Exhibit 10.1
Hubbell Incorporated Incentive Compensation Plan
2005 Annual Incentive Guidelines
Program Objectives
| • | To encourage teamwork and individual performance by providing rewards for the achievement of corporate and division goals and individual performance objectives on an annual basis. |
| • | To attract and retain key executives by delivering competitive annual total cash compensation. |
Eligibility for Participation
Participation in the Hubbell Incorporated Incentive Compensation Plan is limited to Key Corporate Group (KCG) Managers. This group numbers approximately 47 managers.
Target Incentive Levels
The size of the potential cash award varies by employee group or position. Each group’s, or individual’s target incentive level, established by competitive analysis, is apercentage of base salary. When financial and certain individual goals are met, this target incentive level is paid at 100%. For example; Base Salary $100,000:
| Target % | 30% | |||
| Bonus Target $ | $30,000 |
If all financial and individual goals are met, the bonus payout is $30,000. Should financial and individual goals be exceeded, the bonus payout can be greater than 100% of target dollars, up to a maximum of 150% of target dollars. In this example the maximum payout is $45,000.
Should financial and/or individual goals not be met, bonus payouts will be less than the target dollar amount. The minimum payout is 50% of target dollars, or in this example $15,000.
Should financial results fall short of a predetermined threshold performance level, no bonuses will be paid.
Representative target incentive levels are shown in the table below, expressed as a percent of base salary:
| CEO | 100 | % | ||
| CFO | 70 | % | ||
| Group V.P. Lighting | 70 | % | ||
| Other Group V.P.’s | 60 | % | ||
| Other Officer’s | 50 | % |
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Performance Measures
The guidelines consist of primarily financial measures. Executives, however, may be measured on the attainment of certain non-financial performance objectives when appropriate.
| • | Corporate | |||
| Corporate executives will have one financial measure, the corporation’s Earnings Per Share (EPS). Current year EPS figures are shown in Exhibit A. | ||||
| • | Group Vice Presidents & Business Platform Executives | |||
| These executives have two (2) financial measures: | ||||
| • | Platform Operating Profit |
| • | Platform Cash Flow |
| These Targets are shown in Exhibit B & C | ||||
| • | Business Unit Managers | |||
| These executives have two (2) financial measures: | ||||
| • | Business Unit Operating Profit |
| • | Platform Operating Profit or Business Unit Cash Flow |
| • | Performance Measure Weighting |
| Group | Performance Measure | Weighting | ||||||
| Corporate Executives | EPS | 100 | % | |||||
| Group Vice Presidents & | Platform OP | 75 | % | |||||
| Platform Executives | Platform Cash Flow | 25 | % | |||||
| Business Unit Executives | Business Unit OP | 75 | % | |||||
| Platform OP | 25 | % | ||||||
| Or Business Unit Cash Flow | ||||||||
| Note: | The CEO will assess individual attainent of non-financial goals, as appropriate, and may add or subtract as much as 25% to the earned award, subject to Compensation Committee approval. |
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