![]() United States and PSEG Power Nuclear Preparedness United States and PSEG Power Nuclear Preparedness March 22, 2011 March 22, 2011 Exhibit 99 |
![]() Forward Looking Statement Forward Looking Statement Readers are cautioned that statements contained in this presentation about our and our subsidiaries' future performance, including future revenues, earnings, strategies, prospects, consequences and all other statements that are not purely historical, are forward-looking statements for purposes of the safe harbor provisions under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. When used herein, the words “anticipate”, “intend”, “estimate”, “believe”, “expect”, “plan”, “should”, “hypothetical”, “potential”, “forecast”, “project”, variations of such words and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Although we believe that our expectations are based on reasonable assumptions, they are subject to risks and uncertainties and we can give no assurance they will be achieved. The results or developments projected or predicted in these statements may differ materially from what may actually occur. Factors which could cause results or events to differ from current expectations include, but are not limited to: Adverse changes in energy industry law, policies and regulation, including market structures, and a potential shift away from competitive markets towards subsidized market mechanisms, transmission planning and cost allocation rules, including rules regarding how transmission is planned and who is permitted to build transmission going forward, and reliability standards. Any inability of our transmission and distribution businesses to obtain adequate and timely rate relief and regulatory approvals from federal and state regulators. Changes in federal and state environmental regulations that could increase our costs or limit operations of our generating units. Changes in nuclear regulation and/or developments in the nuclear power industry generally that could limit operations of our nuclear generating units. Actions or activities at one of our nuclear units located on a multi-unit site that might adversely affect our ability to continue to operate that unit or other units located at the same site. Any inability to balance our energy obligations, available supply and trading risks. Any deterioration in our credit quality. Availability of capital and credit at commercially reasonable terms and conditions and our ability to meet cash needs. Any inability to realize anticipated tax benefits or retain tax credits. Changes in the cost of, or interruption in the supply of, fuel and other commodities necessary to the operation of our generating units. Delays in receipt of necessary permits and approvals for our construction and development activities. Delays or unforeseen cost escalations in our construction and development activities. Adverse changes in the demand for or price of the capacity and energy that we sell into wholesale electricity markets. Increase in competition in energy markets in which we compete. Adverse performance of our decommissioning and defined benefit plan trust fund investments and changes in discount rates and funding requirements. Changes in technology and customer usage patterns. For further information, please refer to our Annual Report on Form 10-K, including Item 1A. Risk Factors, and subsequent reports on Form 10-Q and Form 8-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These documents address in further detail our business, industry issues and other factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those indicated in this presentation. In addition, any forward-looking statements included herein represent our estimates only as of today and should not be relied upon as representing our estimates as of any subsequent date. While we may elect to update forward-looking statements from time to time, we specifically disclaim any obligation to do so, even if our internal estimates change, unless otherwise required by applicable securities laws. |
![]() DISCLAIMER: DISCLAIMER: “While PSEG Nuclear has made every attempt to assure that the information included herein, including the information about the situation in Japan, is up to date, the event is dynamic and only Tokyo Electric or its authorized representatives can confirm the accuracy or currency of the information presented with respect to its nuclear facilities. Information herein concerning facilities other than PSEG Nuclear facilities has been obtained from sources PSEG Nuclear deems reliable.” |
![]() 4 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Six BWR units at the Fukushima Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, 3 in operation prior to event Units 4, 5, 6 in outage prior to event Unit 1 |
![]() Fuel Cladding 1 2 3 Boiling Water Reactor – Three Barriers to Radiation Release Boiling Water Reactor – Three Barriers to Radiation Release |
![]() Japanese Plant Response following Earth Quake Japanese Plant Response following Earth Quake Steam vented to Torus Water returned to Pressure Vessel |
![]() Cooling capability lost due to high Torus water temps Fuel uncovered as steam vented to Torus Hydrogen produced from fuel damage Pressure builds up in containment Hydrogen builds up in containment Japanese Emergency Escalates following Tsunami Japanese Emergency Escalates following Tsunami |
![]() Attempts to Vent Containment Result in Hydrogen Explosions Attempts to Vent Containment Result in Hydrogen Explosions Operators attempt to vent containment Hydrogen buildup explodes in Unit 1, 3 Reactor Building Hydrogen buildup explodes in Unit 2 Torus |
![]() United States Plant Designs United States Plant Designs |
![]() United States Plant Designs United States Plant Designs Site – specific designed criteria developed for each site Based on historical information with added conservatism (flood, hurricane, earthquake, etc) Based on geography Plant designed to withstand severe events and maintain design basis Plant modifications / upgrades implemented based on industry experience and strengthened regulation |
![]() 23 Boiling Water Reactors in the United States utilize the Mark I Containment United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements |
![]() United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Significant Control Room Modifications after TMI – 1980 |
![]() United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Control Room TMI – 1980 Strengthened Torus following NRC Regulation – 1980-83 |
![]() United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 Physical Separation of safety systems following Browns Ferry Fire – 1979 |
![]() United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Fire Protection – 1979 Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 Hardened Containment Vent to prevent H2 Buildup – 1992 |
![]() United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Containment Vent - 1992 Fire Protection – 1979 Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 Enhanced Battery Capability for Station Black Out – 1988 |
![]() United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements Station Black Out – 1988 Containment Vent – 1992 Fire Protection – 1979 Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 Redundant Generator and Pumps following 9/11 – 2002 |
![]() Spare Diesel / Pump – 2002 Station Black Out – 1988 Containment Vent – 1992 Fire Protection – 1979 Strengthened Torus – 1980 Control Room TMI – 1980 United States Design Improvements United States Design Improvements |
![]() Used Fuel Pool Protection Used Fuel Pool Protection Used Fuel Pools designed to station Design Bases criteria Redundant pumps available to ensure used fuel pool cooling Alternative fuel pool cooling capability added post 9/11 Multiple sources of water and power for cooling beyond design bases |
![]() Emergency Planning Emergency Planning |
![]() Radiation Levels are fluctuating at Fukushima Daiichi Radiation Levels are fluctuating at Fukushima Daiichi Site Boundary 50 mrem/hr – spikes up to 1200 mrem/hr Between Reactor Buildings 10,000 mrem/hr – 40,000 mrem/hr (Likely spikes following Unit 2 explosion) Controlled venting of containment and issues with used fuel pools resulted in radiation releases General evacuation within 12 miles / US citizens within 50 miles Potassium Iodide tablets distributed to area residents and workers Background General population receives ~600 mrem/year United States Nuclear worker limited to 5,000 mrem/yr PSEG Nuclear limits exposure to 2,000 mrem/yr |
![]() United States Emergency Planning United States Emergency Planning 1978 – 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) deemed appropriate Limited offsite agency participation – Site driven 1980 – Post TMI – NRC NUREG 0654 implemented Determined appropriate emergency response program • number required on shift / emergency facilities / offsite participation required Evaluated every 2 years by FEMA / NRC Integrated response between onsite and offsite agencies and states Mandated siren for alerting public and Emergency News Center Established 50 Mile ingestion pathway (Tested every 6 years) 2001 – Potassium Iodide recommended for protection of thyroid Distribution to residents within 10 miles of nuclear plant enacted 2002 – Post 9/11 Security Changes implemented Required greater integration of security plan and emergency plan 2006 – Battery Backup on sirens recommended |
![]() Salem / Hope Creek Site Specific Information Salem / Hope Creek Site Specific Information |
![]() Salem – Hope Creek Seismic Design Salem – Hope Creek Seismic Design Design Basis levels for environmental events are determined independently for every plant in the US Based on geographic and historic information Salem – Hope Creek Seismic Design – 6.5 Richter Scale All structures, systems, and components important to plant safety will perform safety function to keep plant cool Re-evaluated during current License Renewal review The largest earthquake in New Jersey occurred in 1783 Magnitude 5.3 Felt from New Hampshire to Pennsylvania |
![]() Salem/Hope Creek Flooding Design Salem/Hope Creek Flooding Design Designed for flood level 22.9 ft above ground level Water-tight doors Exterior walls reinforced concrete Max. flood predicted for Tsunami – 5.6 ft above ground level Coincident with High Tide and High Winds Max. flood predicted for Hurricane – 22.9 ft above ground level Category 4 Coincident with High Tide and High Winds Normal level for Delaware River – 11 ft below ground level Mean Water level of river – 89ft Record height – 2.5 feet below ground level (1950) |
![]() Salem/Hope Creek Flood Design Salem/Hope Creek Flood Design Salem 1 & 2 Salem 1 & 2 Hope Creek Hope Creek 22.9 ft above ground level |
![]() Site Flooding Actions Site Flooding Actions Worst Case flooding event for site is Hurricane Surge Expect forecast >24hrs from event Site actions planned at specific river levels, including Emergency Plan staffing if required 93.0 ft Local Area Road Flooding may restrict access to site and to EOF/ENC 95.0 ft. Salem and Hope Creek doors to be shut 98.5 ft Hot Standby in 6 hours 99.5 ft Hope Creek, Salem in Hot Shutdown in 12 and cold shutdown within following 24 hrs. Unusual Event Declared 124 ft Emergency Diesel Generators are impacted |
![]() Hope Creek EDG Flood Protection Design Hope Creek EDG Flood Protection Design Hope Creek 4 Dedicated Emergency Diesel Generators protected from flooding up to 31 feet above site grade Hope Creek Diesel Combustion Air Intakes 31 feet above site grade Hope Creek EDG Combustion Air Intakes |
![]() Salem Diesel Flood Protection Design Salem Diesel Flood Protection Design Salem Diesels protected from flooding up to 25 feet above site grade. Starting Air, Fuel and control systems in flood protection area. Salem Diesel Combustion Air intake 25 feet above site grade |
![]() Industry Mark 1 Containment Modifications Industry Mark 1 Containment Modifications US Industry response to Severe Accident Management Program (SAMP 1988 ) required implementation of hardened external torus vent to prevent hydrogen infiltration into reactor building during venting. |
![]() Alternate Makeup Fire Pump Alternate Makeup Fire Pump Post 9/11 regulatory requirements included development of alternate fire protection, fuel pool and reactor vessel makeup strategies. Photo of dedicated site portable diesel fire pump utilized in post accident event. |
![]() Operated by PSEG Nuclear PSEG Ownership: 100% Technology: Boiling Water Reactor Total Capacity: 1,197MW Owned Capacity: 1,197MW License Expiration: 2026 Filed for license extension, August 2009 Next Refueling 2012 Operated by PSEG Nuclear Ownership: PSEG – 57% Exelon – 43% Technology: Pressurized Water Reactor Total Capacity: 2,337MW Owned Capacity: 1,342MW License Expiration: 2016 and 2020 Filed for license extension, August 2009 Next Refueling Unit 1 – Fall 2011 Unit 2 – Spring 2011 Operated by Exelon PSEG Ownership: 50% Technology: Boiling Water Reactor Total Capacity: 2,245MW Owned Capacity: 1,122MW License Expiration: 2033 and 2034 Next Refueling Unit 2 – 2012 Unit 3 – Fall 2011 Hope Creek Salem Units 1 and 2 Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 Our five unit nuclear fleet |