| | | | |
| | STEPHEN R. BASSER (121590) | | |
1 | | SAMUEL M. WARD (216562) | | |
| | BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE | | |
2 | | One America Plaza | | |
| | 600 West Broadway, Suite 900 | | |
3 | | San Diego, CA 92101 | | |
| | Telephone: (619) 230-0800 | | |
4 | | Facsimile: (619) 230-1874 | | |
| | |
5 | | Counsel For Plaintiffs Ryan Ridgeway and | | |
6 | | David Thompson | | |
7 | | | | |
8 | | | | |
9 | | SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA |
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10 | | COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA |
11 | | | | |
12 | | RYAN RIDGEWAY AND DAVID THOMPSON, | | CASE NO. 109CV157437 |
| | |
13 | | Plaintiffs, | | CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR |
14 | | | | INJUNCTIVE RELIEF RE: BREACH OF |
| | v. | | FIDUCIARY DUTY AND AIDING AND |
15 | | | | ABETTING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY |
| | BING YEH, YAH WEN HU, RONALD | | DUTY |
16 | | CHWANG, TERRY NICKERSON, EDWARD | | |
17 | | Y.W. YANG, SILICON STORAGE | | |
| | TECHNOLOGY, INC. and PROPHET EQUITY | | |
18 | | LP, | | |
| | | | JURY TRIAL DEMANDED |
19 | | Defendants. | | |
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| | |
| | VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT |
| |
1 | | Plaintiffs, Ryan Ridgeway and David Thompson, by their attorneys, allege on |
2 | | information and belief except as to paragraph 7, which plaintiff Ryan Ridgeway alleges on |
3 | | personal knowledge and paragraph 8, which plaintiff David Thompson alleges on personal |
4 | | knowledge: |
| |
5 | | SUMMARY OF THE ACTION |
| |
6 | | 1. This is a shareholder class action on behalf of the public shareholders of Silicon |
7 | | Storage Technology, Inc. (“Silicon Storage” or the “Company”) against the Company and its |
8 | | Board of Directors (the “Board” or the “Individual Defendants”), to enjoin the proposed |
9 | | acquisition of Silicon Storage by Prophet Equity LP (“Prophet”), and alleging that the Board |
10 | | breached its fiduciary duties in connection with the proposed sale of the Company to Prophet |
11 | | and members of the Company’s management for $2.10 per share in cash, or approximately |
12 | | $201 million in the aggregate (the “Proposed Transaction”). |
| |
13 | | 2. The Proposed Transaction is unfair and fails to maximize shareholder value and |
14 | | otherwise undervalues the Company’s shares. The consideration offered to public shareholders |
15 | | is only a 13% premium over the close of $1.86 per share on the day before the Proposed |
16 | | Transaction was announced publicly. Indeed, the Company’s shares traded at or above the |
17 | | offering price as recently as two weeks before the Proposed Transaction was announced and |
18 | | since the announcement of the Proposed Transaction shares have traded over the inadequate |
| | offer price. |
| |
19 | | 3. Accordingly, this action seeks,inter alia, equitable relief seeking to enjoin the |
20 | | Proposed Transaction and compelling the Board to properly exercise its fiduciary duties to |
21 | | maximize shareholder value in connection with the Proposed Transaction or any alternate |
22 | | transaction. |
| |
23 | | JURISDICTION AND VENUE |
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24 | | 4. This Court has jurisdiction over the cause of action asserted herein pursuant to |
25 | | the California Constitution, Article VI, § 10, because this case is a cause not given by statute to |
26 | | other trial courts. |
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27 | | 5. This Court has jurisdiction over defendant Silicon Storage because it conducts |
28 | | business in California and maintains its principal place of business at 1171 Sonora Court, |
| | |
1 | | Sunnyvale, California. This action is not removable. |
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2 | | 6. Venue is proper in this Court because the conduct at issue took place and had an |
| | effect in this County. |
| |
3 | | PARTIES |
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4 | | 7. Plaintiff Ryan Ridgeway is, and at all times relevant hereto was, a shareholder of |
5 | | Silicon Storage. |
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6 | | 8. Plaintiff David Thompson is, and at all times relevant hereto was, a shareholder |
7 | | of Silicon Storage. |
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8 | | 9. Defendant Silicon Storage supplies NOR flash memory semiconductor devices |
9 | | for digital consumers, networking, wireless communications, and the Internet computing |
10 | | markets. The Company produces and sells semiconductor products, including NAND flash |
11 | | controllers and NAND controller-based modules, smart card integrated circuits (“ICs”) and |
12 | | modules, flash microcontrollers, and radio frequency ICs and modules. It also produces and |
13 | | sells various products based on its proprietary SuperFlash design and manufacturing process |
14 | | technology, as well as licenses the SuperFlash technology for applications in semiconductor |
15 | | devices that integrate flash memory with other functions on a monolithic chip. Silicon Storage |
16 | | sells its products in Asia, North America and Europe. The Company’s common stock publicly |
17 | | trades on the NASDAQ Stock Market (“NASDAQ”) under the trading symbol “SSTI.” As of |
| | October 31, 2009, Silicon Storage had over 95 million shares of common stock outstanding. |
| |
18 | | 10. Defendant Bing Yeh (“Yen”), one of the co-founders of Silicon Storage, has |
19 | | served as the President and Chief Executive Officer and has been a member of the Company’s |
20 | | Board of Directors since its inception in 1989. In April 2004, he was appointed Chairman of |
21 | | the Board of Directors. |
| |
22 | | 11. Defendant Yaw Wen Hu (“Hu”) has been a member of the Board of Directors of |
23 | | Silicon Storage since 1995. He joined the Company in 1993 as Vice President of Technology |
24 | | Development. Currently, defendant Hu is the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating |
25 | | Officer of Silicon Storage. |
| |
26 | | 12. Defendant Ronald Chwang has been a member of the Company’s Board of |
27 | | Directors since June 1997. He is also a member of the Audit Committee and the Compensation |
28 | | Committee and the Chairman of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. |
| | |
1 | | 13. Defendant Terry Nickerson has been a member of the Company’s Board of |
2 | | Directors since April 2005. He is the Chairman of the Audit Committee and a member of the |
| | Compensation Committee and the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. |
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3 | | 14. Defendant Edward Y.W. Yang has been a member of the Company’s Board of |
4 | | Directors since October 2007. |
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5 | | 15. Defendant Prophet, a private equity firm, is located at 181 Grand Avenue, |
6 | | Southlake, Texas. |
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7 | | 16. The defendants identified in ¶¶ 10 - 14 are collectively referred to herein as the |
8 | | “Individual Defendants.” By reason of their positions as officers and/or directors of the |
9 | | Company, the Individual Defendants are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiffs and the other |
10 | | public shareholders of Silicon Storage, and owe Plaintiffs and Silicon Storage’s other |
11 | | shareholders the highest obligations of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing, due care, and full and |
| | fair disclosure. |
| |
12 | | 17. Each of the Individual Defendants at all times had the power to control and direct |
13 | | Silicon Storage to engage in the misconduct alleged herein. The Individual Defendants’ |
14 | | fiduciary obligations required them to act in the best interest of Plaintiffs and all other Silicon |
15 | | Storage shareholders. |
| |
16 | | 18. Each of the Individual Defendants owes fiduciary duties of good faith, fair |
17 | | dealing, loyalty, candor, and due care to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class. They are |
18 | | acting in concert with one another in violating their fiduciary duties as alleged herein, and, |
| | specifically, in connection with the Proposed Transaction. |
| |
19 | | 19. As directors and/or officers of a publicly traded corporation, the Individual |
20 | | Defendants have an affirmative fiduciary obligation to obtain the highest value reasonably |
21 | | available for the Company’s shareholders and to avoid taking action that: |
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22 | | (a) discourages or inhibits alternative offers to purchase Silicon Storage; |
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23 | | (b) adversely affects the value provided to the Company’s shareholders; |
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24 | | (c) contractually prohibits them from complying with their fiduciary duties; |
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25 | | (d) adversely affects their ability to secure the best value reasonably |
26 | | available under the circumstances for the corporation’s shareholders; and/or |
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27 | | (e) provides Silicon Storage insiders with preferential treatment at the |
28 | | expense of, or separate from, its public shareholders. |
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1 | | 7. In accordance with his/her duties of loyalty and good faith, the Individual |
2 | | Defendants are also obligated to refrain from: |
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3 | | (a) participating in any transaction in which their loyalties are divided; |
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4 | | (b) participating in any transaction in which they will receive a personal |
| | financial benefit not equally shared by the public shareholders of the corporation; and/or |
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5 | | (c) unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the |
6 | | public shareholders. |
| |
| | SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS |
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7 | | 20. Silicon Storage, which was founded in 1989, designs, manufactures and markets |
8 | | a diversified range of memory and non-memory products for high volume applications in the |
9 | | digital consumer, networking, wireless communications and Internet computing markets. With |
10 | | its proprietary, patented SuperFlash technology, the Company is a leading provider of |
11 | | nonvolatile memory solutions for products with various densities of high functionality flash |
12 | | memory components and flash mass storage products. The Company has a broad network of |
13 | | world-class manufacturing partners and technology licensees, including TSMC, which offers it |
14 | | under its trademark Emb-FLASH. Additionally, Silicon Storage offers non-memory products |
15 | | include NAND controller-based products, smart card ICs and modules, flash microcontrollers |
| | and radio frequency ICs and modules. |
| |
16 | | 21. The Company’s products have been very successful. On November 2, 2009, just |
17 | | days before the announcement of the Proposed Transaction, Silicon Storage unveiled the |
18 | | industry’s first 1.8V, high-speed quad-bit serial flash memory. It features an 80 MHz operating |
19 | | frequency and a specialized instruction set and allows programs to be stored and executed |
20 | | directly from the flash memory without the need for code shadowing. Its technology is ideal for |
21 | | mobile handsets, Bluetooth headsets, GPS devices and other small form factor, portable |
22 | | electronics. This new product follows after the Company won an Innovation of the Year Award |
| | fromEDN Magazine in April of 2009 for another flash product. |
| |
23 | | 22. The Company’s positive prospects suggest that the Proposed Transaction |
24 | | undervalues its shares. Silicon Storage has seen bright prospects in recent months as a result of |
25 | | stronger product and licensing revenue and cost cuts to help the bottom line. Indeed, in |
26 | | September 2009, the Company raised its guidance for the second quarter ending September 30, |
27 | | 2009. The Company said it now sees revenue of $69 million to $71 million, up from a |
28 | | previously expected $61 million to $68 million and now expects net income of zero to 3 cents a |
| | |
1 | | share, up from a previously forecast loss of 3-7 cents a share. Silicon Storage further said that |
2 | | the better forecast reflects “stronger than anticipated product and licensing revenues in the |
3 | | quarter as well as increased dividends on investments and lower operating expenses.” Despite |
4 | | its recent strong performance and its potential for continued growth and success, Silicon |
5 | | Storage, via its Board of Directors has willingly accepted inadequate consideration and entered |
| | into the Proposed Transaction to the detriment of its public shareholders. |
| |
6 | | 23. On November 13, 2009, Silicon Storage announced publicly that it agreed to be |
7 | | acquired by management and equity firm Prophet and members of the Company’s management, |
8 | | pursuant to which Silicon Storage’s public shareholders will receive $2.10 in cash for each |
9 | | share of common stock in the Company that they own. The aggregate value of the deal is |
| | $201 million. The Proposed Transaction is expected to close during the second quarter of 2010. |
| |
10 | | 24. Under the terms of the Proposed Transaction, shares of Silicon Storage will no |
11 | | longer trade on a stock exchange and shareholders will not receive a continuing interest in the |
12 | | Company. While the public shareholders’ investment in Silicon Storage will be terminated if |
13 | | the Proposed Transaction is consummated, defendant Yeh, the Company’s Chairman and Chief |
14 | | Executive Officer, and defendant Hu, the Company’s Executive Vice President and Chief |
15 | | Operating Officer, who together hold or control 12.7 percent of outstanding shares of Silicon |
16 | | Storage, will continue having an equity interest in the Company as they have agreed to |
17 | | exchange all of their shares of Silicon Storage for shares of capital stock of the resulting |
18 | | privately held company. Accordingly, Prophet and defendant Yeh and Hu stand to benefit from |
19 | | the Company’s promising growth and operational results. In contrast, Silicon Storage |
20 | | shareholders do not. Defendants Yeh and Hu have also entered into voting agreements pursuant |
21 | | to which they have agreed to vote their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction and against |
| | any other acquisition proposals. |
| |
22 | | 25. The consideration to public shareholders is only a 13 percent premium over the |
23 | | $1.86 closing price on November 12, 2009, the last day of trading before the Proposed |
24 | | Transaction was announced. Shares traded at this level as recently as two weeks ago on |
25 | | October 29, 2009. Aside from the fact that the Proposed Transaction appears to favor two of |
26 | | Silicon Storage’s insider shareholders, the trading price of the Company’s common stock in the |
27 | | wake of the Proposed Transaction’s announcement suggests that the market believes that the |
28 | | shares should fetch a higher price. Indeed, since the Proposed Transaction was announced, the |
| | |
1 | | stock has traded above the $2.10 offering price. Market reaction to the announcement of the |
2 | | Proposed Transaction has been swift, as investors sent Silicon Graphic’s stock price up |
3 | | approximately 20% to close at $2.24 on the day the Proposed Transaction was announced. As a |
4 | | result, the price Prophet is offering in the Proposed Transaction, and the Company has |
| | unanimously accepted, already represents a discount to Silicon Storage’s public shareholders. |
| |
5 | | 26. A Strategic Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors, consisting of all |
6 | | four of the so-called “independent” members of the Board, was formed to evaluate the Proposed |
7 | | Transaction. The Strategic Committee approved the Merger Agreement and resolved to |
8 | | recommend that the Company’s shareholders adopt and approve the agreement. However, |
9 | | Bryant R. Riley, one of the independent directors since 2008 and a major holder in the |
10 | | Company, voted against the approval of the Merger Agreement and subsequently resigned from |
| | the Board of Directors on the day the Proposed Transaction was announced. |
| |
11 | | 27. Moreover, Lloyd I. Miller, III, Silicon Storage’s second largest shareholder, filed |
12 | | a Schedule 13D-A with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on November |
13 | | 13, 2009. In it, Mr. Miller revealed that he “strongly opposes the price terms of the recently |
14 | | announced merger” and that “it would be in his best interest, and those of other stockholders, to |
15 | | attempt to influence the governance and business strategies of the Company.” Mr. Miller |
16 | | expressed concern about the appearance of opposition to the Proposed Transaction on the Board |
17 | | of Directors and about the appearance of conflicts of interest in the Proposed Transaction. |
18 | | Specifically, Mr. Miller notes (1) the resignation of Bryant R. Riley and his vote against the |
19 | | Proposed Transaction, and (2) the special treatment of the shares of two insiders, defendants |
20 | | Yeh and Hu, who will receive equity in the acquiring company while public shareholders will |
21 | | be cashed out at $2.10, a price that Mr. Miller believes is deficient. Mr. Miller is examining all |
22 | | of the options that he believes will enhance stockholder value, including encouraging, |
23 | | participating in or leading efforts to appoint individuals to the Company’s Board of Directors |
24 | | who would be independent of management and would represent the Company and the holders |
| | of the shares. |
| |
25 | | 28. No doubt recognizing that the deal is unfair to existing shareholders, the |
26 | | individual defendants, aided and abetted by Prophet, have attempted to camouflage their |
27 | | breaches of fiduciary duty to Silicon Storage shareholders by the inclusion of a cosmetic “go |
28 | | shop” provision in the Merger Agreement. This provision is insufficient to protect the interests |
| | |
1 | | of Silicon Storage’s public shareholders. Any potential suitor for the Company’s shares must |
2 | | complete its due diligence within the short, 45 day time permitted by the “go shop” provision, |
3 | | which is expected to expire on December 28, 2009. Under the circumstances, the provision is |
4 | | cosmetic and merely intended to camouflage the fact that the Board violated its fiduciary duties |
5 | | and engaged in an unfair process that lead to an inadequate and unfair price. Now, any third |
6 | | party that would have paid a fair price for the Company is advantaged by the knowledge that the |
7 | | Board has already made it clear that it would be willing to agree, and indeed has agreed, to a |
| | wholly unfair and inadequate price and is not focused upon maximizing shareholder value. |
| |
8 | | 29. Moreover, if a potential acquiror were to propose a transaction more favorable to |
9 | | Silicon Storage’s public shareholders, pursuant to Section 8.3(b) of the Merger Agreement, the |
10 | | Company would be required to pay the sum of $7.05 million or approximately 3.5 percent of the |
11 | | deal value to Prophet as a termination fee, thus hindering the prospect of a more favorable |
| | transaction from being proposed. |
| |
12 | | 30. Accordingly, the Proposed Transaction undervalues the Company’s shares when |
13 | | giving due consideration to the Company’s anticipated operating results and prospects. The |
14 | | Proposed Transaction will deny class members their right to share proportionately and equitably |
15 | | in the true value of the Company’s valuable and profitable business, and future growth in profits |
16 | | and earnings, at a time when the Company is poised to increase its profitability. Unless the |
17 | | Individual Defendants are enjoined from breaching their fiduciary duties, Plaintiffs and the |
| | other public shareholders of Silicon Storage will continue to suffer irreparable harm. |
| |
18 | | 31. Plaintiffs allege herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in |
19 | | connection with the Proposed Transaction, violated the fiduciary duties owed to plaintiffs and |
20 | | the other public shareholders of Silicon Storage, including their duties of loyalty, good faith, |
21 | | candor, due care and independence, insofar as they stood on both sides of the transaction and |
22 | | engaged in self-dealing and obtained for themselves personal benefits, including personal |
23 | | financial benefits, not shared equally by plaintiffs or the Class. As a result of the Individual |
24 | | Defendants’ self-dealing and divided loyalties, neither Plaintiffs nor the Class will receive |
25 | | adequate or fair value for their Silicon Storage investment in the Proposed Transaction. |
| |
26 | | 32. Because the Individual Defendants have breached their duties of due care, |
27 | | loyalty and good faith in connection with the Proposed Transaction, the burden of proving the |
28 | | inherent or entire fairness of the Proposed Transaction, including all aspects of its negotiation, |
| | |
1 | | structure, price and terms, is placed upon the Individual Defendants as a matter of law. |
| |
| | CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS |
| |
2 | | 33. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to §382 of the California Code of Civil |
3 | | Procedure on their own behalf and as a class action on behalf of all common stockholders of |
4 | | Silicon Storage who are being and will be harmed by defendants’ actions described below (the |
5 | | “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, |
6 | | corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any defendants, or their principals or |
7 | | affiliates. |
| |
8 | | 34. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. |
| |
9 | | 35. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of |
10 | | October 31, 2009, the Company had over 95 million shares of common stock outstanding held |
| | by scores, if not hundreds of individuals and entities scattered throughout America. |
| |
11 | | 36. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and |
12 | | predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions |
13 | | include,inter alia, the following: |
| |
14 | | (a) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty of |
15 | | undivided loyalty, independence, due care and/or candor with respect to plaintiffs and the other |
16 | | members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; |
| |
17 | | (b) whether the Individual Defendants are engaging in self-dealing in |
18 | | connection with the Proposed Transaction; |
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19 | | (c) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty to |
20 | | secure and obtain the best price reasonable under the circumstances for the benefit of Plaintiffs |
21 | | and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; |
| |
22 | | (d) whether defendants have breached any of their other fiduciary duties to |
23 | | Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction, |
24 | | including the duties of good faith, diligence, candor and fair dealing; |
| |
25 | | (e) whether the defendants have impeded or erected barriers to discourage |
26 | | other offers for the Company or its assets; whether the consideration payable to Plaintiffs and |
27 | | the Class is unfair and inadequate; and |
| |
28 | | (f) whether Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class would be |
| | |
1 | | irreparably harmed if the transactions complained of herein are consummated. |
| |
2 | | 37. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and |
| | plaintiffs do not have any interests adverse to the Class. |
| |
3 | | 38. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class, have retained competent |
4 | | counsel experienced in litigation of this nature and will fairly and adequately protect the |
5 | | interests of the Class. |
| |
6 | | 39. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would |
7 | | create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the |
8 | | Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class. |
| |
9 | | 40. Plaintiffs anticipate that there will be no difficulty in the management of this |
10 | | litigation. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient |
| | adjudication of this controversy. |
| |
11 | | 41. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect |
12 | | to the matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with |
13 | | respect to the Class as a whole. |
| |
14 | | CAUSES OF ACTION |
| |
15 | | COUNT I |
| |
| | (For Breach of Fiduciary Duty against the Individual Defendants) |
| |
16 | | 42. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each allegation set forth herein. |
| |
17 | | 43. The defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor and |
18 | | independence owed to the public shareholders of Silicon Storage. |
| |
19 | | 44. By the acts, transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, defendants, |
20 | | individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive Plaintiffs |
21 | | and other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in Silicon Storage. |
22 | | Moreover, they have violated their fiduciary duties by entering into the Proposed Transaction |
23 | | without regard to its fairness. |
| |
24 | | 45. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to |
25 | | exercise the care required and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith and candor owed to |
26 | | the shareholders of Silicon Storage. |
| |
27 | | 46. As a result of the actions of defendants, Plaintiffs and the Class have been and |
28 | | will be irreparably harmed in that they have not and will not be provided complete and candid |
| | |
1 | | information concerning the Proposed Transaction, which information is in the possession of |
2 | | defendants. |
| |
3 | | 47. Unless enjoined by this Court, the defendants will continue to breach their |
4 | | fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs and the Class, and may consummate the Proposed |
5 | | Transaction that will result in irreparable harm to the Class. |
| |
6 | | 48. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only |
7 | | through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiffs and the Class be fully |
8 | | protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which defendants’ actions threaten to |
9 | | inflict. |
| |
10 | | COUNT II (For Aiding and Abetting the Individual Defendants’ Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Silicon Storage and Prophet) |
| |
11 | | 49. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each allegation set forth herein. |
| |
12 | | 50. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet are sued herein as aiders and |
13 | | abettors of the breaches of fiduciary duties outlined above by the Individual Defendants, |
14 | | as members of the Board and/or executives of Silicon Storage. |
| |
15 | | 51. The Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties of due care, |
16 | | good faith, loyalty, and candor to the Silicon Storage stockholders by the actions alleged |
17 | | supra. |
| |
18 | | 52. Such breaches of fiduciary duties could not and would not have occurred |
19 | | but for the conduct of Defendant Silicon Storage, which, therefore, aided and abetted |
20 | | such breaches via entering into the Proposed Transaction with Prophet. |
| |
21 | | 53. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet directly breached or aided and/or abetted |
22 | | the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs and the other holders of |
23 | | Silicon Storage stock. In connection with discussions regarding the Proposed Transaction, |
24 | | Silicon Storage provided, and Prophet obtained, sensitive non-public information concerning |
25 | | Silicon Storage’s operations and thus had unfair advantages which enabled it to acquire the |
26 | | Company at an unfair and inadequate price. |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | 54. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet had knowledge that it was aiding and |
2 | | abetting the Individual Defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duties to the Silicon Storage |
3 | | stockholders. |
| |
4 | | 55. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet rendered substantial assistance to the |
5 | | Individual Defendants in their breach of their fiduciary duties to the Silicon Storage |
6 | | stockholders. |
| |
7 | | 56. As a result of Silicon Storage’s and Prophet’s conduct of aiding and abetting the |
8 | | Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiffs and the other members of the |
9 | | Class have been and will be damaged in that they have been and will be prevented from |
| | obtaining a fair price for their shares. |
| |
10 | | 57. As a result of the unlawful actions of Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet, |
11 | | Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class will be irreparably harmed in that they will not |
12 | | receive fair value for Silicon Storage’s assets and business and will be prevented from |
13 | | obtaining the real value of their equity ownership in the Company. Unless the actions of |
14 | | Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet are enjoined by the Court, it will continue to aid and |
15 | | abet the Individual Defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs and the |
16 | | members of the Class, and will aid and abet a process that inhibits the maximization of |
17 | | stockholder value. |
| |
18 | | 58. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have no adequate remedy at |
19 | | law. |
| |
20 | | PRAYER FOR RELIEF |
| |
21 | | WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment and preliminary and permanent relief, |
22 | | including injunctive relief, in their favor and in favor of the Class and against defendants as |
23 | | follows: |
| |
24 | | A. Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a class action; |
| |
25 | | B. Declaring and decreeing that the Merger Agreement was entered into in breach |
26 | | of the fiduciary duties of the Individual Defendants and is therefore unlawful and |
27 | | unenforceable; |
| |
28 | | C. Rescinding, to the extent already implemented, the Proposed Transaction or any |
| | of the terms thereof, |
| | |
| | | | |
1 | | D. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining defendants, their agents, counsel, |
2 | | employees and all persons acting in concert with them from consummating the Proposed |
3 | | Transaction, unless and until the defendants provide Silicon Storage shareholders with an offer |
4 | | that is fair, equitable, maximizes shareholder value; |
| |
5 | | E. Directing the Individual Defendants to exercise their fiduciary duties to obtain a |
6 | | transaction which is in the best interests of Silicon Storage’s shareholders and implement a |
7 | | process for the sale of the Company designed to ensure that the highest possible price is |
8 | | obtained; |
| |
9 | | F. Awarding Plaintiffs the costs and disbursements of this action, including |
10 | | reasonable attorneys’ and experts’ fees; and |
| |
11 | | G. Granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. |
| | |
12 | | DATED: November 16, 2009 | | Respectfully Submitted, |
| | |
13 | | | | BARRACK, RODOS, & BACINE |
14 | | | | STEPHEN R. BASSER |
15 | | | | SAMUEL M. WARD |
| | |
16 | | | | /s/ Stephen R. Basser |
17 | | | | STEPHEN R. BASSER |
| | |
18 | | | | 600 West Broadway, Suite 900 |
19 | | | | San Diego, CA 92101 |
20 | | | | Telephone: (619) 230-0800 |
21 | | | | Facsimile: (619) 230-1874 |
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22 | | | | BARRACK, RODOS, & BACINE |
23 | | | | DANIEL E. BACINE |
24 | | | | JULIE PALLEY |
25 | | | | 3300 Two Commerce Square |
26 | | | | 2001 Market Street |
27 | | | | Philadelphia, PA 19130 |
28 | | | | (215) 963-0600 |
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| | | | Attorneys for Plaintiff David Thompson |