Exhibit 99.3
1
D3EMCHEC
| | | | | | |
1 | | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | | |
1 | | SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK | | |
2 | | x | | |
2 | | | | | | |
3 | | CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORPORATION, | | |
3 | | | | | | |
4 | | | | Plaintiff, | | |
4 | | | | | | |
5 | | | | v. | | 13 CV 1582 (PAE) |
5 | | | | | | |
6 | | THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON | | |
6 | | TRUST COMPANY, N.A., | | |
7 | | | | | | |
7 | | | | Defendant. | | |
8 | | | | | | |
8 | | x | | |
9 | | | | | | New York, N.Y. |
9 | | | | | | March 14, 2013 |
10 | | | | | | 3:00 p.m. |
10 | | | | | | |
11 | | | | Before: | | |
11 | | | | | | |
12 | | | | HON. PAUL A. ENGELMAYER |
12 | | | | | | |
13 | | | | | | District Judge |
13 | | | | | | |
14 | | | | APPEARANCES |
14 | | | | | | |
15 | | | | JENNER & BLOCK LLP | | |
15 | | | | Attorney for Plaintiff | | |
16 | | | | BY: RICHARD F. ZIEGLER | | |
16 | | | | STEVEN ASHER | | |
17 | | | | ANNE CORTINA-PERRY | | |
17 | | | | TOBIAS BERKMAN | | |
18 | | | | | | |
18 | | | | EMMET, MARVIN & MARTIN, LLP |
19 | | | | Attorney for Defendant | | |
19 | | | | BY: PAUL T. WEINSTEIN | | |
20 | | | | TYLER J. KANDEL | | |
20 | | | | MORDECAI GEISLER | | |
21 | | | | | | |
21 | | | | SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP |
22 | | | | Attorneys for INTERVENOR AD HOC NOTEHOLDER GROUP |
22 | | | | BY: STEVEN M. BIERMAN | | |
23 | | | | BENJAMIN R. NAGIN | | |
23 | | | | ALEX R. ROVIRA | | |
24 | | | | | | |
25 | | | | | | |
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2 | MR. ZIEGLER: Ready for the plaintiff, your Honor, |
3 | Richard Ziegler from Jenner & Block. With me are my |
4 | colleagues, Stephen Asher, Anne Cortina-Perry, and Tobias |
6 | THE COURT: Good afternoon. |
7 | MR. WEINSTEIN: Ready as well, your Honor. Paul |
8 | Weinstein for the Bank of New York, Mellon Trust Company, N.A., |
9 | with Tyler Kandel and Mordecai Geisler. |
10 | MR. BIERMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor, Steven |
11 | Bierman, Benjamin Nagin and Alex Rovira for the intervenors. |
12 | THE COURT: Good afternoon. |
13 | Is there counsel for Whitebox here? |
14 | Good afternoon. We are here for the purpose of |
15 | announcing the Court’s decision on the application by plaintiff |
16 | Chesapeake Energy Corporation for emergency relief in the form |
17 | of a preliminary injunction. As counsel are aware, the Court |
18 | received that application and a memorandum of law in support |
19 | from Chesapeake late Friday afternoon. On Tuesday morning, on |
20 | the schedule that the Court set, the Court received opposition |
21 | briefs from the parties opposing Chesapeake’s application. On |
22 | Tuesday evening, March 12, the Court heard extended oral |
24 | I have a lengthy opinion that I will be rendering from |
25 | the bench. A written opinion will not issue in the case. |
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1 | Instead, the Court will issue a short order afterwards that |
2 | states its ruling and incorporates by reference the reasoning |
3 | given from the bench. Therefore, to the extent that the |
4 | Court’s remarks and reasoning are useful to counsel or the |
5 | parties, counsel may wish to order the transcript. |
6 | By way of background, Chesapeake is an oil and natural |
7 | gas producer. It is a publicly-traded Oklahoma corporation. |
8 | In February 2012, Chesapeake completed a public |
9 | offering of $1.3 billion in senior notes due in 2019. The |
10 | notes pay at a rate of 6.775 percent. I will refer to these |
11 | notes as the Notes or the 2019 Notes. The 2019 Notes were |
12 | issued pursuant to a Base Indenture governing a series of notes |
13 | issued or to be issued by Chesapeake. The 2019 Notes were also |
14 | issued pursuant to a Supplemental Indenture, formally denoted |
15 | as the Ninth Supplemental Indenture, which is dated February |
16 | 16, 2012. It is an important document here and I will refer to |
17 | it as the Supplemental Indenture. Both the Base Indenture and |
18 | Supplemental Indentures were entered into between Chesapeake, |
19 | as the issuer, and others, including Bank of New York Mellon, |
21 | The issue presented here involves Chesapeake’s right |
22 | to redeem the notes prior to the 2019 maturity date, and |
23 | specifically, during what time period Chesapeake had the lawful |
24 | right to act to redeem the bonds at par value. |
25 | It is undisputed that, under the Supplemental |
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1 | Indenture, Chesapeake had, during some period of time, the |
2 | right to redeem the notes at par value. Section 1.7(b) of the |
3 | Supplemental Indenture provides for what it calls a “Special |
4 | Early Redemption Period.” It gave Chesapeake the right to |
5 | redeem the Notes, or some of the Notes, early. Under Section |
6 | 1.7(b), the redemption price was a price equal to 100 percent |
7 | of the principal, or par, value of the Notes, plus accrued and |
8 | unpaid interest on the Notes as of the date of redemption. As |
9 | a practical matter, the provision for Special Early Redemption |
10 | gave Chesapeake the opportunity to opt out early of the bonds |
11 | and the 6.775 percent interest rate. So, if, for example, the |
12 | interest rate environment as of the window of time during which |
13 | early redemption was permitted was such that, for Chesapeake, |
14 | the terms of the 2019 Notes were proving disadvantageous, |
15 | Chesapeake had the right to redeem early and opt out of the |
16 | duty to pay the stated interest rate. |
17 | It is also undisputed that any redemption by |
18 | Chesapeake after the period provided for Special Early |
19 | Redemption would be subject to different terms, and for |
20 | Chesapeake, far less favorable terms. Section 1.7(c) of the |
21 | Supplemental Indenture is the provision relevant here. It |
22 | provides that, were Chesapeake to make redemptions after the |
23 | period during which the Special Early Redemption terms applied, |
24 | it would have to pay an amount equal to what is referred to as |
25 | “Make-Whole Price,” plus accrued and unpaid interest. The |
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1 | Make-Whole Price is effectively the present value of the bonds |
3 | A separate provision, Section 3.06 of the Base |
4 | Indenture, sets forth the mechanics of a redemption. |
5 | Specifically, on the redemption date, Chesapeake is obligated |
6 | to deposit with the paying agent, which is BNY Mellon, no later |
7 | than 11 a.m., the funds sufficient to pay the aggregate |
8 | redemption price for all the Notes to be redeemed, plus accrued |
9 | and unpaid interest for all the Notes to be redeemed. |
10 | The instant controversy arises out of events in late |
11 | February of this year. On February 20, 2013, representatives |
12 | of Chesapeake spoke with Sharon McGrath, a BNY Mellon |
13 | vice-president, and indicated that Chesapeake planned to redeem |
14 | the 2019 Notes at the par price, in other words, pursuant to |
15 | the Special Early Redemption provision. On the facts as |
16 | proffered to the Court, Ms. McGrath did not indicate, at least |
17 | initially, that BNY Mellon in any problem with that proposed |
18 | course. However, later that day, Ms. McGrath was contacted by |
19 | James Seery, a partner in River Birch Capital, which had |
20 | recently purchased 2019 Notes. Here I am relying on |
21 | Mr. Seery’s declaration. He advised Ms. McGrath of his view |
22 | that the time period during which Chesapeake could redeem the |
23 | Notes pursuant to the Special Early Redemption had lapsed. It |
24 | appears, both from Mr. Seery’s declaration and the submission |
25 | by Chesapeake, that BNY Mellon was persuaded by Mr. Seery’s |
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1 | analysis of the problem. In any event, on February 22, 2013, |
2 | Ms. McGrath and BNY Mellon’s counsel, speaking on behalf of BNY |
3 | Mellon, communicated to Chesapeake their view that Chesapeake |
4 | no longer had the right to issue a notice of redemption |
5 | pursuant to Section 1.7(b), the Special Early Notice provision. |
6 | That position was reiterated six days later in a call between |
7 | counsel for BNY Mellon and Chesapeake. |
8 | Under even Chesapeake’s reading of Section 1.7(b), the |
9 | last date on which it could give a timely notice of redemption |
10 | is Friday, March 15, 2013, in order to secure the special early |
12 | Chesapeake accordingly finds itself in an uncertain |
13 | position, one which it characterizes as being between a rock |
14 | and a hard place. On the one hand, Chesapeake desires to avail |
15 | itself of the Special Early Redemption opportunity, which, it |
16 | represents, will save it about $400 million over the present |
17 | value of letting the bonds run to maturity. On the other hand, |
18 | Chesapeake is aware that BNY Mellon, and various holders of the |
19 | 2019 Notes, dispute that it has the right any longer to make |
20 | that Special Early Redemption. Chesapeake is further concerned |
21 | that, in the event that it gives notice today or tomorrow, |
22 | March 15, of its desire to redeem the 2019 Notes, BNY Mellon |
23 | will treat that notice instead as a notice of a Make Whole |
24 | Redemption, thereby potentially forcing Chesapeake to pay the |
25 | extra $400 million in short order to the 2019 noteholders. |
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1 | To try to solve this problem, Chesapeake prepared a |
2 | proposed notice of redemption, which is Exhibit D to its |
3 | complaint. Chesapeake states that it would use that notice, |
4 | either in identical or substantively identical form to the form |
5 | of Exhibit D, if it chooses to pursue the Special Early |
6 | Redemption on March 15. That notice is entitled “Notice of |
7 | Special Early Redemption” and it specifies a redemption price |
8 | and terms consistent with the Special Early Redemption price as |
9 | provided in Section 1.7(b). Exhibit D, the proposed redemption |
10 | notice, states clearly Chesapeake’s intention that, in the |
11 | event that its attempt to make a Special Early Redemption were |
12 | held untimely, the notice is null and void. The proposed |
13 | notice specifically states that it is not intended as a notice |
14 | to redeem pursuant to the Make-Whole Provision, Section 1.7(c). |
15 | BNY Mellon and the Noteholders, however, have notified |
16 | Chesapeake that they do not agree, or in BNY Mellon’s case, |
17 | that to this point it is unpersuaded, that Chesapeake can issue |
18 | what the noteholders call such a “conditional notice.” They |
19 | take the position that, because notice to redeem is required |
20 | under the Base Indenture to be given 30 to 60 days before the |
21 | redemption date, and because they interpret March 15, 2013 as |
22 | the date for redemption under the Special Early Redemption |
23 | terms, that Chesapeake has missed the deadline to give notice |
24 | of an intent to redeem the 2019 Notes under those terms. The |
25 | Noteholders and BNY Mellon take the further position that if |
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1 | Chesapeake gives the redemption notice identified in Exhibit D |
2 | under the Indenture, that Notice would be irrevocable. They |
3 | take the position that because any notice issued from this |
4 | point forward would have been issued too late to qualify as a |
5 | valid Notice of Special Early Redemption, and because it |
6 | contemplates redemption after March 15, under Section 1.7(c), |
7 | it is required to be treated as a notice of redemption at the |
9 | On March 8, 2013, Chesapeake filed this lawsuit |
10 | against BNY Mellon, based on diversity jurisdiction. |
11 | Chesapeake being based in Oklahoma and BNY Mellon being based |
13 | Chesapeake’s complaint seeks a declaration that its |
14 | Notice of Special Early Redemption, if mailed on or prior to |
15 | March 15, 2013, is timely and effective to redeem the Notes at |
16 | par value plus accrued interest, i.e., at the Special Early |
17 | Redemption price. It also seeks a declaration that, in the |
18 | event that its Notice of Special Early Redemption were held |
19 | untimely for that purpose, it would be null and void and not |
20 | effective as a necessary of redemption at the Make-Whole Price. |
21 | On the same date, Chesapeake moved for a preliminary |
22 | injunction. The proposed injunction would enjoin BNY Mellon |
23 | from treating Chesapeake’s Notice of Special Early Redemption |
24 | as a notice of redemption requiring payment at the Make-Whole |
25 | Price. Chesapeake’s motion for emergency relief alternatively |
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1 | seeks a declaration now that if the Notice of Special Early |
2 | Redemption is held untimely to achieve a Special Early |
3 | Redemption, then it is null and void and ineffective to achieve |
5 | Upon receiving the application for emergency relief, |
6 | and in light of the urgent timetable, the Court issued an order |
7 | to show cause scheduling a preliminary injunction hearing for |
8 | March 12, 2013, at 5:30 p.m., and directing BNY Mellon to |
9 | respond to Chesapeake’s motion by March 12, 2013, at 8 a.m. |
10 | On March 12, I received opposition papers both from |
11 | BNY Mellon and from a group denominated intervenor Ad Hoc |
12 | Noteholder Group, or Noteholders, who are the owners of |
13 | approximately $250,000 of the $1.3 billion in issued Notes in |
14 | this dispute. Because the arguments made by BNY Mellon and the |
15 | Noteholder group are substantially similar, I am going to refer |
16 | henceforth to those arguments, unless otherwise stated, as |
17 | those by the noteholders. |
18 | On the evening of March 12, the Court held a |
19 | preliminary injunction hearing. At that hearing, I granted the |
20 | motion to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil |
21 | Procedure 24(b). Yesterday morning, I issued an order |
22 | memorializing that decision. At the preliminary injunction |
23 | hearing, the Court heard argument from counsel for Chesapeake, |
24 | BNY Mellon, and Noteholders. An appearance was also made, |
25 | although no argument given, by a representative of another |
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1 | noteholder, Whitebox. As I said at the time, the quality of |
2 | the advocacy by all parties, both in written submissions and at |
3 | the argument, was first-rate. The Court commends counsel for |
4 | their excellent written and oral advocacy, which was |
5 | particularly striking given the short deadlines under which |
7 | As a threshold matter, I am obliged to determine |
8 | whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this |
9 | case. The Noteholders argue that there is no case or |
10 | controversy, because the dispute here is not ripe for |
11 | resolution. They argue that Chesapeake is seeking an advisory |
12 | opinion. They note that the Special Early Redemption notice |
13 | has not yet been issued, and BNY Mellon therefore has not yet |
14 | decided with finality how it would treat any such notice. |
15 | The Supreme Court has stated that “a claim is not ripe |
16 | if it depends upon contingent future events that may not occur |
17 | as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” I’m quoting |
18 | from Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985). |
19 | The Second Circuit, for its part, has stated that “the |
20 | standard for ripeness in a declaratory judgment action is that |
21 | there is a substantial controversy, between parties having |
22 | adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to |
23 | warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” I’m citing |
24 | Duane Reade, Inc., v. St. Paul Fire Insurance, 411 F.3d 384, |
25 | 388 (2d Cir. 2005). As the Second Circuit further added, the |
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1 | Court must, therefore, ask “(1) whether the judgment will serve |
2 | a useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal issues |
3 | involved; and (2) whether a judgment would finalize the |
4 | controversy and offer relief from uncertainty.” |
5 | The Court concludes that the standard of ripeness is |
6 | met here. Whether or not the relief requested is merited under |
7 | the standards for a preliminary injunction is a separate issue |
8 | I will turn to in a few moments. But as to the threshold issue |
9 | of ripeness, I conclude that there is a case or controversy |
10 | here, and a justiciable one. A declaratory judgment, if |
11 | merited at this preliminary stage, would serve to clarify or |
12 | settle the legal issues involved and offer relief from |
13 | uncertainty. That there is a case or controversy and a serious |
14 | highly consequential disagreement between the parties as to |
15 | their respective rights and obligations is apparent from the |
16 | submissions to the Court; and from every party’s representation |
17 | that lots of money hangs in the balance. With the March 15 |
18 | outside deadline, whether viewed as the deadline for a Special |
19 | Early Redemption notice or for such redemption itself, |
20 | virtually upon us, and with the parties having been unable to |
21 | resolve their disputes either as to the timeliness or effect of |
22 | a noise of Special Early Redemption issued on that date, there |
23 | is an obvious practical and constructive purpose served by the |
24 | Court’s considering the question. |
25 | Further, the fact that the parties’ relationship is |
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1 | governed by an ongoing contract (the Base and Supplemental |
2 | Indentures) is itself sufficient to make the case ripe for a |
3 | declaratory judgment. The Second Circuit has held that where a |
4 | case presents as “a pure question of contract interpretation |
5 | requiring no further factual development,” a district court |
6 | does not abuse its discretion in determining that a declaratory |
7 | judgment would “offer relief from uncertainty” and serve a |
8 | “useful purpose in clarifying” the rights of the parties. I’m |
9 | citing there the case of SR International Business Insurance |
10 | Company v. Allianz Insurance Company, 343 F.App’x 629, 632 (2d |
11 | Cir. 2009). Further support may be found in the district court |
12 | decision in Compagnia Importazioni Esportazioni Rappresentanze, |
13 | spelled the usual way, versus L-3 Communications Corp., 703 |
14 | F.Supp.2d 296, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). There the Court held that |
15 | the action was ripe where it was “asked to interpret a valid |
16 | contract that plaintiff argues continues to bind the parties |
17 | regarding sales occurring during the contract’s effective |
19 | For these reasons, I conclude that this case is ripe |
20 | for adjudication and susceptible to a declaratory judgment. |
21 | I do need to say a few words about diversity |
22 | jurisdiction here, although neither party has raised the issue. |
23 | There is complete diversity, as pled, among Chesapeake and BNY. |
24 | It is not clear as yet what the citizenship is of the |
25 | intervening noteholders and whether any of them is, like |
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1 | Chesapeake, a citizen of Oklahoma. Assuming that one or more |
2 | of the intervening noteholders is from Oklahoma, an issue as to |
3 | diversity jurisdiction conceivably might arise. I would then |
4 | expect very prompt briefing on the issue of whether there is |
5 | valid diversity jurisdiction here. To be sure, there is |
6 | persuasive case law holding that an intervention of right, as |
7 | is the case here, would not destroy complete diversity. I |
8 | note, for example, the First Circuit’s decision in In Re |
9 | Olympics Mills Corp., 477 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2007). For |
10 | its part, the Second Circuit has intimated, but based on our |
11 | research has not decided conclusively, that this is the correct |
12 | rule. I’m citing here the case of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. |
13 | Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2007), which |
14 | assumes arguendo that well-established exceptions to the |
15 | complete diversity rule, including that set forth in the First |
16 | Circuit’s decision in Olympic Mills, apply. Nevertheless, |
17 | should the case continue forward, I will want to make sure that |
18 | that point is carefully addressed. |
19 | I therefore proceed to the merits of Chesapeake’s |
20 | claim for preliminary relief. |
21 | As to the applicable legal standards, the Second |
22 | Circuit instructs that a preliminary injunction is a “drastic |
23 | remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a |
24 | clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” The case |
25 | cite there is Grand River Enterprises Six Nations LTD v. Pryor, |
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1 | 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit adds that: |
2 | “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish |
3 | irreparable harm and either (A) a likelihood of success on the |
4 | merits or (B) sufficiently serious questions going to the |
5 | merits and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its |
6 | favor.” The cite there is Pogliani v. U.S. Army Corps of |
7 | Engineers, 306 F.3d 1235, 1238 (2d Cir. 2002). |
8 | In this case, Chesapeake faces a higher standard, |
9 | because either form of relief that it seeks would give it a |
10 | final victory on its second claim in its underlying lawsuit. |
11 | That claim seeks a declaration that the Notice of Special Early |
12 | Redemption, if untimely, is null and void. The Second Circuit |
13 | instructs that: “A heightened substantial likelihood standard |
14 | may also be required when the requested injunction (1) would |
15 | provide the plaintiff with all the relief that is sought and |
16 | (2) could not be undone by a judgment favorable to defendants |
17 | on the merits at trial.” The cite there is Mastrovincenzo v. |
18 | City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 90 (2d Cir. 2006). I would also |
19 | cite to you the case of Tom Doherty Associates, Inc. v. Saban |
20 | Entertainment, Inc., 60 F.3d 37, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1995). |
21 | I will address the three factors in this order: |
22 | Likelihood of success on the merits, then the balance of |
23 | hardships, and, finally, irreparable harm. |
24 | The Court turns first to the question whether |
25 | Chesapeake is likely to succeed on the merits. As I noted, |
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1 | there are two merits questions presented by Chesapeake’s |
2 | complaint, one involving the timeliness of the notice of |
3 | Special Redemption that would issue on or by March 15, and the |
4 | other involving the effect of the proposed Notice if untimely. |
5 | Both of these questions are questions of contract |
6 | interpretation. They turn on the language of the Indentures. |
7 | The indentures provide, and the parties do not dispute, that |
8 | they are governed by New York law, citing here Base Indenture |
9 | Section 13.08 and Supplemental Indenture Section 22. |
10 | The Second Circuit instructs that “the primary |
11 | objective of a court in interpreting a contract is to give |
12 | effect to the intent of the parties as revealed by the language |
13 | of their agreement,” citing Compagnie Financiere CIC L’Union |
14 | Europeenne v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 232 F.3d |
15 | 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit has added that |
16 | only if the language of a contract is wholly unambiguous is |
17 | judgment as a matter of law generally proper. “The question of |
18 | whether the language of a contract is ambiguous is a question |
19 | of law to be decided by the Court.” Same case at 157-158. The |
20 | Second Circuit has further instructed that ambiguity is |
21 | “defined in terms of whether a reasonably intelligent person, |
22 | viewing the contract objectively could interpret the language |
23 | in more than one way”, citing Topps Company v. Cadbury Stani |
24 | S.A.I.C., 526 F.3d 63; 68 (2d Cir. 2008). The reasonably |
25 | intelligent person is deemed to be “cognizant of the customs, |
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1 | practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in |
2 | the particular trade and business,” Quoting the Second Circuit |
3 | case of Sayers v. Rocherster Telephone Corp. Supplemental |
4 | Management Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091, 1095 (2d Cir. 1993). |
5 | A further principal of law that is potentially |
6 | relevant is this. Merely because parties urge different |
7 | interpretations of language does not make an agreement |
8 | ambiguous. That is so only where each interpretation “is a |
9 | renal interpretation,” same case cite. But where a contract is |
10 | ambiguous, it is appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence. |
11 | That is so even at the preliminary injunction stage. And so, |
12 | in weighing the likelihood of success prong of the injunction |
13 | test, where courts in this district have found textual |
14 | ambiguity, they have commonly considered extrinsic evidence. |
15 | Citing, among other cases, Judge Schwartz’s decision in |
16 | Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enterprises, 155 |
17 | F.Supp.2d 1, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) affirmed 277 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. |
18 | 2002); Judge Koeltl’s decision in Columbus Rose LTD v. New |
19 | Millennium Press, No. 02 Civ. 2634, 2002 WL 1033560, at page 8, |
20 | S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2002 decision; Judge Chin’s decision in Hearst |
21 | Business Publishing, Inc., v. W.G. Nichols, Inc., 76 F.Supp.2d |
22 | 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). And I also direct you to Judge |
23 | Owen’s decision in CF Global Telesystems, Inc. v. KPNQwest, |
24 | N.V., 151 F.Supp.2D 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). |
25 | The Court here engages in two separate analyses of |
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1 | likelihood of success on the merits, corresponding to |
2 | Chesapeake’s two claims. It does so because these claims are |
3 | bound up together and counsel have treated both as relevant to |
4 | the likelihood of success issue. The first issue is whether |
5 | Chesapeake is likely to prevail on its claim that notice on or |
6 | before March 15, 2013, is timely to redeem the Notes as par |
7 | value, i.e., under the terms of Special Early Redemption. The |
8 | second issue is whether Chesapeake is likely to prevail on its |
9 | claim that an untimely notice of such redemption such as was |
10 | contained as Exhibit D, such as that contained as Exhibit D, is |
11 | null and void, as opposed to functioning, as the noteholders |
12 | argue, as a notice of Make Whole Redemption. |
13 | As to the first issue, whether notice on March 15 of a |
14 | Special Early Redemption would be timely, Chesapeake and the |
15 | Noteholders take diametrically opposite positions. Both argue |
16 | that the text of the indentures is unambiguous in their favor. |
17 | On that score, both parties are incorrect. As counsel |
18 | have ably demonstrated, both of the competing positions find |
19 | textual support within the indentures. |
20 | Within the four corners of Section 1.7(b), Chesapeake |
21 | relies on the following sentence near the bottom of that |
22 | provision. It reads: “The company, meaning Chesapeake, shall |
23 | be permitted to exercise its option to redeem the Notes |
24 | pursuant to this Section 1.7 so long as it gives the notice of |
25 | redemption pursuant to Section 3.04 of the Base Indenture |
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1 | during the Special Early Redemption Period.” The Special Early |
2 | Redemption Period, in turn, is expressly defined in Section 1.7 |
3 | as “from and including November 15, 2012 to and including March |
4 | 15, 2013.” The plain language of the sentence on which |
5 | Chesapeake relies assists it, insofar as it suggests that the |
6 | Special Early Redemption Period sets the deadline for a notice |
7 | of a forthcoming redemption, not the redemption itself. And as |
8 | the parties are aware, the Base Indentures, at Section 3.04(a), |
9 | provide that Chesapeake shall mail a notice of redemption “at |
10 | least 30 but not more than 60 days before a redemption date” to |
11 | the holders of 2019 Notes at the respective registered |
13 | But that is not the end of the story. The |
14 | noteholders, for their part, rely on different language in |
15 | Section 1.7(b). The first sentence of that section provides: |
16 | “At any time from and including November 15, 2012 to and |
17 | including March 15, 2013 (the Special Early Redemption Period) |
18 | the company, at its option, may redeem the Notes in whole or |
19 | from time to time in part for a price equal to 100 percent of |
20 | the principal amount of the Notes to be redeemed, plus accrued |
21 | and unpaid interest on the Notes to be redeemed to the date of |
23 | That language, in turn, viewed on its own, is fairly |
24 | read to limit Chesapeake’s right to redeem the Notes at par |
25 | value to March 15, 2013. On the basis of that sentence, the |
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1 | noteholders reasonably contend that it is the redemption, not |
2 | Chesapeake’s antecedent notice of redemption, that must be |
3 | completed by March 15, 2013, for Chesapeake to take advantage |
4 | of the favorable terms available under the Special Redemption |
5 | Vehicle. Chesapeake counters that the word “redemption” can |
6 | plausibly be read to include the process of redemption |
7 | beginning with its notice. However, the noteholders counter |
8 | that redemption is defined, including in Black’s Law |
9 | Dictionary, as an act of reacquisition, by an issuer, not as a |
11 | The Noteholders also point to Section 1.7(c) of the |
12 | Supplemental Indenture. It governs redemption after March 15, |
13 | 2013. It reads: At any time after March 15, 2013 to the |
14 | maturity date, the company, at its options, may redeem the |
15 | Notes in whole or from time to time in part for an amount equal |
16 | to the Make-Whole Price, plus accrued and unpaid interest to |
17 | the date of redemption in accordance with the form of note. |
18 | The noteholders reasonably argue that Section 1.7(c) |
19 | makes March 15 the break point, and that it is keyed to the act |
20 | of redemption and not the moment of notice, such that |
21 | redemptions that occur after that date, whenever noticed, are |
22 | permitted only at the Make-Whole Price. |
23 | Both parties also fairly argue that the other’s |
24 | construction of Section 1.7(c) is imperfect because of what the |
25 | supplemental indenture does not say. Chesapeake observes that, |
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1 | if the Noteholders’ theory were correct, then there is an |
2 | unstated deadline for notice of February 13, 2013, which is 30 |
3 | days before March 15, 2013. It is improbable, Chesapeake |
4 | argues, that the estimable lawyers who drafted the Indenture |
5 | would have intended to impose such a deadline, yet failed to |
6 | specify it explicitly. There is some force to that argument. |
7 | On the other hand, the Noteholders point out that |
8 | under Chesapeake’s construction, a redemption triggering the |
9 | terms of the Special Early Notice provision can occur as late |
10 | as 60 days after March 15, 2013, in other words, up until May |
11 | 13, 2013. Yet, that date, too, is nowhere mentioned in the |
12 | supplemental indenture. And any such date is arguably |
13 | inconsistent with Section 1.7(c), which, as noted, states that |
14 | redemptions after March 15, 2013 are to be done at the |
16 | Chesapeake has an additional argument along these |
17 | lines. It notes that Section 1.7(b) expressly requires that |
18 | notice be given during the Special Early Redemption Period of |
19 | between November 15 and March 15. If the noteholders’ reading |
20 | is correct, Chesapeake points out, then both the notice and the |
21 | redemption must occur during that period. And because of the |
22 | requirement of at least 30 days’ notice, the actual redemption |
23 | period is effectively no more than three months and as little |
24 | as two. As Chesapeake points out, there is nothing in the |
25 | supplemental indenture that suggests an intention that the |
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1 | effective duration of its Special Early Redemption right was |
3 | In the end, viewing the matter within the four corners |
4 | of the Special Indenture, and based on the initial attention |
5 | and analysis that the Court has been able to apply during the |
6 | very limited time frame permitted by this emergency motion, the |
7 | Court’s view is that the parties are in rough equipoise. Each |
8 | party has made responsible textual arguments and drawn fair |
9 | inferences. Neither party’s interpretation accounts for or |
10 | explains every feature of the short but difficult document that |
11 | is the supplemental indenture. |
12 | Accordingly, again, based on the Court’s review to |
13 | date, this would appear to be a case in which recourse to |
14 | extrinsic evidence is appropriate to discern the meaning of an |
15 | agreement. The Court is permitted on an application for |
16 | preliminary relief to examine such evidence, although I am |
17 | mindful that, because this case is before me on a emergency |
18 | application, there has been no document discovery, no email |
19 | review, no depositions, et cetera. |
20 | But on the very limited extrinsic materials submitted |
21 | to me at this stage, the Noteholders seem to have, slightly, |
22 | the better of the argument to the extent based on the extrinsic |
23 | evidence. The prospectus, which I treat as extrinsic evidence, |
24 | has portions favoring both sides. The front page clearly |
25 | states that “at any time from and including November 15, 2012 |
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1 | to and including March 15, 2013, Chesapeake may redeem” at par |
2 | value. That assists the Noteholders. On the other hand, the |
3 | body of the prospectus, at pages S7 and S30, states that |
4 | Chesapeake may redeem at par value “so long as the notice of |
5 | redemption is given during the Early Redemption Period.” That |
6 | assists Chesapeake. These statements, too, like their analogs |
7 | in the Supplemental Indenture, largely cancel each other out. |
8 | The drafting history, on the other hand, to the extent |
9 | furnished to the Court, favors the Noteholders. That drafting |
10 | history reflects that, at one point, Chesapeake’s counsel |
11 | sought to include the following language in Section 1.7(b). |
12 | Specifically, within the sentence that currently reads: “The |
13 | company shall be permitted to exercise its option to redeem the |
14 | Notes pursuant to this Section 1.7 so long as it gives the |
15 | notice of redemption pursuant to Section 3.4 of the Base |
16 | Indenture during the Special Early Redemption Period.” |
17 | Chesapeake’s counsel sought to insert the following clause: |
18 | “Even if such notice is received by holders, or such redemption |
19 | occurs, following the Early Redemption Period.” |
20 | If that language had been included, it would likely |
21 | have been decisive as to the timeliness issue before this |
22 | Court. The clause proposed by Chesapeake would have made |
23 | absolutely clear that Chesapeake had the right it is now |
24 | seeking to give notice up through and including March 15. But |
25 | that language was not accepted, or perhaps it was accepted and |
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1 | then excised. The e-mail traffic is not entirely clear. In |
2 | any event, it does not appear in the final version of Section |
3 | 1.7(b). Perhaps that clause was excised for some reason other |
4 | than a party’s substantive disagreement with it. Maybe it was |
5 | thought to be surplusage because the point was already obvious. |
6 | But inasmuch as that 17-word clause addresses no issue other |
7 | than the possibility of a redemption after March 15, provided |
8 | notice was given by March 15, and inasmuch as this clause was |
9 | apparently rejected, the logical inference, at this early |
10 | stage, is either that the parties did not agree to the |
11 | substance of that clause or that they did not have a meeting of |
13 | A final relevant point relates to how ambiguity is to |
14 | be construed. BNY Mellon makes the argument that “any |
15 | ambiguity in the Ninth Supplemental Indenture must be |
16 | interpreted in favor of the holders, unless the holders |
17 | specifically consent otherwise. For this proposition, BNY |
18 | Mellon cites Section 9.01 of the Base Indenture. But that |
19 | argument is wrong. That provision in the Supplemental |
20 | Indenture does not address at all how ambiguities are to be |
21 | construed by a Court. It address the entirely separate subject |
22 | of the way or ways in which ambiguities or unaddressed issues |
23 | in the Base Indenture can be cured, for example, by |
24 | supplements, such as the Supplemental Indenture. Section 9.01 |
25 | is silent as to in whose favor ambiguity is to be construed. |
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1 | In the end, as to Claim One, relating to the |
2 | timeliness of a March 15 Special Early Redemption notice, |
3 | Chesapeake has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the |
4 | merits. On balance, based on the incomplete materials |
5 | available at this point to the Court, the noteholders have, by |
6 | a small margin, the better of the argument. However, |
7 | Chesapeake has established a sufficiently serious question |
9 | Next, I consider Chesapeake’s Claim Two. The question |
10 | presented there is what the effect would be of Chesapeake’s |
11 | giving Noteholders on March 15 a Special Early Redemption |
12 | Notice. The parties do not appear to dispute that if that |
13 | notice was timely, i.e., within the deadline to trigger the |
14 | Special Early Redemption, then it would trigger a redemption |
15 | subject to the Special Early Redemption Terms. However, the |
16 | parties part company as to the effect of Chesapeake’s notice if |
17 | it were determined to be untimely, i.e., outside the time for a |
18 | Special Early Redemption notice. Chesapeake argues that the |
19 | notice would be null and void, as the notice in fact explicitly |
20 | proclaims. The noteholders, however, argue that there is no |
21 | such thing as a conditional notice, and therefore Chesapeake’s |
22 | notice, if held untimely, must be treated as a notice of |
23 | Make-Whole Redemption, and trigger those terms, effectively |
24 | obliging Chesapeake to pay out $400 million in the coming two |
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1 | On this issue, the Court finds, overwhelmingly, in |
2 | Chesapeake’s favor. Chesapeake’s notice could not be more |
3 | clear that it has nothing to do with a Make-Whole Redemption. |
4 | Everything about the notice says that as loud and as clear as |
5 | can possibly be said. The notice is called a “Notice of |
6 | Special Early Redemption at Par.” It states, in capitalized |
7 | and bold letters, that the Notes are being called for |
8 | redemption “solely at a price equal to 100 percent of the |
9 | principal amount of the Notes plus accrued and unpaid |
10 | interest.” It also states, in bold, that the redemption is |
11 | pursuant to Section 1.7(b), which deals solely with the Special |
12 | Early Redemption program. |
13 | Also significant, the notice openly references the |
14 | parties’ dispute about what the deadline is to give a timely |
15 | Special Early Redemption notice. The Notice references this |
16 | lawsuit, in which Chesapeake seeks a declaration as to that |
17 | subject. It explicitly provides that if the Court holds that |
18 | the notice is untimely for the purpose of effecting a Special |
19 | Early Redemption, or if the Court has not ruled by the |
20 | redemption date of May 13, the notice is to be null and void. |
21 | It states: “For avoidance of doubt . . . this Notice of |
22 | Special Early Redemption at Par will not be deemed to be made |
23 | pursuant to Section 1.7(c) of the Supplemental Indenture or |
24 | otherwise require the company, Chesapeake, to redeem the Notes |
25 | at the Make-Whole Price. It would, in sum, be hard to come up |
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1 | with language to get that message across more clearly or more |
2 | unambiguously than the language of Exhibit D. |
3 | In the face of this truly Shermanlike prose, the |
4 | Noteholders argue that conditional notice is not perform by the |
5 | Indentures. They rely on Section 3.05 of the Base Indentures, |
6 | which states that a notice is irrevocable. That section states |
7 | that: “Once notice of redemption is mailed in accordance with |
8 | Section 3.04, securities called for redemption be due and |
9 | payable on the redemption date at the redemption price.” The |
10 | Noteholders then argue that if the notice is irrevocable, and |
11 | if it is too late to work a Special Early Redemption, then, |
12 | under Section 1.7 (c), the notice must be at the Make-Whole |
13 | Price. Therefore, they argue, if Chesapeake issues the Exhibit |
14 | D notice and it is held untimely, Chesapeake is obliged to |
15 | redeem at the Make-Whole Price, and to pay them the $400 |
16 | million now, notwithstanding the explicit language of |
17 | Chesapeake’s notice to the contrary. |
18 | In the Court’s assessment, Chesapeake is |
19 | overwhelmingly likely to win on this point, should it ever be |
20 | litigated. It is true that the indentures do not provide for |
21 | conditional notice. Thus, the indentures do not allow |
22 | Chesapeake to retract a redemption notice once given, for |
23 | example, due to a change of heart or different market |
24 | conditions or so forth. That is clear from Section 3.05. But |
25 | that is not at all the situation presented here by Chesapeake’s |
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1 | proposed notice. The situation here is not one of a |
2 | conditional notice. The situation here is how to treat a |
3 | notice later determined to be void for the purpose issued. Put |
4 | differently, the issue presented is how to treat a notice of |
5 | redemption that is later held defective as to a highly material |
6 | term. Is such a redemption notice to be treated as void, |
7 | because it was untimely, i.e., because Chesapeake missed the |
8 | notice deadline? Or is it required, as the Noteholders argue, |
9 | to be transmogrified, or contorted, if you will, into another |
10 | type of redemption notice altogether? Section 3.05, on which |
11 | the Noteholders rely, says nothing about that. On the |
12 | contrary, in the Court’s view, Section 3.05 implicitly but |
13 | clearly assumes a legally valid notice. It is addressed to |
14 | whether the issuer can retract such a valid notice, not whether |
15 | a judicial ruling finding a notice untimely requires that the |
16 | notice be construed as valid for some other purpose. |
17 | A hypothetical may helpfully illustrate the point. If |
18 | Chesapeake issued a notice of early special redemption but a |
19 | day later it was shown that that notice had been issued as a |
20 | result of duress, or incapacity, or by a low-level employee |
21 | without capacity to bind the company, that notice would be |
22 | legally invalid. In the face of a legal ruling that the notice |
23 | has been invalid when made, Section 3.05 would not countenance |
24 | treating the notice as irrevocable just because it had once |
25 | issued. Rather, the notice would be void, a nullity. |
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1 | Similarly, if an issuer gave notice of a redemption on terms |
2 | utterly outside the scope permitted by the indentures, that |
3 | notice would be invalid. It would be void and have no legal |
4 | effect. Section 3.05 is simply not addressed to those |
5 | circumstances. Section 3.05 does not speak to the point of |
6 | what happens if Chesapeake issues a notice that is defective, |
7 | in this case because it was issued outside the deadline for a |
8 | redemption notice of the type of redemption indicated. |
9 | There is, in fact, based on the Court’s review in the |
10 | limited time available, no provision in the supplemental |
11 | indenture that speaks to the situation presented here. That is |
12 | presumably because the parties did not focus on the fact that |
13 | the text of the indenture that they had negotiated leaves |
14 | ambiguous what the deadline was for filing a notice of Special |
15 | Early Redemption. There is nothing in the indenture that bars |
16 | Chesapeake at this point from candidly acknowledging the |
17 | good-faith disagreement that exists with regard to timeliness |
18 | and making clear that the notice will be void if held untimely. |
19 | In the Court’s assessment, Chesapeake’s appears to be a |
20 | rational and permissible approach to dealing with the difficult |
21 | problem of contractual ambiguity with which it is confronted. |
22 | Nor is there any policy reason why the Special Indenture should |
23 | be read to give the intervening Noteholders a windfall, in the |
24 | form of a compulsory Make-Whole Redemption in the 60 days |
25 | following March 15, if Chesapeake’s proposed notice of Special |
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1 | Early withdrawal is held untimely. |
2 | Furthermore, to the extent that the agreement |
3 | implicitly addresses this point, it assists Chesapeake’s |
4 | position and refutes that of Noteholders. Section 3.04 (a) (2) |
5 | of the Base Indenture requires that a redemption notice include |
6 | the redemption price, and Section 3.05 provides that the |
7 | redeemed notes become “due and payable on the redemption date |
8 | at the redemption price.” Under the Base Indenture, then, a |
9 | noise of redemption that included no redemption price or |
10 | redemption date at all would not comply with Section 3.04. |
11 | Thus, it appears such a notice would not become irrevocable |
12 | under Section 3.05, which requires that notice becomes |
13 | irrevocable upon compliance with Section 3.04. Chesapeake’s |
14 | proposed notice identifies the redemption price as solely the |
15 | par price plus accrued interest. Under those circumstances, |
16 | treating Chesapeake’s notice as requiring redemption at a |
17 | totally different and much richer price is in conflict with the |
18 | terms of the Base Indenture. |
19 | The Court is also mindful that there are other |
20 | affected parties here, the majority of Noteholders who to date |
21 | have not joined the ad hoc group of intervening noteholders. |
22 | It is conceivable that one or more of these noteholders may |
23 | oppose redemption at the Make-Whole Price. Such a noteholder |
24 | might prefer, rather than receiving a present-value lump sum |
25 | payment in the spring 2013, to receive the same amount under |
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1 | the term of the Supplemental Indenture, which entail being paid |
2 | 6.775 percent interest through 2019. Perhaps tax consequences |
3 | would make a graduated payout preferable to such a Noteholder |
4 | to a lump sum payout in which this year’s tax rates increased. |
5 | The point is that Chesapeake is not the only entity who may |
6 | oppose treating its untimely notice of Special Redemption as a |
7 | notice of Make-Hold Redemption. In the scenario that I have |
8 | posited, such a Noteholder could legitimately challenge in |
9 | court Chesapeake’s Exhibit D notice as ineffective under |
10 | Section 3.04 to achieve Make-Whole Redemption and therefore |
11 | void. As authority, such a Noteholder could point, among other |
12 | case authority, to the Second Circuit’s decision in Van Gemert |
13 | v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1383 (2d Cir. 1975). The Court |
14 | held a notice of redemption inadequate where it was “simply |
15 | insufficient to give fair and reasonable notice to the |
17 | In sum, as to Chesapeake’s second claim, if this issue |
18 | is litigated, the Court finds that it is overwhelmingly likely |
19 | that Chesapeake would prevail: In other words, the Court |
20 | concludes that it is overwhelmingly likely that an untimely |
21 | notice of Special Early redemption would be held null and void, |
22 | and not as requiring redemption under the entirely different |
23 | Make-Whole Price. Lest the point be unclear, I will add this. |
24 | It would be reckless for any party or entity to condition its |
25 | conduct or order its legal or business affairs on the |
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1 | assumption that the Court would rule otherwise. |
2 | Thus, as to Claim Two, Chesapeake has demonstrated a |
3 | sufficient likelihood of success on the merits. |
4 | Having addressed likelihood of success on the merits |
5 | on each of Chesapeake’s two claims, the Court turns to the next |
6 | step in the preliminary injunction inquiry. In that step, the |
7 | Court assesses the balance of hardships. The question in that |
8 | inquiry is how granting, or not granting, the requested |
9 | preliminary instruction would affect each of the parties. |
10 | I consider first the effect upon the Noteholders. The |
11 | Noteholders make four distinct arguments as to how entering the |
12 | injunction would harm then. |
13 | First, the Noteholders argue that if the Court enjoins |
14 | BNY Mellon from treating Chesapeake’s notice as a notice of |
15 | redemption requiring payment at the Make-Whole Price, they, the |
16 | Noteholders, would be “deprived of the very benefit of their |
17 | bargain if a preliminary injunction issues.” That argument |
18 | does not withstand analysis. Simply stated, the Noteholders do |
19 | not have a freestanding contractual right to redemption at the |
20 | Make-Whole Price. On the contrary, under the supplemental |
21 | indenture, it is Chesapeake’s unilateral right to elect whether |
22 | or not to initiate an early redemption. If Chesapeake decides |
23 | not to redeem the bonds until they reach maturity, the |
24 | Noteholders are stuck with that outcome. They have no right to |
25 | effect or to obtain an early redemption, let alone at the |
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1 | Make-Whole Price. That was not part of the benefit of the |
3 | To be sure, the Noteholders have a different |
4 | contractual right. The Noteholders have the right to enforce |
5 | the time limit that the contract imposes on Chesapeake’s |
6 | ability to obtain the favorable Special Early Redemption terms. |
7 | Sections 1.7(b) and 1.7(c) give the Noteholders that right. It |
8 | is a right that the Noteholders can enforce in Court should |
9 | Chesapeake attempt, after the contractual deadline, to invoke |
10 | the Special Early redemption terms. But granting the |
11 | preliminary injunction does not in any sense infringe upon that |
12 | right. If the Court were to grant the preliminary injunction, |
13 | and if Chesapeake were then to issue the proposed Notice of |
14 | Special Redemption today or tomorrow, the parties would then |
15 | litigate whether Chesapeake’s notice was timely. If the |
16 | Noteholders’ legal position as to timeliness prevails i.e., |
17 | that the redemption notice issued on March 15, 2013 is |
18 | untimely, then the Noteholders’ contractual rights will have |
19 | happy vindicated. There would not be a redemption at the |
20 | Special Early Redemption terms based on a delinquent notice. |
21 | If, however, the Noteholders’ legal position as to timeliness |
22 | were rejected, and if the Court were to hold that Chesapeake |
23 | was contractually permitted to issue a Special Redemption |
24 | Notice on March 15, then the parties’ contractual rights, by |
25 | definition, will equally have been honored. The injunction |
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1 | that is sought here thus does not threaten the Noteholders’ |
3 | In their second argument as to harm, the Noteholders |
4 | suggest that the injunction would prevent them from treating |
5 | the Notice of Special Early redemption as a notice of Make |
6 | Whole Redemption. But that is not a valid claim of harm. As I |
7 | have explained, there is nothing in the Supplemental Indenture |
8 | or anywhere else that gives the legal noteholders the legal |
9 | right to treat Chesapeake’s notice as something that it |
10 | manifestly is not. As a matter of leverage, the Noteholders |
11 | may wish to hold a Sword of Damocles over Chesapeake’s head so |
12 | as to defer it from giving notice. But an injunction that |
13 | forbade BNY Mellon from doing so, or from misusing or |
14 | misapplying that notice to gain leverage, would not interfere |
15 | with any of the parties’ legal or contract rights. The |
16 | Noteholders do not have a contractual right to force Chesapeake |
18 | Third, the noteholders argue that granting the |
19 | injunction would introduce uncertainty into the market for the |
20 | 2019 Notes. The injunction, they argue, would make uncertain |
21 | the value of the Notes, because noteholders, or would be |
22 | purchasers, would be left to speculate whether Chesapeake’s |
23 | notice of Special Early redemption at par plus interest was |
24 | valid, pending a final judicial ruling on that point. But that |
25 | claim of harm is not persuasive. It is not the injunction that |
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1 | is the source of any market uncertainty. The source of the |
2 | uncertainty is the ambiguous text of the Indentures on this |
3 | point. That ambiguity exists today and it exists whether or |
4 | not that injunction issues. And that ambiguity and uncertainty |
5 | will continue until either, one, Chesapeake elects not to issue |
6 | the Special Early Redemption notice, or, two, there is a final |
7 | resolution to Chesapeake’s lawsuit seeking a declaration as to |
8 | the timing issue. To the extent that a Noteholder is |
9 | uncomfortable with the present uncertainty, he or she or it is |
10 | free to attain certainty by sell its at the current market |
12 | To put the problem a little differently, if one starts |
13 | with a premise that the contract is clear that a notice issued |
14 | on March 15 by Chesapeake would be late, then of course an |
15 | injunction that tends to free Chesapeake to litigate that point |
16 | and keep alive the possibility of a contrary ruling is a source |
17 | of harm to the Noteholders. If, however, one starts with the |
18 | correct premise, which is that the contract is ambiguous on |
19 | that point, then an injunction works no such injury. |
20 | In so holding, I am mindful of the various precedents |
21 | holding that the persistence of market uncertainty, or the |
22 | speculative behavior of market prices, is generally not a |
23 | cognizable harm in the balancing equation. I would cite there, |
24 | among others, Judge Rakoff’s decision in Fluor Daniel |
25 | Argentina, Inc. v. ANZ Bank, 13 F.Supp.2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), |
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1 | in which he wrote, “while one can never wholly discount future |
2 | dangers, plaintiff’s evidence neither supports a finding of any |
3 | undue danger of future insolvency nor indicates that the market |
4 | fluctuations to which plaintiff refers present unusual risks |
5 | beyond those associated with trade in any similar commodity.” |
6 | I also rely on Judge Carter’s decision in Rievman v. Burlington |
7 | N.R. Company, 618 F.Supp. 592, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and Judge |
8 | Sand’s decisions in both ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes |
9 | Land Trust, 378 F.Supp. 918, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) and Condec |
10 | Corp. v. Farley, 573 F.Supp. 1382, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). |
11 | Fourth and finally, the Noteholders appear to make an |
12 | argument that the injunction would injure recent purchasers of |
13 | the 2019 Notes, people who bought the Notes after February 13, |
14 | 2013, when the Noteholders claim the right to give notice of |
15 | Special Early Redemption lapsed. Here I am referring in |
16 | particular to the declaration of James P. Seery, Jr., on behalf |
17 | of River Birch Capital LLC, which identifies itself as an |
18 | investment advisor. According to Mr. Seery, River Birch |
19 | purchased the 2019 notes on February 15, 2013, in reliance on |
20 | the belief that any right by Chesapeake to redeem those Notes |
21 | at par plus interest pursuant to the Special Early redemption |
22 | provision had lapsed. Mr. Seery declares that judicial action |
23 | permitting Chesapeake to “delay” or “unpend” the Trustee’s |
24 | interpretation of the Supplemental indenture will cause River B |
25 | Birch to lose money on his investment. Thus, Mr. Seery |
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1 | declares there is a risk of “permanent, material economic harm |
3 | With respect to River Birch, that is an unusually |
4 | unpersuasive argument. River Birch is presumably a |
5 | sophisticated investor. It is an investment advisor. Before |
6 | deciding to buy the 2019 Notes, River Birch, or other recent |
7 | investors, had, or presumably had, the opportunity to do |
8 | diligence on the Notes. Relevant here, River Birch |
9 | acknowledges that it had the opportunity to review the |
10 | indentures. If it had not that opportunity, it had no reason |
11 | to be investing in the Notes. On their face, as a review by |
12 | River Birch or its counsel would have revealed, the text of the |
13 | notes contains contrary and inconsistent indications as to what |
14 | the deadline is for giving a timely Notice of Special Early |
15 | Redemption. I have canvassed those provisions for you earlier. |
16 | The point is that there are significant aspects of the |
17 | indentures that favor Chesapeake’s reading. Agree or disagree |
18 | with that reading, it cannot responsibly be dismissed out of |
19 | hand. A careful investor or his or her lawyer who reviewed the |
20 | supplemental Indenture would have spotted the ambiguity. And |
21 | any would-be investor that read, for example, the central |
22 | provision here, Section 1.7(b), and the portion of it that |
23 | states that Chesapeake “shall be permitted to exercise its |
24 | option to redeem the Notes . . . so long as it gives the notice |
25 | of redemption pursuant to Section 3.04 of the Base Indenture |
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1 | during the Special Early redemption period” had to know that it |
2 | was taking a risk that Chesapeake would give such notice up |
3 | through March 15 and that such notice might be upheld as |
4 | timely. So as to the claim of harm by River Birch on behalf of |
5 | itself and other recent investors, the answer is, if you had |
6 | access to the indentures, you took the risk that Chesapeake |
7 | would give such notice and that the matter would end up here in |
8 | litigation. River Birch’s submission does not describe a |
9 | credible claim of harm. It describes assumption of the risk. |
10 | For these reasons, the imposition of an injunction |
11 | would not work substantial harms, at least of a nature that the |
12 | law recognizes, on the noteholders. |
13 | We are going to take a five minute break. |
15 | THE COURT: Continuing, the Court next turns to the |
16 | claim of harm by Chesapeake. In large part, Chesapeake makes a |
17 | mirror-image argument to that of the noteholders. Chesapeake |
18 | argues that the injunction is needed to preserve its ostensibly |
19 | clear right to early redemption. But, again, the indentures |
20 | are ambiguous whether Chesapeake has any such right. To the |
21 | extent that Chesapeake’s argument is based on an assertion that |
22 | it has such a right, its argument is equally as defective as |
24 | If anything, Chesapeake is particularly ill-positioned |
25 | to argue harm to the extent derived from the contractual |
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1 | ambiguity. Chesapeake was a party to, and had a heavy hand in |
2 | drafting, the Indentures that gave rise to that ambiguity. It |
3 | must live with the consequences that it has wrought. Further, |
4 | based on the drafting history, Chesapeake appears to have had |
5 | notice of the potential ambiguity, its bid to add what it |
6 | apparently regarded as clarifying language was rejected. In |
7 | that vain, Chesapeake’s decision to wait until after February |
8 | 13, 2013, to give notice of a Special Early Redemption at par |
9 | was high-stakes poker. It was risky business, even by the |
10 | standards of a risky industry. Chesapeake could have avoided |
11 | this litigation by filing a redemption notice by that date. It |
12 | did not do so and that decision, on the record before me, must |
13 | be taken as a deliberate choice. The Court therefore |
14 | emphatically rejects any claim of harm by Chesapeake to the |
15 | extent based on the market uncertainty or the uncertain course |
17 | That said, Chesapeake does have a separate, valid |
18 | point about process harm that the noteholders do not have. |
19 | Chesapeake represents that, absent an injunction, it is |
20 | unlikely to go ahead with the proposed Special Early redemption |
21 | notice. That is because, Chesapeake says, the downside risk to |
22 | it of having that notice improperly treated as a Make-Whole |
23 | Notice, and of its having to pay out $400 million in relatively |
24 | short order, is daunting. In effect, because of that risk, |
25 | Chesapeake argues, it would be deterred from issuing its notice |
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1 | tomorrow, nor would it be able to litigate the claim of |
2 | timeliness to conclusion, even though it may prove correct on |
4 | The Court credits Chesapeake’s representation as |
5 | plausible. It is credible that a public company such as |
6 | Chesapeake might forego pursuing a claim of a right to early |
7 | redemption if by doing so it exposed itself to the risk of an |
8 | unwanted duty to pay out $400 million within 60 days. However, |
9 | there are several factors that limit the extent of that harm. |
10 | First, Chesapeake has not shown concretely an inability to fund |
11 | or borrow $400 million. On the record before the Court, doing |
12 | so is inconvenient but not impossible. Second, because the |
13 | $400 million represents the present value of the Notes if |
14 | redeemed in 2019, Chesapeake will by then, based on present |
15 | calculations, have had to made payments of equal value. So, |
16 | the harm to Chesapeake lies in the prospect of an abrupt $400 |
17 | million payment, not its amount. Third, the analysis that the |
18 | Court has given today of the grave legal infirmities affecting |
19 | any attempt by BNY Mellon to treat a Special Early redemption |
20 | Notice as a shadow notice of Make-Whole redemption may also |
21 | affect the extent to which Chesapeake concludes it really has a |
22 | significant risk of being forced to make a Make-Whole payout. |
23 | In so stating, I emphasize that the assessment that the Court |
24 | has given of that issue was necessarily preliminary. It was |
25 | made in the context of assessing the likelihood of success on |
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1 | the merits. The Court was neither deciding with finality the |
2 | issue whether a late notice of Special Early redemption can be |
3 | validly treated as a Make-Whole notice. Nevertheless, the |
4 | Court’s emphatic statements on that point were made with |
5 | forethought and are relevant here. They may fairly tend to |
6 | reduce the extent to which there is really a Sword of Damocles |
7 | hanging over Chesapeake, or at least of the likelihood that |
8 | that sword would strike. |
9 | On balance, therefore, the balance of hardships in |
10 | this case tips in favor of Chesapeake, but not heavily so. |
11 | As a final point, I note that there is no argument |
12 | here that a preliminary injunction would harm or, for that |
13 | matter, advance the public interest. That is a factor I am |
14 | permitted to consider in this analysis, but it is not |
16 | �� That leads me finally to the question of irreparable |
17 | harm. As I noted earlier, a finding of irreparable harm is a |
18 | required element of the preliminary injunction analysis. As |
19 | the Second Circuit has stated, in 2007: “To satisfy the |
20 | irreparable harm requirement, plaintiffs must demonstrate that |
21 | absent a preliminary injunction they will suffer an injury that |
22 | is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent, and |
23 | one that cannot be remedied if a Court waits until the end of |
24 | trial to resolve the harm.” That’s the Grand River Enterprises |
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1 | Chesapeake’s argument is that without an injunction it |
2 | will be caught, as I said, between a rock and a hard place. If |
3 | it does not give notice, it will lose out on the opportunity to |
4 | redeem at par, an opportunity for which it specifically |
5 | bargained and which may still be available to it. If it gives |
6 | notice, it risks a finding that its Notice was untimely and may |
7 | face a redemption, as BNY Mellon has threatened, at the |
8 | Make-Whole Price, causing Chesapeake to pay $400 million in |
10 | In response, the noteholders make two arguments. They |
11 | argue that any harm to Chesapeake is not irreparable, because |
12 | it would be purely pecuniary and compensable by means of money |
13 | damages. Further, the Noteholders argue Chesapeake has brought |
14 | this situation upon itself in that, had it redeemed on or |
15 | before February 13, rather than waiting until the last minute, |
16 | it would have avoided the contractual ambiguity. |
17 | In assessing these arguments, the Court is mindful of |
18 | the Second Circuit’s instruction that “if an injury can be |
19 | appropriately compensated by an award of monetary damages, then |
20 | an adequate remedy at law exists, and no irreparable injury may |
21 | be found to justify specific relief.” I’m citing Register.com, |
22 | Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 56 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004). As the |
23 | Second Circuit has explained, there is an “essential |
24 | distinction between compensable and noncompensable harm,” |
25 | citing the case of Wisdom Import Sales Co. LLC v. Labatt |
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1 | Brewing Co., LTD, 339 F.3d 101, 114 (2d Cir. 2003). Where a |
2 | contract right can be vindicated through a damages action, a |
3 | finding of irreparable harm is unwarranted. And, in contract |
4 | cases, courts must be wary of too liberally granting |
5 | prohibitory injunctions, because as my former colleague, Judge |
6 | Holwell, has recognized, “finding irreparable harm in the loss |
7 | of contractual rights too readily would effectively replace |
8 | damages with specific performance as the default remedy for |
9 | breach of contract, an inefficient result that would risk |
10 | making even prohibitively expensive performance compulsory,” |
11 | citing Oracle Real Estate Holdings LLC v. Adrian Holdings Co. |
12 | LLC, 582 F.Supp.2d 616, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). |
13 | The Court has considered Chesapeake’s claim of |
14 | irreparable harm in light of those familiar principles. |
15 | Chesapeake posits two scenarios. One is that it is forced to |
16 | forego the opportunity to redeem at par out of fear that a |
17 | redemption at Make-Whole Prices will be forced upon it. The |
18 | Court agrees that, to the extent Chesapeake were stripped of a |
19 | right to redeem at par value during a Special Early Redemption |
20 | Period, that right would have an intrinsic value to it which |
21 | cannot be collected from the Noteholders after the fact, in |
22 | other words, if Chesapeake does not issue the notice by |
23 | tomorrow. And the Second Circuit has held that the loss of |
24 | contractual rights with such intrinsic value can be irreparable |
25 | harm; again, citing Wisdom, 339 F.3d at 114. |
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1 | However, the Court is unpersuaded that this situation |
2 | presents one of irreparable harm. No one, not BNY Mellon, not |
3 | the noteholders, no one has stripped Chesapeake of a |
4 | contractual right. Rather, this situation presents Chesapeake |
5 | with a hard business decision that tests its appetite for risk, |
6 | in this case, legal risk. The choice whether to issue the |
7 | notice of Special Early Redemption is Chesapeake’s to make. If |
8 | Chesapeake is held to be right, either as to its claim of |
9 | timeliness or its claim that an untimely notice is null and |
10 | void, then it has nothing to fear. If Chesapeake is held to be |
11 | wrong about both, then it faces a costly Make-Whole redemption. |
12 | But Chesapeake is at liberty to make its own nuanced assessment |
13 | of the risks and rewards of action and inaction. As everyone |
14 | in this room knows, risk is a part of doing business. Risk, |
15 | even a big downside risk, does not equate to irreparable harm. |
16 | Now, there is a different scenario of asserted |
17 | irreparable harm that Chesapeake posits. It is the scenario in |
18 | which Chesapeake issues the notice, BNY Mellon takes the |
19 | position that the notice is untimely and that it triggers |
20 | Make-Whole redemption, and there is no judicial ruling yet as |
21 | of the 60-day redemption deadline. To avoid a cascading series |
22 | of defaults, Chesapeake then posits that it would be forced to |
23 | pay out the $400 million. This scenario, however, describes a |
24 | classic pecuniary harm and, generally, damages would be |
25 | sufficient to compensate for this type of injury. As my |
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1 | colleague, Judge Berman, has stated: “Courts in this circuit |
2 | repeatedly have held that injury stemming from investments in a |
3 | market for bonds or stocks is fully remediable in an action for |
4 | monetary damage, citing Emmet & Company, Inc., v. Catholic |
5 | Health, 11 Civ. 3272 2011 WL 2015533 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2011) |
7 | In such an action, such a lawsuit, Chesapeake could |
8 | seek to recover its $400 million by suing the various |
9 | Noteholders to whom it paid that money. Chesapeake has |
10 | protested that such a multiparty action could be cumbersome and |
11 | costly and that may be true. But it has not argued that such a |
12 | proceeding is unavailable or shown that it is unworkable. |
13 | Quite the contrary, the Second Circuit has held that just |
14 | because recovery would involve suing many different parties |
15 | does not make an injury irreparable, citing CRP/Extell Parcel |
16 | L.P. v. Cuomo, 394 F.App’x 779, 781 (2d Cir. 2010). Nor have |
17 | we ever held that the fact that recovery would involve a |
18 | multiplicity of actions is sufficient, standing alone, to make |
19 | otherwise compensable harm irreparable. There has been no |
20 | suggestion that the noteholders would be judgment proof. |
21 | Further, as a practical matter, in the event of a suit by |
22 | Chesapeake against numerous noteholders to recover $400 million |
23 | that it was improperly required to pay, the court system |
24 | contains mechanisms to facilitate that, including consolidation |
25 | for a multidistrict litigation. |
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1 | Further, Chesapeake could also pursue a lawsuit |
2 | against BNY Mellon, on the theory that BNY Mellon exceeded the |
3 | pounds of its indemnity protections in taking the position that |
4 | Chesapeake’s notice required redemption on Make-Whole terms. |
5 | Indeed, the indemnity provision appears to deny protection to |
6 | BNY if it acts either negligently or it engages in willful |
8 | Finally, but importantly, in the Court’s estimation, |
9 | the chances that Chesapeake will ever be forced to pay the $400 |
10 | million as part of an involuntary Make-Whole redemption are |
11 | remote. For the reasons I have stated, the interpretation of |
12 | the Indentures that requires an untimely Notice of Special |
13 | Redemption to be treated as one requiring Make-Whole Redemption |
14 | is, on the Court’s initial analysis, exceedingly unpersuasive. |
15 | In assessing whether there is a risk of irreparable harm, the |
16 | Court may properly consider the likelihood of the harm scenario |
17 | actually materializing. Here, in my estimation, that |
18 | likelihood is quite slim. |
19 | For these reasons, the Court holds that Chesapeake has |
20 | failed to show an irreparable harm. The two injury scenarios |
21 | it posits involve business risk, on the one hand, and |
22 | compensable pecuniary damages, on the other. Neither, however, |
23 | involves irreparable harm. |
24 | To sum up, as to likelihood of success on the merits, |
25 | the Court has found such a likelihood in Chesapeake’s favor on |
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1 | Claim Two and sufficiently serious questions going to the |
2 | merits as to Claim One. As to the balance of hardships, the |
3 | Court has found that the balance tips towards Chesapeake, but |
4 | only slightly. As to irreparable harm, the Court has found |
5 | none. On these determinations, under the law of this circuit, |
6 | a preliminary injunction cannot issue, because a finding of |
7 | irreparable harm is a requirement for such an injunction. The |
8 | Court accordingly denies Chesapeake’s application for such an |
10 | Where this leaves us is as follows. The ball is in |
11 | Chesapeake’s court as to whether or not to issue the notice of |
12 | special redemption by tomorrow. Chesapeake presumably has a |
13 | lot to think about overnight. In the event that a notice is |
14 | issued, this litigation needs to move forward fast, presumably |
15 | with extremely expedited discovery. I want to make sure an |
16 | outcome can be reached comfortably before the 60-day redemption |
17 | deadline. In the event that a notice is not issued, this |
18 | lawsuit would appear to be moot. |
19 | Either way, I am going to ask counsel for all three |
20 | parties, Chesapeake, BNY Mellon, and the noteholders, to meet |
21 | and confer either tomorrow or over the weekend, once it is |
22 | known whether Chesapeake has issued such a notice. I will |
23 | direct counsel to submit a joint letter to me by 5 p.m. on |
24 | Monday, March 18, reporting whether the notice issued, and what |
25 | counsel’s views are as to next steps, if any, in the case. In |
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1 | the event that the case is moving forward, I direct counsel in |
2 | that letter to propose, hopefully jointly, an expedited |
3 | schedule for discovery, briefing and/or trial so as to permit |
4 | the issue to be resolved substantially before the redemption |
5 | deadline. In the event I am notified that the case is moving |
6 | forward, I will also schedule a status conference 5 p.m. this |
8 | I thank counsel again for their excellent advocacy. |
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