| | | | |
1 | | LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP | | |
| | David E. Bower, Esq. SBN 119546 |
2 | | 600 Corporate Pointe, Suite 1170 |
| | Culver City, CA 90230-7600 |
3 | | Tel: 310-839-0442 |
| |
| | LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP |
4 | | Joseph Levi, Esq. |
| | Juan E. Monteverde Esq. |
5 | | 30 Broad Street, 15th Floor |
| | New York, New York 10004 |
6 | | Tel: 212-363-7500 |
7 | | Fax: 212-363-7171 |
| |
8 | | Attorneys for Plaintiff |
| |
9 | | SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA |
| |
10 | | SANTA CLARA COUNT |
| | | | |
11 | | HUNG-CHUNG SHIH, individually and on behalf | | Case No. 109CV157882 |
| | of all others similarly situated, | | |
12 | | | | |
| | Plaintiff, | | |
13 | | v. | | CIVIL ACTION |
| | | | |
14 | | BING YEH, YAW WEN HU, RONALD CHWANG, | | CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT |
15 | | TERRY NICKERSON, YAO-WU YANG, SILICON | | |
16 | | STORAGE TECHNOLOGY, INC., TECHNOLOGY | | |
17 | | RESOURCES HOLDINGS, INC., and | | |
18 | | TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES MERGER SUB, | | |
| | INC., | | |
| | | | |
| | Defendants. | | |
| |
19 | | Plaintiff, by his attorneys, alleges upon information and belief, except for his own acts, |
20 | | which are alleged on knowledge, as follows: |
| |
21 | | 1. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the public stockholders of Silicon Storage |
22 | | Technology, Inc. (“Silicon Storage “ or the “Company”) against Defendants, Silicon Storage and its |
23 | | Board of Directors (the “Board”) seeking equitable relief for their breaches of fiduciary duty and |
24 | | other violations of state law arising out of their attempt to sell the Company to Defendants |
25 | | Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. and Technology Resources Merger Sub, Inc., entities |
26 | | controlled by Prophet Equity LP (collectively “Prophet Equity”) by means of an unfair process and |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | for an unfair price of $2.10 per share in cash (the “Proposed Transaction”). The Proposed |
2 | | Transaction is valued at approximately $210 million. |
| |
3 | | 2. While the public shareholders will be cashed out at the unfair price of $2.10 per |
4 | | share, certain members of Silicon Storage’s management will remain shareholders of the newly |
5 | | resulting company following consummation of the Proposed Transaction. |
| |
6 | | 3. Defendants Bing Yeh (“Yeh”), Silicon Storage’s Chief Executive Officer, President, |
7 | | and Chairman of the Board, and Yaw Wen Hu (“Hu”), Silicon Storage’s Executive Vice President |
8 | | and Chief Operating Officer and a member of the Board collectively own approximately 12.7% of |
9 | | the Company’s common stock. |
| |
10 | | 4. Pursuant to the Proposed Transaction, Prophet Equity will acquire all of the |
11 | | outstanding common stock of the Company for $2.10 per share, except for shares held by Yeh and |
12 | | Hu, who have agreed to exchange all of their shares of Silicon Storage common stock for shares of |
13 | | capital stock of the newly resulting privately held company following the Proposed Transaction. As |
14 | | a result, Yeh and Hu will be able to realize the benefits of the burgeoning prospects that lay ahead |
15 | | for Silicon Storage, while the public shareholders are cashed out. |
| |
16 | | PARTIES |
| |
17 | | 5. Plaintiff is, and has been at all relevant times, the owner of shares of common stock |
18 | | of Silicon Storage. |
| |
19 | | 6. Silicon Storage is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of |
20 | | California. It maintains its principal corporate offices at 1020 Kifer Road, Sunnyvale, California |
21 | | 94086, and supplies NOR flash memory semiconductor devices for the digital consumer, |
22 | | networking, wireless communications, and the Internet computing markets. The company produces |
23 | | and sells semiconductor products, including NAND flash controllers and NAND controller-based |
24 | | modules, smart card integrated circuits (ICs) and modules, flash microcontrollers, and radio |
25 | | |
26 | | |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | frequency ICs and modules. The Company also produces and sells various products based on its |
2 | | SuperFlash design and manufacturing process technology, as well as licenses the SuperFlash |
3 | | technology for applications in semiconductor devices that integrate flash memory with other |
4 | | functions on a monolithic chip. |
| |
5 | | 7. Defendant Bing Yeh (“Yeh”) has been the President and Chief Executive Officer of |
6 | | the Company since 1989, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Company since 2004. |
| |
7 | | 8. Defendant Yaw Wen Hu (“Hu”) has been the Chief Operating Officer, Executive |
8 | | Vice President, and a director of the Company since 2004. |
| |
9 | | 9. Defendant Ronald Chwang (“Chwang”) has been a director of the Company since |
10 | | 1997. |
| |
11 | | 10. Defendant Terry Nickerson (“Nickerson”) has been a director of the Company since |
12 | | 2005. |
| |
13 | | 11. Defendant Yao-Wu Yang (“Yang”) has been a director of the Company since 2007. |
| |
14 | | 12. Defendants referenced in ¶¶7 through 12 are collectively referred to as Individual |
15 | | Defendants and/or the Silicon Storage Board. The Individual Defendants as officers and/or directors |
16 | | of Silicon Storage, have a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and other public shareholders of |
17 | | Silicon Storage and owe them the highest obligations of good faith, fair dealing, loyalty and due |
18 | | care. |
| |
19 | | 13. Defendant Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that is |
20 | | controlled by Prophet Equity LP, a private equity firm. |
| |
21 | | 14. Defendant Technology Resources Merger Sub, Inc. is a California corporation |
22 | | wholly owned by Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. that was created for the purposes of |
23 | | effectuating the Proposed Transaction. |
| |
24 | | INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES |
25 | | |
26 | | |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | 15. By reason of Individual Defendants’ positions with the Company as officers and/or |
2 | | Directors, they are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the other public shareholders of |
3 | | Silicon Storage and owe them, as well as the Company, a duty of highest good faith, fair dealing, |
4 | | loyalty and full, candid and adequate disclosure, as well as a duty to maximize shareholder value. |
| |
5 | | 16. Where the officers and/or Directors of a publicly traded corporation undertake a |
6 | | transaction that will result in either: (i) a change in corporate control; (ii) a break up of the |
7 | | corporation’s assets; or (iii) sale of the corporation, the Directors have an affirmative fiduciary |
8 | | obligation to obtain the highest value reasonably available for the corporation’s shareholders, and if |
9 | | such transaction will result in a change of corporate control, the shareholders are entitled to receive |
10 | | a significant premium. To diligently comply with their fiduciary duties, the directors and/or officers |
11 | | may not take any action that: |
| |
12 | | (a) adversely affects the value provided to the corporation’s shareholders; |
| |
13 | | (b) favors themselves or will discourage or inhibit alternative offers to purchase |
14 | | control of the corporation or its assets; |
| |
15 | | (c) contractually prohibits them from complying with their fiduciary duties; |
| |
16 | | (d) will otherwise adversely affect their duty to search and secure the best value |
17 | | reasonably available under the circumstances for the corporation’s shareholders; and/or |
| |
18 | | (e) will provide the directors and/or officers with preferential treatment at the |
19 | | expense of, or separate from, the public shareholders. |
| |
20 | | 17. In accordance with their duties of loyalty and good faith, the Individual Defendants, |
21 | | as Directors and/or officers of Silicon Storage, are obligated to refrain from: |
| |
22 | | (a) participating in any transaction where the directors or officers’ loyalties are |
23 | | divided; |
24 | | |
25 | | |
26 | | |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
| |
1 | | (b) participating in any transaction where the directors or officers receive, or are |
2 | | entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit not equally shared by the public shareholders of the |
3 | | corporation; and/or |
| |
4 | | (c) unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the public |
5 | | shareholders. |
| |
6 | | 18. Plaintiff alleges herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in |
7 | | connection with the Proposed Transaction are knowingly or recklessly violating their fiduciary |
8 | | duties, including their duties of loyalty and good faith owed to Plaintiff and other public |
9 | | shareholders of Silicon Storage, or are aiding and abetting others in violating those duties. |
| |
10 | | 19. Defendants also owe the Company’s stockholders a duty of candor, which includes |
11 | | the disclosure of all material facts concerning the Proposed Transaction and, particularly, the |
12 | | fairness of the price offered for the stockholders’ equity interest. Defendants are knowingly or |
13 | | recklessly breaching their fiduciary duties of candor by failing to disclose all material information |
14 | | concerning the Proposed Transaction, and/or aiding and abetting other Defendants’ breaches. |
| |
15 | | CONSPIRACY, AIDING AND ABETTING AND CONCERTED ACTION |
| |
16 | | 20. In committing the wrongful acts alleged herein, each of the Defendants has pursued, |
17 | | or joined in the pursuit of, a common course of conduct, and acted in concert with and conspired |
18 | | with one another, in furtherance of their common plan or design. In addition to the wrongful |
19 | | conduct herein alleged as giving rise to primary liability, the Defendants further aided and abetted |
20 | | and/or assisted each other in breach of their respective duties as herein alleged. |
| |
21 | | 21. During all relevant times hereto, the Defendants, and each of them, initiated a course |
22 | | of conduct which was designed to and did: (i) permit Prophet Equity to attempt to eliminate the |
23 | | public shareholders’ equity interest in Silicon Storage pursuant to a defective sales process, and (ii) |
24 | | permit Prophet Equity to buy the Company for an unfair price. In furtherance of this plan, |
25 | | |
26 | | |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | conspiracy and course of conduct, Defendants, and each of them, took the actions as set forth |
2 | | herein. |
| |
3 | | 22. Each of the Defendants herein aided and abetted and rendered substantial assistance |
4 | | in the wrongs complained of herein. In taking such actions, as particularized herein, to substantially |
5 | | assist the commission of the wrongdoing complained of, each Defendant acted with knowledge of |
6 | | the primary wrongdoing, substantially assisted the accomplishment of that wrongdoing, and was |
7 | | aware of his or her overall contribution to, and furtherance of, the wrongdoing. The Defendants’ |
8 | | acts of aiding and abetting included, inter alia, the acts each of them are alleged to have committed |
9 | | in furtherance of the conspiracy, common enterprise and common course of conduct complained of |
10 | | herein. |
11 | | |
| |
12 | | CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS |
| |
13 | | 23. Plaintiff brings this action on its own behalf and as a class action on behalf of all |
14 | | owners of Silicon Storage common stock and their successors in interest, except Defendants and |
15 | | their affiliates (the “Class”). |
16 | | |
17 | | 24. This action is properly maintainable as a class action for the following reasons: |
| |
18 | | (a) the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of |
19 | | November 19, 2009, Silicon Storage has approximately 95.85 million shares outstanding. |
| |
20 | | (b) questions of law and fact are common to the Class, including, inter alia, the |
21 | | following: |
22 | | |
| |
23 | | (i) Have the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed |
24 | | by them to Plaintiff and the others members of the Class; |
| |
25 | | (ii) Are the Individual Defendants, in connection with the Proposed |
26 | | Transaction of Silicon Storage by Prophet Equity, pursuing a course |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | of conduct that does not maximize Silicon Storage’s value in violation |
2 | | of their fiduciary duties; |
| |
3 | | (iii) Have the Individual Defendants misrepresented and omitted material |
4 | | facts in violation of their fiduciary duties owed by them to Plaintiff |
5 | | and the other members of the Class; |
| |
6 | | (iv) Have Silicon Storage and Prophet Equity aided and abetted the |
7 | | Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty; and |
| |
8 | | (v) Is the Class entitled to injunctive relief or damages as a result of |
9 | | Defendants’ wrongful conduct. |
| |
10 | | (c) Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and have retained competent |
11 | | counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. |
12 | | |
13 | | (d) Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the other members of the Class. |
| |
14 | | (e) Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the Class. |
| |
15 | | (f) The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class |
16 | | would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications for individual members of the Class |
17 | | and of establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. |
| |
18 | | (g) Conflicting adjudications for individual members of the Class might as a |
19 | | practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications |
20 | | or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. |
21 | | |
22 | | |
23 | | SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS |
| |
24 | | 25. Silicon Storage is poised for substantial growth. On October 27, 2009, the Company |
25 | | announced its results for the third quarter of 2009. Among the financial highlights, the Company |
26 | | announced that revenues for the quarter were $71.3 million compared with $58.1 million in the |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | second quarter of 2009, and that net income for the quarter was $3.1 million compared with a net |
2 | | loss of $6.4 million for the second quarter of 2009. |
| |
3 | | 26. In the press release announcing the results, Defendant Yeh commented on the |
4 | | Company’s bright future that lay ahead: |
| |
5 | | “This was a productive quarter for SST as we executed well on our |
6 | | strategy and returned the company to profitability ahead of our |
| | expectations,” said Bing Yeh, chief executive officer. “Seasonally |
7 | | strong demand in NOR flash memory, as well as a stabilizing |
| | pricing environment, resulted in healthy sequential growth in unit |
8 | | shipments and improved product revenues across all four of our |
| | application segments.Over the past few quarters, we have signed |
9 | | several new licensing agreements for our embedded SuperFlash |
10 | | program, which will begin to contribute upfront fee revenue in |
| | the fourth quarter as we make progress on deliverables. These |
11 | | new licensing agreements will help drive royalty growth in our |
| | licensing business in future years. We continue to manage our |
12 | | expenses closely and operate our business conservatively, butwe |
13 | | are optimistic about the opportunities in our markets and we |
14 | | believe that we are laying a solid foundation for growth in 2010.” |
| |
15 | | 27. Despite its promise and poise for growth, in a press release dated November 13, |
16 | | 2009, the Company announced that it had entered into a merger agreement with Prophet Equity, |
17 | | stating: |
| |
18 | | SUNNYVALE, Calif., Nov. 13, 2009 — SST (Silicon Storage |
| | Technology, Inc.) (NASDAQ: SSTI), a memory and non-memory |
| | products provider for high-volume applications in the digital |
19 | | consumer, networking, wireless communications and Internet |
| | computing markets, today announced that it has entered into a |
20 | | definitive merger agreement to be acquired by Technology |
| | Resource Holdings, Inc., a Prophet Equity LP-controlled entity, as |
21 | | well as by members of SST’s management team. Prophet Equity |
| | LP will acquire all of the outstanding common stock of the |
22 | | company for $2.10 per share, except for shares held by Bing Yeh, |
| | SST’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and Yaw Wen Hu, |
23 | | SST’s Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer and |
| | member of the Board of Directors, who have agreed to exchange |
24 | | all of their shares of SST common stock for shares of capital stock |
| | of the resulting privately held company. This price per share |
25 | | represents approximately a 13 percent premium to the closing price |
| | per share of SST’s stock on November 12, 2009. |
| |
26 | | SST’s Board of Directors, acting upon the recommendation of a |
27 | | Strategic Committee composed of all of SST’s independent |
28 | | |
| | |
| | directors, approved the agreement and resolved to recommend that |
1 | | the company’s shareholders adopt and approve the agreement. |
| |
2 | | * * * |
| |
3 | | The transaction, which is expected to close in the second quarter of |
| | 2010, is subject to regulatory approvals and approval of the |
4 | | agreement by (i) the holders of a majority of the company’s |
| | outstanding common stock represented and voting at a special |
5 | | meeting to be held to approve the transaction, excluding Bing Yeh |
| | and Yaw Wen Hu, and (ii) the holders of a majority of the |
6 | | company’s outstanding common stock, and other customary |
7 | | closing conditions. |
| |
8 | | 28. As part of the Proposed Transaction, Defendants Yeh and Hu, who collectively own |
9 | | 12.7% of the Company’s common stock, agreed to exchange all of their Silicon Storage common |
10 | | stock for common stock and preferred stock of Prophet Equity immediately prior to the |
11 | | consummation of the Proposed Transaction. The Proposed Transaction was a fantastic opportunity |
12 | | for Defendants Yeh and Hu, along with Prophet Equity, to cash out the public shareholders at an |
13 | | unfair price. |
14 | | |
15 | | 29. First, the Proposed Transaction represents a mere 13% premium to shareholders |
16 | | based upon the closing price of Silicon Storage’s shares the day prior to the announcement of the |
17 | | Proposed Transaction. This is a paltry amount to offer for the entire equity stake of any company, |
18 | | but is doubly offensive because it fails to account for Silicon Storage’s future growth prospects. |
| |
19 | | 30. Indeed, in the few months prior to the Proposed Transaction, Silicon Storage stock |
20 | | had been trading well in excess of the Proposed Transaction offer price of $2.10. In fact, as recently |
21 | | as September 29, 2009, Silicon Storage’s stock traded at $2.75 per share. Moreover, the Company |
22 | | has a book value of greater than $2.62 per share with $1.20 per share in cash and no debt. In |
23 | | addition, at least one analyst set a $2.50 price target for Silicon Storage shares prior to the |
24 | | announcement of the Proposed Transaction. |
25 | | |
26 | | 31. Given the Company’s recent performance and future prospects, the consideration |
27 | | shareholders are to receive is inadequate. Rather, Defendants Yeh and Hu found the perfect |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | opportunity to cash out the public shareholders at an unfair price and, along with Prophet Equity, |
2 | | pick up Silicon Storage at a time when Silicon Storage is poised for growth and its stock price is |
3 | | trading at a huge discount to its intrinsic value. |
| |
4 | | 32. The fact that the Proposed Transaction is unfair to shareholders is supported by the |
5 | | fact that Bryant R. Riley, one of the Company’s independent directors, voted against the approval of |
6 | | the Proposed Transaction. He subsequently resigned from the Board the day prior to the |
7 | | announcement of the Proposed Transaction. |
8 | | |
9 | | 33. Furthermore, on November 13, 2009, the Company filed a Form 8-K with the United |
10 | | States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) wherein it disclosed the operating Agreement |
11 | | and Plan of Merger for the Proposed Transaction (the “Merger Agreement”). As part of the Merger |
12 | | Agreement, Defendants agreed to certain onerous and preclusive deal protection devices that |
13 | | operate conjunctively to make the Proposed Transaction afait d’accompli and ensure that no |
14 | | competing offers will emerge for the Company. |
15 | | |
16 | | 34. First, pursuant §6.4(a) of the Merger Agreement, the Company has only 45 days |
17 | | from November 13, 2009, the date the Merger Agreement was signed, to solicit other offers. After |
18 | | the 45 day period, the “go-shop” period ends, and a strict “no solicitation” provision kicks in and |
19 | | demands that the Company terminate any attempts to solicit other potential suitors. |
20 | | |
21 | | 35. In addition, pursuant to §6.4(c) of the Merger Agreement, should a bidder arrive on |
22 | | the scene during either the “go-shop” period or after, the Company must notify Prophet Equity of |
23 | | the bidder’s identity and offer. Thereafter, should the Board determine that the alternative offer is |
24 | | superior, Prophet Equity is granted three business days as a “last look” to amend the terms of the |
25 | | Merger Agreement to make a counter-offer that only needs to be at least as favorable to the |
26 | | Company’s shareholders as the alternative offer. Prophet Equity is able to match the offer because |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | it is granted unfettered access to the offer, in its entirety, eliminating any leverage that the Company |
2 | | has in receiving other offers. |
| |
3 | | 36. In other words, the Merger Agreement gives Prophet Equity access to any rival |
4 | | bidder’s information and allows Prophet Equity a free right to top any superior offer. Accordingly, |
5 | | no rival bidder is likely to emerge and act as a stalking horse for Prophet Equity, because the |
6 | | Merger Agreement unfairly assures that any “auction” will favor Prophet Equity and piggy-back |
7 | | upon the due diligence of the foreclosed second bidder. |
| |
8 | | 37. In addition, should the other bidder overcome the “last look,” the Merger Agreement |
9 | | provides that a termination fee of $4,025,875 (in the event the offer resulted during the “go-shop” |
10 | | period) or $7,045,281 (in the event the offer resulted from an unsolicited offer after the “go-shop” |
11 | | period) must be paid to Prophet Equity by Silicon Storage if the Company decides to pursue said |
12 | | other offer, thereby essentially requiring that the alternate bidder agree to pay a naked premium for |
13 | | the right to provide the shareholders with a superior offer. |
| |
14 | | 38. Lastly, Defendants Yeh and Hu, who hold approximately 12.7% of the Company’s |
15 | | outstanding common stock, have entered into voting agreements with Prophet Equity pursuant to |
16 | | which they have agreed to vote their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction and against any |
17 | | other acquisition proposal. |
| |
18 | | 39. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent the |
19 | | irreparable injury that Company shareholders will continue to suffer absent judicial intervention. |
| |
20 | | CLAIM FOR RELIEF |
| |
21 | | COUNT I |
22 | | Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Failure to Maximize Shareholder Value |
23 | | (Against All Individual Defendants) |
| |
24 | | 40. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. |
25 | | |
26 | | |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | |
1 | | 41. As Directors of Silicon Storage, the Individual Defendants stand in a fiduciary |
2 | | relationship to Plaintiff and the other public stockholders of the Company and owe them the highest |
3 | | fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care. The Individual Defendants’ recommendation of the |
4 | | Proposed Transaction will result in change of control of the Company which imposes heightened |
5 | | fiduciary responsibilities to maximize Silicon Storage’s value for the benefit of the stockholders and |
6 | | requires enhanced scrutiny by the Court. |
| |
7 | | 42. As discussed herein, the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties |
8 | | to Silicon Storage shareholders by failing to engage in an honest and fair sale process. |
| |
9 | | 43. As a result of the Individual Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff |
10 | | and the Class will suffer irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair |
11 | | portion of the value of Silicon Storage’s assets and will be prevented from benefiting from a value- |
12 | | maximizing transaction. |
| |
13 | | 44. Unless enjoined by this Court, the Individual Defendants will continue to breach |
14 | | their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class, and may consummate the Proposed |
15 | | Transaction, to the irreparable harm of the Class. |
| |
16 | | 45. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. |
| |
17 | | COUNT II |
| |
18 | | Aiding and Abetting |
19 | | (Against Silicon Storage and Prophet Equity) |
| |
20 | | 46. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. |
| |
21 | | 47. As alleged in more detail above, Silicon Storage and Prophet Equity are well aware |
22 | | that the Individual Defendants have not sought to obtain the best available transaction for the |
23 | | Company’s public shareholders. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet Equity aided and abetted |
24 | | the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties. |
| |
25 | | 48. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class members are being harmed. |
26 | | |
27 | | |
28 | | |
| | | | |
1 | | 49. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. |
| |
2 | | WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants jointly and severally, as |
3 | | follows: |
| |
4 | | (A) declaring this action to be a class action and certifying Plaintiff as the Class |
5 | | representatives and their counsel as Class counsel; |
| |
6 | | (B) enjoining, preliminarily and permanently, the Proposed Transaction; |
| |
7 | | (C) in the event that the transaction is consummated prior to the entry of this |
8 | | Court’s final judgment, rescinding it or awarding Plaintiff and the Class rescissory damages; |
| |
9 | | (D) directing that Defendants account to Plaintiff and the other members of the |
10 | | Class for all damages caused by them and account for all profits and any special benefits obtained |
11 | | as a result of their breaches of their fiduciary duties; |
| |
12 | | (E) awarding Plaintiff the costs of this action, including a reasonable allowance |
13 | | for the fees and expenses of Plaintiff’s attorneys and experts; and |
| |
14 | | (F) granting Plaintiff and the other members of the Class such further relief as the |
15 | | Court deems just and proper. |
| | |
16 | | DATED: November 19, 2009 | | LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP |
| | |
17 | | | | /s/ David E. Bower |
18 | | | | DAVID E. BOWER |
19 | | | | 600 Corporate Pointe, Suite 1170 |
20 | | | | Culver City, CA 90230-7600 |
| | |
21 | | | | LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP |
22 | | | | Joseph Levi, Esq. |
23 | | | | Juan E. Monteverde, Esq. |
24 | | | | 30 Broad Street, 15th Floor |
25 | | | | New York, New York 10004 |
26 | | | | Tel: 212-363-7500 |
27 | | | | Fax: 212-363-7171 |
28 | | | | |
| | | | Attorneys for Plaintiff |