Commitments And Contingencies | NOTE 13—COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES: a. Commitments: Preferred dividends : T he Company pay s dividend s under its outstanding mandatory convertible preferred shares . S ee note 14b . Operating leases: As of December 31, 2016, minimum future rentals under operating leases of buildings, machinery and equipment for periods in excess of one year were as follows: 2017 —$165 million ; 2018 —$144 million ; 2019 —$131 million ; 2020 —$84 million ; 2021 —$70 million ; 2022 and ther eafter—$135 million . The lease fees expensed in each of the years ended December 31, 2016, 2015 and 2014 were $164 million , $122 million and $153 million, respectively. Royalty commitments: The Company is committed to paying royalties to owners of know-how, partners in alliances and other certain arrangements and to parties that financed research and development, at a wide range of rates as a percentage of sales or of the gross margin of certain products, as defined in the underlying agreements. Royalty expenses are reported in cost of goods sold if related to the acquisition of a product , and if not are included in sales and marketing expenses. The royalty expense in each of the years ended December 31, 2016, 2015 and 2014 were $814 million , $911 million and $987 million, respectively. Milestone commitments: The Company is committed to pay ing milestone payments , usually as part of business transactions. Such payments are contingent upon the achievement of certain regulatory milestones and sales targets. A s of December 31, 2016, were all milestones and targets, for compounds in Phase II and more advanced stages of development, to be achieved, the total contingent payments could reach an aggregate of up to approximately $1.1 billion . b. Contingencies: General From time to time, Teva and/or its subsidiaries are subject to claims for damages and/or equitable relief arising in the ordinary course of business. In addition, as described below, in large part as a result of the nature of its business, Teva is frequently subject to litigation. Teva generally believes that it has meritorious defenses to the actions brought against it and vigorously pursues the defense or settlement of each such action. Except as described below, Teva does not currently have a reasonable basis to estimate the loss, or range of loss, that is reasonably possible with respect to matters disclosed in this note. Teva records a provision in its financial statements to the extent that it concludes that a contingent liability is probable and the amount thereof is estimable. Based upon the status of the cases described below, management's assessments of the likelihood of damages, and the advice of counsel, no provisions have been made regarding the matters disclosed in this note, except as noted below. Litigation outcomes and contingencies are unpredictable, and excessive verdicts can occur. Accordingly, management's assessments involve complex judgments about future events and often rely heavily on estimates and assumptions. Based on currently available information, Teva believes that none of the proceedings brought against it described below is likely to have a material adverse effect on its financial condition. However, if one or more of such proceedings were to result in final judgments against Teva, such judgments could be material to its results of operations and cash flows in a given period. In addition, Teva incurs significant legal fees and related expenses in the course of defending its positions even if the facts and circumstances of a particular litigation do not give rise to a provision in the financial statements. In connection with third-party agreements, Teva may under certain circumstances be required to indemnify, and may be indemnified by, in unspecified amounts, the parties to such agreements against third-party claims. Among other things, Teva's agreements with third parties may require Teva to indemnify them, or require them to indemnify Teva, for the costs and damages incurred in connection with product liability claims, in specified or unspecified amounts. Except as otherwise noted, all of the litigation matters disclosed below involve claims arising in the United States. Except as otherwise noted, a ll third party sales figures given below are based on IMS data. Intellectual Property Litigation From time to time, Teva seeks to develop generic versions of patent-protected pharmaceuticals for sale prior to patent expiration in various markets. In the United States, to obtain approval for most generics prior to the expiration of the originator's patents, Teva must challenge the patents under the procedures set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, as amended. To the extent that Teva seeks to utilize such patent challenge procedures, Teva is and expects to be involved in patent litigation regarding the validity, enforceability or infringement of the originator's patents. Teva may also be involved in patent litigation involving the extent to which its product or manufacturing process techniques may infringe other originator or third-party patents. Additionally, depending upon a complex analysis of a variety of legal and commercial factors, Teva may, in certain circumstances, elect to market a generic version even though litigation is still pending. This could be before any court decision is rendered or while an appeal of a lower court decision is pending. To the extent Teva elects to proceed in this manner, it could face substantial liability for patent infringement if the final court decision is adverse to Teva. The general rule for damages in patent infringement cases in the United States is that the patentee should be compensated by no less than a reasonable royalty, and it may also be able in certain circumstances to be compensated for its lost profits. The amount of a reasonable royalty award would generally be calculated based on the sales of Teva's generic product. The amount of lost profits would generally be based on the lost sales of the branded product. The launch of an authorized generic and other generic competition may be relevant to the damages calculation. In addition, the patentee may seek consequential damages as well as enhanced damages of up to three times the profits lost by the patent holder for willful infringement, although courts have typically awarded much lower multiples. Teva is also involved in litigation regarding patents in other countries where it does business, particularly in Europe, where Teva has in recent years increased the number of launches of its generic versions of branded pharmaceuticals prior to the expiration of the innovator's patents. The laws concerning generic pharmaceuticals and patents differ from country to country. Damages for patent infringement in Europe may include lost profits or a reasonable royalty, but enhanced damages for willful infringement are generally not available. In December 2012, Endo International (“Endo”) sued Actavis Inc. and Actavis South Atlantic LLC ( collectively, “Actavis ” ) in New York federal court for infringement of patents expiring in 2023. The lawsuit followed the launch by Actavis of its 7.5 mg and 15 mg oxymorphone extended-release tablets, which were the AB-rated generic versions of the original formulation of Endo's Opana ® ER. According to Endo's annual report, Opana ® ER had net sales of approximately $299 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2012. In September 2013, Actavis launched additional strengths of its product. In August 2015, the court found two Endo patents valid and infringed, and on April 29, 2016, enjoined Actavis from selling its oxymorphone ER products. Actavis has appealed these rulings. In addition, in November 2014, Endo and Mallinckrodt sued Actavis in Delaware federal court, alleging that sales of the Actavis oxymorphone ER products infringe another patent that expires in 2029, which Endo had licensed from Mallinckrodt. Trial in that case is scheduled for February 2017. Were Endo ultimately to be successful in its allegations of patent infringement, Actavis could be required to pay damages relating to past sales of its oxymorphone ER products and continue to be enjoined from future sales until patent expiration. The amount of damages, if any, would be determined in a separate trial that would be scheduled after resolution of the pending appeal. In July 2014, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) sued Teva in Delaware federal court for infringement of a patent expiring in June 2015, which covers GSK's Coreg ® products. Teva and other generic producers began selling their carvedilol tablets (the generic version of Coreg ® ) in September 2007. At the time of Teva's launch, annual sales of Coreg ® were approximately $1.6 billion. The parties served their first round expert reports in September 2016, including GSK's confidential damages expert report. Teva vigorously disputes GSK's claims on the merits and also disputes the amount and nature of GSK's alleged damages. Rebuttal expert reports, including Teva's damages report, were served in November 2016. A hearing on any dispositive motions is scheduled for March 2017, and trial, if necessary, is scheduled to commence in June 2017. Were GSK ultimately to be successful in its allegations of patent infringement, Teva could be required to pay damages relating to past sales of its carvedilol products. Teva would be permitted to continue selling its carvedilol products, given that GSK's patent has expired. In April 2015, Teva launched its 2 mg, 5 mg, 10 mg, 15 mg, 20 mg, and 30 mg aripiprazole tablets, which are the AB-rated generic versions of Otsuka's Abilify ® , which had sales of approximately $7.8 billion for the twelve months ended December 31, 2014. Otsuka sued Teva in New Jersey federal court for infringement of patents that expire in March 2023 and March 2027. On January 20, 2016, the court granted summary judgment on the grounds that Teva's generic product does not infringe Otsuka's patent directed to using aripiprazole in combination with certain anti-depressants. Otsuka appealed this order. In August 2016, Teva and Otsuka settled this litigation, and a provision for the settlement was recorded in the financial statements. Product Liability Litigation Teva's business inherently exposes it to potential product liability claims, and in recent years the number of product liability claims asserted against Teva has increased. Teva maintains a program of insurance, which may include commercial insurance, self-insurance (including direct risk retention), or a combination of both approaches, in amounts and on terms that it believes are reasonable and prudent in light of its business and related risks. However, Teva sells, and will continue to sell, pharmaceuticals that are not covered by insurance; in addition, it may be subject to claims for which insurance coverage is denied as well as claims that exceed its policy limits. Product liability coverage for pharmaceutical companies is becoming more expensive and increasingly difficult to obtain. As a result, Teva may not be able to obtain the type and amount of commercial insurance it desires, or any commercial insurance on reasonable terms, in all of its markets. Teva and/or its subsidiaries, including Watson Laboratories, Inc. (“Watson”) and Actavis Elizabeth LLC (“Actavis”), have been named as defendants in approximately 4,000 product liability lawsuits brought against them and other manufacturers by approximately 4,400 plaintiffs claiming injuries (including allegations of neurological disorders, such as tardive dyskinesia) from the long-term use of metoclopramide (the generic form of Reglan ® ). For over 20 years, the FDA-approved label for metoclopramide has contained warning language about the risk of tardive dyskinesia, and that the risk of developing the disorder increases with duration of treatment and total cumulative dose. In February 2009, the FDA announced that manufacturers of metoclopramide would be required to revise the label, including the addition of a “black box” warning about the risk of tardive dyskinesia resulting from long-term usage. Teva expects to be dismissed from at least some of the cases on the basis that some plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they used a Teva product. Approximately 40% of the plaintiffs are parties to cases against Teva that are part of a mass tort proceeding in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. In addition, there are mass tort proceedings under way in state courts in California and New Jersey. The California litigation includes about half of the total plaintiffs. In the New Jersey proceeding, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, on federal preemption grounds, all claims other than those based on an alleged failure to timely update the label. The appellate court affirmed this dismissal. On August 22, 2016, following Teva's appeal of the decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the failure to update claims. On November 21, 2016, Teva filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Court has asked the plaintiffs to respond to that petition, and plaintiffs' response is due on February 27, 2017. In October 2015, Actavis reached an agreement in principle to resolve the vast majority of the cases pending against it. In January 2017, Teva and/or its other subsidiaries involved in the litigation also reached an agreement in principle to resolve the vast majority of the cases pending against them, subject to participation by a certain percentage of plaintiffs. A provision has been included in the financial statements for these matters. Competition Matters As part of its generic pharmaceuticals business, Teva has challenged a number of patents covering branded pharmaceuticals, some of which are among the most widely-prescribed and well-known drugs on the market. Many of Teva's patent challenges have resulted in litigation relating to Teva's attempts to market generic versions of such pharmaceuticals under the federal Hatch-Waxman Act. Some of this litigation has been resolved through settlement agreements in which Teva obtained a license to market a generic version of the drug, often years before the patents expire. Teva and its subsidiaries have increasingly been named as defendants in cases that allege antitrust violations arising from such settlement agreements. The plaintiffs in these cases, which are usually direct and indirect purchasers of pharmaceutical products, and often assert claims on behalf of classes of all direct and indirect purchasers, typically allege that (1) Teva received something of value from the innovator in exchange for an agreement to delay generic entry, and (2) significant savings could have realized if there had been no settlement agreement and generic competition had commenced earlier. These class action cases seek various forms of injunctive and monetary relief, including damages based on the difference between the brand price and what the generic price allegedly would have been and disgorgement of profits, which are automatically trebled under the relevant statutes, plus attorneys' fees and costs. The alleged damages generally depend on the size of the branded market and the length of the alleged delay, and can be substantial - potentially measured in multiples of the annual brand sales -particularly where the alleged delays are lengthy or branded drugs with annual sales in the billions of dollars are involved. Teva believes that its settlement agreements are lawful and serve to increase competition, and has defended them vigorously. In Teva's experience to date, these cases have typically settled for a fraction of the high end of the damages sought, although there can be no assurance that such outcomes will continue. In June 2013, the United States Supreme Court held, in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc . (the “AndroGel case”), that a rule of reason test should be applied in analyzing whether such settlements potentially violate the federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held that a trial court must analyze each agreement in its entirety in order to determine whether it violates the antitrust laws. This new test has resulted in increased scrutiny of Teva's patent settlements, additional action by the FTC and state and local authorities, and an increased risk of liability in Teva's currently pending antitrust litigations. In April 2006, certain subsidiaries of Teva were named in a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case alleges that the settlement agreements entered into between Cephalon, Inc., now a Teva subsidiary (“Cephalon”), and various generic pharmaceutical companies in late 2005 and early 2006 to resolve patent litigation involving certain finished modafinil products (marketed as Provigil ® ) were unlawful because they had the effect of excluding generic competition. The case also alleges that Cephalon improperly asserted its Provigil ® patent against the generic pharmaceutical companies. The first lawsuit was brought by King Drug Company of Florence, Inc. on behalf of itself and as a proposed class action on behalf of any other person or entity that purchased Provigil ® directly from Cephalon (the “Direct Purchaser Class”). Similar allegations have been made in a number of additional complaints, including those filed on behalf of a proposed class of end payors of Provigil ® (the “End Payor Class”), by certain individual end payors, by certain retail chain pharmacies and by Apotex, Inc. (collectively, these cases are referred to as the “Philadelphia Modafinil Action”). Separately, Apotex challenged Cephalon's Provigil ® patent, and in October 2011, the Court found the patent to be invalid and unenforceable based on inequitable conduct. This decision was affirmed on appeal in April 2013. Teva has either settled or reached agreements in principle to settle with all of the plaintiffs in the Philadelphia Modafinil Action. However, one of the end payors, United Healthcare Services, took the position that it is not bound by the settlement that was agreed to on its behalf and brought a separate action in Minnesota federal court. On February 6, 2017, the Minnesota court granted Teva ' s motion to transfer that action to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where Teva has also filed suit to enforce the settlement. In February 2008, following an investigation, the FTC sued Cephalon, alleging that Cephalon violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the marketplace, by unlawfully maintaining a monopoly in the sale of Provigil ® and improperly excluding generic competition (the “FTC Modafinil Action”). In addition to the Philadelphia Modafinil Action and the FTC Modafinil Action, the City of Providence ( Rhode Island ) and the State of Louisiana have also filed lawsuits against Cephalon and other Teva subsidiaries. Teva settled its suit with the City of Providence, and won its motion to dismiss against the State of Louisiana. Cephalon and Teva have also reached a settlement with 48 state attorneys general, which was approved by the court on November 7, 2016. Certain other claimants have given notices of potential claims related to these settlement agreements. Annual sales of Provigil ® were approximately $500 million at the time of the settlement agreements, and approximately $1 billion when the first generic modafinil product was launched in March 2012. In May 2015, Cephalon entered into a consent decree with the FTC under which the FTC dismissed its claims against Cephalon in the FTC Modafinil Action in exchange for payment of $1.2 billion (less set-offs for prior settlements) by Cephalon and Teva into a settlement fund. The net amount paid into the settlement fund may be (and has been) used to settle certain other related cases, including the claims in the litigations described above, as well as other government investigations. Under the consent decree, Teva also agreed to certain injunctive relief with respect to the types of settlement agreements Teva may enter into to resolve patent litigation in the United States for a period of ten years. If, at the end of the ten years, the entire settlement fund has not been fully disbursed, any amount remaining will be paid to the Treasurer of the United States. In July 2015, Teva made a payment into the settlement fund for the difference of $1.2 billion less the amount of the agreed-upon settlements reached as of that date. Management recorded an additional charge of $398 million in the second quarter of 2015 as a result of the settlement with the FTC. In January 2009, the FTC and the State of California filed a lawsuit in California federal court alleging that a September 2006 patent lawsuit settlement between Watson and Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Solvay”) relating to AndroGel ® 1% (testosterone gel) violated the antitrust laws. Additional lawsuits alleging similar claims were later filed by private plaintiffs (including plaintiffs purporting to represent classes of similarly situated claimants), and the various actions were consolidated in a multidistrict litigation in Georgia federal court. In February 2010, the court granted Watson's motion to dismiss all claims except certain sham litigation claims brought by the private plaintiffs. Those sham litigation claims were later dismissed on summary judgment and appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. In June 2013, the United States Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the FTC's reverse-payment claims in the AndroGel decision referenced above, and ordered the case remanded. The Eleventh Circuit also remanded the private plaintiffs' cases. In May 2015, Giant Eagle, Inc., an individual direct purchaser opt-out plaintiff, filed a new complaint, alleging similar claims, in Pennsylvania federal court. That action was transferred to the multidistrict litigation in Georgia, and Watson answered the complaint in August 2015. Discovery remains ongoing in both the multidistrict and FTC litigations. On May 19, 2016, the indirect purchaser plaintiffs stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of their claims with prejudice. On October 14, 2016, Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc. (successor-in-interest to Watson) moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the FTC's case is moot in light of the above-described consent decree stemming from the FTC Modafinil Action. That motion remains pending. Annual sales of AndroGel ® 1% at the time of the settlement were approximately $350 million, and annual sales of the AndroGel franchise (AndroGel ® 1% and AndroGel ® 1.62%) were approximately $140 million and $1.05 billion, respectively, at the time Actavis launched its generic version of AndroGel ® 1% in November 2015. In April 2011, the European Commission opened a formal investigation against both Cephalon and Teva to assess whether the 2005 settlement agreement between the parties might have had the object or effect of hindering the entry of generic modafinil. The Commission has indicated to Teva that it intends to issue a statement that will specify the initial findings of the investigation. Teva subsidiaries Barr Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”) and The Rugby Group (“Rugby”) are defendants in actions in California, Kansas and Florida state courts alleging that a January 1997 patent litigation settlement agreement between Barr, Rugby (then a subsidiary of Sanofi Aventis) and Bayer Corporation concerning the antibiotic ciprofloxacin was anticompetitive and violated state antitrust and consumer protection laws. In addition, Rugby is also named as a defendant in Tennessee. In the California case, the trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motions, and the court of appeal affirmed in October 2011. While an appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, the trial court approved a $74 million class settlement with Bayer. In May 2015, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for a rule of reason inquiry as to the remaining defendants, including Barr and Rugby. In August 2016, Rugby agreed to settle with plaintiffs for $100 million, which was indemnified by Sanofi Aventis. The settlement was approved by the court on November 4, 2016. On January 18, 2017, Barr agreed to settle with plaintiffs for $225 million and a provision has been included in the financial statements. On January 25, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking preliminary approval of that settlement, and a hearing is scheduled for February 17, 2017 for that motion. Based on the plaintiffs' expert testimony in the California case, estimated sales of ciprofloxacin in California were approximately $500 million during the alleged damages period. In the Kansas action, the court granted preliminary approval of the settlement Bayer entered into with plaintiffs in June 2015. In July 2015, Barr and the remaining co-defendants also agreed to settle with the plaintiffs; the court granted final approval of the settlement on June 6, 2016. The Florida case has been administratively closed by the court. In December 2011, three groups of plaintiffs sued Wyeth and Teva for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving extended release venlafaxine (generic Effexor ® XR) entered into in November 2005. The cases were filed by a purported class of direct purchasers, by a purported class of indirect purchasers and by certain chain pharmacies. The plaintiffs claim that the settlement agreement between Wyeth and Teva unlawfully delayed generic entry. In October 2014, the court granted Teva's motion to dismiss in the direct purchaser cases, after which the parties agreed that the court's reasoning applied equally to the indirect purchaser cases. Plaintiffs filed notices of appeal, and the Third Circuit has consolidated the appeal with a separate antitrust case in which Teva is not a party, In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation , solely for purposes of disposition by the same appellate panel. Argument on the issue of whether the appeal should be transferred to the Federal Circuit was heard on September 27, 2016. Annual sales of Effexor ® XR were approximately $2.6 billion at the time of settlement and at the time generic versions were launched in July 2010. In February 2012, two purported classes of direct-purchaser plaintiffs sued GSK and Teva in New Jersey federal court for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving lamotrigine (generic Lamictal ® ) entered into in February 2005. In August 2012, a purported class of indirect purchaser plaintiffs filed a nearly identical complaint against GSK and Teva in the same court. The plaintiffs claim that the settlement agreement unlawfully delayed generic entry and seek unspecified damages. In December 2012, the court dismissed the cases. In January 2014, the court denied the direct purchaser plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and affirmed its original dismissal of the cases. In June 2015, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On February 19, 2016, Teva and GSK filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on November 7, 2016. In the meantime, litigation has resumed in both the direct purchaser and indirect purchaser actions. Teva and GSK filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the indirect purchaser action in December 2015, which the court granted in part and denied in part in March 2016. On September 21, 2016, GSK, Teva and the indirect purchaser plaintiffs agreed to settle the litigation, and on October 27, 2016, the indirect purchaser plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal of their claims with prejudice. A provision has been included in the financial statements for the dismissed matter. Annual sales of Lamictal ® were approximately $950 million at the time of the settlement, and approximately $2.3 billion at the time generic competition commenced in July 2008. In April 2013, purported classes of direct purchasers of, and end payors for, Niaspan ® (extended release niacin) sued Teva and Abbott for violating the antitrust laws by entering into a settlement agreement in April 2005 to resolve patent litigation over the product. A multidistrict litigation has been established in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Teva and Abbott's motion to dismiss was denied in September 2014. Throughout 2015 and in January 2016, several individual direct purchaser opt-out plaintiffs filed complaints with allegations nearly identical to those of the direct purchaser class. In October 2016, the District Attorney for Orange County, California, filed a similar complaint, which has since been amended, in California state court alleging violations of state law. On February 10, 2017, Teva and Abbott filed a demurrer seeking to dismiss the Orange County claims on statute of limitations grounds, and also moved to strike all claims for restitution and civil penalties to the extent they are not limited to alleged activity in Orange County. Those filings remain pending. Annual sales of Niaspan ® were approximately $416 million at the time of the settlement and approximately $1.1 billion at the time generic competition commenced in September 2013. Since July 2013, numerous lawsuits have been filed in several federal courts by purported classes of end payors for, and direct purchasers of, Solodyn ® ER (minocycline hydrochloride) against Medicis, the innovator, and several generic manufacturers, including Teva. The lawsuits allege, among other things, that the settlement agreements between Medicis and the generic manufacturers violated the antitrust laws. Teva entered into its agreement with Medicis in March 2009. A multidistrict litigation has been established in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. In September 2014, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that did not name Teva as a defendant. Annual sales of Solodyn ® ER were approximately $380 million at the time Teva settled and approximately $765 million at the time generic competition entered the market on a permanent basis in November 2011. In November 2013, a putative class action was filed in Pennsylvania federal court against Actavis, Inc. and certain of its affiliates, alleging that Watson's 2012 patent lawsuit settlement with Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. relating to Lidoderm ® (lidocaine transdermal patches) violated the antitrust laws. Additional lawsuits containing similar allegations followed on behalf of other classes of putative direct purchaser and end-payer plaintiffs, and the cases have been consolidated as a multidistrict litigation ( “ MDL ”) in federal court in California. Defendants moved to dismiss, and in November 2014, the court granted the motions in part but denied them with respect to the claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs then filed amended consolidated complaints in December 2014, and additional complaints have followed from retailers acting in their individual capacities. Discovery in these cases is ongoing. In March 2016, the FTC filed a lawsuit in Pennsylvania federal court against Allergan plc, Watson, Endo and Impax Laboratories, Inc. challenging (1) Watson's 2012 patent lawsuit settlement with Endo related to Lidoderm ® and (2) a June 2010 patent litigation settlement between Endo and Impax related to Opana ® ER (generic oxymorphone extended release tablets). The FTC's allegations against Watson relate to the Lidoderm ® settlement only (and not the Opana ® ER settlement). The defendants moved to sever the Lidoderm ® -related claims from the Opana ® ER-related claims, and also to dismiss the FTC's claims outright. On October 20, 2016, the court granted Watson's and Impax's motions to sever and ordered the FTC to file new, individual complaints. The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss as moot, with leave to re-file once the FTC files new complaints. On October 25, 2016, the FTC filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. On October 26, 2016, Endo and Watson filed a complaint in Pennsylvania federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the FTC's claims are not authorized by statute, or, in the alternative, that the FTC does not have statutory authority to pursue a disgorgement remedy. On December 30, 2016, the FTC moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment complaint. The court denied that motion as moot on February 1, 2017, when it consolidated Watson's action with a later-filed declaratory judgment action broug |