Bank Jos A Clothiers (JOSB) SC 14D9 Tender offer solicitation

Exhibit (a)(6)

EFiled:Jan13201408:30AMEST
TransactionID54831702
CaseNo.9241-

INTHE COURTOFCHANCERYOFTHESTATEOFDELAWARE

EMINENCECAPITAL,LLC,	)
	)
Plaintiff,	)
	)
	)
v.	)
	)	C.A. No.
ROBERTN.WILDRICK,ANDREWA.	)
GIORDANO,BYRONL.BERGREN,R.NEAL	)
BLACK,JAMESH.FERSTL,WILLIAME.	)
HERRON,SIDNEYH.RITMAN,JOS.A.BANK	)
CLOTHIERS,INC.,	)
Defendants.	)
	)

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

PlaintiffEminenceCapital,LLC(“Plaintiff”or“EminenceCapital”),byandthroughitsattorneys,bringsthisactionforinjunctivereliefagainstRobert N.Wildrick,AndrewA. Giordano,ByronL.Bergren,R.NealBlack,James H.Ferstl,WilliamE.Herron,SidneyH.Ritman(collectively,“Directors”or“DirectorDefendants”),andJos.A.BankClothiers,Inc.(“Jos. A.Bank,”“JOSB,” orthe“Company”)(collectively,“Defendants”).ByandforitsComplaint,Plaintiffallegesasfollows:

INTRODUCTION

1.          Plaintiff,theholderofapproximately5%oftheoutstandingcommonstockofJos. A.Bank,bringsthisactiontoholdthemembersoftheCompany’sboardof directors(the“Board”)accountableforbreachingtheirfiduciaryduties. TheDirectorDefendantsarepoisedtolaunchanimminentscorched-earth defensivetacticdesignedtoentrenchthemselvesandfendoffanattractiveacquisitionproposalandtenderofferbytheCompany’slargerrival,TheMen’sWearhouse,Inc. (“Men’sWearhouse”). AbsentthisCourt’sexerciseofitsequitable powers,themembersoftheJos.A.BankBoardwillsucceedinkillingahighlyattractive business

combination,destroyingthevalueofJos.A.Bank’ssharesthroughanill-advisedacquisition,andentrenchingthemselves.

2.          Formonths,Men’sWearhouseandJos.ABankhavebeenpursuingabusinesscombination—eachsidewishingtobethe“acquirer”ratherthanthe“acquired.”Jos.A.Bank startedtheprocess whenitmadeanunsolicitedoffertoacquireMen’sWearhouseinSeptember 2013. AlthoughJOSBwastheproposedacquirerinthisscenario,RobertN.Wildrick,Jos.A.Bank’sChairman,saidinaninterviewatthetimethattheCompany wouldbe“receptiveto being boughtinsteadif Men’sWearhouseofferedthesame42%premium”thatJOSB was offering. Thefollowingmonth,Men’sWearhouserejectedthatoffer.Butthenit didjustwhatJos.A.Bank’sChairmansuggested:itmadeitsownunsolicitedoffertoacquireJos.A.Bank,thesmallerrival. Afewweekslater,Men’sWearhousefollowedtheinitialofferwithanincreasedcashtenderoffertoJos.A.Bankstockholders. Thecashtenderofferthatiscurrently onthetablevaluesJos.A.Bankata38%premiumaboveitsclosing pricebeforethebiddingwar hadbegun—preciselyin therangethatMr.Wildrick said,afewmonthsago,theCompany wouldbe“receptive”toaccepting.

3.           TheMen’sWearhouseproposalishighlyattractiveandoffersclearvaluethatthe stockholdersofbothcompanieswouldachievethroughacombinationofthesetworetailers—a viewthatisvirtuallyunanimousamongsttheinvestmentcommunity.Yet despitetheseclear benefits,anddespiteMr.Wildrick’sownwordsjustafewmonthsago,the Boardhasmadeclearthatit hasnointention ofsellingJos.A.Bankto Men’sWearhouse. Notonly hastheJos.A.BankBoardrefusedtonegotiatewithMen’sWearhouse,it hasadoptedandisonthecuspofadoptingadditionalimproper defensivemeasuresdesignedtothwartanytakeoverbyMen’sWearhousefromhappening.

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4.         Mostalarming,theJos.A.BankBoardisnowpoisedtosabotageanypotentialacquisitionbyMen’sWearhousebyengaginginaseparatetransactionwithanotherretailer. Anysuch proposedacquisitiontarget,particularlyifitisoutsidethecorebusinessofJos.A.Bank,woulddevastatethevalueofJos.A.Bank’sshares,whicharenowvaluedbasedonthemarket’sexpectationthatadeal withMen’sWearhousewillinfact happen. Ifthis separatetransaction—whichJos.A.Bankhasmadeclearinpublicstatementsitis pursuinginearnest— occurs,theDirectorswillgetexactlywhattheynowwant:tofendofftheMen’sWearhousetakeoverproposalandenablethemselvestoretaintheirlucrativeand prestigiousseatsontheBoardofJos.A.Bank, awell-knownandrespectedretailer.

5.           ThisconductbytheentrenchedJos.A.BankBoardmustbestopped.Themembersofthe Boardareactingintheirowninterestandignoringtheinterestsofthe stockholderstheyareduty-boundtoprotect. Absentinjunctiverelief,theBoardwillcloseona disastroustransactionthatwillcauseincalculableandirreparableharmtoJos.A.Bank stockholdersbydrivingawayahighly desirabletransactionwithMen’sWearhouse—atransactionthattheJos.A.BankBoardhasmadeclearitisonlywillingtopursueifJos.A.Bankitselfistheacquirer,nottheother wayaround.

6.           ThisimproperobjectivebytheJos.A.BankBoardisapparentfromthepublic statementsoftheCompany’sownChairman,RobertN.Wildrick.WhenJos.A.Bankmadeits proposaltoacquireMen’sWearhouse,Mr.Wildricktrumpetedthevalueof apotentialbusinesscombinationofthetworetailers,sayingthatJos.A.BankanditsDirectorshave“alwaysadmiredMen’sWearhouseand believethesetwogreatcompanies,whencombined,willcreatecontinuedgrowthand sustainablevaluefor our shareholders,greatlyenhancedbenefitsfor ourcustomers,andexciting opportunitiesfor ouremployees.”

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7.           ButnowthatJos.A.Bankisthetargetratherthantheacquirer,andnowthatMr.WildrickandtherestoftheJos.A.BankBoardmembersandseniorexecutivescouldlosetheir positionsifthebusinesscombinationoccursthroughaMen’sWearhouse-ledacquisition,Mr.Wildrickissingingafardifferenttune. Henowsaysthatacombinationis“simply notinthe bestinterestofourshareholders”andthatthe Boardwill,asaresultoftheMen’sWearhouse offer,“continuetoreview[other]acquisition opportunities.”R.NealBlack,theCEO,addedthat,althoughJos. A.Bankwaspreviouslypoisedtocreatethelargestmen’sclothingretailerintheUnitedStates(ifit hadmergedwithMen’sWearhouse),itisnowlookingpotentiallytocombine withretailers“outsidethemen’sapparelbusiness.” Thistwo-facedapproachbyJos.A.Bank’sChairmanandCEObetraysanuglytruth:theDirectorsprefertoprotecttheir own positionsbyoverwhelmingtheCompany withdebtandanon-corebusinessasatactictosubverttheMen’sWearhouseproposal,ratherthantogeneratevalueforJos.A.Bank’sstockholders.

8.           Therefore,PlaintiffseeksinjunctivereliefinordertopreventtheDirectorsfromcontinuingtobreachtheirfiduciarydutiesbyrefusingtonegotiatewithMen’sWearhouseandbyattemptingtokillanyacquisitionbyMen’sWearhouseby pursuinganimminentalternativetransactionthat,if consummated,woulddestroythevalueofJos.A.Bank’s sharesanddriveMen’sWearhouseaway.

PARTIES

9.         PlaintiffEminenceCapital,LLC,isaNewYorklimitedliabilitycompanywithits principalplaceofbusinessat65East55thStreet,25thFloor,NewYork,NewYork10022.Plaintiffis,andat alltimesrelevantheretocontinuouslyhasbeen,astockholderoftheCompany.Plaintiffcurrentlyholdsapproximately 5%oftheoutstandingcommonstockofJos.A.Bank.

10.         DefendantRobertN.Wildrickisandat alltimesrelevantheretohasbeena DirectorandChairmanoftheBoard.Mr.WildrickservedastheCompany’sChief Executive

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Officerfrom1999to2008,andhas beenontheBoardsince1994.Mr.Wildrickreceivedtotalcompensation of$1,143,092infiscalyear 2012fromtheCompany

11.         DefendantR.NealBlackisandat alltimesrelevant heretohasbeen adirector ofJos.A.BankandistheCompany’sPresidentandChief Executive Officer.Mr.Blackjoined theCompanyin2000,andjoinedtheBoardin2008.Mr.Blackreceivedtotalcompensation of $2,901,229infiscalyear 2012.

12.         DefendantAndrewA.Giordanoisandat alltimesrelevantheretohasbeen LeadIndependentDirectorandChairmanEmeritusoftheBoardofJos.A.Bank.Healsoservesaschairman oftheNominatingandCorporateGovernanceCommittee.Mr.Giordanohasbeen ontheBoardsince1994,andservedasChairmanoftheBoardfrom1999to2008,atwhichpointhe becametheLeadIndependentDirector. HealsoservedasinterimChiefExecutiveOfficerfor severalmonthsin2009. Hereceivedtotalcompensationof$253,105infiscalyear2012.

13.         DefendantByronL.Bergrenisandat alltimesrelevant hereto hasbeen adirector ofJos.A.Bank.Mr.Bergrenjoinedthe Boardin September 2013.Underthecurrent non-employee directorcompensationguidelines,Mr.Bergren willreceiveanannualretainer of $40,000,aswellasfeesforattendingeach boardandcommitteemeeting,anadditionalretainerifelectedchairman oftheboardoracommittee,andexpensereimbursements.

14.         DefendantJamesH.Ferstlisandat alltimesrelevantheretohasbeenadirectorofJos.A.Bank.Mr.Ferstlreceivedtotalcompensationof$147,355infiscalyear2012.

15.         DefendantWilliamE.Herronisandat alltimesrelevantheretohasbeena directorofJos.A.Bank.HealsoservesaschairmanoftheAuditCommittee.Mr.Herronreceivedtotalcompensationof$181,855infiscalyear2012.

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16.         DefendantSidneyH.Ritmanisandat alltimesrelevantheretohasbeenadirector ofJos.A.Bank.Mr.Ritmanreceivedtotalcompensationof$195,355infiscalyear2012.

17.         DefendantJos.A.BankClothiers,Inc.isapubliclytradedcorporationincorporatedinDelawareandheadquarteredinHampstead,Maryland. TheCompany’scorporate officesarelocatedat500Hanover Drive,Hampstead,Maryland21074.

FACTUALALLEGATIONS

18.         Foundedin1905,Jos.ABanktodayisoneofthenation’sleadingmen’sapparelretailcompanies.TheCompanyoperatesmorethan600storesthroughouttheUnitedStates,andmaintainsane-commerceandcatalogbusiness.

19.        Foundedin1973byGeorgeZimmer—whoseguaranteesofsartorialsatisfactionaresynonymouswiththe companyitself—Men’sWearhouseisoneofthelargestspecialtyretailersofmen’sclothinginNorthAmerica.Ithas over1,100storesintheUnitedStatesandCanadaandownsanumberofotherbrands,includingK&GFashionSuperstores,TwinHill(forcorporateapparel),andMoores(inCanada).

TheBoardProposesaTransactionwithMen’sWearhouse

20.         OnSeptember18,2013,Jos.A.BankmadeanunsolicitedproposaltoacquireMen’sWearhousefor$48pershare.

21.        Laterthatday,Jos.A.Bank’sChairman,Mr.Wildrick,calledMen’sWearhouseCEO,DouglasEwert,andsentafollow-upletterwiththedetailsoftheCompany’sinitial proposal. Uponannouncingthetransaction,Mr.Wildrickstatedthat“[w]ehavealwaysadmiredMen’sWearhouseandbelievethesetwogreatcompanies,whencombined,willcreatecontinuedgrowthandsustainablevalueforourshareholders,greatlyenhancedbenefitsforourcustomers,andexcitingopportunitiesforemployees.”

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22.         Themarketimmediatelyrecognizedthevalueintheproposedtransaction.OnSeptember17,2013—theday beforeJOSB’s proposal—Men’sWearhouse stockclosedat $33.71 pershare. OnOctober 9,2013,afterJOSB’s proposal hadbeenmadepublic,thestockjumped,closingat$45.03 pershare,reflectingthemarket’s perceptionthatacombination ofthetwocompanieswouldcreate significantvalue.

23.         OnOctober9,2013,Men’sWearhouserejectedJOSB’sofferasinadequate.

24.         Thatsameday,Jos.A.Bank’sChairman,Mr.Wildrick,notedinaninterviewthatJos.A.BankwouldbereceptivetobeingboughtinsteadbyMen’sWearhouseifMen’sWearhouseofferedthesame42%premiumtoJos.A.Bank.

25.         OnNovember15,2013,JOSBissuedapressreleaseannouncingthatit hadterminateditsacquisitionproposal.ThepressreleasepublishedaletterfromJOSB’sCEOtoMr. Ewert,whichstatedthattheCompanywas“terminating ourproposalinordertoconsider otherstrategicalternativeswhichwe havebeeninvestigating.”

26.         Despitethiswarning,JOSBalsoindicatedthatiftheMen’sWearhouseBoardchangeditsmindanddecidedtoengageJOSBindiscussionsaboutapotentialtransaction,JOSB was opentomakinganotherproposal.AccordingtotheletterfromJOSB’sCEO,“[w]econtinuetobelievethatatransactionbetweenourtwocompaniescouldbeinthebestinterestofourrespectiveshareholders.”

Men’sWearhouseEngagesWiththeJOSBProposal

27.         OnNovember26,2013,Men’sWearhouseconfirmedwhatthemarketalreadyrecognized—thatabusinesscombinationofthetwomen’sretailerswouldcreatesubstantial valueforthestockholdersofbothcompanies.Onthatday,Men’sWearhousemadeaproposaltoacquirealloftheoutstandingJOSBcommonstockat$55pershare. Thisrepresented a45%

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premiumovertheCompany’senterprisevalueanda32%premiumovertheCompany’sshare pricepriortothepublicannouncementofJOSB’soriginalacquisitionproposal.

28.        Inconnectionwiththeproposal,Men’sWearhouse’sLeadDirector,WilliamB.Sechrest,saidthatacombinationwithJOSB“hasstrategiclogicandthepotentialtodeliver substantialbenefitstoourrespectiveshareholders,employeesandcustomers”andthattheMen’sWearhouseBoardwas“readytoengage”withtheDirectorDefendants. He alsonotedthatthe“experienced[Men’sWearhouse]managementteamisbestpositionedtoexecutetheintegration ofourcompaniesandachievethesynergiesthatwouldresult.”Mr.Ewert,theMen’sWearhouseCEO,highlightedthattheproposal,ifaccepted,wouldleadtosignificantearnings“inyearone.”Further,incontrasttoJOSB’soriginalproposal,theMen’sWearhouseofferwasnotconditioned onoutsidefinancing,becauseMen’sWearhousehad(andhas)a“balancesheetwiththe operationalflexibility”toachievethe dealandexecuteonacombinedstrategicplan.

29.         AccordingtoMen’sWearhouse,itsproposal wouldbring $100to$150millionofannualsynergiesthroughimproved purchasingefficiencies, optimizedcustomer serviceandmarketingpractices,and streamlinedcorporatefunctions. Thecombinedcompany would becomethefourthlargest UnitedStatesmen’sapparelretailer, withmorethan 1,700total stores. Inaddition,Men’sWearhouse notedthatit has a“proventrackrecordofsuccessfulacquisitions,” whichwouldhelpitintegrateJos.A.Bankand driveimmediate valuetostockholders.

30.        Mr.EwertmadeclearthatMen’sWearhousewaspreparedtonegotiatewiththeJos.A.BankBoard.HestressedthatMen’sWearhousehada“strongpreference...towork with[Jos.A.Bank]tonegotiate amutuallyacceptabletransactionandavoidunnecessarycosts.”

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AndduringaDecember12thearningscall,Mr.EwertreiteratedthatMen’sWearhousewas“readytoengagewiththeJos.A.Bankboardimmediately.”

TheValueoftheTransactionBecomesApparent

31.         Industryanalystshavewidelychampionedabusinesscombinationbetweenthesetworetailers.

32.         AccordingtoBrianSozzi,ananalystatBelusCapital,“[a]nybodywhofollowscorporateAmericacan seethatthesetwocompanieshavetobejoined.”Anotheranalyst predictedthat“Christmashascomeearly”afterMen’sWearhouse’scounter-offer.

33.         StifelanalystRichardJaffeconcludedthattheproposalwouldgenerate$100to $150millionincostsavingsoverthreeyears,while“greaterbenefitsremaintoberealized overtime.”Mr.Jaffealsorecognizedthatthecombination would“dramaticallyimprove profitability” of acombinedentity.

34.         Othercommentatorsnotedthatthisstrengthwouldallowthecombinedcompanytocompetewithdepartmentstores.Alongtheselines,

[t]hejoiningofretailforcesbetweenMen’sWearhouseandJos.A.Bankcancreateaformidablecompetitorinmen’sapparelthat’sbetterequippedtohandlethecurrentlychallengingretailsectoranditsvalue-focusedconsumers.Men'sWearhousegains greaterscalewithadditionalstoresandotheroperatingefficiencies.Jos.A.Bankgetsamuch-neededcashboostandrewardsitsinvestorsbyjoiningamoresuccessfulrival.

OthersnotedthatacombinedentitywouldalsobenefitfromthedifferingdemographicsofMen’sWearhouseandJOSBcustomers.JOSBcustomersaretypically“higher-spending-and-earningcustomerdemographiccoulddrawnewattentiontoMen’sWearhousegoods,whileMen’sWearhouse standstoprovide abroader,youngermaledemographicforthesmallerretailer.”

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35.        Commentatorsarguedthatthe“mostbeneficial[courseforJOSB]istodoadeal withMen’sWearhouse.”AnarticleinWomen’sWearDailyconcludedthattheMen’sWearhouse offerisattractivebecauseit doesnotrequireoutsidefinancingandbecauseMen’sWearhouse hasexperience withsuccessfullyacquiring othercompanies.

36.         Thus,investors,analysts,andindustrycommentatorsare almostuniversallyofthe viewthataMen’sWearhouse/Jos.A.Bankcombinationisanobviousmatchthatshouldhappen,andwhenit does,willaddtremendous valuetothecombinedcompany’s stockholders.

DirectorDefendantsRejecttheMen’sWearhouseProposal

37.         DespitethesignificantpremiumthattheMen’sWearhouseofferwouldprovidetoJos.A.Bankstockholders,despitethepubliccommentsbyJos.A.Bank’sChairmanthattheCompany wouldbereceptivetoanacquisition proposalfromMen’sWearhouse,anddespitethe nearunanimous praiseforabusinesscombinationfromtheinvestmentcommunityandindustrycommentators,Jos.A.BankquicklycooledtotheideaofamergerifJos.A.Bankwerethetargetinsteadofthe acquirer. DuringaDecember5,2013earningscall,forexample,Jos.A.Bank’sCEO,Mr.Black,notedthat“Men’sWearhouseisnottheonlypotentialopportunityfor us.” TheBoard,accordingtoMr. Black,hadbeen“surveyingthemarketplaceforacquisitionsforsometime,”and“[a]saresult,thereareseveralpotentialacquisitioncandidatesweareevaluatingthatcouldmeetourcriteria,”including,remarkably,makinganacquisition“outsidethemen’sapparelbusiness.”Jos.A.Bankhasnooperationsorexperienceoutsideofmen’sapparel.

38.         RatherthanengagetheMen’sWearhouseBoardtonegotiateamutuallyagreeablemergerthatwouldgeneratevalueforJos.A.Bankstockholders,theJos.A.BankBoardthumbeditsnoseatthepremiumoffermadebyMen’sWearhouseandrejectedit outright. TheDirector

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Defendantsassertedtheproposal“significantlyundervalued”theCompany—eventhoughthe proposalofferedasignificantpremiumovertheunaffected stockprice.

39.        Instead,theDirectorDefendantsagainstatedthattheywere“reviewingallalternativesregardingpotentialstrategicacquisitionopportunities.”AndMr.Wildrickconcurredthat“wecontinuetoreviewacquisitionopportunities.”

40.         Men’sWearhouseexpresseditssurpriseattheDirectorDefendants’outrightrefusaltonegotiateapotentialdeal,“[g]ivenJos.A.Bank’srepeatedexpressionsofinterestinengagingin goodfaithdiscussionsaboutapossiblecombination.”Initspressreleaseissuedon December 23,2013,Men’sWearhousere-committeditselftoatransactionwithJos.A.Bank, statingit was“continuingtocarefullyconsiderallofouroptionstomakethiscombinationareality.”

DirectorDefendantsAmendThePoisonPillandMen’sWearhouseLaunchesATenderOffer

41.         TheDirectorshavenotonlysummarilyrejectedavalue-generatingtransaction withMen’sWearhouse,butalsoadopteddefensivemeasuresdesignedtothwartanypossibleacquisitionbyMen’sWearhouseandtosalvagetheirBoardpositions. Thesemeasureswere designedtoprotecttheDirectors,nottofurtherthebestinterestsoftheCompany orits stockholders.

42.         Specifically,inthefaceoftheMen’sWearhousepremiumacquisitionproposal,theDirectorDefendantsamendedtheCompany’spoisonpilltoreducethetriggerfrom20%to 10%.Theintentandeffectwereclear:topreventMen’sWearhousefromacquiringtheCompany withouttheconsentoftheJos.A.BankBoard.

43.         AffirmingitsinterestincombiningwithJos.A.Bank,andinresponsetotheamendmentofthepoisonpillbytheJos.A.BankBoard,onJanuary6,2014,theMen’sWearhouseBoardannouncedacashtenderofferforthesharesofJos.A.Bankat$57.50per

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share,upfromtheinitialproposalof$55pershare.ThisoffervaluedJos.A.Bankat$1.61 billion,evenhigherthantheinitialMen’sWearhouseacquisitionproposal.Men’sWearhousealsoannouncedthatit wouldnominatetwoindependentdirectorstoJos.A.Bank’sBoardattheCompany’s2014annualmeeting.

44.         Mr.EwertagainreiteratedthatMen’sWearhousehada“strongpreferencetoworkcollaborativelywithJos.A.Banktorealizethebenefitsofthistransaction”andwas“committedtothiscombination.”BecauseJos.A.Bankhadrefusedeventonegotiate apotentialcombination whenJos.A.Bankwasthetargetratherthantheacquirer,however,Men’sWearhouse saidthatitwasforcedto“tak[e][its]offerdirectlytoshareholders.”

Jos.A.BankThreatensToPursueAlternativeTransactions

45.           EversinceJos.A.BankandMen’sWearhousebegancontemplatingacombination,Jos.ABankhasbeenholdingoutthethreatofpursuinganalternativetransaction. Therationaleisperplexing.Sincethestart,Mr.Wildrickhasacknowledged,correctly,thatacombinationbetweenthetwocompaniesisinthebestinterestofbothcompanies’stockholders. HehasevensaidinaninterviewthatJOSBisopentobeingacquiredbyMen’sWearhouse, statinginunequivocaltermsthattheJos.A.BankBoardwouldbereceptivetoanacquisition proposalfromMen’sWearhouseatvirtuallythesamepremiumnowofferedintheMen’sWearhousetenderoffer. YetJos.A.Bankhascontinuallythreatenedtopursueanalternativetransactionthatwouldonlyservetodriveaway atransactionthatvirtuallyeveryone(including,atonetime,theJos.A.BankBoard) hasacknowledgedwouldbeinthebestinterestofthe stockholdersofbothJos.A.BankandMen’sWearhouse.Forexample:

a. InitsForm8-KdatedOctober31,2013,Jos.A.Banknotedthat,“If[theMen’sWearhouse]boardhasnotengagedingoodfaithdiscussionswith

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usbyNovember14,2013,wewillterminateourproposalinordertoconsiderotherstrategicalternativeswhichwehavebeeninvestigating.”

b. Similarly, in a Form 8-K dated November 15, 2013, Jos. A. Bank concluded that, “We are therefore terminating our proposal in order to consider other strategic alternatives which we have been investigating.”

c. The rhetoric became more strident after Men’s Wearhouse’s initial acquisition proposal. In a December 5, 2013, earnings call, Mr. Black said, “It is important to be aware that Men's Wearhouse is not the only potential opportunity for us. Under the leadership of our Chairman, Bob Wildrick, we have been surveying the marketplace for acquisitions for some time. As a result, there are several potential acquisition candidates we are evaluating that could meet our criteria.” In response to a question,Mr.Blacksaid,forthe firsttime,thattheCompany’s“corecompetencies .. .. canbeappliedtocompaniesthatareoutsideofthemen’sapparel space.”

d. In a Form 8-K dated December 23, 2013, attaching a press release, the Company noted, “Further, as the Company has said previously, it is reviewing all alternatives regarding potential strategic acquisition opportunities . . . .”

46.          TheseassertionsflyinthefaceofthestatementsMr.Wildrickmadejustweeksearlier.Jos.A.Bankhadlongmaintainedthatacombination ofthetwocompanies wouldbeinthebestinterests ofboth companies’ stockholders. Yettherewasalways aveiledthreat:ifthe dealdoes nothappen onJos.A.Bank’sterms—withtheCompanyastheacquirer—the

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Companywouldpursue“otherstrategicalternatives.”Despitethenear-unanimousconsensusofanalystsand both companiesthat acombinationisthebest optionforallinvolved,theDirectorsarethreateningtheimminentacquisition ofanothercompany,whichwouldlikelysaddleJos.A.Bank withdebtand,inanyevent,makeJos.A.BankanunattractiveacquisitiontargettoMen’sWearhouse.

47.          Thisalternativetransaction—whichJos.A.Bankhasindicatedmayinvolveacompanyoutsideitscorecompetencyofmen’sretail—wouldtorpedoany businesscombination withMen’sWearhouse. The principalreasonfor anyalternativetransactionissimple:the Directors, afterbeing spurnedasthepotentialacquirer,donotwanttoselltheCompanyandlosetheirseats ontheCompany’s board ofdirectors andtheirrolesasseniorexecutives ofa household namebrandmen’sretailer.

48.          NowthatthetableshaveturnedandJos.A.Bankisnolongertheacquirer,the Directorshavehad aboutofamnesiaandforgottenthat,justthreemonthsago,Jos.A.Bankwastrumpetingthesignificantvaluethatwouldbecreatedthroughacombinationofthetworetailers.InordertoderailanypotentialsaletoMen’sWearhouseandensurethatMen’sWearhouselosesinterestinJos.A.Bank,theCompany’sBoardispoisedtothrowmoneyatanill-advisedacquisition,theeffectof whichwillonlydrivedownthevalue ofJos.A.Bankandignorethe stockholderstheBoardisboundtoprotect.

THEDIRECTORSARENOTDISINTERESTED

49.          UnderDelawarelaw,adirectorowesthecorporationdutiesofloyaltyandcare. Thedutyofloyaltyprohibitsadirectorfromfailingtoactinthebestinterestsofthecorporationanditsstockholdersby,amongotherthings,puttingthedirector’sinterestsaheadofthecorporationand stockholdersthedirectorisentrustedtoserve.

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50.         Here,theDirectorshaveforthrightlyrejectedapremiumacquisitionproposal,andfailedtotakethenecessarystepseventoattempttonegotiate ahigheracquisitionproposalfromMen’sWearhouse.Instead,theyareonthecuspofanacquisitionthatwouldseriouslydepresstheCompany’svalueandmakeitanunattractiveacquisitiontarget.

51.         TheonlyconclusionthatmaybedrawnisthattheDirectorsare actingtofurthertheirowninterestincontinuingtoserveontheBoardofawell-knownand highlyrespectedcorporation,andreceivethesignificantcompensationandprestigethatcomesfromthose positions.

52.         The Directorsarehandsomelyrewardedfortheirboardserviceand wouldprefertomaintainthestatus quo.Eachindependent directorreceivesapproximately $150,000to $250,000peryearforhis boardservice.Mr. Black,theCompany’sCEO,receivedapproximately $2.9millioninfiscalyear 2013.AndMr.Wildrick,thenon-executiveChairman,received aremarkable $1.1millionforhis service ontheBoard—an eye-poppingfigurethatis outoflinewithtypical directorpay,andwhichexplains hisdesiretoremainentrenched ontheJos. A.BankBoard.

53.         Afundamental principle underlyingthe compensation structure ofmostcompany boardsisthatdirectors shouldbecompensatedinwaysthataligntheir own economicinterests withtheinterests ofthestockholderstheyserve. Thus,publiccompany directors oftenreceiveascompensationfortheirboardservice, orotherwise hold,asignificantamount ofcompany stock. ThatisnotthecasefortheJos.ABankBoard. TheDirectorscollectivelyownjustone percentoftheCompany,comparedto3.3%among peercompanies’ non-employee directors. TheDirectors,in other words,together ownjustonepercent ofthecompanyasa

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whole,andthushaveverylittle“skininthegame.”(Bycontrast,Plaintiffownscloseto5%oftheCompany).

54.         BecausetheDirectorsholdsolittlestock,theyhavelittlefinancialincentivetoactinthebestinterestsoftheCompanyanditsstockholders.Thus,thereisasignificantriskthatthe Directorswillact—and,indeed,nowhaveacted—intheirownself-interest,ratherthanseektomaximizethevalueoftheCompany’sstock.

55.         ThepossibilitythattheincumbentDirectorsmaybedisplacedinapossible businesscombinationcreatesaninherentconflictbetweentheinterestsofstockholdersandthe Directors.Here, giventheintransigence oftheDirectorsandtheirunwillingnesstoengage seriouslyinaprocessof possiblysellingtheCompanyandlosingtheirseatsontheBoard,andgiventhe extreme defensivemeasuresthathavebeenorwillsoonbeadoptedbytheDirectorsinresponsetowhatwasinitiallyafriendlyacquisition proposal,theonlyconclusionthatmaybe drawnisthattheDirectorsaremotivated bythepossibilitythatatakeovercouldhave anegativeeffectontheirpersonalreputations, bottomlines,andcareers.Inotherwords,thestockholders’ bestinterestsaresecondaryat bestandirrelevantatworst. Thesemotivations donotexcusea director’sfailuretoactinthebestinterest ofthecorporationandstockholderstheyserve.

THECOMPANYWILLBEIRREPARABLYHARMED
ABSENTINJUNCTIVERELIEF

56.         Asexplainedabove,Jos.A.Bankhasbeenthreateningtoacquireanothercompany.Thesethreatshavecontinued—and,indeed,escalated—afterMen’sWearhousemadeandsubsequentlyincreaseditsoffertoacquireJos.A.Bank.Jos.A.BankisnowonthecuspofeffectinganalternativeacquisitionthatwoulddecreasethevalueofJos.A.BankanddriveawayMen’sWearhousefromcontinuingtopursueitsattempttocombinethetwocompanies.

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57.         Thesethreatserectabarriertomaximizingstockholdervalue.Men’sWearhouse hasatenderofferpendingtothestockholdersofJos.ABank.IfJos.A.Bank,whilethatofferis pending,acquiresanothercompany—particularlyonethatisnotalignedwithitscorestrengths ofmen’sretailasJos.A.Bankhasindicatedit willdo—theCompany willbecome amuchlessattractiveacquisitiontarget.

58.        Plaintiffhasnoadequateremedyatlaw.OnlythroughthisCourt’sequitable powerstoentertherequestedinjunctivereliefwilltheCompany beprotectedfromtheimmediate, ongoing,andirreparableinjurytheDirectorshaveinflictedandareinflicting. Theirconductinrefusingtonegotiateapossibletransaction withMen’sWearhouseandpreparingimminentlytoerectimproperdefensivemeasuresinresponsetotheMen’sWearhouseproposalareimproperandunlawful.

COUNTI
(BreachofFiduciaryDuty)

59.         PlaintiffrepeatsandreallegestheallegationssetforthinParagraphs1through58asif fullysetforthherein.

60.         DirectorDefendantsBergren,Black,Ferstl,Herron,Giordano,Ritman,andWildrickwereat alltimesrelevantheretodirectorsoftheCompany.Asdirectors,theyowetheCompanyanditsstockholdersthedutiesofutmostloyaltyandduecare.

61.         DirectorDefendantsBergren,Black,Ferstl,Herron,Giordano,Ritman,andWildrickhaverepeatedlyputtheirowninterestsaheadofthebestinterestoftheCompanyanditsstockholders:theyhaverefusedeventoenterintodiscussionswithMen’sWearhouseregardingitsproposal;summarilyrejectedMen’sWearhouse’sacquisitionproposal;amendedtheCompany’spoisonpilleffectivelytoprecludeanacquisitionwithouttheDirectors’approval;

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andarepoisedtoacquireanothercompanysothatJos.A.Bankbecomesa muchlessattractiveacquisitiontargetanddrivesawayMen’sWearhouse.

62.         RatherthanactinthebestinterestoftheCompany,DirectorDefendantsBergren,Black,Ferstl,Herron,Giordano,Ritman,andWildrickhaveactedtoentrenchthemselvesand preventtheCompanyfromengaginginorevenattemptingtonegotiateavalue-maximizingtransactioninwhichMen’sWearhouse—ratherthanJos.A.Bank—istheacquirer.

63.         TheactionsofDirectorDefendantsBergren,Black,Ferstl,Herron,Giordano,Ritman,andWildrickinrefusingtoconsidertheMen’sWearhouseproposal,refusingtoengageinany discussionswithMen’sWearhouseaboutthatproposal,amendingthepoisonpill,and preparingtolaunchanimminentacquisitionofacompanymisalignedwithJos.A.Bank’score businessdemonstratethattheDirectorsareputtingtheirinterestsaheadoftheCompany’s,andareunfairtotheCompanyanditsstockholders.

64.         Therefore,DirectorDefendantsBergren,Black,Ferstl,Herron,Giordano,Ritman,andWildrickhavebreachedtheirfiduciarydutiestoJos.A.Bankanditsstockholders.

PRAYERFORRELIEF

WHEREFORE,PlaintiffrequestsjudgmentinitsfavorandagainstDefendants:

A.          DeclaringthattheDirectorsbreachedtheirfiduciarydutiesofloyaltyandduecare;

B.         PreliminarilyandpermanentlyenjoiningtheDirectorsfromcommittinganyfurtherbreachesoftheirfiduciary duties ofloyaltyorduecare;

C.           Enjoining the Defendants from entering into any agreement on behalf of the Company to acquire another company or other material assets;

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D.          Awarding Plaintiff money damages arising from the Directors’ breaches of their fiduciary duties, in an amount to be proven at trial, including pre-judgment and post-judgment interest thereon; and

E.           Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 

/s/RaymondJ. DiCamillo

RaymondJ.DiCamillo(#3188)

SusanM.Hannigan(#5342)

RachelE.Horn(#5906)

Richards,Layton&Finger,P.A.

920N.KingStreet

Wilmington,Delaware19801

(302)651-7700

AttorneysforPlaintiffEminenceCapital,LLC

OFCOUNSEL:

BrianM.Lutz

GoutamU.Jois

Gibson,Dunn&CrutcherLLP

200ParkAvenue

NewYork,NewYork10166

(212)351-4000

Dated:January13,2014

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