| Commitments and contingencies | NOTE 16 – Commitments and contingencies: General From time to time, Teva and/or its subsidiaries are subject to claims for damages and/or equitable relief arising in the ordinary course of business. In addition, as described below, in large part as a result of the nature of its business, Teva is frequently subject to litigation. Teva generally believes that it has meritorious defenses to the actions brought against it and vigorously pursues the defense or settlement of each such action. Except as described below, Teva does not currently have a reasonable basis to estimate the loss, or range of loss, that is reasonably possible with respect to matters disclosed in this note. Teva records a provision in its financial statements to the extent that it concludes that a contingent liability is probable and the amount thereof is estimable. Based upon the status of the cases described below, management’s assessments of the likelihood of damages, and the advice of counsel, no provisions have been made regarding the matters disclosed in this note, except as noted below. Litigation outcomes and contingencies are unpredictable, and excessive verdicts can occur. Accordingly, management’s assessments involve complex judgments about future events and often rely heavily on estimates and assumptions. Teva continuously reviews the matters described below and may, from time to time, remove previously disclosed matters that the Company has determined no longer meet the materiality threshold for disclosure. If one or more of such proceedings described below were to result in final judgments against Teva, such judgments could be material to its results of operations and cash flows in a given period. In addition, Teva incurs significant legal fees and related expenses in the course of defending its positions even if the facts and circumstances of a particular litigation do not give rise to a provision in the financial statements. In connection with third-party agreements, Teva may under certain circumstances be required to indemnify, and may be indemnified by, in unspecified amounts, the parties to such agreements against third-party claims. Among other things, Teva’s agreements with third parties may require Teva to indemnify them, or require them to indemnify Teva, for the costs and damages incurred in connection with product liability claims, in specified or unspecified amounts. Except as otherwise noted, all of the litigation matters disclosed below involve claims arising in the United States. Except as otherwise noted, all third party sales figures given below are based on IQVIA (formerly IMS Health Inc.) data. For income tax contingencies, see note 15 to Teva’s Annual Report on Form 10-K Intellectual Property Litigation From time to time, Teva seeks to develop generic versions of patent-protected pharmaceuticals for sale prior to patent expiration in various markets. In the United States, to obtain approval for most generics prior to the expiration of the originator’s patents, Teva must challenge the patents under the procedures set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, as amended. To the extent that Teva seeks to utilize such patent challenge procedures, Teva is and expects to be involved in patent litigation regarding the validity, enforceability or infringement of the originator’s patents. Teva may also be involved in patent litigation involving the extent to which its product or manufacturing process techniques may infringe other originator or third-party patents. Additionally, depending upon a complex analysis of a variety of legal and commercial factors, Teva may, in certain circumstances, elect to market a generic version even though litigation is still pending. To the extent Teva elects to proceed in this manner, it could face substantial liability for patent infringement if the final court decision is adverse to Teva, which could be material to its results of operations and cash flows in a given period. The general rule for damages in patent infringement cases in the United States is that the patentee should be compensated by no less than a reasonable royalty and it may also be able, in certain circumstances, to be compensated for its lost profits. The amount of a reasonable royalty award would generally be calculated based on the sales of Teva’s product. The amount of lost profits would generally be based on the lost sales of the patentee’s product. In addition, the patentee may seek consequential damages as well as enhanced damages of up to three times the profits lost by the patent holder for willful infringement, although courts have typically awarded much lower multiples. Teva is also involved in litigation regarding patents in other cou n In July 2014, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) sued Teva in Delaware federal court for infringement of a patent expiring in June 2015 directed to using carvedilol in a specified manner to decrease the risk of mortality in patients with congestive heart failure. Teva and eight other generic producers began selling their carvedilol tablets (the generic version of GSK’s Coreg ® pre- The provision that was originally included in the financial statements following the damage s in On May , , both parties filed an appeal. A hearing was held on , and Teva awaits the Court’s decision. If the appeal of the district court’s decision is decided against Teva, the case would be remanded to the district court for it to consider Teva’s other legal and equitable defenses that have not yet been considered by the district court. In 2014, Teva Canada succeeded in its challenge of the bortezomib (the g e u ® which was denied by the appellate court on November 4, 2019. Janssen Millennium may apply for a leave to to the Canadian Supreme Court. I ultimately On July 8, 2011, Helsinn sued Teva over its filing of an ANDA to market a generic version of palonosetron IV solution (the generic equivalent of ® In July 2015, Janssen sued Actavis and Teva (along with 10 other filers) over their filing of an ANDA to market their abiraterone acetate tablets, 250mg (generic versions of Zytiga ® r inter partes did not so matter is considered closed. Product Liability Litigation Teva’s business inherently exposes it to potential product liability claims. Teva maintains a program of insurance, which may include commercial insurance, self-insurance (including direct risk retention), or a combination of both approaches, in amounts and on terms that it believes are reasonable and prudent in light of its business and related risks. However, Teva sells, and will continue to sell, pharmaceuticals that are not covered by its product liability insurance; in addition, it may be subject to claims for which insurance coverage is denied as well as claims that exceed its policy limits. Product liability coverage for pharmaceutical companies is becoming more expensive and increasingly difficult to obtain. As a result, Teva may not be able to obtain the type and amount of insurance it desires, or any insurance on reasonable terms, in all of its markets. Competition Matters As part of its generic pharmaceuticals business, Teva has challenged a number of patents covering branded pharmaceuticals, some of which are among the most widely-prescribed and well-known drugs on the market. Many of Teva’s patent challenges have resulted in litigation relating to Teva’s attempts to market generic versions of such pharmaceuticals under the federal Hatch-Waxman Act. Some of this litigation has been resolved through settlement agreements in which Teva obtained a license to market a generic version of the drug, often years before the patents expire. Teva and its subsidiaries have increasingly been named as defendants in cases that allege antitrust violations arising from such settlement agreements. The plaintiffs in these cases, which are usually direct and indirect purchasers of pharmaceutical products, and often assert claims on behalf of classes of all direct and indirect purchasers, typically allege that (1) Teva received something of value from the innovator in exchange for an agreement to delay generic entry, and (2) significant savings could have been realized if there had been no settlement agreement and generic competition had commenced earlier. These class action cases seek various forms of injunctive and monetary relief, including damages based on the difference between the brand price and what the generic price allegedly would have been and disgorgement of profits, which are automatically tripled under the relevant statutes, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. The alleged damages generally depend on the size of the branded market and the length of the alleged delay, and can be substantial—potentially measured in multiples of the annual brand sales—particularly where the alleged delays are lengthy or branded drugs with annual sales in the billions of dollars are involved. Teva believes that its settlement agreements are lawful and serve to increase competition, and has defended them vigorously. In Teva’s experience to date, these cases have typically settled for a fraction of the high end of the damages sought, although there can be no assurance that such outcomes will continue. In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. (the “AndroGel case”), that a rule of reason test should be applied in analyzing whether such settlements potentially violate the federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held that a trial court must analyze each agreement in its entirety in order to determine whether it violates the antitrust laws. This new test has resulted in increased scrutiny of Teva’s patent settlements, additional action by the FTC and state and local authorities, and an increased risk of liability in Teva’s currently pending antitrust litigations. In April 2006, certain subsidiaries of Teva were named in a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case alleges that the settlement agreements entered into between Cephalon, Inc., now a Teva subsidiary (“Cephalon”), and various generic pharmaceutical companies in late 2005 and early 2006 to resolve patent litigation involving certain finished modafinil products (marketed as PROVIGIL ® In May 2015, Cephalon entered into a consent decree with the FTC (the “Modafinil Consent Decree”) under which the FTC dismissed its claims against Cephalon in the FTC Modafinil Action in exchange for payment of $1.2 billion (less set-offs The remaining balance of the settlement fund after consideration of the settlement with the 19 - ten-year Additionally, following an investigation initiated by the European Commission in April 2011 regarding a modafinil patent settlement in Europe, the European Commission issued a Statement of Objections in July 2017 against both Cephalon and Teva alleging that the 2005 settlement agreement between the parties had the object and effect of hindering the entry of generic modafinil. No final decision regarding infringement has yet been taken by the European Commission. The sales of modafinil in the European Economic Area during the last full year of the alleged infringement amounted to EUR 46.5 million. In January 2009, the FTC and the State of California filed a complaint for injunctive relief in California federal court alleging that a September 2006 patent lawsuit settlement between Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson”), from wh ich ® O ® ® ® $350 million at the time of the settlement and approximately $140 million at the time Actavis launched its generic version of AndroGel ® In December 2011, three groups of plaintiffs sued Wyeth and Teva for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving extended release venlafaxine (generic Effexor XR ® ® ® In February 2012, two purported classes of direct-purchaser plaintiffs sued GSK and Teva in New Jersey federal court for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving lamotrigine (generic Lamictal ® ® ® In April 2013, purported classes of direct purchasers of, and end payers for, Niaspan ® opt-out August 2019, the district court certified , although the court has yet to rule on the purchaser’ pending motion ® ® In November 2013, a putative class action was filed in Pennsylvania federal court against Actavis, Inc. and certain of its affiliates, alleging that Watson’s 2012 patent lawsuit settlement with Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. relating to Lidoderm ® end-payer ® On September 16, 2019, end-payers Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan filed their own lawsuit against Watson, and other defendants, in Michigan state court. That lawsuit was subsequently removed to federal court and remains pending. Since November 2013, numerous lawsuits have been filed in various federal courts by purported classes of end payers for, and direct purchasers of, Aggrenox ® for the District of Connecticut. On April 11, 2017, the Orange County District Attorney filed a complaint for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law based on the Aggrenox ® patent litigation settlement. Teva has settled with the putative classes of direct purchasers and end payers, as well as with the opt-out direct purchaser plaintiffs, and with two of the opt-out end payer plaintiffs. A provision with respect to the settlements was included in the financial statements. The district court overruled certain objections to the end payer settlement, including objections made by the Orange County District Attorney, and approved the settlement. The District Attorney subsequently appealed the court’s approval to the Second Circuit. Opt-outs from the end payer class have also appealed certain aspects of the court’s approval order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Those appeals remain pending. Annual sales of Aggrenox ® were approximately $ million at the time of the settlement and approximately $ million at the time Teva launched its authorized generic version of Aggrenox ® in July 2015. Since January 2014, numerous lawsuits have been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by purported classes of end payers for, and direct purchasers of, Actos ® , but on October 8, 2019, the district court dismissed, with prejudice, the direct purchasers’ claims against the generic manufacturers (including Teva, Actavis , and Watson). At the time of the settlement, annual sales of Actos ® ® ® In September 2014, the FTC sued AbbVie Inc. and certain of its affiliates (“AbbVie”) as well as Teva in federal court in Philadelphia alleging that they violated the antitrust laws when they entered into a December 2011settlement agreement to resolve the AndroGel ® ® I ® settlement between Watson and Solvay, referenced above. The defendants have moved to transfer the second group’s claims to the Georgia federal court that is presiding over the multidistrict litigation related to the September 2006 settlement between Watson and Solvay. That motion remains pending. In May 2015, a purported class of end payers for Namenda IR ® ® ® ® On December 16, 2016, the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) issued a statement of objections (a provisional finding of infringement of the Competition Act) in respect of certain allegations against Allergan, Actavis UK and certain Auden Mckenzie entities alleging competition law breaches in connection with the supply of 10mg and 20mg hydrocortisone tablets in the U.K. On December 18, 2017, the CMA issued a Statement of Draft Penalty Calculation. No final decision regarding infringement of competition law has yet been issued. On March 3, 2017, the CMA issued a second statement of objections in respect of certain additional allegations (relating to the same products and covering part of the same time period as in the first statement of objections) against Actavis UK, Allergan and certain Auden Mckenzie entities. On February 28, 2019, the CMA issued a third statement of objections with allegations of additional infringements relating to the supply of 10mg and 20mg hydrocortisone tablets in the U.K against certain Auden Mckenzie entities and others. On January 9, 2017, Teva completed the sale of Actavis UK to Accord Healthcare Limited, pursuant to which Teva will indemnify Accord Healthcare for potential fines imposed by the CMA and/or damages awarded by a court against Actavis UK in relation to the December 18, 2017 and March 3, 2017 statements of objections, and resulting from conduct prior to the closing date of the sale. In addition, Teva agreed to indemnify Allergan against losses arising from this matter, pursuant to the agreement the parties entered into on January 31, 2018. See note 3. In the event of any such fines or damages, Teva expects to assert claims, including claims for breach of warranty, against the sellers of Auden Mckenzie. The terms of the purchase agreement may preclude a full recovery by Teva. A liability for this matter has been recorded in purchase accounting related to the acquisition of Actavis Generics. Since November 2016, several putative indirect purchaser and direct purchaser class actions were filed in federal courts in Wisconsin, Massachusetts and Florida against Shire U.S., Inc. and Shire LLC (collectively, “Shire”), Actavis and Teva, alleging that Shire’s 2013 patent litigation settlement with Actavis related to the ADHD drug Intuniv ® In August 2019, the court denied the indirect purchasers’ motion for class certification, and they filed a petition for immediate appellate review, which remains pending. The court granted the direct purchasers’ motion for class certification in September 2019. Annual sales of Intuniv ® ® In January 2019, generic manufacturer Cipla Limited filed a lawsuit aga i ® end-payer ® ® Government Investigations and Litigation Relating to Pricing and Marketing Teva is involved in government investigations and litigation arising from the marketing and promotion of its pharmaceutical products in the United States. Many of these investigations originate through what are known as qui tam A number of state attorneys general have filed various actions against Teva and/or certain of its subsidiaries relating to reimbursements or drug price reporting under Medicaid or other programs. Such price reporting is alleged to have caused states and others to pay inflated reimbursements for covered drugs. Teva and its subsidiaries have reached settlements in most of these cases. On October 4, 2018, Teva settled longstanding litigation filed by the State of Illinois against subsidiaries of Teva and Watson for a total settlement amount of $135 million, the majority of which was paid in December 2018. Teva accepted the settlement while denying any liability with respect to the claims made by the state. Pending the final settlement payment, the Illinois litigation is stayed. In August 2013, judgment was entered in a separate case brought by the State of Mississippi against Watson, pursuant to which Watson was ordered to pay compensatory damages amounting to $12.4 million. In March 2014, the Mississippi court amended the judgment to also include punitive damages in the amount of $17.9 million. The judgment was affirmed in all respects by the Mississippi Supreme Court in January 2018 and has since been satisfied in full. Certain Actavis subsidiaries were dismissed by the trial court in an action brought by the State of Utah. That dismissal was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals on February 28, 2019. The State’s time to seek further appellate review has expired and the matter is now concluded. A provision for these cases was included in the financial statements. Several qui tam qui tam In January 2014, Teva received a civil investigative demand from the U.S. Att o ® ® In January 2014, a qui tam qui tam On September 27, 2019, the Court granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss. In May 2017, a qui tam qui tam in-kind Since May 2014, more than , tribes Other cases remain pending in various states. In some jurisdictions, such as Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and Utah, certain state court cases have been transferred to a single court within their respective state court systems for coordinated pretrial proceedings. Absent resolutions, trials are expected to proceed in several states in 2020 . Complaints asserting claims under similar provisions of different state law, generally contend that the defendants allegedly engaged in improper marketing and distribution of opioids, including ACTIQ ® and FENTORA ® . The complaints also assert claims related to Teva’s generic opioid products. In addition, approximately complaints have named Anda, Inc. (and other distributors and manufacturers) alleging that Anda failed to develop and implement systems sufficient to identify suspicious orders of opioid products and prevent the abuse and diversion of such products to individuals who used them for other than legitimate medical purposes. Plaintiffs seek a variety of remedies, including restitution, civil penalties, disgorgement of profits, treble damages, attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief. Certain plaintiffs assert that the measure of damages is the entirety of the costs associated with addressing the abuse of opioids and opioid addiction and certain plaintiffs specify multiple billions of dollars in the aggregate as alleged damages. In many of these cases, plaintiffs are seeking joint and several damages among all defendants. An adverse resolution of any of these lawsuits or investigations may involve large monetary penalties, damages, and/or other forms of monetary and non-monetary relief and could have a material and adverse effect on Teva’s reputation, business, results of operations and cash flows. In May 2019, Teva settled the Oklahoma litigation brought by the Oklahoma Attorney General (State of Oklahoma, ex. rel. Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma vs. Purdue Pharma L.P., et. al.) for $85 million. The settlement did not include any admission of violation of law for any of the claims or allegations made. As the Company demonstrated a willingness to settle part of the litigation, for accounting purposes, management considered a portion of opioid-related cases as probable and, as such, recorded an estimated provision in the second quarter of 2019. Given the relatively early stage of the cases, management viewed no amount within the range to be the most likely outcome. Therefore, management recorded a provision for the reasonably estimable minimum amount in the assessed range for such opioid-related cases in accordance with Accounting Standards Codification 450 “Accounting for Contingencies.” On October 21, 2019, Teva reached a settlement with the two plaintiffs in the MDL Opioid Proceeding that was scheduled for trial for the Track One case, Cuyahoga and Summit Counties of Ohio. Under the terms of the settlement, Teva will provide the two counties with opioid treatment medication , known by the brand name Suboxone®, with a value of Also on October 21, 2019, Teva and certain other defendants reached an agreement in principle with a group of Attorneys General from North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Texas for a nationwide settlement framework. The framework is designed to provide a mechanism by which the Company attempts to seek resolution of remaining potential and pending opioid claims by both the U.S. states and political subdivisions (i.e., counties, tribes and other plaintiffs) provide a period ts Following these devel o Separately, on April 27 , 2018 , Teva received subpoena requests from the DOJ seeking documents relating to the manufacture, marketing and sale of opioids. In August 2019 , Teva received a grand jury subpoena from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York for documents related to the Company’s anti-diversion policies and procedures and distribution of its opioid medications, in what the Company understands to be part of a broader investigation into manufacturers’ and distributors’ monitoring programs and reporting under the Controlled Substances Act. In September 2019 , Teva received subpoenas from the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) as part of an industry-wide inquiry into the effect of opioid prescriptions on New York health insurance premiums. The Company is cooperating with NYDFS’s inquiry and producing documents in response to the various subpoenas and requests for information. Currently, Teva cannot predict how the nationwide settlement framework agreement (if finalized) will affect these investigations. In addition, a number of state attorneys general, including a coordinated multistate effort, have initiated investigations into sales and marketing practices of Teva and its affiliates with respect to opioids. Other states are conducting their own investigations outside of the multistate group. Teva is cooperating with these ongoing investigations and cannot predict their outcome at this time. In addition, several jurisdictions in Canada have initiated litigation regarding opioids alleging similar claims as those in the United States. The cases in Canada are likely to be consolidated and are in their early stages. On June 21, 2016, Teva USA received a subpoena from the DOJ Antitrust Division seeking documents and other information relating to the marketing and pricing of certain Teva USA generic products and communications with competitors about such products. Actavis received a similar subpoena in June 2015. Teva and Actavis are cooperating with the DOJ subpoena requests. On July 12, 2016, Teva USA received a subpoena from the Connecticut Attorney General seeking documents and other information relating to potential state antitrust law violations. In 2015, Actavis received a similar subpoena from the Connecticut Attorney General. On December 15, 2016, a civil action was brought by the attorneys general of twenty states against Teva USA and several other companies asserting claims under federal antitrust law alleging price fixing of generic products in the United States. That complaint was later amended to add new states as named plaintiffs, as well as new allegations and new state law claims, and on June 18, 2018, the attorneys general of 49 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia filed a consolidated amended complaint against Actavis and Teva, as well as other companies and individuals. On May 10, 2019, most (though not all) of these same attorneys general filed yet another antitrust complaint against Actavis and Teva, plus other companies and individuals, alleging price-fixing and market allocation as concerns additional generic products. The complaint alleges that Teva was at the center of a conspiracy in the generic pharmaceutical industry, and asserts that Teva and others fixed prices, rigged bids, and allocated customers and market share with respect to certain additional products, many of which were not previously at issue in the Pennsylvania MDL. In the various complaints described above, the states seek a finding that the defendants’ actions violated federal antitrust law and state antitrust and consumer protection laws, as well as injunctive relief, disgorgement, damages on behalf of various state and governmental entities and consumers, civil penalties and costs. All such complaints have been transferred to the generic drug multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“Pennsylvania MDL”). Beginning on March 2, 2016, numerous complaints have been filed in the United States on behalf of putative classes of direct and indirect purchasers of several generic drug products, as well as several individual direct purchaser opt-out On July 18, 2019, certain individual plaintiffs commenced a civil action in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against many of the defendants in the Pennsylvania MDL, including Teva and Actavis, but no complaint has been filed. In May 2018, Teva received a civil investigative demand from the DOJ Civil Division, pursuant to the federal False Claims Act, seeking documents and information produced since January 1, 2009 relevant to the Civil Division’s investigation concerning allegations that generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, including Teva, engaged in market allocation and price-fixing agreements, paid illegal remuneration, and caused false claims to be submitted in violation of the False Claims Act. Teva is cooperating with this subpoena. On March 21, 2017, Teva received a subpoena from the U.S. Attorney’s office in Boston, Massachusetts requesting documents related to Teva’s donations to patient assistance programs. Teva is cooperating in responding to the subpoena. In December 2016, Teva resolved certain claims under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) with the SEC and the DOJ. The settlement included a fine, disgorgement and prejudgment interest; a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) for Teva and the retention of an independent compliance monitor for a period of three years. If, during the term of the DPA (approximately three years unless extended), the DOJ determines that Teva has committed a felony under federal law, provided deliberately false or misleading information or otherwise breached the DPA, Teva could be subject to prosecution and additional fines or penalties, including the deferred charges. Following the above resolution with the SEC and DOJ, Teva has had requests for documents and information from various Russian government entities. In addition, on January 14, 2018, Teva entered into an arrangement for the Contingent Cessation of Proceedings pursuant to the Israeli Securities Law with the Government of Israel that ended the investigation of the Israeli government into the conduct that was subject to the FCPA investigation, and provided a payment of approximately $22 million. Shareholder Litigation On November 6, 2016 and December 27, 2016, two putative securities class actions were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Teva and certain of its current and former officers and directors. After those two lawsuits were consolidated and transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, the court appointed the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board as lead plaintiff (the “Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation”). The lead plaintiff then filed a consolidated amended complaint. On April 3, 2018, the court dismissed the case without prejudice. The lead plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on June 22, 2018, purportedly on behalf of purchasers of Teva’s securities between February 6, 2014 and August 3, 2017. The second complaint asserts that Teva and certain of its current and former officers and On September 25, 2019, the court denied in substantial part and granted in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court has yet to establish a pre-trial schedule . On July 17, 2017, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio derivatively on behalf of the Teva Employee Stock Purchase Plan, and alternatively as a putative class action lawsuit on behalf of individuals who purchased Teva stock through that plan. That lawsuit seeks unspecified damages, legal fees, interest and costs. The complaint alleges that Teva failed to maintain adequate financial controls based on the facts underpinning Teva’s FCPA DPA and also based on allegations substantially similar to those in the Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation. On November 29, 2017, the court granted Teva’s motion to transfer the litigation to the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut where the Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation is pending. On February 12, 2018, the district court stayed the case pending resolution of the motions to dismiss filed in the Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation described above. Following the September 25, 2019 decision on the motions to dismiss in the Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation, Teva is awaiting the court’s pre-trial schedule for this case. On August 3, 2017, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut by OZ ELS Master Fund, Ltd. and related entities. The complaint asserts that Teva and certain of its current and former officers violated the federal securities laws in connection with Teva’s alleged failure to disclose Teva’s participation in an alleged anticompetitive scheme to fix prices and allocate markets for generic drugs in the United States. On August 30, 2017, the court entered an order deferring all deadl |
