Then, a month later, in April 1994, they hauled in their big catch—a mammoth grant of 3.5 million options (60% going to Mr. Peltz) worth $32 million. These last were subject to shareholder approval. And there was a catch. According to the proxy statement, this huge grant was made "in lieu of base salary, annual performance bonus and long-term compensation" for the six years starting in April 1993. Shareholders voted in favor.
Gordon Wolf, a principal at Towers Perrin, which recommended the plan, boasted that Messrs. Peltz and May, by taking salaries of $1 a year, were “extraordinary” examples of a bold new breed of executives. Mr. Wolf told this newspaper, “They really wanted to put their entire compensation at stake.”
Messrs. Peltz and May could afford this because, in the 1980s, with financing from Michael Milken, the had made a bundle with fortuitously timed investments in Triangle Industries. Though they delivered at Triangle, their unusually high pay attracted notice, prompting Mr. Peltz to observe that if Andrew Carnegie had endured such criticism, he could do no less.
After they became dollar-a-year men at Triarc, one might have expected these Carnegies and Morgans to forgo taking more options. But no sooner did they haul in their big grant than the stock fell by half—eroding the value of that grant. Later that year, the duo took 400,000 more options worth $2.5 million. And in 1995, 250,000 options worth $1.4 million. Of course, you can’t spend an option if the stock doesn't rise. But you can spend money.
And for 1996—kudos to consultant Graef Crystal for spotting it—Mr. Peltz took a $2 million cash bonu and Mr. May a $1 million cash bonus. What about working for $1 a year? Oh, these are “special bonuses,” awarded for paying down debt, selling assets, restructuring and such. Mr. Peltz, in an interview, says the board always intended to leave the door ajar “if we did something special.” Indeed, h said, that intention is clear from the minutes. It just isn't clear from the proxies that went to investors.
Mr. Peltz says the proxies didn’t rule out “all compensation.” It merely said his big award was in lieu of base salary, “annual bonus and long-term”compensation. But in a section entitled “Overview of Executive Compensation,” Triarc said its program comprises “three principal elements”: base salary and annual and long-term incentives.
When I asked whether the proxy should have mentioned something about a “special bonus,” Mr. Peltz said, “You’re probably right, as hindsight is 20-20. The intent was not to mislead. I will attempt to get my attorneys to rewrite that section.” Sorry, fellas, the election's over.
And what about his continued taking of options—aren’t they a form of “long-term” compensation? Mr. Peltz, on advice from his lawyer, says, “That was meant to be ’long-term cash compensation.’ ” Funny how these guys have trouble saying what they mean.
It doesn“t stop there. This March, Messrs. Peltz and May took 300,000 more options. In an unusual step, the options were priced at only 85% of the market price—because, Triarc said, the stock was lower in December, when it usually grants options. Should they exercise, this discount will put an extra $663,000 in their pockets.
Wall Street expected a quick turnaround when Messrs. Peltz and May took over but was disappointed. Despite a rebound, the stock has trailed the market during their reign. But Triarc is a changed company. It has acquired Mistic beverages and, most recently, Snapple, and the Street is high on it again. Maybe this time, it will work out. If so, Mr. Peltz, who controls 28% of the stock, will get plenty richer on his one huge grant. What business—what possible earthly incentive—did he have taking more?
By the way, the head of the compensation committee is Gerald Tsai Jr., no naif on CEO pay. As head of Primerica, he grabbed a $28 million parachute for selling his company. He didn't return my calls.
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March 10, 2005 | Dow Jones WebReprint Service® |
Ex-Raider Peltz
Turns Activist,
With Hedge Fund
By DAVID REILLY
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Over more than two decades, Nelson Peltz bought businesses, polished them up and sold them again a few years later, often racking up hefty profits.
Now, instead of purchasing companies outright, the billionaire investor is buying small stakes in them and pushing for change. And he’s doing so through a newly created hedge fund that has raised more than $1 billion.
Since launching this venture in November, Mr. Peltz has pressed for a change in strategic tack or board seats at CBRL Group Inc., owner of the Cracker Barrel restaurant chain; fast-food restaurant operator Wendy’s International Inc., and food producer H.J. Heinz Co. So far, CBRL and Wendy’s have given in to some of his demands; A battle at Heinz has yet to play out.
The foray into hedge-fund activism has put Mr. Peltz back in the Wall Street spotlight, reviving memories of investing successes dating back to the junk-bond era of the 1980s—as well as scrapes with his own shareholders that have some on Wall Street questioning his activist credentials.
Mr. Peltz’s changed modus operandi reflects the popularity among large shareholders of taking matters into their own hands to boost returns. Despite slowing flows of money into once red-hot hedge funds, investors still want to ride along with a marquee-name manager.
Investors looking to join Mr. Peltz’s crusade must be willing to carry a heavy burden: His hedge-fund outfit, Trian Fund Management LP, requires minimum investments of $25 million, according to a person familiar with the firm. That’s a hurdle even for hedge funds, lightly regulated partnerships that often require their wealthy clients to pony up at least $1 million.
Plus, Trian’s investors have to keep their money with the firm for three years, this person said. Such lockups are becoming more common—in some cases because they allow the funds to avoid new Securities and Exchange Commission oversight rules—but many investors still balk at losing control for so long.
Mr. Peltz and longtime business partner Peter W. May, who is also a principal in Trian, declined to comment on the firm.
Besides Trian, the pair controls about 40% of Triarc Companies Inc., the publicly traded company they have used for deals since 1993. Triarc is considering a restructuring that would see Messrs Peltz and May, along with Triarc’s vice chairman, Edward P. Garden, relinquish executive roles. This would allow the three to focus on the hedge-fund firm, in which Mr. Garden is also a principal. Triarc last year invested $75 million in the venture.
The 63-year-old Mr. Peltz first gained attention in the 1980s, when he used junk-bond financing arranged by Drexel Burnham Lambert to purchase National Can Co. and then American Can. He merged the packaging companies and within three years sold them to France’s Pechiney SA, snaring about $800 million profit on his total investment.
The association with Drexel earned Mr. Peltz the label of corporate raider. He is often mentioned in the same breath as Carl Icahn, a raider from that era who is now an activist hedge-fund manager. Yet people who know the two say their approaches differ.
“I would describe Carl as a trader who became a businessman and Nelson as a businessman who became an investor,” says Jack Wasserman, an attorney in private practice who sits on Triarc’s board and who has sat on boards of companies Mr. Icahn was involved with.
Mr. Peltz is best known for the 1997 purchase of beverage maker Snapple for $300 million. After a three-year turnaround, Triarc sold Snapple for about $1.45 billion.
Still, some on Wall Street eye Mr. Peltz warily, recalling his battles with his own shareholders.
The financier’s sale of the can companies in 1988, for example, resulted in lawsuits from investors who claimed Mr. Peltz unfairly bought them out just months beforehand. Mr. Peltz denied the allegation but eventually settled, without admitting any wrongdoing, for $75 million. Pechiney paid half the amount.
Messrs. Peltz and May also were censured by the London Stock Exchange in 1991 for their handling of a sale of shares in Mountleigh Group PLC. The two had taken a 20% stake in the property developer in the hope of using it for European takeovers, but the company eventually collapsed.
In 1993, Messrs. Peltz and May bought a stake in near-bankrupt DWG Group, a conglomerate that owned Arby’s restaurants and the RC Cola brand, among other disparate businesses. They renamed it Triarc and focused on food and beverages businesses. This led to the Snapple purchase in 1997. A year later, in the midst of that turnaround, Messrs. Peltz and May proposed taking the company private. With Triarc’s shares well below that year’s high, shareholders cried foul and the plan fell through.
Triarc is still the franchisor of Arby’s and owns more than 1,000 of the chain’s 3,500 restaurants, along with interests in other, unrelated businesses. Under Triarc’s proposed restructuring, those businesses may be spun off to shareholders.
Messrs. Peltz, May and Garden had been kicking around the idea of starting a hedge fund for at least the past two years, according to the person familiar with the fund. Mr. Peltz had long been frustrated by the constraints of working through a publicly traded vehicle due to restrictions on the number of investments he could make.
The idea clicked when hedge funds’ surging popularity made investors more open to restrictive terms such as multiyear lock-ups of capital. That was key for an activist strategy because investors can’t flee during often fierce public battles, the person says.
Although the fund has taken positions in industries Mr. Peltz knows best—food and restaurants—he plans to target companies in a variety of sectors, the person says.
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