Commitments and contingencies | NOTE 12—Commitments and contingencies: a. Commitments: Royalty commitments: The Company is committed to pay royalties to owners of know-how, Until September 30, 2018, royalty expenses were reported in cost of goods sold if related to the acquisition of a product, and if not, such expenses we Milestone commitments: Teva has committed to make potential future milestone payments to third parties under various agreements. These payments are contingent upon the occurrence of certain future events and, given the nature of these events, it is unclear when, if ever, Teva may be required to pay such amounts. As of December 31, 2019, if all milestones and targets, for compounds in phase 2 and more advanced stages of development, are achieved, the total contingent payments could reach an aggregate amount of up to $426 million. b. Contingencies: General From time to time, Teva and/or its subsidiaries are subject to claims for damages and/or equitable relief arising in the ordinary course of business. In addition, as described below, in large part as a result of the nature of its business, Teva is frequently subject to litigation. Teva generally believes that it has meritorious defenses to the actions brought against it and vigorously pursues the defense or settlement of each such action. Except as described below, Teva does not currently have a reasonable basis to estimate the loss, or range of loss, that is reasonably possible with respect to matters disclosed in this note. Teva records a provision in its financial statements to the extent that it concludes that a contingent liability is probable and the amount thereof is estimable. Based upon the status of the cases described below, management’s assessments of the likelihood of damages, and the advice of counsel, no provisions have been made regarding the matters disclosed in this note, except as noted below. Litigation outcomes and contingencies are unpredictable, and excessive verdicts can occur. Accordingly, management’s assessments involve complex judgments about future events and often rely heavily on estimates and assumptions. Teva continuously reviews the matters described below and may, from time to time, remove previously disclosed matters that the Company has determined no longer meet the materiality threshold for disclosure. If one or more of such proceedings described below were to result in final judgments against Teva, such judgments could be material to its results of operations and cash flows in a given period. In addition, Teva incurs significant legal fees and related expenses in the course of defending its positions even if the facts and circumstances of a particular litigation do not give rise to a provision in the financial statements. In connection with third-party agreements, Teva may under certain circumstances be required to indemnify, and may be indemnified by, in unspecified amounts, the parties to such agreements against third-party claims. Among other things, Teva’s agreements with third parties may require Teva to indemnify them, or require them to indemnify Teva, for the costs and damages incurred in connection with product liability claims, in specified or unspecified amounts. Except as otherwise noted, all of the litigation matters disclosed below involve claims arising in the United States. Except as otherwise noted, all third party sales figures given below are based on IQVIA (formerly IMS Health Inc.) data. For income tax contingencies, see note 13. Intellectual Property Litigation From time to time, Teva seeks to develop generic versions of patent-protected pharmaceuticals for sale prior to patent expiration in various markets. In the United States, to obtain approval for most generics prior to the expiration of the originator’s patents, Teva must challenge the patents under the procedures set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, as amended. To the extent that Teva seeks to utilize such patent challenge procedures, Teva is and expects to be involved in patent litigation regarding the validity, enforceability or infringement of the originator’s patents. Teva may also be involved in patent litigation involving the extent to which its product or manufacturing process techniques may infringe other originator or third-party patents. Additionally, depending upon a complex analysis of a variety of legal and commercial factors, Teva may, in certain circumstances, elect to market a generic version even though litigation is still pending. To the extent Teva elects to proceed in this manner, it could face substantial liability for patent infringement if the final court decision is adverse to Teva, which could be material to its results of operations and cash flows in a given period. The general rule for damages in patent infringement cases in the United States is that the patentee should be compensated by no less than a reasonable royalty and it may also be able, in certain circumstances, to be compensated for its lost profits. The amount of a reasonable royalty award would generally be calculated based on the sales of Teva’s product. The amount of lost profits would generally be based on the lost sales of the patentee’s product. In addition, the patentee may seek consequential damages as well as enhanced damages of up to three times the profits lost by the patent holder for willful infringement, although courts have typically awarded much lower multiples. Teva is also involved in litigation regarding patents in other countries where it does business, particularly in Europe. The laws concerning generic pharmaceuticals and patents differ from country to country. Damages for patent infringement in Europe may include lost profits or a reasonable royalty, but enhanced damages for willful infringement are generally not available. In July 2014, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) sued Teva in Delaware federal court for infringement of a patent expiring in June 2015 directed to using carvedilol in a specified manner to decrease the risk of mortality in patients with congestive heart failure. Teva and eight other generic producers began selling their carvedilol tablets (the generic version of GSK’s Coreg ® million, not including pre- In 2014, Teva Canada succeeded in its challenge of the bortezomib (the generic equivalent of Velcade ® infringement of the same two patents as well as a patent covering a process to prepare bortezomib. The product patent expired in October 2015; the other patents expire in January 2022 and March 2025. In 2017, Teva entered into an agreement with Janssen and Millennium which limits the damages payable by either party depending on the outcome of the infringement/impeachment action. As a result, the most Janssen and Millennium could recover is 200 million Canadian dollars plus post-judgment interest. In June 2018, the court ruled that Janssen and Millennium pay Teva 5 million Canadian dollars in Section 8 damages. Janssen and Millennium filed an appeal , which was denied by the appellate court on November 4, 2019. On January 3, 2020, Janssen and Millennium applied for leave to appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court. If the decision is ultimately overturned, Teva could owe the capped damages set forth above. In addition to the potential damages that could be awarded, Teva could be ordered to cease sales of its bortezomib product. On July 8, 2011, Helsinn sued Teva over its filing of an ANDA to market a generic version of palonosetron IV solution (the generic equivalent of Aloxi ® In July 2015, Janssen sued Actavis and Teva (along with 10 other filers) over their filing of an ANDA to market their abiraterone acetate tablets, 250mg (generic versions of Zytiga ® Product Liability Litigation Teva’s business inherently exposes it to potential product liability claims. Teva maintains a program of insurance, which may include commercial insurance, self-insurance (including direct risk retention), or a combination of both approaches, in amounts and on terms that it believes are reasonable and prudent in light of its business and related risks. However, Teva sells, and will continue to sell, pharmaceuticals that are not covered by its product liability insurance; in addition, it may be subject to claims for which insurance coverage is denied as well as claims that exceed its policy limits. Product liability coverage for pharmaceutical companies is becoming more expensive and increasingly difficult to obtain. As a result, Teva may not be able to obtain the type and amount of insurance it desires, or any insurance on reasonable terms, in all of its markets. Competition Matters As part of its generic pharmaceuticals business, Teva has challenged a number of patents covering branded pharmaceuticals, some of which are among the most widely-prescribed and well-known drugs on the market. Many of Teva’s patent challenges have resulted in litigation relating to Teva’s attempts to market generic versions of such pharmaceuticals under the federal Hatch-Waxman Act. Some of this litigation has been resolved through settlement agreements in which Teva obtained a license to market a generic version of the drug, often years before the patents expire. Teva and its subsidiaries have increasingly been named as defendants in cases that allege antitrust violations arising from such settlement agreements. The plaintiffs in these cases, which are usually direct and indirect purchasers of pharmaceutical products, and often assert claims on behalf of classes of all direct and indirect purchasers, typically allege that (1) Teva received something of value from the innovator in exchange for an agreement to delay generic entry, and (2) significant savings could have been realized if there had been no settlement agreement and generic competition had commenced earlier. These class action cases seek various forms of injunctive and monetary relief, including damages based on the difference between the brand price and what the generic price allegedly would have been and disgorgement of profits, which are automatically tripled under the relevant statutes, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. The alleged damages generally depend on the size of the branded market and the length of the alleged delay, and can be substantial — potentially measured in multiples of the annual brand sales — particularly where the alleged delays are lengthy or branded drugs with annual sales in the billions of dollars are involved. Teva believes that its settlement agreements are lawful and serve to increase competition, and has defended them vigorously. In Teva’s experience to date, these cases have typically settled for a fraction of the high end of the damages sought, although there can be no assurance that such outcomes will continue. In June 2013, the U . . In April 2006, certain subsidiaries of Teva were named in a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case alleges that the settlement agreements entered into between Cephalon, Inc., now a Teva subsidiary (“Cephalon”), and various generic pharmaceutical companies in late 2005 and early 2006 to resolve patent litigation involving certain finished modafinil products (marketed as PROVIGIL ® In May 2015, Cephalon entered into a consent decree with the FTC (the “Modafinil Consent Decree”) under which the FTC dismissed its claims against Cephalon in the FTC Modafinil Action in exchange for payment of $1.2 billion (less set-offs non-financial ten-year Additionally, following an investigation initiated by the European Commission in April 2011 regarding a modafinil patent settlement in Europe, the European Commission issued a Statement of Objections in July 2017 against both Cephalon and Teva alleging that the 2005 settlement agreement between the parties had the object and effect of hindering the entry of generic modafinil. No final decision regarding liability has yet been taken by the European Commission. The sales of modafinil in the European Economic Area during the last full year of the alleged breach amounted to € million. In January 2009, the FTC and the State of California filed a complaint for injunctive relief in California federal court alleging that a September 2006 patent lawsuit settlement between Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson”), from which Teva later acquired certain assets and liabilities, and Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Solvay”) relating to AndroGel ® paid in full. In addition, in , certain other direct-purchaser plaintiffs (who would have been members of the direct purchaser class, had it been certified) filed their own claims in federal court in Philadelphia, challenging (in one complaint) both the settlement between Watson and referenced above, as well as ’s settlement with AbbVie involving AndroGel ® and TriCor ® , referenced below. Annual sales of AndroGel ® % were approximately $ million at the time of the settlement and approximately $ million at the time launched its generic version of AndroGel ® % in . A provision for this case was included in the financial statements. In December 2011, three groups of plaintiffs sued Wyeth and Teva for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving extended release venlafaxine (generic Effexor XR ® . . ® ® In February 2012, two purported classes of direct-purchaser plaintiffs sued GSK and Teva in New Jersey federal court for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving lamotrigine (generic Lamictal ® ® million at the time of the settlement and approximately $ billion at the time Teva launched its generic version of Lamictal ® In April 2013, purported classes of direct purchasers of, and end payers for, Niaspan ® 2005 to resolve patent litigation over the product. A multidistrict litigation has been established in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Throughout 2015 and in January 2016, several individual direct purchaser opt-out s ® $ million at the time of the settlement and approximately $ billion at the time Teva launched its generic version of Niaspan ® In November 2013, a putative class action was filed in Pennsylvania federal court against Actavis, Inc. and certain of its affiliates, alleging that Watson’s 2012 patent lawsuit settlement with Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. relating to Lidoderm ® end-payer in full ® end-payers Since November 2013, numerous lawsuits have been filed in various federal courts by purported classes of end payers for, and direct purchasers of, Aggrenox ® ® opt-out opt-out in full Opt-outs appeal remains pending. Annual sales of Aggrenox ® were approximately $ million at the time of the settlement and approximately $ million at the time launched its authorized generic version of ® in July 2015. Since January 2014, numerous lawsuits have been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by purported classes of end payers for, and direct purchasers of, Actos ® ® $3.7 billion and approximately $500 million, respectively. At the time Teva launched its authorized generic version of Actos ® ® In September 2014, the FTC sued AbbVie Inc. and certain of its affiliates (“AbbVie”) as well as Teva in federal court in Philadelphia alleging that they violated the antitrust laws when they entered into a December 2011 settlement agreement to resolve the AndroGel ® ® $ million in disgorgement but declined to award injunctive relief. The FTC filed a notice of appeal as to, among other things, the district court’s May 2015 dismissal of the FTC’s claim against Teva, but in February 2019, the FTC stipulated to dismiss Teva from its appeal, in exchange for Teva’s agreement to amend the Modafinil Consent Decree, as described above. In August 2019, two groups of direct-purchaser plaintiffs filed similar claims against AbbVie and Teva, in the same federal court in Philadelphia where the FTC’s claims had been pending. The first group, comprised of the three direct purchasers that had sought class certification in the Georgia AndroGel ® purchasers, have filed claims challenging both Teva’s December 2011 settlement with AbbVie and the September 2006 AndroGel ® Those claims remain In May 2015, a purported class of end payers for Namenda IR ® opt-outs ® ® $ billion and approximately $ million at the time other manufacturers first launched generic versions of Namenda IR ® In January 2019, generic manufacturer Cipla Limited filed a lawsuit against Amgen in Delaware federal court, alleging, among other things, that a January 2, 2019 settlement agreement between Amgen and Teva, resolving patent litigation over cinacalcet (generic Sensipar ® end-payer ® ® On December 16, 2016, the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) issued a statement of objections (a provisional finding of breach of the Competition Act) in respect of certain allegations against Allergan, Actavis UK and certain Auden Mckenzie entities alleging competition law breaches in connection with the supply of 10mg and 20mg hydrocortisone tablets in the U.K. On December 18, 2017, the CMA issued a Statement of Draft Penalty Calculation. On March 3, 2017 and February 28, 2019, the CMA issued second and third statements of objections in respect of certain additional allegations relating to the same products and covering part of the same time periods as in the first statement of objections. On February 12, 2020, the CMA issued a supplementary statement of objections effectively combining the three previously issued statements referenced above. On January 9, 2017, Teva completed the sale of Actavis UK to Accord Healthcare Limited, in connection with which Teva will indemnify Accord Healthcare for potential fines imposed by the CMA and/or damages awarded by a court against Actavis UK in relation to the December 1 6 6 Since November 2016, several putative indirect purchaser and direct purchaser class actions were filed in federal courts in Wisconsin, Massachusetts and Florida against Shire U.S., Inc. and Shire LLC (collectively, “Shire”), Actavis and Teva, alleging that Shire’s 2013 patent litigation settlement with Actavis related to the ADHD drug Intuniv ® , ® $ million at the time of the settlement and approximately $ million at the time Actavis launched its generic version of Intuniv ® In 2015 and 2016, Actavis and Teva USA each respectively received subpoenas from the DOJ Antitrust Division seeking documents and other information relating to the marketing and pricing of certain Teva USA generic products and communications with competitors about such products. In May 2018, Teva received a civil investigative demand from the DOJ Civil Division, pursuant to the federal False Claims Act, seeking documents and information produced since January 1, 2009 relevant to the Civil Division’s investigation concerning allegations that generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, including Teva, engaged in market allocation and price-fixing agreements, paid illegal remuneration, and caused false claims to be submitted in violation of the False Claims Act. Teva is cooperating with these subpoena requests. In 2015 and 2016, Actavis and Teva USA each respectively received a subpoena from the Connecticut Attorney General seeking documents and other information relating to potential state antitrust law violations. Subsequently, on December 15, 2016, a civil action was brought by the attorneys general of twenty states against Teva USA and several other companies asserting claims under federal antitrust law alleging price fixing of generic products in the United States. That complaint was later amended to add new states as named plaintiffs, as well as new allegations and new state law claims, and on June 18, 2018, the attorneys general of 49 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia filed a consolidated amended complaint against Actavis and Teva, as well as other companies and individuals. On May 10, 2019, most (though not all) of these same attorneys general filed yet another antitrust complaint against Actavis, Teva and other companies and individuals, alleging price-fixing and market allocation with respect to additional generic products. On November 1, 2019, the state attorneys general filed an amended complaint, bringing the total number of plaintiff states and territories to 54. The amended complaint alleges that Teva was at the center of a conspiracy in the generic pharmaceutical industry, and asserts that Teva and others fixed prices, rigged bids, and allocated customers and market share with respect to certain additional products, many of which were not previously at issue in the Pennsylvania MDL. In the various complaints described above, the states seek a finding that the defendants’ actions violated federal antitrust law and state antitrust and consumer protection laws, as well as injunctive relief, disgorgement, damages on behalf of various state and governmental entities and consumers, civil penalties and costs. All such complaints have been transferred to the generic drug multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“Pennsylvania MDL”). Beginning on March 2, 2016, numerous complaints have been filed in the United States on behalf of putative classes of direct and indirect purchasers of several generic drug products, as well as several individual direct and indirect purchaser opt-out Government Investigations and Litigation Relating to Pricing and Marketing Teva is involved in government investigations and litigation arising from the marketing and promotion of its pharmaceutical products in the United States. Many of these investigations originate through what are known as qui tam A number of state attorneys general have filed various actions against Teva and/or certain of its subsidiaries relating to reimbursements or drug price reporting under Medicaid or other programs. Such price reporting is alleged to have caused states and others to pay inflated reimbursements for covered drugs. Teva and its subsidiaries have reached settlements in most of these cases. On October 4, 2018, Teva settled longstanding litigation filed by the State of Illinois against subsidiaries of Teva and Watson for a total settlement amount of $135 million. Teva accepted the settlement while denying any liability with respect to the claims made by the state. Following on Jan uary 8, 2020, the tr ial court dismissed with pr e subsidiaries were dismissed by the trial court in an action brought by the State of Utah. That dismissal was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals on February 28, 2019. The State’s time to seek further appellate review has expired and the matter is now concluded. A provision for these cases was included in the financial statements and settlement amounts were paid in full . Several qui tam complaints have been unsealed in recent years as a result of government decisions not to participate in the cases. The following is a summary of certain government investigations, qui tam actions and related matters. In January 2014, Teva received a civil investigative demand from the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York seeking documents and information from January 1, 2006 related to sales, marketing and promotion of COPAXONE ® ® In January 2014, a qui tam complaint was filed in Rhode Island federal court alleging that Teva and several other defendants, including manufacturers of MS drugs and pharmacy benefit managers, violated the False Claims Act. The qui tam action was unsealed on April 4, 2018 after the government declined to intervene. The relator alleges that Teva and the other defendants induced fraudulent overpayments for illegitimate “Bona Fide Service Fees” in excess of fair market value to inflate prices for the Medicare Part D program. Teva moved to dismiss the complaint. The DOJ also moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it lacked merit and was not in the government’s interest to continue. On September 27, 2019, the Court granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss. In May 2017, a qui tam action was filed against a number of Teva subsidiaries. The qui tam action was unsealed on June 13, 2018 after the government declined to intervene. The relator in the case alleges that Teva violated the False Claims Act by devising and engaging in promotional schemes that violate the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), resulting in false certifications of compliance with the AKS. Specifically, the relator alleges that Teva paid in-kind On March 21, 2017, Teva received a subpoena from the U.S. Attorney’s office in Boston, Massachusetts requesting documents related to Teva’s donations to patient assistance programs. Teva is cooperating in responding to the subpoena. In December 2016, Teva resolved certain claims under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) with the SEC and the DOJ. The settlement included a fine, disgorgement and prejudgment interest, a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) for Teva and the retention of an independent compliance monitor for a period of three years. If, during the term of the DPA, the DOJ had determined that Teva had committed a felony under federal law, provided deliberately false or misleading information or otherwise breached the DPA, Teva could have been subject to prosecution and additional fines or penalties, including the deferred charges. In November 2019, Teva’s independent compliance monitor certified that Teva’s compliance program is reasonably designed and implemented to prevent and detect violations of anti-corruption laws. In February 2020 the term of the monitorship provided for by the DPA and Teva’s consent judgement with the SEC expired. Upon completion of this term, Teva’s Chief Compliance Officer submitted a certification to the SEC confirming that Teva has complied with the monitorship requirements. Also, in February 2020, Teva’s CEO and CFO submitted certifications to the DOJ confirming that Teva has complied with its disclosure obligations under the DPA. Under the terms of the DPA, upon receipt of these certifications, and satisfactory completion of all other requirements, the DOJ is expected to move to dismiss the information filed against Teva. Opioids Litigation Since May 2014, more than 2,000 complaints have been filed with respect to opioid sales and distribution against various Teva affiliates, along with several other pharmaceutical companies, by a number of cities, counties, states, other governmental agencies, tribes and private plaintiffs (including various putative class actions of individuals) in both state and federal courts. Most of the federal cases have been consolidated into a multidistrict litigation in the Northern District of Ohio (“MDL Opioid Proceeding”) and many of the cases filed in state court have been removed to federal court and consolidated into the MDL Opioid Proceeding. Other cases remain pending in various states. In some jurisdictions, such as Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and Utah, certain state court cases have been transferred to a single court within their respective state court systems for coordinated pretrial proceedings. Absent resolutions, trials are expected to proceed in several states in 2020. A court in New York has set a date, for a liability trial only, to start in March 2020. A court in California also set a date for a trial to start in June 2020. Complaints asserting claims under similar provisions of different state law, generally contend that the defendants allegedly engaged in improper marketing and distribution of opioids, including ACTIQ ® ® non-monetary In May 2019, Teva settled the Oklahoma litigation brought by the Oklahoma Attorney General (State of Oklahoma, ex. rel. Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma vs. Purdue Pharma L.P., et. al.) for $85 million. The settlement did not include any admission of violation of law for any of the claims or allegations made. As the Company demonstrated a willingness to settle part of the litigation, for accounting purposes, management considered a portion of opioid-related cases as probable and, as such, recorded an estimated provision in the second quarter of 2019. Given the relatively early stage of the cases, management viewed no amount within the range to be the most likely outcome. Therefore, management recorded a provision for the reasonably estimable minimum amount in the assessed range for such opioid-related cases in accordance with Accounting Standards Codification 450 “Accounting for Contingencies.” On October 21, 2019, Teva reached a settlement with the two plaintiffs in the MDL Opioid Proceeding that was scheduled for trial for the Track One case, Cuyahoga and Summit Counties of Ohio. Under the terms of the settlement, Teva will provide the two counties with opioid treatment medication, buprenorphine naloxone (sublingual tablets), known by the brand name Suboxone ® $ million at wholesale acquisition cost and distributed over three years to help in the care and treatment of people suffering from addiction, and a cash payment in the amount of $20 million, to be paid in four payments over three years. Also on October 21, 2019, Teva and certain other defendants reached an agreement in principle with a group of Attorneys General from North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Texas for a nationwide settlement framework. The framework is designed to provide a mechanism by which the Company attempts to seek resolution of remaining potential and pending opioid claims by both the U.S. states and political subdivisions (i.e., counties, tribes and other plaintiffs) thereof. Under this agreement, Teva would provide buprenorphine naloxone (sublingual tablets) with an estimated value of up to approximately $23 billion at wholesale acquisition cost over a ten year period. In addition, Teva would also provide cash payments of up to $250 million over a ten year period. The Company cannot predict if the nationwide settlement framework will be finalized. Following these developments, the Company considered a range of potential settlement outcomes. No single outcome in the range was considered to be more likely than any other outcome; accordingly, in the third quarter of 2019, Teva accrued to the new low end of the range, resulting in an increase in Teva’s previously recorded estimated liability. There was no change in this estimate in the fourth quarter of 2019. Separately, on April 27, 2018, Teva received subpoena requests from the United States Attorney’s office in the Western District of Virginia and the Civil Division seeking documents relating to the manufacture, marketing and sale of branded opioids. In August 2019, Teva received a grand jury subpoena from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York for documents related to the Company’s anti-diversion policies and procedures and distribution of its opioid medications, in what the Company understands to be part of a broader investigation into manufacturers’ and distributors’ monitoring programs and reporting under the Controlled Substances Act. In September 2019, Teva received subpoenas from the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) as part of an industry-wide inquiry into the effect of opioid prescriptions on New York health insurance premiums. The Company is cooperating with NYDFS’s inquiry and producing documents in response to the various subpoenas and requests for information. Currently, Teva cannot predict how the nationwide settlement framework agreement (if finalized) will affect these investigations. In addition, a number of state attorneys general, including a coordinated multistate effort, have initiated investigations into sales and marketing practices of Teva and its affiliates with respect to opioids. Other states are conducting their own investigations outside of the multistate group. Teva is cooperating with these ongoing investigations and cannot predict their outcome at this time. In addition, several jurisdictions in Canada have initiated litigation regarding opioids alleging similar claims as those in the United States. The cases in Canada are likely to be consolidated and are in their early stages. Shareholder Litigation On November 6, 2016 and December 27, 2016, two putative securities class actions were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Teva and certain of its current and former officers and directors. After those two lawsuits were consolidated and transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, the court appointed the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board as lead plaintiff (the “Ontario Teachers Securities Litigation”). The lead plain |