Exhibit (a)(5)(vi)
1 | Joseph J. Tabacco, Jr. (75484) | |||||||
jtabacco@bermandevalerio.com | ||||||||
2 | Christopher T. Heffelfinger (118058) | |||||||
cheffelfinger@bermandevalerio.com | ||||||||
3 | James Magid (233043) | |||||||
jmagid@bermandevalerio.com | ||||||||
4 | BERMAN DEVALERIO | |||||||
425 California Street, Suite 2100 | ||||||||
5 | San Francisco, CA 94010 | |||||||
Telephone: (415) 433-3200 | ||||||||
6 | Facsimile: (415) 433-6282 | |||||||
7 | Attorneys for Plaintiff | |||||||
8 | ||||||||
9 | SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA | |||||||
10 | COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |||||||
11 | ||||||||
12 | ALAN FRIEDMAN, on behalf of himself and | ) | Case No. 109CV157578 | |||||
all others similarly situated, | ) | |||||||
13 | ) | |||||||
Plaintiff, | ) | CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT | ||||||
14 | vs. | ) | ||||||
15 | PROPHET EQUITY LP, TECHNOLOGY | ) | ||||||
RESOURCES HOLDINGS, INC., | ) | JURY TRIAL DEMANDED | ||||||
16 | TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES MERGER | ) | ||||||
SUB, INC., BING YEH, YAW WEN HU, | ) | |||||||
17 | RONALD CHWANG, TERRY NICKERSON, | ) | ||||||
EDWARD Y.W. YANG, and SILICON | ) | |||||||
18 | STORAGE TECHNOLOGY, INC., | ) | ||||||
) | ||||||||
19 | Defendants. | ) | ||||||
20 | ) | |||||||
21 | ||||||||
22 | ||||||||
23 | ||||||||
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28 |
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | Plaintiff, Alan Friedman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by his | |
2 | attorneys, alleges the following based upon the investigation of his counsel, which included, among | |
3 | other things, a review of relevant publicly available information, including news articles, public | |
4 | statements by the defendants, and filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission | |
5 | (“SEC”), except as to allegations specifically pertaining to Plaintiff and his counsel, which are based | |
6 | on personal knowledge. | |
7 | I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT | |
8 | 1. This is a class action commenced on behalf of holders of Silicon Storage Technology, | |
9 | Inc. (“SSTI” or the “Company”) common stock, against certain officers and directors of SSTI | |
10 | seeking equitable relief relating to the buyout of SSTI’s common stock. SSTI’s Board of Directors | |
11 | (the “Board”) has approved a definitive merger agreement, pursuant to which SSTI will be acquired | |
12 | by Technology Resources Holdings, Inc., a Prophet Equity LP-controlled entity, as well as by | |
13 | members of SSTI’s management team (the “Buyout Transaction”) for grossly inadequate | |
14 | consideration. The Board has also failed to disclose adequately all material information concerning | |
15 | the Buyout Transaction. | |
16 | 2. The Company’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Defendant Bing Yeh, and its | |
17 | Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Defendant Yah Wen Hu, have agreed to vote | |
18 | their shares in favor of the proposed Buyout Transaction and against any other acquisition proposals | |
19 | and, under the terms of the proposed transaction, would receive shares of the resulting privately held | |
20 | company in exchange for their currently held shares of SSTI. Defendants Yeh and Hu own | |
21 | approximately 12.7% of the outstanding common stock of the Company. | |
22 | 3. On November 12, 2009, the day before the Buyout Transaction was publicly | |
23 | announced, SSTI Director, Bryant R. Riley, resigned effective immediately from the Board, and | |
24 | several committees thereof, after voting against the approval by the Board of the merger agreement. | |
25 | 4. On November 13, 2009, the day on which the Buyout Transaction was publicly | |
26 | announced, SSTI common stock closed at $2.24 per share – an amount of $0.14 more per share than | |
27 | the $2.10 per share offered as consideration to SSTI’s shareholders pursuant to the Buyout | |
28 |
1 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT |
1 | Transaction. | |
2 | 5. Plaintiff is seeking equitable relief relating to the buyout of SSTI’s common stock for | |
3 | grossly inadequate consideration. Plaintiff alleges that he and other holders of SSTI shares are | |
4 | entitled to enjoin the Buyout Transaction or, alternatively, recover damages in the event the Buyout | |
5 | Transaction is consummated. Defendants have structured the Buyout Transaction in a way that is | |
6 | unfair to Plaintiff and the other shareholders of SSTI. Defendants’ offer is grossly inadequate, and | |
7 | moreover, the Defendants have provided insufficient information to allow STTI shareholders to | |
8 | make an informed decision regarding approval of the transaction. | |
9 | II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE | |
10 | 6. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendants because they conduct business in | |
11 | California, including, but not limited to, the conduct here at issue, the attempted buyout of SSTI, | |
12 | which is headquartered in Sunnyvale, California, or because they have sufficient minimum contacts | |
13 | with California to render the exercise of jurisdiction by the California courts permissible under | |
14 | traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. This action is not removable. | |
15 | 7. Venue is proper in this Court because the conduct at issue took place and has effect in | |
16 | this County. SSTI’s headquarters and principal place of business is in the County at 1020 Kifer | |
17 | Road, Sunnyvale, California 94086. | |
18 | III. PARTIES | |
19 | 8. Plaintiff is, and has been at all relevant times, the owner of thousands of shares of | |
20 | SSTI common stock. | |
21 | 9. Defendant Silicon Storage Technology, Inc. describes itself as a company that | |
22 | designs, manufactures and markets a diversified range of memory and non-memory products for | |
23 | high volume applications in the digital consumer, networking, wireless communications and Internet | |
24 | computing markets. It is incorporated in California and its headquarters are located at 1020 Kifer | |
25 | Road, Sunnyvale, California 94086. | |
26 | 10. Defendant Prophet Equity LP describes itself as “a private equity firm that uses | |
27 | proven, data-driven analytical techniques coupled with over 100 years of investment and | |
28 |
2 |
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT |
1 | management experience to invest in, unlock and realize future value today.” Prophet Equity LP is | |
2 | headquartered at 181 Grand Avenue, Suite 201, Southlake, Texas 76092. Two Prophet Equity LP | |
3 | affiliates entered into a definitive merger agreement to acquire SSTI (the “Merger Agreement”). | |
4 | 11. Defendant Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware corporation controlled | |
5 | by Prophet Equity LP, and Defendant Technology Resources Merger Sub, Inc., is a California | |
6 | corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. Under the | |
7 | Merger Agreement, SSTI will be acquired by Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. Together with | |
8 | Defendant Prophet Equity LP, Technology Resources Holdings, Inc., and Technology Resources | |
9 | Merger Sub, Inc., are referred to herein as “Prophet.” | |
10 | 12. Defendant Bing Yeh (“Yeh”) is an SSTI co-founder, and has served as SSTI | |
11 | President and Chief Executive Officer and a director since the Company’s inception in 1989. In | |
12 | April 2004, he was appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors. Yeh beneficially owns | |
13 | approximately 11.3% of the Company’s common stock and entered into a voting agreement pursuant | |
14 | to which he has agreed to vote his shares in favor of the Buyout Transaction and against any other | |
15 | acquisition proposals, and “further agreed to certain restrictions on the transfer of [his] shares.” | |
16 | 13. Defendant Yaw Wen Hu, Ph.D. (“Hu”), joined SSTI in July 1993. He has served as | |
17 | Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer since April 2004, and has been a director | |
18 | since September 1995. Hu beneficially owns approximately 1.4% of the Company’s common stock | |
19 | and entered into a voting agreement pursuant to which he has agreed to vote his shares in favor of | |
20 | the Buyout Transaction and against any other acquisition proposals, and “further agreed to certain | |
21 | restrictions on the transfer of [his] shares.” | |
22 | 14. Defendant Ronald Chwang, Ph.D. (“Chwang”), has been a director of SSTI since | |
23 | June 1997. Chwang is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of iD Ventures America, a venture | |
24 | capital management company, and also serves on the Board of Directors of ATI Technologies, Inc, | |
25 | iRobot, and BenQ Corporation. | |
26 | 15. Defendant Terry Nickerson (“Nickerson”) has been a director of SSTI since April | |
27 | 2005. Nickerson is also a director of Miranda Technologies and Quake Technologies. | |
28 |
3 |
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT |
1 | 16. Defendant Edward Y.W. Yang (“Yang”) has been a director since October 2007. | |
2 | Yang also serves as a partner of iD Ventures America, LLC. | |
3 | 17. Defendants Yeh, Hu, Chwang, Nickerson, and Yang are collectively referred to | |
4 | herein as the “Individual Defendants.” | |
5 | 18. The Individual Defendants, as officers and/or directors, owed SSTI and its | |
6 | shareholders fiduciary obligations of good faith, loyalty, and candor, and were required to use their | |
7 | utmost ability to control and manage SSTI in a fair, just, honest, and equitable manner. | |
8 | 19. By virtue of their fiduciary positions, the Individual Defendants were, and are, | |
9 | requiredinter alia, to (a) act in furtherance of the best interests of SSTI shareholders; (b) maximize | |
10 | shareholder value in a sale of the Company; (c) heed the expressed views of its shareholders; and (d) | |
11 | refrain from abusing their positions of control. | |
12 | IV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS | |
13 | 20. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to California Code of Civil | |
14 | Procedure Section 382, on behalf of all shareholders of the Company (except the Defendants herein | |
15 | and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to, or affiliated with, any of the | |
16 | Defendants) and their successors in interest, who are or will be threatened with injury arising from | |
17 | Defendants’ actions as more fully described herein (the “Class”). | |
18 | 21. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. | |
19 | 22. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are | |
20 | approximately 215 million shares of the Company’s common shares outstanding owned by | |
21 | thousands of holders other than Defendants. The Company’s common stock is listed and actively | |
22 | traded on the NASDAQ Global Market System under the ticker symbol “SSTI.” | |
23 | 23. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class including, inter | |
24 | alia, the following: (a) whether the Defendants have breached their fiduciary and other common law | |
25 | duties owed by them to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; (b) whether Defendants are | |
26 | pursuing a scheme and course of business designed to eliminate the public shareholders of the | |
27 | Company in violation of their fiduciary duties in order to enrich themselves at the expense and to the | |
28 |
4 |
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT |
1 | detriment of Plaintiff and the Class; (c) whether the Buyout Transaction, hereinafter described, | |
2 | constitutes a breach of the duty of fair dealing with respect to Plaintiff and the Class; and (d) whether | |
3 | the Class is entitled to injunctive relief and/or damages as a result of the wrongful conduct | |
4 | committed by Defendants. | |
5 | 24. Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained competent counsel | |
6 | experienced in litigation of this nature. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of other | |
7 | members of the Class and Plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. | |
8 | Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class. | |
9 | 25. Defendants have acted in a manner which affect Plaintiff and all members of the | |
10 | Class alike, thereby making appropriate injunctive relief and/or corresponding declaratory relief with | |
11 | respect to the Class as a whole. | |
12 | 26. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create | |
13 | a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which | |
14 | would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants, or adjudications with respect to | |
15 | individual members of the Class which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of | |
16 | other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to | |
17 | protect their interests. | |
18 | V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS | |
19 | 27. In May 2008, the Board formed a Strategic Committee to review the Company’s | |
20 | investments and to investigate strategic alternatives including acquisitions and divestitures. | |
21 | 28. More than a year later, on November 13, 2009, SSTI entered into the Merger | |
22 | Agreement with Prophet whereby the Company agreed to be acquired by Prophet and members of | |
23 | SSTI management for $2.10 per share in cash. | |
24 | 29. According to the Form 8-K filed with the SEC by the Company in connection with | |
25 | the Buyout Transaction on November 13, 2009 (the “8-K”), The Strategic Committee of the Board | |
26 | of Directors, consisting of all four of the remaining independent members of the Board of Directors, | |
27 | approved the Merger Agreement and determined that the Merger Agreement and the Merger are | |
28 |
5
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | advisable and both fair to and in the best interest of the Company’s shareholders. | |
2 | 30. The 8-K also stated that Bryant R. Riley, one of the independent directors, voted | |
3 | against the approval of the Merger Agreement. | |
4 | 31. According to the 8-K, on November 12, 2009, Riley resigned effective immediately | |
5 | from the Board and the Compensation, Nominating and Corporate Governance, and Strategic | |
6 | Committees of the Board of Directors of SSTI. | |
7 | 32. Riley beneficially owns 4.3% of SSTI common stock, and had been a director since | |
8 | 2008. Riley is founder and managing member of Riley Investment Management LLC, an investment | |
9 | advisor that provides investment management services. He is also founder and Chairman of B. Riley | |
10 | & Co., LLC, a Southern California-based brokerage firm providing research and trading ideas | |
11 | primarily to institutional investors. | |
12 | 33. Defendants have provided no additional details regarding Riley’s departure. | |
13 | 34. The SSTI press release announcing the Buyout Transaction stated as follows: | |
14 | SST (Silicon Storage Technology, Inc.) (NASDAQ: SSTI), a memory and non-memory | |
products provider for high-volume applications in the digital consumer, | ||
15 | networking, wireless communications and Internet computing markets, today | |
announced that it has entered into a definitive merger agreement to be acquired by | ||
16 | Technology Resource Holdings, Inc., a Prophet Equity LP-controlled entity, | |
as well as by members of SST’s management team. Prophet Equity LP will acquire all of the | ||
17 | outstanding common stock of the company for $2.10 per share, except for shares | |
held by Bing Yeh, SST’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and Yaw Wen Hu, | ||
18 | SST’s Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer and member of the | |
Board of Directors, who have agreed to exchange all of their shares of SST common | ||
19 | stock for shares of capital stock of the resulting privately held company. This price | |
per share represents approximately a 13 percent premium to the closing price per | ||
20 | share of SST’s stock on November 12, 2009. | |
21 | SST’s Board of Directors, acting upon the recommendation of a Strategic Committee | |
composed of all of SST’s independent directors, approved the agreement and | ||
22 | resolved to recommend that the company’s shareholders adopt and approve the | |
agreement. | ||
23 | ||
The agreement contains a go-shop provision under which the Strategic Committee, | ||
24 | with the assistance of its independent advisors, has the right to solicit proposals or | |
offers with respect to, or that would reasonably be expected to lead to, an acquisition | ||
25 | proposal from a third party for a 45 day period beginning on November 13, 2009. | |
SST does not intend to disclose any developments with respect to this solicitation | ||
26 | process unless or until the Strategic Committee has made a decision with respect to | |
any proposals or offers it may receive. | ||
27 | ||
“After an extensive review of strategic alternatives with company management and | ||
28 | our financial advisors, we determined this all-cash sale of the company with a go-shop |
6
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | provision is in the best interests of the company’s shareholders,” said Ronald | |
Chwang, chairman of the Strategic Committee. | ||
2 | ||
“We believe that this transaction provides the greatest likelihood of achieving the | ||
3 | highest value for the company’s shareholders, and that this is also in the best interest | |
of our customers, partners and employees. We believe the added flexibility of being | ||
4 | a private company will help us to focus on delivering innovative memory and non- | |
memory solutions to our customers and supporting their needs with the highest levels | ||
5 | of service that they have come to expect,” said Bing Yeh, co-Founder and Chief | |
Executive Officer of SST. | ||
6 | ||
The transaction, which is expected to close in the second quarter of 2010, is subject | ||
7 | to regulatory approvals and approval of the agreement by (i) the holders of a majority | |
of the company’s outstanding common stock represented and voting at a special | ||
8 | meeting to be held to approve the transaction, excluding Bing Yeh and Yaw Wen Hu, | |
and (ii) the holders of a majority of the company’s outstanding common stock, and | ||
9 | other customary closing conditions. | |
10 | 35. The Company also filed a document titled “Investor, Customer, and Employee | |
11 | Q&A,” (the “Q&A Sheet”) on November 13, 2009, in conjunction with the public announcement of | |
12 | the Buyout Transaction. Among other items, the Q&A Sheet addressed the question “Why did we decide | |
13 | to sell the company now?” The Company responded as follows: | |
14 | The strategic committee of our board of directors (consisting of independent | |
members of our board of directors) and our executive team regularly review a range | ||
15 | of available strategic alternatives to determine the best course of action and to | |
attempt to maximize value for our shareholders. Based on multiple indications of | ||
16 | interest, the strategic committee of our board of directors conducted an exploratory | |
process and decided that this transaction, at this time, yields the best outcome for our | ||
17 | shareholders. We believe this transaction will enhance our company’s ability to | |
capitalize on business opportunities while providing excellent value to our | ||
18 | shareholders today. | |
19 | 36. Defendants failed to provide any information about the “multiple indications of | |
20 | interest” or the strategic committee’s “exploratory process.” | |
21 | A. The Buyout Transaction is the Result of Unfair Dealing | |
22 | 37. The Defendants have clear and material conflicts of interest and are acting to better | |
23 | their own interests at the expense of SSTI’s shareholders. | |
24 | 38. The 8-K disclosed that, unlike Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, who will | |
25 | be cashed out at $2.10, Defendants Yeh and Hu will receive equity in the acquiring company: | |
26 | Our Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Bing Yeh, and our Executive Vice | |
President and Chief Operating Officer, Yaw Wen Hu, have entered into a | ||
27 | contribution agreement with Parent. Under the terms of the contribution agreement, | |
Mr. Yeh and Dr. Hu agreed to exchange all of their SST common stock for common | ||
28 | stock and preferred stock of Parent immediately prior to the consummation of the |
7
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | Merger. Parent has obtained conditional equity and debt financing commitments for | |
the transactions contemplated by the Merger Agreement, the aggregate proceeds of | ||
2 | which, together with our available cash will be sufficient to pay the aggregate merger | |
consideration and all related fees and expenses. | ||
3 | ||
4 | 39. Although the Merger Agreement contains a go-shop provision, it also contains a | |
5 | termination fee: | |
6 | The Merger Agreement contains certain termination rights for both SST and | |
Parent and further provides that upon termination of the Merger Agreement under | ||
7 | specified circumstances either SST or Parent may be required to pay the other a | |
termination fee. Under specified circumstances, we may be required to reimburse | ||
8 | certain of Parent’s expenses incurred in connection with the Merger. | |
9 | 40. Under the Merger Agreement, the termination fee is $4.025 million, or approximately | |
10 | 2.2% of the total deal value if the agreement is terminated due to receipt of a superior proposal from | |
11 | a bidder during the go-shop period. If the Buyout Transaction is otherwise terminated, the fee is | |
12 | approximately $7 million, which is equal to approximately 3.9% of the total deal value. | |
13 | 41. The go-shop provision in the Merger Agreement is illusory and does not constitute an | |
14 | effective market check. This provision allows SSTI to solicit proposals or offers for an acquisition | |
15 | proposal from a third party in the 45 days after the effective date of the Merger Agreement, but any | |
16 | competing bidder would have to go through a costly due-diligence process, without any assurance | |
17 | that its efforts would lead to a deal. Indeed, Prophet has the right to make a proposal in response to a | |
18 | superior proposal (i.e. a right of first refusal), which further dilutes the provision. In addition, the | |
19 | less than 45 days any interested bidder would have to consider making a superior proposal to the | |
20 | Buyout Transaction is an inadequate amount of time to conduct due diligence and obtain financing, | |
21 | especially in the current market, and the termination fee would likely make a competing proposal | |
22 | prohibitively expensive. | |
23 | 42. Essentially, Yeh and Hu, and other members of the Company’s management have | |
24 | engineered and timed the Buyout Transaction to freeze out SSTI’s shareholders and to allow the | |
25 | Company’s management, and Prophet to capture the benefits of SSTI’s promising future potential | |
26 | without paying adequate or fair consideration to the Company’s shareholders. | |
27 | ||
28 |
8
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | B. Merger Consideration Is Grossly Inadequate | |
2 | 43. The consideration of $2.10 in cash, per share, to be paid to Class members pursuant to | |
3 | the Buyout Transaction is unfair and inadequate because, among other things: (a) the intrinsic value | |
4 | of the stock of the Company is materially in excess of $2.10 per share, giving due consideration to | |
5 | the prospects for growth and profitability of the Company in light of its business, earnings and | |
6 | earnings power, present and future; and (b) the $2.10 per share price offers an inadequate premium | |
7 | to the shareholders of SSTI. | |
8 | 44. As recently as October 23, 2009, SSTI stock closed at a price of $2.30 per share, as | |
9 | compared to the $2.10 per share merger price. | |
10 | 45. According toYahoo! Finance, the one year price target for SSTI is $2.50 per share. | |
11 | 46. Immediately after the announcement of the proposed Buyout Transaction, the | |
12 | Company’s stock began trading above the offer price at over $2.20 per share, demonstrating that the | |
13 | market does not believe that the merger consideration adequately values SSTI. On November 13, 2009, | |
14 | SSTI closed at $2.24 per share. | |
15 | 47. The announcement of the Buyout Transaction comes less than a month after the | |
16 | Company posted third quarter results. According to the Company’s October 27, 2009 press release: | |
17 | SST (Silicon Storage Technology, Inc.) (NASDAQ: SSTI), a leader in flash memory | |
technology, today announced results for the third quarter, ended September 30, 2009. | ||
18 | ||
19 | Net revenues for the third quarter were $71.3 million compared with $58.1 million in | |
the second quarter of 2009 and with $92.4 million in the third quarter of 2008. | ||
20 | Product revenues for the third quarter of 2009 were $61.8 million, compared with | |
$51.8 million in the second quarter of 2009 and with $79.8 million in the third | ||
21 | quarter of 2008. Revenues from technology licensing for the third quarter of 2009 | |
were $9.5 million, compared with $6.3 million in the second quarter of 2009 and | ||
22 | with $12.6 million in the third quarter of 2008. | |
23 | ||
Income from operations for the third quarter of 2009 was $1.5 million compared with | ||
24 | a loss from operations of $7.5 million in the second quarter of 2009 and with income | |
from operations of $4.1 million in the third quarter of 2008. | ||
25 | ||
Net income for the third quarter of 2009 was $3.1 million, or $0.03 per share, based | ||
26 | on approximately 95.9 million diluted shares. By comparison, the company recorded | |
a net loss of $6.4 million, or $0.07 per share, based on approximately 95.7 million | ||
27 | diluted shares in the second quarter of 2009. For the third quarter of 2008, SST | |
reported net income of $4.9 million, or $0.05 per share based on approximately | ||
28 |
9
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | 99.7 million diluted shares. | |
2 | SST finished the third quarter of 2009 with $143.8 million in cash, cash equivalents, | |
short-term investments, and long-term marketable debt securities, up approximately | ||
3 | $8.5 million from $135.3 million at June 30, 2009. | |
4 | Management Qualitative Comments | |
5 | ||
“This was a productive quarter for SST as we executed well on our strategy and | ||
6 | returned the company to profitability ahead of our expectations,” said Bing | |
Yeh, chief executive officer. “Seasonally strong demand in NOR flash memory, as well as | ||
7 | a stabilizing pricing environment, resulted in healthy sequential growth in unit | |
shipments and improved product revenues across all four of our application | ||
8 | segments. Over the past few quarters, we have signed several new licensing | |
agreements for our embedded SuperFlash program, which will begin to contribute | ||
9 | upfront fee revenue in the fourth quarter as we make progress on deliverables. These | |
new licensing agreements will help drive royalty growth in our licensing business in | ||
10 | future years. We continue to manage our expenses closely and operate our business | |
conservatively, but we are optimistic about the opportunities in our markets and we | ||
11 | believe that we are laying a solid foundation for growth in 2010.” | |
12 | ||
13 | Fourth Quarter 2009 Outlook | |
14 | Taking into account normal seasonality, SST expects its fourth quarter revenues to be | |
between $67 million and $72 million. Gross margin is expected to be between 30 | ||
15 | and 32 percent, subject to the risk of changing market conditions. Total operating | |
expenses are expected to be between $21 million and $23 million. Our net income | ||
16 | per share is expected to be between $0.00 and $0.03. | |
17 | ||
18 | 48. On the conference call following the October 27, 2009 announcement, Defendant Yeh | |
19 | stated: | |
20 | This has been an encouraging and productive quarter for SST. When we reviewed | |
our results for you in July, we told you that we were taking a fresh look at our | ||
21 | business and were focusing our resources on areas that would yield to the most | |
impact overtime. These efforts include the targeted approach to product development | ||
22 | that emphasizes non-commodity products with differentiated featured new programs | |
to enhance our licensing business and they continue to focus on cost control and the | ||
23 | conservative management of our assets. We are pleased to report that strong | |
execution of these objectives, coupled with an improved demand environment, | ||
24 | resulted in the solid financial performance in the third quarter, and several key | |
achievements in our product development and licensing efforts that will help to drive | ||
25 | our growth in quarters to come. | |
26 | 49. Specifically, the Buyout Transaction is the product of unfair dealing, and the price of | |
27 | $2.10 per share to be paid to Class members is unfair and so grossly inadequate as to constitute a | |
28 |
10
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | gross breach of trust committed by Defendants against the shareholders because, among other things: | |
2 | a. the intrinsic value of the stock of the Company is materially in excess of $2.10 | |
3 | per share, giving due consideration to the prospects for growth and profitability of the Company in | |
4 | light of its business, earnings and earnings power, present and future; | |
5 | b. the $2.10 per share price offers an inadequate premium to the shareholders of | |
6 | the Company; | |
7 | c. the buyout price of $2.10 per share in cash being offered to investors | |
8 | represents a below average premium of approximately 13% over the closing price of SSTI’s | |
9 | common stock on the date prior to the announcement of the Buyout Transaction and constitutes a | |
10 | negative premium to the price of SSTI’s stock on the day of the announcement; | |
11 | d. the buyout price is significantly below the premiums paid in acquisitions of | |
12 | comparable businesses; | |
13 | e. According to the Q&A Sheet, SSTI’s management is expected to remain in | |
14 | place, and thus paid compensation above that which will be received by the Company’s | |
15 | shareholders; | |
16 | f. Further, Defendants Yeh and Hu will receive equity in the acquiring company | |
17 | and thus share in the fruits of the Company’s future potential, unlike the Class, who will receive only | |
18 | a negligible premium, if any, for their shares; and | |
19 | g. The Company, on October 27, 2009, disclosed its financial results for the third | |
20 | quarter, with positive indications for SSTI’s future potential: | |
21 | i. Net revenues for the third quarter were $71.3 million compared with | |
22 | $58.1 million in the second quarter of 2009; | |
23 | ii. Income from operations for the third quarter of 2009 was $1.5 million | |
24 | compared with a loss from operations of $7.5 million in the second quarter of 2009; and | |
25 | iii. The Company “signed several new licensing agreements for [its] | |
26 | embedded SuperFlash program, which will begin to contribute upfront fee revenue in the fourth | |
27 | quarter as [it] make[s] progress on deliverables. These new licensing agreements will help drive | |
28 |
11
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | royalty growth in [ ] licensing business in future years.” | |
2 | 50. In addition, by reason of their positions with SSTI, Individual Defendants are in | |
3 | possession of material non-public information concerning the financial condition and prospects of | |
4 | the Company, especially the true value and expected increased future value of the Company and its | |
5 | assets, which they have not adequately disclosed to the Company’s shareholders. | |
6 | 51. Defendants, in failing to disclose the material non-public information in their | |
7 | possession as to the value of the Company’s assets, the full extent of the future earnings potential of | |
8 | the Company and its expected increase in profitability, have breached, and are breaching their | |
9 | fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class: | |
10 | a. Defendants have thus far, failed to provide information about the “multiple | |
11 | indications of interest” or the strategic committee’s “exploratory process;” | |
12 | b. Defendants have failed to provide sufficient information to explain to what | |
13 | restrictions on the transfer of their shares Defendants Yeh and Hu agreed. | |
14 | c. Defendants have failed to provide sufficient information regarding Riley’s | |
15 | departure from SSTI. | |
16 | 52. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiff and the Class will be damaged | |
17 | in that they will not receive their fair portion of the value of the Company’s assets and business and | |
18 | will be prevented from obtaining the real value of their equity ownership of the Company. | |
19 | 53. Unless the proposed Buyout Transaction is enjoined by this Court, Defendants will | |
20 | continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class, and will consummate and | |
21 | close the Buyout Transaction complained of and succeed in their plan described above, all to the | |
22 | irreparable harm of Plaintiff and the Class. | |
23 | FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION | |
24 | For Breach of Fiduciary Duty | |
25 | 54. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations as in the paragraphs above, as if fully set | |
26 | forth herein. | |
27 | 55. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants, as controlling shareholders of the Company, | |
28 |
12
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | violated fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the other Class members by failing to offer a fair price to | |
2 | SSTI’s shareholders. This breach of fiduciary duty includes Defendants’ attempt to obtain the | |
3 | publicly traded shares of SSTI for grossly inadequate consideration. Defendants have engineered | |
4 | and timed the Buyout Transaction to attempt to freeze out SSTI’s shareholders and to allow | |
5 | themselves to capture the benefits of SSTI’s improved outlook without paying adequate or fair | |
6 | consideration to the Company’s shareholders. | |
7 | 56. Defendants offer represents grossly inadequate consideration for SSTI shareholders. | |
8 | 57. Defendants further breached their fiduciary duties by,inter alia, putting their interests | |
9 | ahead of the interests of the Company and its shareholders. | |
10 | 58. Defendants have also provided insufficient information to Plaintiff and the Class | |
11 | regarding the Buyout Transaction. Without material and accurate information, SSTI’s shareholders | |
12 | cannot make an informed judgment regarding the merger vote. | |
13 | 59. Plaintiff and the Class have been and will be damaged in that they are not and will not | |
14 | receive full and fair information to allow them to make an informed decision as to whether or not to | |
15 | vote in favor of the transaction and will be required to exchange their SSTI shares for inadequate | |
16 | consideration based on the material false and misleading statements and omissions. | |
17 | 60. Plaintiff and the other Class members are immediately threatened by the acts and | |
18 | transactions complained of herein and will suffer irreparable harm unless Defendants are enjoined | |
19 | from breaching their fiduciary duties as set forth herein. | |
20 | SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION | |
21 | For Injunctive Relief | |
22 | 61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations as in the paragraphs above, as if fully set | |
23 | forth herein. | |
24 | 62. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff and the other Class members will be irreparably | |
25 | harmed unless the Buyout Transaction is enjoined by this Court. | |
26 | 63. The harm that threatens Plaintiff and the other Class members outweighs the potential | |
27 | harm to Defendants if this Court grants an injunction. Defendants embarked on a self-interested | |
28 |
13
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | buy-out transaction that will benefit only themselves. If this Buyout Transaction is completed, | |
2 | Plaintiff and the other Class members will be deprived of their equity investment and the benefits | |
3 | thereof, including, among other things, the expected growth in the Company’s profitability, which | |
4 | they will be unable to recover if the Proposed Transaction is consummated. | |
5 | 64. Plaintiff and the other Class members are likely to succeed on the merits of their | |
6 | claims. The Buyout Transaction that Defendants have orchestrated is so self-interested that they | |
7 | alone will stand to gain. This is in stark contrast to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to SSTI’s | |
8 | public shareholders that Defendants are required to exercise as directors of the Company. Moreover, | |
9 | Plaintiff and the Class will be deprived of their right as shareholders to make a fully informed vote if | |
10 | they are forced to vote on the Buyout Transaction without complete and accurate information. | |
11 | 65. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. | |
12 | WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, as | |
13 | follows: | |
14 | (1) an Order certifying this action as a class action and designating Plaintiff as Class | |
15 | representative and the undersigned counsel as class counsel; | |
16 | (2) enjoining preliminarily and permanently, the Buyout Transaction complained of | |
17 | herein; | |
18 | (3) declaring that the Buyout Transaction is in breach of Defendants’ fiduciary duties; | |
19 | (4) requiring the Individual Defendants to fulfill their fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, | |
20 | and candor, as alleged herein; | |
21 | (5) rescinding, to the extent implemented prior to the entry of this Court’s final judgment | |
22 | the Buyout Transaction complained of, or granting the Class rescissory damages; | |
23 | (6) directing that Defendants account to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for | |
24 | all damages caused to them and account for all profits and any special benefits obtained as a result of | |
25 | their unlawful conduct; | |
26 | (7) awarding Plaintiff and the Class appropriate compensatory damages; | |
27 | (8) awarding Plaintiff the costs, expenses and disbursements of this action, including any | |
28 |
14
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
1 | reasonable attorneys’ and experts’ fees and expenses ; and, if applicable, pre- and post-judgment | |||||
2 | interest; | |||||
3 | (9) awarding Plaintiff and the Class any other compensatory, equitable and declaratory | |||||
4 | relief as this Court deems just, equitable and proper. | |||||
5 | JURY TRIAL DEMAND | |||||
6 | Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. | |||||
7 | DATED: November 17, 2009 | BERMAN DeVALERIO | ||||
8 | ||||||
9 | ||||||
10 | By: | /s/ Christopher T. Heffelfinger | ||||
Christopher T. Heffelfinger | ||||||
11 | Joseph J. Tabacco, Jr. | |||||
James Magid | ||||||
12 | 425 California Street, Suite 2100 | |||||
San Francisco, CA 94104 | ||||||
13 | Telephone: (415) 433-3200 | |||||
Facsimile: (415) 433-6282 | ||||||
14 | Attorneys for Plaintiff | |||||
15 | ||||||
16 | OF COUNSEL: | |||||
17 | WOLF POPPER LLP | |||||
Robert M. Kornreich | ||||||
18 | rkornreich@wolfpopper.com | |||||
Chet B. Waldman | ||||||
19 | cwaldman@wolfpopper.com | |||||
Carl L. Stine | ||||||
20 | cstine@wolfpopper.com | |||||
845 Third Avenue | ||||||
21 | New York, NY 10022 | |||||
Telephone: (212) 759-4600 | ||||||
22 | Facsimile: (212) 486-2093 | |||||
23 | ||||||
24 | ||||||
25 | ||||||
26 | ||||||
27 | ||||||
28 |
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT