Perot Systems 8-K/A Financial statements and exhibits

EXHIBIT 99.378

Alternatives for Mitigating Potentially
High Zonal Market Clearing Prices

Confidential Draft

California Power Exchange

06/28/02   –   p.1

Summary of Alternatives:

Pricing Proposals to Mitigate High Zonal Prices	Mitigating	Efficient	Implement’n	Gaming	Long-term	Work
	High Prices	Prices	Requirement	Potential	Application	for MPs
Alternative 1
•   Apply UMCP to all zones •   Pay bid prices to suppliers above IPS •   Create uplift charge to account for congestion     charges from the ISO and added payments in 2 •   Charge uplift to all demand based on MWh	Very effective	Inefficient	Moderate	Very limited	No	Minor
Alternative 2
•   Same as Alternative 1 except charge uplift to all     demand based on zone and MWh	Very effective	Moderately inefficient	Moderate	Very limited	No	Minor
Alternative 3
•   Use Regional Incremental Costs (RICs) for zonal MCPs •   Create uplift as the additional congestion     payment/credit for the remaining ISO congestion charges •   Charge uplift to all demand based on MWh	Moderately effective	Moderately efficient	Moderate	Limited	No	Minor
Alternative 4
•   Same as Alternative 3 except charge uplift to all     demand based on zone and MWh	Moderately effective	Moderately efficient	Moderate	Limited	No	Minor
Alternative 5
•   Stay with current marginal pricing procedures •   Require incremental adjustment bids for all     generators and imports capped at $250/MWh	Moderately effective	Efficient	Moderate	Limited	Probably	Moderate – may challenge Price caps
Alternative 6
•   Stay with current marginal pricing procedures •   Require that the SABs submitted with IPS to mimic     overall portfolio bids – capped at $250/MW •   Limit total import MW bid to less than the     capacity of the path	Effective	Efficient	Major	Limited	Probably	Major
Alternative 7
•   Stay with current marginal pricing procedures •   Require the PX market participants to submit “unit     bids” instead of portfolio bids – capped at $250/MW	Very effective	Efficient	Major	Limited	Yes	Major

06/28/02   –   p.2

Details of Alternatives:

Pricing Proposals to Mitigate High Zonal Prices	Mitigating	Efficiency				Added
	High Zonal	of Price	Implementation	Gaming	Long-term	Work
	Prices	Signals	Requirements	Potential	Application	for MPs
Alternative 1
1.   UMCP will apply to all zones 2.   All suppliers with Final       Schedule (FS) above       Initial Preferred Schedule (IPS)       will receive their bid price for       supply above IPS as a lump sum 3.   The ISO congestion charge       and the added payment to       suppliers are summed to create a       congestion uplift payment (CUP) 4.   CUP will be allocated to all loads       based on their MWh use	Very effective	Inefficient	•   Settlements should be     modified to allow     extra payments as     lump sum payment     to supplies     (generation or import)     – not trivial •   Settlements should be     modified to assign     CUP as a lump sum     charge for demands     (load or export)     – not trivial. •   Uplift charges and     added payments can     be calculated in ZPC     and passed onto     the Settlements     – moderate effort •   Will have time to the     first Settlements cycle     to implement	Very limited gaming for the transmission auction	Stop gap measure as we will deviate from marginal pricing principles	None – except for potentially adjusting their software to deal with new charge items
Alternative 2
1.   UMCP will apply to all zones 2.   All suppliers with Final       Schedule (FS) above Initial       Preferred Schedule (IPS) will       receive their bid price for       supply above IPS as a lump sum 3.   The ISO congestion charge       and the added payment to       suppliers are summed to       create a congestion uplift       payment (CUP) 4.   CUP will be first allocated to       each zone (ZCUP) based on       the ISO relative congestion       prices for the zones 5.   ZCUP in each zone will be       allocated to loads in that zone       based on their MWh use	Very effective	Moderately inefficient	•   Settlements should be     modified to allow     extra payments as     lump sum payment     to supplies     (generation or import)     – not trivial •   Settlements should be     modified to assign     CUP as a lump sum     charge for demands    (load or export)     – not trivial. •   Lump sum outside     can be calculated in     ZPC and passed onto     the Settlements    – moderate effort •   Will have time to the     first Settlements cycle     to implement	Very limited gaming for the transmission auction	Stop gap measure as we will deviate from marginal pricing principles	None – except for potentially adjusting their own software to deal with new charge items

¹   Of course the PX market participants will not observe the prices until software changes are complete.

06/28/02   –   p.3

Pricing Proposals to Mitigate High Zonal Prices	Mitigating High Zonal Prices	Efficiency of Price Signals	Implementation Requirements	Gaming Potential	Long-term Application	Added Work for MPs
Alternative 3
1.   Regional Incremental Costs       (RICs)2 used for zonal MCPs 2.   Additional congestion       payment/credit for       the remaining ISO       congestion charges are       translated into a CUP 3.   CUP will be allocated       to all loads based on their       MWh use	Moderately effective	Moderately efficient	•   Settlements     should be     modified to     assign CUP as     a lump sum     charge for     demands (load     or export)     – not trivial. •   Uplift charges     can be     calculated in     ZPC and     passed onto     the Settlements     – moderate     effort •   Will have     time to the     first     Settlements     cycle to     implement	Gaming opportunities with default congestion pricing will be mitigated	Stop gap measure as we will deviate from marginal pricing principles	None – except for potentially adjusting their own software to deal with new charge items
Alternative 4
1.   Regional Incremental Cost       (RIC) of each zone used       for zonal MCP 2.   Additional congestion       payment/credit for the       remaining ISO congestion       charges are translated       into a CUP 3.   CUP will be first allocated       to each zone (ZCUP)       based on the ISO       relative congestion       prices for the       congestion zones 4.   ZCUP in each zone will be       allocated to loads       in that zone based       on their MWh use	Moderately effective	Moderately efficient	•   Settlements     should be     modified to     assign CUP as     a lump sum     charge for     demands (load     or export)     – not trivial. •   Uplift charges     can be     calculated     in ZPC and     passed onto     the Settlements –     moderate     effort •   Will have     time to     the first     Settlements     cycle to     implement	Gaming opportunities with default congestion pricing will be mitigated	Stop gap measure as we will deviate from marginal pricing principles	None – except for potentially adjusting their own software to deal with new charge items

²   RIC is the price bid value for the last unit incremented/decremented in a region (each region consists of one or more zones with no congestion).

06/28/02   –   p.4

Pricing Proposals to Mitigate High Zonal Prices	Mitigating	Efficiency	Implementation	Gaming	Long-term	Added Work
	High Zonal	of Price	Requirements	Potential	Application	for MPs
	Prices	Signals
Alternative 5
1.   Stay with current marginal       pricing procedures 2.   Require incremental       adjustment bids for       all generators       and imports 3.   Require the ISO not       to change our prices       for congestion       management process 4.   Limit incremental       adjustment bid to       a max of $250/MWh	Moderately effective	Efficient	•   Need to add     validation for     incremental bids     – not trivial •   ISO needs to     modify software     to leave our     price bids alone	Mitigated congestion pricing gaming. Less effective w/ energy price gaming	Applicable	•   MPs need     to create     bids •   Bids     may be     rejected     delaying     market     close •   Price caps     may be     challenged
Alternative 6
1.   Stay with current marginal       pricing procedures 2.   Require that the       SABs submitted as       part of IPS, when       aggregated, to closely       mimic the overall       portfolio bids 3.   Limit total import       MW bid to less       than the capacity       of the path 4.   Limit incremental       adjustment bid to       a max of $250/MWh	Moderately effective	Efficient	•   Need to add     validation for     incremental bids     – not trivial	Mitigated congestion pricing gaming. Less effective w/ energy price gaming	Applicable	•   Bids     may be     rejected     delaying     market     close •   Will be     difficult     to mimic     the     portfolio     bid •   Price caps     may be     challenged
Alternative 7
1.   Stay with current marginal       pricing procedures 2.   Require the PX market       participants to submit       “unit bids”       instead of portfolio       bids 3.   Convert the unit       bids into SABs       for congestion       management 4.   Limit incremental       adjustment bid to       a max of $250/MWh	Very effective	Efficient	•   Need to test     OMH software for     substantially lager     number of bids •   Need to develop     a simple software     to convert the     unit bid into     adjustment bid	Limited overall gaming	Applicable	•   Requires     MPs to     create bid     curves per     resource •  Complicates     the     energy     auction     process •   Price     caps     may be     challenged

06/28/02   –   p.5