| Commitments and contingencies | NOTE 16 – Commitments and contingencies: General From time to time, Teva and/or its subsidiaries are subject to claims for damages and/or equitable relief arising in the ordinary course of business. In addition, as described below, in large part as a result of the nature of its business, Teva is frequently subject to litigation. Teva generally believes that it has meritorious defenses to the actions brought against it and vigorously pursues the defense or settlement of each such action. Except as described below, Teva does not currently have a reasonable basis to estimate the loss, or range of loss, that is reasonably possible with respect to matters disclosed in this note. Teva records a provision in its financial statements to the extent that it concludes that a contingent liability is probable and the amount thereof is estimable. Based upon the status of the cases described below, management’s assessments of the likelihood of damages, and the advice of counsel, no provisions have been made regarding the matters disclosed in this note, except as noted below. Litigation outcomes and contingencies are unpredictable, and excessive verdicts can occur. Accordingly, management’s assessments involve complex judgments about future events and often rely heavily on estimates and assumptions. Teva continuously reviews the matters described below and may, from time to time, remove previously disclosed matters that the Company has determined no longer meet the materiality threshold for disclosure. If one or more of such proceedings described below were to result in final judgments against Teva, such judgments could be material to its results of operations and cash flows in a given period. In addition, Teva incurs significant legal fees and related expenses in the course of defending its positions even if the facts and circumstances of a particular litigation do not give rise to a provision in the financial statements. In connection with third-party agreements, Teva may under certain circumstances be required to indemnify, and may be indemnified by, in unspecified amounts, the parties to such agreements against third-party claims. Among other things, Teva’s agreements with third parties may require Teva to indemnify them, or require them to indemnify Teva, for the costs and damages incurred in connection with product liability claims, in specified or unspecified amounts. Except as otherwise noted, all of the litigation matters disclosed below involve claims arising in the United States. Except as otherwise noted, all third party sales figures given below are based on IQVIA (formerly IMS Health Inc.) data. For income tax contingencies, see note 15 to Teva’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2018. Intellectual Property Litigation From time to time, Teva seeks to develop generic versions of patent-protected pharmaceuticals for sale prior to patent expiration in various markets. In the United States, to obtain approval for most generics prior to the expiration of the originator’s patents, Teva must challenge the patents under the procedures set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, as amended. To the extent that Teva seeks to utilize such patent challenge procedures, Teva is and expects to be involved in patent litigation regarding the validity, enforceability or infringement of the originator’s patents. Teva may also be involved in patent litigation involving the extent to which its product or manufacturing process techniques may infringe other originator or third-party patents. Additionally, depending upon a complex analysis of a variety of legal and commercial factors, Teva may, in certain circumstances, elect to market a generic version even though litigation is still pending. To the extent Teva elects to proceed in this manner, it could face substantial liability for patent infringement if the final court decision is adverse to Teva, which could be material to its results of operations and cash flows in a given period. The general rule for damages in patent infringement cases in the United States is that the patentee should be compensated by no less than a reasonable royalty and it may also be able, in certain circumstances, to be compensated for its lost profits. The amount of a reasonable royalty award would generally be calculated based on the sales of Teva’s product. The amount of lost profits would generally be based on the lost sales of the patentee’s product. In addition, the patentee may seek consequential damages as well as enhanced damages of up to three times the profits lost by the patent holder for willful infringement, although courts have typically awarded much lower multiples. Teva is also involved in litigation regarding patents in other countries where it does business, particularly in Europe. The laws concerning generic pharmaceuticals and patents differ from country to country. Damages for patent infringement in Europe may include lost profits or a reasonable royalty, but enhanced damages for willful infringement are generally not available. In July 2014, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) sued Teva in Delaware federal court for infringement of a patent expiring in June 2015 directed to using carvedilol in a specified manner to decrease the risk of mortality in patients with congestive heart failure. Teva and eight other generic producers began selling their carvedilol tablets (the generic version of GSK’s Coreg ® ) in September 2007. A jury trial was held and the jury returned a verdict in GSK’s favor finding Teva liable for induced infringement, including willful infringement, and assessing damages of $235.5 million, not including pre- or post-judgment interest. Following post-trial motions filed by the parties, on March 28, 2018, the district court issued an opinion overturning the jury verdict and instead found no induced infringement by Teva, thereby finding that Teva did not owe any damages; the district court also denied Teva’s motion seeking to overturn the jury verdict with respect to invalidity. On May 25, 2018, both parties filed an appeal. A hearing is scheduled for September 4, 2019. If the appeal of the district court’s decision is decided against Teva, the case would be remanded to the district court for it to consider Teva’s other legal and equitable defenses that have not yet been considered by the district court. The provision that was included in the financial statements for this matter was reversed as the exposure is no longer considered probable. In 2014, Teva Canada succeeded in its challenge of the bortezomib (the generic equivalent of Velcade ® ) product and mannitol ester patents under the Patented Medicines (Notice Of Compliance) Regulations (“PM(NOC)”). At the time of Teva’s launch in 2015, annual sales of Velcade were approximately 94 million Canadian dollars. Additionally, Teva commenced an action under Section 8 of PM(NOC) to recover damages for being kept off of the market during the PM(NOC) proceedings. Janssen and Millennium filed a counterclaim for infringement of the same two patents as well as a patent covering a process to prepare bortezomib. The product patent expired in October 2015; the other patents expire in January 2022 and March 2025. In 2017, Teva entered into an agreement with Janssen and Millennium which limits the damages payable by either party depending on the outcome of the infringement/impeachment action. As a result, the most Janssen and Millennium could recover is 200 million Canadian dollars plus post-judgment interest. In June 2018, the court ruled that Janssen and Millennium pay Teva 5 million Canadian dollars in Section 8 damages. Janssen and Millennium filed an appeal, and oral argument in that appeal is scheduled for September 9 , 2019 . If the decision is overturned on appeal, Teva could owe the capped damages set forth above. In addition to the potential damages that could be awarded, Teva could be ordered to cease sales of its bortezomib product. On July 8, 2011, Helsinn sued Teva over its filing of an ANDA to market a generic version of palonosetron IV solution (the generic equivalent of Aloxi ® ) and in November 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled against Teva. Teva appealed this decision and, in May 2017, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling and found the asserted patents invalid. In January 2018, full appellate review of that decision was denied. Helsinn filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court, which was granted. On January 22, 2019, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision finding the asserted patent invalid. Helsinn has no further opportunity to appeal this patent decision. Separately, in October 2014, Helsinn filed an additional claim on later-acquired patents. On January 30, 2018, the district court denied Helsinn’s request for a preliminary injunction based on these later acquired patents. Teva launched its generic palonosetron IV solution after obtaining final regulatory approval on March 23, 2018. If Teva ultimately loses the case on the later-acquired patents discussed above, Teva may be ordered to cease sales of its generic product and/or pay damages to Helsinn. Aloxi ® annual U.S. sales as of November 2017 were $459 million. In July 2015, Janssen sued Actavis and Teva (along with 10 other filers) over their filing of an ANDA to market their abiraterone acetate tablets, 250mg (generic versions of Zytiga ® ). In August 2017, Janssen sued Teva over its ANDA filing to market a 500mg generic version of Zytiga. In both cases, Janssen asserted a method of treatment patent. In January 2018, following a petition for inter partes review, the Patent Trials and Appeals Board (“PTAB”) found the patent to be invalid. In October 2018, the District Court for the District of New Jersey also found the patent to be invalid. Teva launched its generic 250mg product in November 2018. On May 14, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed that Janssen’s patent is invalid. That decision became final on June 20, 2019. Janssen may seek U.S. Supreme Court review of this decision. If Teva ultimately loses this case, Teva may be ordered by the court to cease sales of its generic product and/or pay damages to Janssen. Annual U.S. sales of Zytiga at the time of generic entry were about $ 1.3 billion. Product Liability Litigation Teva’s business inherently exposes it to potential product liability claims. Teva maintains a program of insurance, which may include commercial insurance, self-insurance (including direct risk retention), or a combination of both approaches, in amounts and on terms that it believes are reasonable and prudent in light of its business and related risks. However, Teva sells, and will continue to sell, pharmaceuticals that are not covered by its product liability insurance; in addition, it may be subject to claims for which insurance coverage is denied as well as claims that exceed its policy limits. Product liability coverage for pharmaceutical companies is becoming more expensive and increasingly difficult to obtain. As a result, Teva may not be able to obtain the type and amount of insurance it desires, or any insurance on reasonable terms, in all of its markets. Competition Matters As part of its generic pharmaceuticals business, Teva has challenged a number of patents covering branded pharmaceuticals, some of which are among the most widely-prescribed and well-known drugs on the market. Many of Teva’s patent challenges have resulted in litigation relating to Teva’s attempts to market generic versions of such pharmaceuticals under the federal Hatch-Waxman Act. Some of this litigation has been resolved through settlement agreements in which Teva obtained a license to market a generic version of the drug, often years before the patents expire. Teva and its subsidiaries have increasingly been named as defendants in cases that allege antitrust violations arising from such settlement agreements. The plaintiffs in these cases, which are usually direct and indirect purchasers of pharmaceutical products, and often assert claims on behalf of classes of all direct and indirect purchasers, typically allege that (1) Teva received something of value from the innovator in exchange for an agreement to delay generic entry, and (2) significant savings could have been realized if there had been no settlement agreement and generic competition had commenced earlier. These class action cases seek various forms of injunctive and monetary relief, including damages based on the difference between the brand price and what the generic price allegedly would have been and disgorgement of profits, which are automatically tripled under the relevant statutes, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. The alleged damages generally depend on the size of the branded market and the length of the alleged delay, and can be substantial—potentially measured in multiples of the annual brand sales—particularly where the alleged delays are lengthy or branded drugs with annual sales in the billions of dollars are involved. Teva believes that its settlement agreements are lawful and serve to increase competition, and has defended them vigorously. In Teva’s experience to date, these cases have typically settled for a fraction of the high end of the damages sought, although there can be no assurance that such outcomes will continue. In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. (the “AndroGel case”), that a rule of reason test should be applied in analyzing whether such settlements potentially violate the federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held that a trial court must analyze each agreement in its entirety in order to determine whether it violates the antitrust laws. This new test has resulted in increased scrutiny of Teva’s patent settlements, additional action by the FTC and state and local authorities, and an increased risk of liability in Teva’s currently pending antitrust litigations. In April 2006, certain subsidiaries of Teva were named in a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case alleges that the settlement agreements entered into between Cephalon, Inc., now a Teva subsidiary (“Cephalon”), and various generic pharmaceutical companies in late 2005 and early 2006 to resolve patent litigation involving certain finished modafinil products (marketed as PROVIGIL ® ) were unlawful because they had the effect of excluding generic competition. The case also alleges that Cephalon improperly asserted its PROVIGIL patent against the generic pharmaceutical companies. The first lawsuit was filed by a purported class of direct purchasers. Similar complaints were also filed by a purported class of indirect purchasers, certain chain pharmacies and by Apotex, Inc. (collectively, these cases are referred to as the “Philadelphia Modafinil Action”). Separately, Apotex challenged Cephalon’s PROVIGIL patent and, in October 2011, the court found the patent to be invalid and unenforceable based on inequitable conduct. Teva has either settled or reached agreements in principle to settle with all of the plaintiffs in the Philadelphia Modafinil Action. Additionally, Cephalon and Teva reached a settlement with 48 state attorneys general, which was approved by the court on November 7, 2016, and on July 23, 2019, reached a settlement with the State of California, which is pending court approval. In May 2015 , Cephalon entered into a consent decree with the FTC (the “Modafinil Consent Decree”) under which the FTC dismissed its claims against Cephalon in the FTC Modafinil Action in exchange for payment of $1.2 billion (less set-offs for prior settlements) by Cephalon and Teva into a settlement fund. The settlement fund does not cover any judgments or settlements outside the United States. Under the Modafi n i l Consent Decree, Teva also agreed to certain injunctive relief with respect to the types of settlement agreements Teva may enter into to resolve patent litigation in the United States for a period of ten years. In February 2019 , in connection with the settlement of other unrelated FTC a ntitrust lawsuits, as described below, Teva and the FTC agreed to amend certain provisions of the Modafinil Consent Decree and to restart its ten-year term. Additionally, following an investigation initiated by the European Commission in April 2011 reg arding a modafinil patent settlement in Europe, the European Commission issued a Statement of Objections in July 2017 against both Cephalon and Teva alleging that the 2005 settlement agreement between the parties had the object and effect of hindering the entry of generic modafinil. No final decision regarding infringement has yet been taken by the European Commission. The sales of modafinil in the European Economic Area during the last full year of the alleged infringement amounted to EUR 46.5 million. In January 2009, the FTC and the State of California filed a complaint for injunctive relief in California federal court alleging that a September 2006 patent lawsuit settlement between Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson”), now a Teva subsidiary, and Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Solvay”) relating to AndroGel ® 1% (testosterone gel) violated the antitrust laws. Additional lawsuits alleging similar claims were later filed by private plaintiffs (including plaintiffs purporting to represent classes of similarly situated claimants as well as retailer plaintiffs filing separately) and the various actions were consolidated in a multidistrict litigation in Georgia federal court. On July 16, 2018, the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was denied. As a result, the three direct purchasers that had sought class certification can proceed as individual plaintiffs, but any other member of the proposed direct purchaser class will need to file a separate, individual lawsuit if it wishes to participate in the litigation. On February 22, 2019, the FTC stipulated to the dismissal of its claims against Watson, in exchange for Teva’s agreement to amend the Modafinil Consent Decree, as described above. Teva settled with most of the retailer plaintiffs in April 2019. Trial on the remaining private plaintiffs’ claims has been scheduled to begin in February 2020. Annual sales of AndroGel ® 1% were approximately $ 350 million at the time of the settlement and approximately $ 140 million at the time Actavis launched its generic version of AndroGel ® 1% in November 2015. A provision for this case was included in the financial statements. In December 2011, three groups of plaintiffs sued Wyeth and Teva for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving extended release venlafaxine (generic Effexor XR ® ) entered into in November 2005. The cases were filed by a purported class of direct purchasers, by a purported class of indirect purchasers and by certain chain pharmacies in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs claim that the settlement agreement between Wyeth and Teva unlawfully delayed generic entry. In October 2014, the court granted Teva’s motion to dismiss in the direct purchaser cases, after which the parties agreed that the court’s reasoning applied equally to the indirect purchaser cases. Plaintiffs appealed and, in August 2017, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. Annual sales of Effexor XR ® were approximately $2.6 billion at the time of settlement and at the time Teva launched its generic version of Effexor XR ® in July 2010. In February 2012, two purported classes of direct-purchaser plaintiffs sued GSK and Teva in New Jersey federal court for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving lamotrigine (generic Lamictal ® ) entered into in February 2005. The plaintiffs claim that the settlement agreement unlawfully delayed generic entry and seek unspecified damages. In December 2012, the court dismissed the case, but in June 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In December 2018, the court granted the direct-purchaser plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. On March 18, 2019, the appeals court granted the defendants’ petition for immediate appellate review and the district court has stayed the litigation pending the outcome of the appeal. Annual sales of Lamictal ® were approximately $950 million at the time of the settlement and approximately $2.3 billion at the time Teva launched its generic version of Lamictal ® in July 2008. In April 2013, purported classes of direct purchasers of, and end payers for, Niaspan ® (extended release niacin) sued Teva and Abbott for violating the antitrust laws by entering into a settlement agreement in April 2005 to resolve patent litigation over the product. A multidistrict litigation has been established in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Throughout 2015 and in January 2016, several individual direct purchaser opt-out plaintiffs filed complaints with allegations nearly identical to those of the direct purchaser class and, in December 2018, both the direct-purchaser class plaintiffs and indirect-purchaser class plaintiffs filed motions for class certification, which remain pending. In October 2016, the District Attorney for Orange County, California, filed a similar complaint, which has since been amended, in California state court, alleging violations of state law. Defendants moved to strike the District Attorney’s claims for restitution and civil penalties to the extent not limited to alleged activity occurring in Orange County. The Superior Court denied that motion. The Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the decision and review of the Appellate Court decision is now pending before the California Supreme Court. Annual sales of Niaspan ® were approximately $416 million at the time of the settlement and approximately $1.1 billion at the time Teva launched its generic version of Niaspan ® in September 2013. In November 2013, a putative class action was filed in Pennsylvania federal court against Actavis, Inc. and certain of its affiliates, alleging that Watson’s 2012 patent lawsuit settlement with Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. relating to Lidoderm ® (lidocaine transdermal patches) violated the antitrust laws. Additional lawsuits containing similar allegations followed on behalf of other classes of putative direct purchaser and end-payer plaintiffs, as well as retailers acting in their individual capacities, and those cases were consolidated as a multidistrict litigation in federal court in California. On February 21, 2017, the court granted both the indirect purchaser plaintiffs’ and the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ motions for class certification. Teva settled the multidistrict litigation with the various plaintiff groups in the first quarter of 2018 and a provision was included in the financial statements. The FTC also filed suit to challenge the Lidoderm ® settlement, initially bringing antitrust claims against Watson, Endo and Allergan in Pennsylvania federal court in March 2016. The FTC later voluntarily dismissed those claims and refiled them (along with a stipulated order for permanent injunction to settle its claims against Endo) in the same California federal court in which the private multidistrict litigation referenced above was pending. On February 3, 2017, the State of California filed its own complaint against Allergan and Watson, and that complaint was also assigned to the California federal court presiding over the multidistrict litigation. On February 22, 2019, the FTC dismissed its claims against Actavis and Allergan, in exchange for Teva’s agreement to amend the Modafinil Consent Decree, as described above. On July 23, 2019 Teva and the State of California reached a settlement agreement. Since November 2013, numerous lawsuits have been filed in various federal courts by purported classes of end payers for, and direct purchasers of, Aggrenox ® (dipyridamole/aspirin tablets) against Boehringer Ingelheim (“BI”), the innovator, and several Teva subsidiaries. The lawsuits allege, among other things, that the settlement agreement between BI and Barr entered into in August 2008 violated the antitrust laws. A multidistrict litigation has been established in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. On April 11, 2017, the Orange County District Attorney filed a complaint for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law based on the Aggrenox ® patent litigation settlement. Teva has settled with the putative classes of direct purchasers and end payers, as well as with the opt-out direct purchaser plaintiffs, and with two of the opt-out end payer plaintiffs. A provision with respect to the settlements was included in the financial statements. The district court overruled certain objections to the end payer settlement, including objections made by the Orange County District Attorney, and approved the settlement. The District Attorney subsequently appealed the court’s approval to the Second Circuit. Opt-outs from the end payer class have also appealed certain aspects of the court’s approval order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Those appeals remain pending. Annual sales of Aggrenox ® were approximately $340 million at the time of the settlement and approximately $455 million at the time Teva launched its authorized generic version of Aggrenox ® in July 2015. Since January 2014, numerous lawsuits have been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by purported classes of end payers for, and direct purchasers of, Actos ® and Actoplus Met (pioglitazone and pioglitazone plus metformin) against Takeda, the innovator, and several generic manufacturers, including Teva, Actavis and Watson. The lawsuits allege, among other things, that the settlement agreements between Takeda and the generic manufacturers violated the antitrust laws. The court dismissed the end payer lawsuits against all defendants in September 2015. On February 8, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal in part and vacated and remanded the dismissal in part with respect to the claims against Takeda. The direct purchasers’ case had been stayed pending resolution of the appeal in the end payer matter and the direct purchasers amended their complaint for a second time following the Second Circuit’s decision. Defendants moved to dismiss the direct purchasers’ complaint, and that motion remains pending. At the time of the settlement, annual sales of Actos ® and Actoplus Met were approximately $3.7 billion and approximately $500 million, respectively. At the time Teva launched its authorized generic version of Actos ® and Actoplus Met in August 2012, annual sales of Actos ® and Actoplus Met were approximately $2.8 billion and approximately $430 million, respectively. In September 2014, the FTC sued AbbVie Inc. and certain of its affiliates (“AbbVie”) as well as Teva in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that they violated the antitrust laws when they entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the AndroGel ® patent litigation and a supply agreement under which AbbVie agreed to supply Teva with an authorized generic version of TriCor ® . The FTC alleges that Teva agreed to delay the entry of its generic testosterone gel product in exchange for entering into the TriCor supply agreement. In May 2015, the court dismissed the FTC’s claim concerning the settlement and supply agreements, and thus dismissed Teva from the case entirely. The FTC proceeded with a separate claim against AbbVie alone and in June 2018, following a bench trial, the court held that AbbVie had violated the antitrust laws by filing sham patent infringement lawsuits against both Teva and Perrigo in the underlying AndroGel patent litigation. The court ordered AbbVie to pay $448 million in disgorgement but declined to award injunctive relief. The FTC filed a notice of appeal as to, among other things, the district court’s May 2015 dismissal of the FTC’s claim against Teva, but in February 2019, the FTC stipulated to dismiss Teva from its appeal, in exchange for Teva’s agreement to amend the Modafinil Consent Decree, as described above. In May 2015, a purported class of end payers for Namenda IR ® (memantine hydrochloride) filed a lawsuit against Forest Laboratories, LLC (“Forest”), the innovator, and several generic manufacturers, including Teva. The lawsuit alleges, among other things, that settlement agreements between Forest and the generic manufacturers to resolve patent litigation over Namenda IR ® violated the antitrust laws. Annual sales of Namenda IR ® at the time of the settlement were approximately $1.1 billion and approximately $550 million at the time other manufacturers first launched generic versions of Namenda IR ® in July 2015. On December 16, 2016, the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) issued a statement of objections (a provisional finding of infringement of the Competition Act) in respect of certain allegations against Allergan, Actavis UK and certain Auden Mckenzie entities alleging competition law breaches in connection with the supply of 10mg and 20mg hydrocortisone tablets in the U.K. On December 18, 2017, the CMA issued a Statement of Draft Penalty Calculation. No final decision regarding infringement of competition law has yet been issued. On March 3, 2017, the CMA issued a second statement of objections in respect of certain additional allegations (relating to the same products and covering part of the same time period as in the first statement of objections) against Actavis UK, Allergan and certain Auden Mckenzie entities. On February 28, 2019, the CMA issued a third statement of objections with allegations of additional infringements relating to the supply of 10mg and 20mg hydrocortisone tablets in the U.K against certain Auden Mckenzie entities and others. On January 9, 2017 , Teva completed the sale of Actavis UK to Accord Healthcare Limited, pursuant to which Teva will indemnify Accord Healthcare for potential fines imposed by the CMA and/or damages awarded by a court against Actavis UK in relation to the December 18 , 2017 and March 3 , 2017 statements of objections, and resulting from conduct prior to the closing date of the sale. In addition, Teva agreed to indemnify Allergan against losses arising from this matter, pursuant to the agreement the parties entered into on January 31 , 2018 . See note 3 . In the event of any such fines or damages, Teva expects to assert claims, including claims for breach of warranty, against the sellers of Auden Mckenzie. The terms of the purchase agreement may preclude a full recovery by Teva. A liability for this matter has been recorded in purchase accounting related to the acquisition of Actavis Generics. Since November 2016, several putative indirect purchaser and direct purchaser class actions were filed in federal courts in Wisconsin, Massachusetts and Florida against Shire U.S., Inc. and Shire LLC (collectively, “Shire”), Actavis and Teva, alleging that Shire’s 2013 patent litigation settlement with Actavis related to the ADHD drug Intuniv ® (guanfacine) violated various state consumer protection and antitrust laws. All cases are now in Massachusetts federal court. Annual sales of Intuniv ® were approximately $ 335 million at the time of the settlement and approximately $ 327 million at the time Actavis launched its generic version of Intuniv ® in 2014. In January 2019, generic manufacturer Cipla Limited filed a lawsuit against Amgen in Delaware federal court, alleging, among other things, that a January 2, 2019 settlement agreement between Amgen and Teva, resolving patent litigation over cinacalcet (generic Sensipar ® ), violated the antitrust laws. In March 2019, Cipla Limited amended its complaint to name Teva as an additional defendant, and putative classes of direct-purchaser and end-payer plaintiffs have also filed antitrust lawsuits in U.S. federal district court against Amgen and Teva related to the January 2, 2019 settlement. Both Cipla Limited and the putative class plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief. Annual sales of Sensipar ® in the United States were approximately $1.4 billion at the time Teva launched its generic version of Sensipar ® in December 2018, and at the time of the January 2, 2019 settlement. Government Investigations and Litigation Relating |
